Operation Starvation: Cutting Japan’s Shipping Lifeline with B-29 Bombers

[@BV-fr8bf]

NO ONE ever talks about this aspect of the war! Great data

[@dltroutman]

Started my career on a minesweeper so I am intimately familiar with the topic. I was aware of the effects of the doctrine, but not aware of the details of the campaign. Very well done. Twenty years later, mining and the Naval blockade off the coast of Viet Nam was so effective in inhibiting seaborne resupply of the Viet Cong, that it made the creation of the Ho Chi Minh trail necessary.

[@OlOleander]

I was astounded to find this almost complete blind spot in my knowledge of the Allied/American campaigns against Japan. I knew the USA had mined various ports and shipping lanes, but I had no idea that over _12k_ such mines were laid, nor that they had had such a devastating effect on Japanese shipping. I had mostly pinned the drastic drop in Japanese shipping to the fact that the USN BuOrd had finally stopped being the single greatest asset for the Japanese and had at last (mostly) fixed American submarine torpedoes, and the concurrent massive increase in range, number, and rate of submarine sorties (and the submarines themselves). The extensive use of PSD, the documentation, the wealth of clearly-presented data, and the entirely sober presentation have made this one of my new favorite channels. WW2USB has quickly become one of my favorite military history channels, no short list by any means.

[@ricardokowalski1579]

Let's remember that all the data about the effectiveness of the mines was compiled from japanese archives after the surrender. From March-45 to the surrender, there was no possible way to gauge the effectiveness of the mines. By the time this information became available, the narrative of the fire bombing and a-bombs was already firmly established. So this died a quiet death in the archives. Dropping mines with overwhelming air superiority does not make for exciting movies.

[@daveroberts7295]

That said, raiding by fighters probably reported a lack of targets in coastal waters in the daytime and photo recon would have seen fewer ships in ports in the same period.

[@pakers2128]

DATA source during the war was submarines; no a perfect source of data. I remember reading somewhere that they had broken the code for Jap merchant ships so they could could track. I guess that would have been one way to keep track of how many tons were destroyed. Mines would have no witness. IMHO BUORD fucked up again by not putting resources into mines.

[@ricardokowalski1579]

@@daveroberts7295 absolutely, fair point. They would not see ships moving in daylight. Zero ships="it's working" But at night there was no way to keep score. They couldn't even count the ones sunk by the mines. 😆 Also, they lacked the baseline numbers of 1942/43 to measure effectiveness. Nimitz was a sharp cookie, he new it would be crippling. But I would bet he was surprised how efective it was. Cheers!

[@OlOleander]

This is a very good point. A bit of a tragedy, in its own way.

[@rocka8rz]

My father was a B-29 pilot in He was in the 313th Bomb Wing, 505th Bomb Group, 484th Bomb Squadron. I remember him talking about mining the Shimonoseki Straits and by reading his WWII Journal. Really glad that you have put this video together. Thank you.

[@tj9487]

Very interesting, I have never heard about the sea mining campaign before. Thanks.

[@desobrien3827]

Wow, you sure do come up with the most interesting WW2 subjects...Keep up the great work...TY

[@mikemoscoe4578]

I've been reading about WW II for the last 60 years. Started with Morrison's History of US Naval Ops in WW II. I know a lot about the sub and mining campaighn against Japanese shipping. This is the best report on Op Starvation I've ever seen. Well Done.

[@MDsteeler1]

Never heard of this operation or the tremendous impact it had on Japan.

[@LarryWater]

It got overshadowed by the nukes and firebombing.

[@briancavanagh7048]

Estimated civilian deaths from starvation 7 million, if the war continued.

[@scottanno8861]

At that point it's just a statistic. Nobody can fathom just how large a loss of life that is. Larger than annihilating the entire countries of Sweden and Denmark combined.

[@denvan3143]

@@scottanno8861 the Japanese imperial military had no qualms about annihilation. Chinese civilian deaths: 8-9 million Vietnamese civilian deaths: 1 million due to starvation because of the war. The Japanese imperial military killed between 13 and 18 million enemy civilians in World War II. And they would willingly have sacrificed 20 million Japanese civilians to wear down the allies and force them to the negotiating table. Japanese civilians were not as sanguine; civilian revolution against the military was eminent, the Japanese government knew it, and the atomic bomb was a handy alibi for which to surrender.

[@zeitgeistx5239]

@@denvan3143the Japanese cabinet meeting minutes showed that during the atomic bombings they were seriously afraid of public unrest as factory absenteeism became a major problem as many people left the cities for the countryside to forage for food as civilians were now in a starvation ration of 1,500 daily calories for several months. All adults were losing weight except those on the countryside.

[@sriig]

@@denvan3143 re: civilian revolution against the military...what is the basis for this? It seems the civilian population was actively preparing to defend the home islands against Allied invasion.

[@Random_guy0310]

There will be no JAV if it continues

[@charlesseitz1591]

I liked this one just because :) your vids rock and here is my comment for the algorithm

[@GaryChurch-hi8kb]

I have a book I found in a bookstore years ago about the naval use of sea mines against Japan and it was really an amazing read.

[@trespasserswill7052]

Title? Author?

[@mikeforrence4150]

​@@trespasserswill7052Not sure if it's the same as OP, but Mines Against Japan by Commander Ellis Johnson is the version that I have.

