Why Property Dualists Should be Cartesians - Ralph Weir, Cambridge University

On the 27th-29th of September 2016 the Humane Philosophy Project held a conference and seminar on the topic of the self. Talks engaged with dominant physicalist and naturalist treatments of the self in the philosophy of mind and related disciplines, and examined alternative avenues. This event was supported by the Emmy Noether Group at the Ruhr University Bochum, the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of Oxford, and the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw.

[@MonisticIdealism]

Weir is correct: property dualism is not a stable position as it lapses into substance dualism. Physicalism fails to maintain substance monism and lapses into dualism as well since consciousness is irreducible. The only way to maintain property/substance monism without eliminating or reducing consciousness is idealism.

[@Dhorpatan]

Idealism has four fatal ontological problems: 1) It has no compresence relation 2) For an entity to have causal powers, it has to be temporal as an entailment, and of course idealism is atemporal. This violates Alexander's dictum 3) For a phenomena to be an entity, it must be spatially located as an entailment. Immaterial phenomena are aspatial 4) Idealism cannot maintain substance(entity) haecceity, since that entails having a boundary

[@MonisticIdealism]

@@Dhorpatan 1. You failed to address Weir's argument on how property dualism lapses into substance dualism. Property dualism is unsustainable. 2. You failed to provide support for all four of your claims. Why should anyone believe these claims you are making?

[@StephenPaulKing]

Please discuss Process dualism!

[@TheBrunarr]

I think the Property Dualist argument and the Solipsistic argument are both sound, but I'm not sure about the argument from aggregate entities. The argument is that an aggregate of all entities, either physical or phenomenal, constitutes a Cartesian substance since there is a possible world in which only it exists. My weaker criticism is that it presupposes that an aggregate is a thing that actually exists. My stronger criticism is that a Cartesian substance would have to be simple/metaphysically incapable of decomposition. This is because a Cartesian substance has independent existence, but if a Cartesian substance has parts, then it depends on its parts for its existence. If this is the case, then an aggregate entity cannot be a Cartesian substance because it has parts, namely, the entities that make it an aggregate in the first place. Although, I don't actually think that the aggregate arguments like the Berkeleyian Argument put forth is a necessary connective between the Property Dualist and Solipsistic Argument. I think you can show that Property Dualists are committed to Substance Dualism just by using the Property Dualist and Solipsistic arguments.

[@Dhorpatan]

Idealism has four fatal ontological problems: 1) It has no compresence relation 2) For an entity to have causal powers, it has to be temporal as an entailment, and of course idealism is atemporal. This violates Alexander's dictum 3) For a phenomena to be an entity, it must be spatially located as an entailment. Immaterial phenomena are aspatial 4) Idealism cannot maintain substance(entity) haecceity, since that entails having a boundary