A beautiful lecture

Professor, would you say logic is the foundation of philosophy?

Goff did respond to the shombies argument though? It'd be nice if he developed the response and put it in print, but he did respond during your episode with him. He said that the zombie argument and shombie argument are symmetrical and both concievable, but only if you accept dual carving, and if you reject dual carving, zombies are conceivable and shombies aren't, and he argued we should reject dual carving. Is there anything that response misses, or do you just accept dual carving?

Unrelated to the topic of the video, but I wondered if you would consider a discussion with Graham Priest. I know he's a logician and not a philosopher of mind, but his views on god-particularly as they have manifested themselves through eastern traditions-nothingness as the ground of reality, metaphysics, physicalism, etc. would be interesting to engage with as I'm sure you could push him further than most interviewers who have talked to him for YT videos.

Hey RIchard. You had one of my favorite conversations with Bernardo Kastrup. He's promoting his new book and it would be so fun to hear you guys dive in again. Have you reached out?

i haven't read your shombies paper yet (apologies). But from the sounds of it, you are making a type-b physicalist move like the one katalin balog makes in "in defense of the phenomenal concept strategy", where she suggests, among other things, that it's conceivable that a (minimal) physical duplicate of our world is a phenomenal duplicate. If so, then the second premise of the conceivability argument linking an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap is conceivably false and -- given that this principle if true is true *a priori* -- it is false. hence, the conceivability argument fails at premise 2. does that sound right to you? i don't know if that's what frankish had in mind back when he wrote the anti-zombies paper, but with his turn to illusionism, he seems much more in the type-a camp.

Wouldn't the symmetry to the zombie argument (such as to put their conceivability's in conflict) need to be a kind of "conceivability of a lack of a conceptual gap between physical and phenomenal properties", or in other words, a "conceivability of the inconceivability of zombies"? But wouldn't this be incoherent for those who find zombies conceivable in the first place? Wouldn't the mere positive conceivability of x necessarily commit one to denying the notion of its own inconceivability, thereby shombies/ anti-zombies? It certainly seems that the conceivability of zombies is more readily apparent than their being inconceivable such as to, if nothing else, grant more weight to "zombies-over-anti-zombies-conceivability" compared to the alternative. If the only point is that conceivability isn't in-itself anywhere close to a sufficient guide to metaphysical possibility, then that's obviously fair. I'm sorry if I misinterpreted anything (or everything).

JOSH WEISBERG ❤❤❤❤

Nice, I never get tired of those

Philosophy KZbin BEEF

I really recommend to anyone watching and interested in the shombies argument to read Professor Brown’s paper Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism where this is discussed. I think you allude to this paper but didn’t give the name of it. I think it is a great paper and I find your case very convincing. Thanks for this response video!

So a shombie is a duplicate of you? Without being you? How do we know they are not identical?

I think the shombie argument is effective for showing conceivability is an unreliable guide to metaphysical possibility, I have pointed to it a few times when p-zombies are brought up. A lot of people misunderstand it for some reason, or maybe I am the one who is misunderstood. A common critique is that the shombie argument uses conceivability to go right to metaphysical necessity while p-zombies shows a metaphysical possibility which undermines a metaphysical necessity, but I don't think this is the case. I think you're just showing a symmetrical inverse argument holds up with the same strength, which undermines Chalmers' use of conceivability as a guide to possibility in the first place. At 11:50 - I find this distinction confusing. What do you mean by "real"? Is it possible to expand on what you are thinking of in this aspect of your argument? I was under the impression that Keith thinks the appearance of phenomenal consciousness IS "real" in that the appearance is a real part of the physical structure and function of physical consciousness, but it is the ontological status of this appearance as a special, intrinsic property beyond the physical that is not real, which is what actually constitutes the illusion. I think this would line up with what you say here. Is this not the case? I know there are some forms of illusionism that do fully deny phenomenal consciousness, but I thought Keith's conception was different?

So the shombies argument is just against non-physicalism that claims physicalism is impossible? I am a non-physicalist and don't claim that physicalism is impossible, so it doesn't apply to my view?

I wonder if you've ever talked to or written about phenomenalism or noumenalism (transcendental idealism a la Rae Langton), your María case strikes me as a nice intuition pump for those positions above any traditional dualism or physicalism

13:32 I think Goff responded w 'dual carving' (what is that?)

I’d love to see you discuss with Peter Godfrey Smith, Andy Clark, and Jesse Prinz, and Barbara Montero

It's the current year and people still cannot figure out how to have a quality internet, mic and video setup.

I am so glad you had professor Weisberg! I read his new book and enjoyed it as a layman. I have also read some other articles and appreciate his approach and stance. I enjoy your interviews and this channel. Any updates on your new book Professor Brown?

Thanks for inviting Weisberg, it's a great start to S7! One episode a month?

Nietzsche said that he felt sufficiently strong to divide the world in two.

Beyond double modality and strength of intuition, what's Chalmers' main objection to shombies?

Yo Professor Brown, it’s always great when you upload.

audio is fixed at this point: kzbin.infoSmt6_vwDBUM?si=V9w1c0PbHC7GqM2h&t=493

Brilliant

Interesting

Parmenides VS Heraclitus was something else

Fraco argumento!!!!