[@OlOleander]

Seconded title and author! I wonder if we could track down a copy

[@bartonstano9327]

I had heard about this about 10 years ago. By loss rate and dollar spent, the air mine campaign vs. Japan was cheap and VERY effective. Often sited as the most cost effective way to sink Japanese merchant ships.

[@mikus4242]

Yet the air Corp resisted the carrying out the mining operation.

[@ZMikluscak]

Yep, this is the first I have ever heard of aspect of the war in the Pacific. Damn fine job sir. Keep up the excellent videos

[@Warmaker01]

I only found out about Operation Starvation maybe 1-2 years ago. For something so crippling, it's surprising to see almost no mention of this effort by the USAAF. As you said, for the costs involved in lost bombers (15), the effects against Japan were strategically significant. The US Navy's submarines had begun the strangulation process earlier and in 1944 things really became deadly to Japanese shipping by them. However, the Sea of Japan and particular the narrow straits between Japan and Korea were deadly to even the successful USN submarine force. The Americans tried sending submarines into the region earlier in the war, 1943 even, but it was too dangerous. Everywhere else, particularly the sea route from Singapore to Japan, was nasty with USN subs. Japanese merchant marine darkly joked that "one could walk from Singapore to Tokyo on American periscopes," and that the area north and east of Luzon was known to the Japanese as "the Sea of the Devil" But as said, the straits between Japan and Korea and the Sea of Japan were too dangerous for American subs and so Japan was concentrating its shipping in these safer zones. With Operation Starvation, the USAAF and USN submarine effort elsewhere finally completed the blockade. You can have the will to fight in battle to the death, but it's a different when your country is going to face mass starvation and your industry is literally going to seize up and stop.

[@ddopson]

It's mentioned in several modern air force textbooks, class materials, etc. Such as media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/28/2001861720/-1/-1/0/T_CHILSTROM_MINES_AWAY.PDF. I also recall reading about it in a really fantastic US Navy post war strategic report, written shortly after the war, that was like a hundred pages long and covered everything very well. Unfortunately, I can't seem to find that one.

[@gaim44]

The Soviet Union won the war@@solargeneral

[@bloodgrss]

Huh?

[@amerigo88]

Meanwhile, even in 1945, Liberty ships crewed by Americans were routinely sailing through the Sea of Japan to deliver Lend-Lease cargoes to the Soviet Union. These ships carried a Soviet flag and ran with their lights on at night. The Japanese allowed them safe passage as the Soviet Union and Japan had a neutrality pact after the Japanese thrashing at the Battle of Khalkin Gol in 1939. I wonder if any of these ships hit American-dropped sea mines. There were six such ships accidentally sunk by American submarines during the war. This way to deliver Lend Lease goods to the Soviets was called the "Western Route" and accounted for half of all US deliveries to the USSR.

[@ivancho5854]

​@@amerigo88Wow, that's incredibly interesting. Many thanks for shining a light on it. 👍 All the best.

[@willlockler9433]

Really appreciate how you dig into the archives for these gems.

[@McRocket]

This channel is AWESOME. I have studied WW2 for many years from many sources. But I have learned an incredible number of facts/data from this channel that I was not previously aware of. Like this video. Plus, the presentation style of short, matter-of-fact, easy to understand, data rich videos with no dramatics/music/silliness is extremely refreshing. Thank you for all your efforts on this. ☮

[@kd6pn]

In Gen. LeMays biography, he greatly underestimated the effectiveness of B-29 mining operations. He regretted that he did not authorize more resources for its operation. One of his few wartime errors.

[@spenner3529]

An exceedingly efficient psychopath...but he was our psychopath.

[@briancisco1176]

As always, your research is most impressive.

[@paranoidandroid7718]

Thank you. Started reading about WW2 43yrs ago (Sgt Rock comics). Been reading about it ever since, proud of my collection of obscure books on the subject and this aspect of the war has never been more than a faint footnote. Appreciate the effort in researching this.

[@ShiddyFinkelstein]

Loved Sgt. Rock and Easy Company!

[@petercantwell]

Thank- you. I had no idea about this campaign. Your videos are excellent.

[@williamdozier5395]

My Dad was a bombardier in the 58th BW, 444th BG, 678th BS. He and his crew/aircraft dropped mines near Japan on at least one mission. So, the 313th wasn’t the only wing to drop mines.

[@DoudD]

Good heavens. Small world. My Dad was a B29 pilot with the 444th and he, too, mentioned mine laying missions. These mine laying missions by the 444th are also mentioned in Wikipedia and elsewhere

[@jeg5gom]

Such an important contribution, hardly EVER mentioned. Great video!!!

[@stevepirie8130]

I’d heard of Op Starvation after reading an airpower study on it. The officers looking to rise to higher command have to put together a study as part of their requirements and if lucky gets published. The second part was about the mining of the rivers and canals the Germans were using to transport oil from Romania. The RAF had been doing a low number of these missions and it nearly paralysed the early German war effort. Unfortunately Bomber Harris interfered and threatened to resign as he’d set his mind to bombing cities thanks to the sheer ineffectiveness of bombing at that time. He sacked the junior officers showing data to how much more effective mines were. Germany had no chance at placing AA to defend every inch of waterway.

[@ronaldrhatigan7652]

He also refused to allow the bombing of submarine pens while they were being built. He allowed it afterwards when they were much more impervious to damage.

[@richardvernon317]

If I was grading this officer's paper he would be getting a "F" See Me!!!! Romania was neutral until June 1941, the only base that the British could use to attack it was Crete which was taken by the Germans in May 1941. RAF Mediterranean Air Force started the campaign in April 1944 from bases in Italy. Could not do the missions from North Africa as Türkiye was in the way. 15th Air Force at the same time was smashing the hell out of Ploieşti until the Soviets captured it. A British RAF Group Captain in a Imperil Defence planning Committee in the mid 1930's came up with the concept of the RAF Long range Bombers dropping Influence naval ground mines (called ground mines as they lay on the sea bed) in places where other mine layers couldn't reach . He had had the idea after a bun fight with the navy about who controls the development of air dropped weapons over the sea. The Royal Navy Capitan on the Committee says, Bad Idea, if we use it, the weapon will end up been captured by our enemy and we have a butt load more ships to lose than our enemies. RAF Officer replies, if we develop them, we can also work out counter measures to stop this from happening. Navy wins the bun fight on the subject and though the Navy do a little bit of research into such weapon they are nowhere near having one ready for deployment at the start of the war. (Royal Navy have control of development of under water weapons). WWII starts in September 1939 and the Germans immediately instigate an airborne sea mining campaign using magnetic influence mines. This causes the British a butt load of hurt with major damage to heavy warships and a lot of small coastal shipping being sunk. Fortunately, three months into the war, the Luftwaffe drop an incorrectly armed mine on a British Army coastal weapons experimental establishment and a mixture of Royal navy and Army personnel manage to defuse it and recover it. By April 1940, the Royal Navy have developed their own air dropped magnetic influence mine and want the RAF to drop them where they can not reach. RAF Coastal Command say, can't, we don't have the aircraft which can carry them. Bomber Command gets tasked with the job and the only aircraft they have is the Handley Page Hampden. AOC 5 Group who is in charge of the Hampden bomber force, gets the order to do the task and basically replies, "Awesome, would love to do this, send the navy around and we will get the ball rolling". Bomber Command start a Mining campaign of German controlled ports under the direction of the Royal Navy. The fuck up in Norway, the Low Counties and France happens and the Germans start dumping a lot of assets in France to do operation Sea Lion. Bomber Command attack airfields, landing barge concentrations and other transportation targets with some to little effect and high losses. Somebody has the idea to attack the pair of aqueduct that takes a major German canal over a river that the British suspected of being used to take the majority of these river barges that are going to be used as landing craft out of Germany and into the North sea so they can be towed to France. The only weapon they have with enough explosive in them to blow a hole in the target bridge is a modified air dropped mine fitted with a delay fuze. AOC 5 Group sets up an attack, all of the aircraft used in the attack are shot down or badly damaged by Flak as the Germans have placed quite heavy flak defences along all of their major waterways. One Hampden manages to get a bomb into the water on one of the twin aqueduct's and blows a big hole in it. He manages to get home along with one other aircraft and the Squadron OC puts him up for a DFC. The AOC 5 Group bumps it up to a recommendation for a VC, which is awarded. The AOC also puts in a report stating that any raid that results in the loss of most of the aircraft with only a single aircraft actually hitting the target is worthy of a VC and should not have been carried out in the first place as it is too dangerous. AOC 5 Group then gets promoted, goes to the Air Ministry on a staff job, hates it with a passion and then gets sent over to the USA to buy aircraft (a job he was involved in before the war. In February 1942, the New AOC in C Bomber Command ask's what's the mining effort??? The reply, 5 Group are dropping about 90 a month. His reply, all groups to do it when they can not bomb Germany. He calls the Royal Navy and asks how many mines can you give me to drop a month? the reply, a 1000. So Bomber Command do that, drop a 1000 mines a month around German controlled ports and sea lanes from the Baltic to Norway and down to the French / Spanish Boarder, at times and locations requested by the Royal Navy. The Three Officers I mention in this story are the same person Arthur T Harris!!!! The man wasn't against Mine laying from long range aircraft, he practically invented it (as far as the British are concerned). As for the German Waterways, they were actually very heavily defended with a flak gun at every major piece of infrastructure (locks, sluices and bridges). If the RAF had tried to mine them, the job had to be done at very low level, in good weather and with moonlight. GEE, OBOE and G-H don't work at low level over Germany and operating at over 1000 feet makes you dead meat for nightfighters. The waterways are 300 miles from the UK, the Germans have ground observers all over Germany and the low countries and any navigation error by the RAF bombers normally ended up with the aircraft getting damaged or shot down by some flak gun dotted around the place. Germans had 11,000 plus light flak guns in Germany during WWII (and 11,000 heavy guns on top of that). Of course the Germans know aircraft have been flying about and nobody has heard any bangs. Frist thing they are going to do is look for parachutes in the canals and rivers and if they find them stop all water traffic until the waterway has been swept for mines. All of the low level attacks in Germany by Bomber command suffered 40 to 60% losses. A low level mining campaign was never going to work, so Harris never tried it, for very good reasons.

[@richardvernon317]

@@ronaldrhatigan7652 Harris had nothing to do with not attacking the pen's. while they were being built he was doing a staff job at the Air Ministry and was then in the USA buying aircraft.

[@josephlinck1892]

@@richardvernon317 Planes need fuel. So do tanks.