She's sharp! Very interesting to listen to

Robert Sapolsky’s claims of hard determinism are grounded in the idea that biology and neurological processes dictate human behavior, leaving no room for free will. However, the framework of Holistic Free Will (HFW) provides a compelling counterargument by integrating scientific evidence that demonstrates the capacity for reflection, adaptation, and growth within deterministic systems. For instance, neuroplasticity-the brain's ability to rewire itself-contradicts the deterministic notion that behavior is fixed. HFW highlights how practices like mindfulness meditation can reshape the prefrontal cortex, improving self-regulation and intentionality. Studies show that mindfulness enables individuals to interrupt automatic reactions, such as anger or impulsive behavior, and replace them with deliberate, value-driven choices. This capacity for neural restructuring aligns with HFW’s principle that individuals can navigate and transcend deterministic influences through reflective engagement with their biological and social conditions. Behavioral studies like Walter Mischel’s Marshmallow Test further illustrate HFW’s core principles. While initial self-control abilities in children were largely influenced by environmental and biological factors, the introduction of strategies such as distraction and reframing allowed them to significantly improve their capacity for delayed gratification. HFW emphasizes that these learned behaviors reflect the human ability to interact with deterministic conditions in ways that foster ethical growth and intentional change. Moreover, HFW integrates findings from rehabilitation science, where individuals recover from brain injuries or trauma by engaging in therapies that encourage neuroplasticity. Stroke patients, for example, often regain lost motor functions through intensive therapy that helps their brains form new neural connections. HFW reframes these recoveries as evidence of how structured realities-such as biological constraints-can be actively worked with and overcome through intentional effort, illustrating the dynamic interplay between determinism and autonomy. Through these examples, HFW bridges neuroscience and ethical philosophy, showing that while biology and environment significantly influence behavior, humans also possess tools for reflection, adaptation, and growth. Unlike Sapolsky’s hard determinism, HFW offers a nuanced understanding that respects deterministic realities while demonstrating how individuals can engage with and transcend them. This framework not only aligns with scientific evidence but also provides practical mechanisms for fostering autonomy and moral development within deterministic systems.

What a cross examination! Very interesting. I feel myself wanting you to have questioned his use of naive realism in his argument. If naive realism is true then consciousness really isn't a problem, and Matthias is using that to make it seem as though his view is uncontroversial (i agree with him that overflow is not an issue on naive realism, as any quality, like redness, sits comfortably - in a metaphysical sense - on surfaces or what have you, even if there existed no organisms at all in the entire world, and so qualities aren't even related to consciousness or conscious beings in that case). Problem is, of course, that naive realism is false - at any rate, Matthias isn't a naive realist. And his argument doesn't translate to any other physicalist view. On non naive realist physicalism, experienced qualities do not exist distally to the mind, thats the whole cunundrum. So if he says they exist in the brain then he is taking the exact same route as a first order theorist, and is open to the exact same criticism. Whether he thinks qualities are always conscious or not is irrelevant, because unconscious or not, they'd have to be identical to/grounded in brain states, just like a first order theorist claims. So his idea about consciousness being implicit belief/disposition to belief does no work. One might like that idea for independent reason, but the meat of his position is accepting intrinsic qualities (a view he apparently doesn't like).

Intro ends at 3:05

Philosophy and religion follow differents way. Sometimes they meet to share information. That's all.

What is his proof that space and time are pure a priori knowledge? Don't see a reason an infant does not learn of space and time through experience.

I hope he is going to explain why Christianity but I guess not. I think the explanation that he was intellectually driven to this seems like motivated reasoning. I’ve always sensed Goff had religious spiritual motivations. I don’t know about this nitpicking out the things you don’t like. Like why do Christianity instead of just saying you believe in God.

Its nice to know the origin of the symbol used in psychology thank you!!!

41:52 lol yes we haven’t seen minds elsewhere Bernardo. I have grown to really dislike this guy. He’s so rude and is so thin skinned when people criticize him… lack of self awareness. Keith Frankish is super sweet and I hate this weird psychoanalysis.

DEductive premise is linked to existence and to rational and to Yes; the inductive is to non-existence and to NOT.

Kind of disappointed that Goff didn't go for a more pantheistic/mystic recognition of awareness as divinity. Of nondual realisation as the recognition of God within. Certainly fits perfectly well within an idealist framework. (And, frankly, isn't tremendously far from a kind of atheism in a lot of ways.) But I guess he's traditionally avoided the idealist label-I guess because it really doesn't match how he feels.

Hi Richard. For 18:46, doesn't 'either' straightforwardly imply exclusive or? I view 'valid' as the final answer.

This annoys me on a physical level... like the world ain't tuned for you my guy your tuned for the world... Arguments from puddles always makes me baffled... also the freaking arrogance of the duche bag theist doesn't help.

"Progressive Christian" is a bit of an oxymoron. "Guys, hear me out... what if we _weren't_ in a cannibal death-cult that worships suffering and meets weekly to consume the transubstantiated flesh and blood of our messiah?"

Thanks Dr Brown for a very interesting reaction video! Your thoughts on theism is how I feel. Can I also point out how helpful and thought-provoking the comments section here is too. Great work!

If theists could demonstrate that cosmological constants could be modified, maybe then I could waste some time considering the 'fine tuning' argument, until then it's just wishful thinking.

I think at this point the strongest argument for me being atheist isn't just the lack of reasons to believe, but that all of the reasons people give for believing are so fucking bad

30:12 Why did evolution choose consciousness over biorobots if external behavior is the same?

10 minutes and became the dearly departed. I am sure people fall for these superstitious reasons or life issues.