[@JamesWilliams-en3os]

I had some knowledge of the mining campaign, but was not aware of its great effectiveness. Excellent use of primary source material!

[@rayschoch5882]

I've been reading about WW 2 in the Pacific for more than half a century, but focused primarily on naval combat (both air and at sea). I was vaguely aware that a mining campaign was part of the war effort, but I had no idea - until watching this video - of its scale or effectiveness. Relatively minimal effort, relatively few casualties to American forces, but huge effects on the Japanese ability to wage war.

[@charlestuozzolo7283]

Excellent as usual. Good book "Mines Against Japan" published in 1973 by US Naval Ordnance Lab is another good reference. The mine campaign against Japan was phenomenal but does not always get great coverage. Again great job by our B-29 crews!

[@ivancho5854]

Thank you for the recommendation. I was just able to download it from the National Technical Reports Library.

[@Compulsive_LARPer]

Criminally underrated channel.

[@finallyfriday.]

Excellent video. ETO and Pacific commands usually were slow or missed altogether the most vital targets. Needed economists, industrialist and other civilian specialists to help in selection.

[@Hopeless_and_Forlorn]

Amazing information here. It adds a new dimension of understanding to the history of the ending of the Pacific War. The Navy can be justly proud of the long-delayed success of the submarine war against Japanese shipping, but a relatively minor operation of B-29s finished the job for them quickly and cheaply. Probably this airborne success was a major factor in the outcome of the inter-service rivalry after the war. And it is no wonder that starvation stalked the Japanese people after the end of hostilities.

[@grizwoldphantasia5005]

Calling it cheap is misleading. Submarines required no support other than bases far removed from Japanese control. The B-29s could not lay their mines until the end of the island hopping campaign; some of the mining missions had to stage through Iwo Jima. That campaign took years and a lot of blood and treasure. The mining campaign was cheap only in the same way as the atom bomb missions were cheap because they "only" required 3 B-29s and a few thousand gallons of fuel.

[@RonaldReaganRocks1]

These videos are excellent. They are the most scientific and thorough videos on WWII.

[@Token_Civilian]

A2 / AD, before it was called that. Even if those merchant ships weren't sunk, they were "mission killed" in that they couldn't be risked through mined waters. I knew about this campaign, but you added a great deal of detail - the phases, the specific areas mined, the number of mines, and the level of effort in terms of sorties, and losses, by 20th Bomber Command. Great vid as always WW2USB with the use of primary sources from the period in question.

[@gort8203]

Very impressive research and presentation.

[@samadams2203]

Extremely interesting, thank you for this breakdown! I knew the blockade was effective, but had no idea how efficient and comprehensive it was!

[@donbrashsux]

The info this channel provides is just incredible .. nothing else like it on YT 👍👍

[@ChattahoocheeRiverRat]

I'm not recalling any mention of Operation Starvation until this video. It's amazing how we basically sealed mainland Japan off from the ocean. I've long been of the opinion that dropping "the bomb" was the right thing, to do all things considered. Learning that 7 million people could have starved to death if the war continued for another year only reinforces that thought.

[@zentran2690]

This video was fascinating!

[@rexmyers991]

I had no idea this campaign existed. Another EXCELLENT video, Sir!

[@David-ic4by]

In my view, arguably your most impactful video to date. Previous stuff very very cool, but this actually transformed my view of the effort against Japan in 1945.

[@jangelbrich7056]

Thanks for these very informative collection of details

[@alancranford3398]

Thank you for the detailed report on Operation Starvation. I purchased the 8-volume bound 1982 edition of IMPACT! magazine from the Hill Aerospace Museum several years ago, and was glad to have these books. This operation takes up Volume 8 pages 48 to 51, but your information is "the rest of the story." In the article, that mining operation took place in five phases from Phase I starting on 27 March 1945 to Phase V ending on 15 August 1945 (page 50) -- IMPACT! stated that 15 B-29 bombers were lost during operations.

[@mindbomb9341]

You and your AMAZING videos!

[@RonLWilson]

Quite interesting! Mines still seem to be a dominate factor even today as we see in the war in Ukraine.

[@jhumpich0311]

Another 🔥 video

[@davidbarrass]

Informative as always. One thing I would like discussed is how much economic damage the mining did beyond the ships sunk. I would presume a lot of time was lost ships waiting for channels to be cleared, taking longer routes, or just plain refusing to deliver to Japan's ports. Every day delay would be effective tonnage lost due to being unproductive.

[@jeffreyrodgers2881]

Very good and detailed video. Thanks for sharing.

[@panachevitz]

Great job on this research and presentation!

[@briancavanagh7048]

An episode on the history, development & testing and specifically of the air dropped sea mine would be an interesting episode. I wonder if there is any films of this development work available. Which company & service did this work?

[@dukecraig2402]

He already did all that, look at his channel history and you'll find a bunch of them he just did not long ago about aerial dropped mines and the acoustic homing torpedo called Fido that was air dropped, there's enough videos on the subject to keep you watching them all evening.

[@Brian-----]

🙂 What an awesome, fact filled video compiled from primary sources. For me, the key part began at 13:08 with the map and the table showing the shift to Osaka and Kobe and the port volume declines. Here's some additional background: Recall that Japan, which didn't have a master plan, prioritized the land war in China, which for Japan was the *second* modern war in China (the first being in 1894 and 1895 and yielding control of Taiwan and domination in Korea): (1) Japan had been waging a limited war in north China from 1931 and a total war on China from 7/1937 (2) it was the army's war, and excluded the navy (3) the United States embargoed Japan from 7/1941 or 8/1941 (4) this crippled Japan's war with China, and (5) part of the motivation for Japan's attacks on the United States and other Western colonial powers was to restore access to oil to fuel the war in China while getting the powerful navy into the war, but even so, the army remained the driver and the navy the passenger (much to its irritation, as Japan's army and navy were worse than rivals and were competitors even for the direction of the war's purpose). But I left something out. To sustain a war in China, Japan needed logistics in the form of bulk commercial shipping. Back then, just as now, many of the world's largest commercial shippers were Danish, Norwegian, and Dutch. Shipping is fungible, and access to foreign shipping enabled Japan to concentrate Japanese shipping for war purposes. When Germany attacked those three European countries in 4/1940 and 5/1940, they all chose to stop carrying (anything, anywhere) for Germany's ally Japan. Japan was unaware of Germany's plans and also did not anticipate this response by Germany's invasion targets. This sudden massive loss of available shipping hammered Japan's logistical link to China, because Japan was not remotely capable of supplying the China war plus Japan's other heavy shipping needs using only Japanese ships. This was a big pain point for Japan. You can see it in the map. Normally, in logistics, you want maximum time at sea and minimum time by rail, because all else equal, sea is cheaper and more efficient (even in a war economy, efficiency matters). So Japan normally probably would want to concentrate shipping to Shanghai or Tianjin. But Japan's shipping to China often minimized sea and maximized rail because sea capacity was vulnerable to attack and was limited, while rail was not vulnerable and was plentiful. Japan did everything it could to move shipping into the Inland Sea, to western Japan, and to south and east Korean ports closest to Japan and the Soviet Union, which Japan trusted not to attack. This trust was so fundamental to Japan's war that even after 5/1945 when the Soviet Union told Japan through official channels that the Soviet Union really would attack on a timetable just as it had promised the Western Allies, Japan chose to disregard this warning. Arguably, the Soviet attack in 8/1945 was the straw that broke Japan's back. The American atomic weapons were shocking, but for America to destroy Japanese cities from the air, even totally, was not new in 8/1945 and Japan still fought on anyway. Whether America wrought that devastating damage with many bombers and bombs, or one bomber with one bomb, was something of an academic question. Soviet invasion was new, and losing Manchuria (Japanese held from 1931) and northern Korea (Japanese held from 1895/1910) plus Japan's largest army in the space of a few days was too appalling to bear. Instant, total land defeat in Asia in the territories held longest was for Japan a completely new factor in the war. Additionally, of course, the sweeping Soviet attack, though only in the lands next to the Soviet Union, effectively instantly rendered hopeless the entire China war for Japan, anywhere in China. I want to emphasize one more time, particularly for a Western audience, that Japan's top war priority was fighting China. Japan initiated war with the Western powers when it did because the Western powers had critically undermined the sustenance of the priority war in China. That might seem puzzling to Westerners, but it is true. And while China resisted strongly and inflicted many attrition casualties on Japan's army, and even while Japan struggled to force China to submit, the war was a mismatch in actual warfighting terms. Both China and Japan knew that China was not equipped, in any sense, to force Japan's invasion to end, and that China was suffering the brunt of the damage. For Japan's militarists and fascists, China was where victory always was to be had and where the land and resources Japan "lacked" could be stolen. Air mining of sea lanes to continental Asia hurt Japan where its leaders cared most by hurting its army in continental Asia. It was very cheap and very effective. Bombing Japan's cities hurt, but Japan is big and people and production can be moved. It's never possible to bomb a developed enemy into the ground. But ships are specific and finite, and can be sunk, and once the ship is sunk, everything that depended on that ship stops.

[@Brian-----]

American belief, Japanese fascist reality: - the war began in 12/1941 v. the war began in 7/1937 and was an extension of multiple earlier wars - the Japanese navy was in charge v. the Japanese army was in charge - defeat of the navy hurt Japan v. defeat of the army hurt Japan - America was Japan's priority enemy v. China was Japan's priority conquest opportunity - the atomic bombs motivated surrender v. the atomic bombs were devastating but a combination of factors in totality including the atomic bombs motivated surrender - the Soviet Union spectated v. the Soviet Union briefly but massively intervened at a high leverage time and place where Japan was very sensitive to quick defeat To be clear, I am NOT arguing that the Soviet Union won the Pacific war. America more than any other country both fought and brought defeat home to Japan while the Soviet Union did very little in sum total. But the impact of the Soviet attack was high leverage. This video is great because it highlights one of those factors to which American warfighting was central, but that is underplayed or that Americans ignore: logistics. Operation Starvation thus hit Japan, earlier, in somewhat the same way that the Soviet Union eventually did: it undermined Japan's continental war in China and it efficiently brought vast American air and sea power directly to bear on the home islands, Korea, Manchuria, north China, and their sustenance, geographies where normally America struggled to project power.

[@VintageWanderer]

Great information. Always learning.

[@Chris-ut6eq]

Had not known the scale of mining before watching this video. thank you!

[@longlakeshore]

I was aware of it but not of its extent. Well done.

[@jimsvideos7201]

Very well presented.

[@billwilliams4748]

Can we get a video with full details on the US sea mines, capabilities, and detail outcomes. Love your work.

[@dbaider9467]

A very, very effective approach. It really puts into perspective the Marine casualties endured in order to get the islands that facilitated this - all was following a grand master plan.

[@dukecraig2402]

⅔rds of all the lives lost in the Pacific "taking all those islands" were Army personnel, that includes all the Navy lives lost factored into the math, it's still ⅔rds lost were Army. Iwo Jima is about the only one that was a Marine only operation, Saipan, Pelilu and just about every other island battle of the Pacific involved Army units that just never get mentioned, matter of fact it was an Army division that faced down the largest Banzai charge in history on the island of Saipan. Presumably since the Army was getting all the press in Europe even before D-Day because of the 8th Air Force's Air war the powers that be in Washington decided to give all the press coverage in the Pacific to the Marine's and Navy, which is only fair because everyone back home who had loved one's serving in the Marine Corps and Navy in the Pacific deserved to hear about what they were doing. The total number of Army personnel lost in WW2 dwarfs that of even the Marine's and Navy combined because of it's size, not only was it much bigger than the other two branches combined but what would be today's Air Force was included in it and therefore so was the number of killed and wounded.

[@Broken_dish]

very interesting thank you for making this video love learning this kind of stuff i thought most of the crippling of the shipping was mainly submarine i actually had no clue they deployed mines all around japan like this and ive done alot of research on the war i never even gave it a thought to look again thanks for the video

[@Guangrui]

I talked about this on my channel months ago albeit in Chinese 😊😊

[@richardvernon317]

Another concept that Lemay nicked off Arthur Harris. RAF Bomber Command started doing this against the Germans in April 1940 while he was AOC 5 Group. When he took over Bomber Command in 1942, he was mining the major ports and U-boat bases with around a 1000 mines a month.

[@GaryChurch-hi8kb]

The mine fields could be swept up to nine times without detonating. This meant that some detonations after a couple sweeps might have seemed like the area was cleared but it was not. Sweeping and detonating some more mines might have again seemed like the area was cleared but again.....

[@EnigmaCodeCrusher]

Thanks

[@panic_2001]

interesting video 👍 I've heard of the mine campaign, but have never read or watched anything about it

[@rg3412]

How much of the shipping reduction was due to heavy fuel shortages vs mining damage?

[@dukecraig2402]

The fuel shortages were a product of the mining operation, so that's included in the results from it. Look at the severe reduction in the amount of oil being brought into Japan as a result of this operation in the charts he shows, there you go.

[@McRocket]

0:47 - I like the level of effectiveness listed for the atomic bombings: 'VE'. I.e. - totally effective. Thank you for this. ☮

[@tacticlol]

Why was there such a steep drop from 42 to 43? Submarines? Also I cannot image a country more uniquely vulnerable to sea mines.

[@dukecraig2402]

England, thank God the Germans didn't come up with something like this, I don't think it'd have been quite as effective as this was against Japan but it still would have put a hurtin' on the Allied effort in Europe.

[@mrdojob]

If you mean in tonnage sunk, then apparently so many ships were sunk that the Japanese began to run out of ships.

[@lamwen03]

Wow. And Japan still would not consider surrendering.

[@MrSlugny]

Yup it took the USSR to declare war on the Japanese Empire..,....

[@JimmySailor]

Fantastic coverage of an unknown part of the war. The more I think about it the Japanese government was criminally negligent in even attempting to continue the war into August 45. One battle in particular stands out, the Battle of Kure between July 24-28th resulted in the complete destruction of the Japanese fleet in home waters. The last operational carrier and 3 battleships sunk, leaving only a single Capital ship still operational in all of the IJN. The government knew that by continuing the war they would be sacrificing civilian lives in the slim hope they could negotiate to save Japan for militarism.

[@dougreid2351]

Alas.

[@ddopson]

Yup. Only one capital ship; uncrewed. No fuel to train pilots. No fuel to contest the bomber raids. Remaining planes and pilots reserved for kamikaze duty to resist landings. Shipping down 98.5%, all but totally obliterated. Industrial production down by 60% to 90% in most categories. What's sad is to see that when shipping tonnage cratered, they prioritized shipping food over other industrial inputs. They were literally going hungry.

[@LarryWater]

The civilian government failed to control the military.

[@washingtondale]

Yes, criminally negligent & I think, resulting from the “unconditional surrender” sound byte (no wiggle room, ability to spin) so no back channel diplomacy

[@ddopson]

@@washingtondale but there were attempts at backchannel diplomacy. Japan’s peace faction realized their country was being obliterated and were trying to find a common ground that would be acceptable to both the US and to their country’s militarist faction. The problem was that the proposals they drafted were simultaneously unacceptable to both sides and from the US perspective, entirely unrealistic. They included terms like Japan retaining control of Manchuria, and the war ending without an occupation or regime change. Both of those were nonstarters.

[@zeitgeistx5239]

Now if we can get you to do a video on Generalplan Ost.

[@Satunnaistasotilashistoriaa]

Interesting and detailed video about an often overlooked weapon system. Sea mines aren't nearly as cool as stealthy submarines or mighty surface-combat ships. But still they can be devastating weapon system. Even the mine warfare is quite anti-dramatic. Not big battles, but partisipants just drop mines to sea routes over and over again, or trawling own sea lanes back and forth with minesweepers.

[@SeattlePioneer]

I believe Nixon launched a mining campaign against Hai Phong which resulted in North Vietnam's agreement to terms to end the war.

[@robertmoyse4414]

Properly applied mining has always been underestimated. In Europe RAF mining of the U-Boats' Baltic training areas was the final nail in their coffin. The consequently under-trained U-Boat crews were easy meat for the RN escorts.

[@hinz1]

14:20 Why do you need 1.7Mton of salt??

[@redtobertshateshandles]

Have you ever tasted Soy sauce?? Not the so called "healthy" rubbish. 😂 Then there's pickles. 😂

[@alancranford3398]

The fighter sweeps over Imperial Japan and the Third Reich would make for an interesting video. Attached below is a translation of the 1927 "The Command of the Air" by Douhet. He recommended that "scout aircraft," single-engine and single-seat planes with small bombs and a radio, swarm enemy territory in support of bomber operations. These aircraft would report on bomb damage--but they could also attack targets of opportunity. In late 1945 USAAF fighters based on Okinawa and USN/USMC carrier-based aircraft would make low-level attacks on Japanese cities and suspected airfields. One carrier-based raid against Tokyo's Nakajima Musashino-Tama aircraft factory was conducted from as low as 1000 feet (dive pullout) as 10 VB-84 Helldivers and 12 VT-84 Avengers plastered the 45-acre complex--escorted by 24 VF-84 Corsairs. The aircraft operated off of CV-17 USS Bunker Hill, part of Task Force 58. Reportedly, 32 out of 36 bombs were observed to strike the target. In addition, the target was attacked with rockets and cannon and machine gun fire. Japan was hording its aviation but sent up a few fighters to annoy the Navy planes. It must have been demoralizing for Japanese subjects to witness American war planes shooting up Tokyo's streets. www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0160_DOUHET_THE_COMMAND_OF_THE_AIR.PDF

[@paulmaxwell8851]

I think the 12,076 pounds of Torpex you mentioned at 5:18 is really 1276 lbs. A simple mistake. Excellent video!

[@dukecraig2402]

The Tsunami mine.

[@clearsmashdrop5829]

I knew there was mining of the Japanese waters but I didn't know this level of detail or that the mine were delivered by B-29s. I'd 'assumed' the mine were delivered by subs.

[@hugod2000]

I love this excellent channel. It is a real treat to history lovers. Thank you for your diligent research.

[@bat2293]

Soooo... whatever happened to all those mines after the war was over? That's a lot of mines.

[@dukecraig2402]

I would imagine since they were in harbors and ports they were cleaned up after the war if they didn't have some kind of way engineered into them to deteriorate and become inert over time, otherwise I'd say they went around cleaning them up.

[@maestromecanico597]

Was not aware of this action but not surprised either. This is what total war looks like, the likes of which we have not seen since VJ Day, 1945.

[@SeattlePioneer]

What efforts did Japan make to defeat the mining campaign? Mine sweeping, air attacks on incoming bombers and such. How many ships were sunk by mines? How did the Japanese navy become aware of mines?

[@Satunnaistasotilashistoriaa]

You become very quickly aware of the mines when the ships start exploding in shallow waters. From circumstantial evidence and eyewitness observations, they were able to rule out a torpedo attack, so there aren't many options left. Japan had minesweepers, but lacked quantity and quality. Those US mines were clever devices, almost impossible to find/disable with older minesweeping equipment. After the war, the USA helped Japan clear the sea lanes. Even with their help, it took years even though they knew where the mines are and hoe the trigger mechanism works.

[@BamBamBigelow.]

I've heard mining Japan's ports was more effective than bombing the cities 🤔

[@stevepirie8130]

You could say fire bombing the cities “helped” reduce the amount of hungry mouths to feed. LeMay resisted using his bomber command being used for Op Starvation as he believed in airpower could win by destroying their industry and cities. I recall an airpower study in the early 2000s covered this and highlighted a big weakness in every navy lacking actual minesweepers. Not a glamorous command but crucial for sea trade. The Japanese got to the point even small fishing vessels couldn’t put to sea.

[@stevepirie8130]

Another irony is the same study on mining the Danube and other rivers and canals would have crippled German oil imports before they invaded the Soviet Union. The small amount of night time mining missions sank plenty but diverted huge amounts of AA guns, searchlights and fighters to try defend them. Barge captains refused to sail unless minesweeping was conducted constantly. Unfortunately Harris saw these missions as a drain on his bomber command and refused to divert aircraft. Same went for coastal command needing bombers to hunt U-Boats until Churchill threatened to sack him.

[@redtobertshateshandles]

Have a good look at Japan's sheltered inland sea. It's incredible.

[@johnvanzoest4532]

Its all hindsight, but I wonder if a protracted campaign like this ie say 5x scale and duration might have removed the necessity for nukes being dropped at wars end.

[@randomnickify]

Nukes were inevitable, as Roosevelt said - public would crucify him if they had discovered he had war ending bomb and never used it.

[@johnvanzoest4532]

@@randomnickify Yep, quite true.

[@Knuck_Knucks]

Ha! I've done training on Tinian! 🐿

[@reubensandwich9249]

Another great "what if" would've been if they started the mining campaign earlier. I wondered whether they knew how effective the campaign was during the war, it seems they didn't quite know until the interogations at the end.

[@mikemilner8080]

You have to remember that the bases used for these attacks were only captured and made sufficiently secure in August 1944. Construction of air bases and assembling of the necessary aircraft, fuel, and bombs meant that the first raids, precision high-altitude attacks against Japanese aircraft factories, were in December 1944. Due to the difficulties of high winds and poor visibility, the value of these attacks didn't match the US experience in Europe. By March of 1945 the focus shifted to low-level nighttime incendiary raids and the mining campaign was started in support of the planned Okinawa invasion. What the US failed to understand was the Japanese faith in offensive operations and fighting spirit and the concurrent lack of effort in defensive measures - not just in mine countermeasures but also in antisubmarine warfare, antiaircraft defense, and civil defense, which were considered defeatist. The Japanese also paid scant attention to the logistics of a long war over vast distances as an island nation. Unlike the Battle of the Atlantic, where the Allies and Germany adopted new measures and counter-measures that saw the balance shift repeatedly, the Japanese in the Pacific didn't adapt, respond, or even learn from what was going on in the Atlantic years before.

[@4shink]

Very insightful comments...thank you@@mikemilner8080

[@navyreviewer]

Oh no. Everyone knew how effective mines were. Before this aircraft couldnt reach the sea of Japan. Submarines tried (see the Wahoo for example) but the Japanese mined the north and south entrance to the sea.

[@bloodworthmagic]

Is it true that after the war for many years, that hundreds of Japanese ships continued to be sunk by these mines?

[@orbitalair2103]

doubtful, unless the deactivation timers were faulty. also the sensor packs are battery powered. now if you hauled one up in a net....

[@lawrenceallen8096]

So, they self deactivated. They're still there?

[@daveroberts7295]

I had never heard of this operation before today. I find that amazing as I thought I had a fairly good knowledge of the war. I guess deploying mines is just not as sexy as the shelling of Japan by battleships at the end of the war.

[@luvr381]

How much earlier could B-29s start laying mines there? Or is there suggestion that mine-laying submarines could have started the effort earlier?

[@dfirth224]

B-29s had to wait until the island bases were captured and rebuilt.

[@luvr381]

@@dfirth224 Exactly.

[@ptbird1]

I knew that japan was blockaded, but not to the absolute extent shown here! No imports at all in so many ports! and for a loss of only 15 planes, what an absolutely amazing piece of history that i never heard of before.

[@tomellis4750]

Did the mines, because Japanese shipping was denied the strait, make more targets for American submarines?

[@joeminella5315]

👍👍👍👍👍

[@JTA1961]

Was gonna comment sumtin,...but... never mine.

[@highdesertutah]

I’m surprised the Japanese weren’t able to shoot down more of the mine laying B-29’s. And I wonder if these mines destroyed any American submarines or maybe US subs stayed away from the minefields since they were in close to the harbors. I’m curious if you know more about this.

[@dukecraig2402]

Watch his video on the effectiveness of the defensive gun system on the B29 and you'll understand why, it gave the B29 a kill to loss ratio of 11 to 1 against enemy fighter's, that's higher than the P51's kill to loss ratio, basically they couldn't get close enough to them to shoot them down, especially the inexperienced Japanese fighter pilots which is about all they had left at the end of the war when the B29 became operational.

[@jamiebusch9406]

Just when I think I know a lot about WWII, I watch one of your videos and learn that I dont...🙂 This is great, detailed info. I knew we mined Japanese waters, but had no idea how effective the effort was.. Cruel- but more humane than firebombing cities- assuming the leadership would have faced reality and surrendered.

[@jamesodell3064]

I am going to guess that it was a very difficult job removing these sea mines after the war. That would also be a good story.

[@zhuangsaur227]

😞😢😮Thankfully in the long run the Japanese were not starved into surrender

[@ShiddyFinkelstein]

In light of this, dropping the two atomic bombs was a more humane act for the Japanese people than continuing a total blockade, which would have caused 7 million Japanese to die of starvation. Never mind the numbers of Americans who would have died or become casualties, which would be the larger concern. War is Hell.

[@McRocket]

Japanese late-war version - Manned Air-Dropped Kamikaze (MAD-K) mines. ☮

[@dougerrohmer]

As far as I know, Curtis le May wasn't keen on this. He, like Bomber Harris, felt that the destruction of cities was the most fun. Nimitz pushed really hard to get mining going to supplement the submarines' efforts. Here's a theoretical question: If MacArthur and le May were never there and less egotistical and more tractable commanders had their posts and Nimitz ran the whole bang shoot, how much less would the cost to the Americans have been in material and lives? I know Nimitz takes stick for the possibly unnecessary invasion of Iwo Jima, but other than that he didn't put a foot wrong in my opinion.

[@doughart2720]

So you can add sea mines to the reasons japan surrendered. Given the fire bombing, Soviet declaration of war, and sea mining operations, the atomic bombs were probably the tipping point. So which is worse, 200k killed by the atomc bombs or millions killed by starvation, fire bombings and losses on both sides from an allied invasion. Yes, atomic bombs should never be used again, but that doesn't mean it was wrong to use them in 1945.

[@stevepirie8130]

If they’d started mining as soon as capability allowed and not fire bombed cities there would have been even more strain on their economy with many more mouths to feed. De-mining after the war must have been a nightmare for minesweepers.

[@lawrenceallen8096]

China will not make a land invasion of Taiwan. It will do something similar like this. In addition to naval encirclement and air "no fly zone."