Unknown Atheist remains Atheist: watching "Why This Famous Atheist Became a Progressive Christian"

[@ProneOyster]

I think at this point the strongest argument for me being atheist isn't just the lack of reasons to believe, but that all of the reasons people give for believing are so fucking bad

[@michaelb1716]

Thanks Dr Brown for a very interesting reaction video! Your thoughts on theism is how I feel. Can I also point out how helpful and thought-provoking the comments section here is too. Great work!

[@onemorebrown]

Thanks, I appreciate it!

[@naturalismnext5861]

Great video, I had similar thoughts as you. The two aspects of Goff's view I was most interested in (and they didn't really discuss) are a) how this limited theism hypothesis explains the data and b) why this limited Christian theism over all sorts of alternatives? On the first point, one concern with these kinds of limited hypotheses is that it's hard to explain exactly how they account for evil. Simply stipulating that God has all powers except those that pertain to the peculiarities of the distribution of suffering we observe looks very *ad hoc* and so that view will end up having a correspondingly lower prior probability. Furthermore, the facts most advocates of abductive versions of the problem of evil appeal to are very specific (ie. Draper's argument from the biological role of pain) and even with a God who has generally limited power, it just isn't clear why his limited power would lead to what we see. One possibility would be that all a creator can do is tune the initial conditions of the universe and from there the universe plays out in an uncertain way. But Christians, including Goff, can't accept that view since God clearly intervenes later on at least once in history and probably maybe more times and is intimately involved in transforming our physical bodies to some spiritual realm and saving us all. In that sense, the simulation hypothesis you mention seems way better if one wanted to explain the data, because the powers of that hypothesis are more obviously limited in ways that would lead to the suffering we observe. There may be another concern with that hypothesis though - we have to tune the desires of the simulators in a particular way, however, if you assume that they are sort of fickle entities like our own it may be reasonable to believe they'd want to just simulate many universes with different initial conditions without being too concerned about what happens. I could certainly imagine humans doing such a thing. That hypothesis also benefits from the fact that it concords much better with our background knowledge about persons - which is that we have complex, high limited minds - than any hypothesis that posits an omni property. On that topic, I don't see why the limited theism hypothesis would be preferred over any other host of alternatives ie. polytheism and directed naturalism that can also claim to explain both suffering and fine-tuning. I certainly don't see why one would go further than that and accept Christianity with all its specific claims. On the one hand it seems like Goff's Christianity is partially experiential, but since he says it requires a kind of 'intellectual background' I'd be curious why exactly Christianity has that plausible claim to being true. There are very strong reasons to think revealed religions like Christianity are false that do not apply to mere theism. I also have to say I find it so cringe and strange when people jump on all these apologetics channels to tout their conversion, that channel uses such videos and others as just a cash grab to promote a reactionary kind of Christianity, which is why the whole video was spent trying to sort of fit Goff into that framework so it could be touted as a success (and why that's currently playing out on twitter). That definitely wouldn't be my move if I had some kind of spiritual experience. I don't understand at all why Goff would go on there and choose to be used as a pawn in that industry. Anyway keep up the reactions videos I always enjoy them!

[@onemorebrown]

Yes, I agree completely. And thanks, I am glad to hear you enjoy these things!

[@dimaniak]

30:12 Why did evolution choose consciousness over biorobots if external behavior is the same?

[@juliohernandez3509]

Great review thanks

[@amaizenblue44]

Ive often made arguments regarding an evil god, or a mischievous one. Whether limited or not, it is no less plausible than a loving one. And we would never be able to tell the difference. Literally the only thing that makes theists think a loving god makes more sense is the comfort it makes them *feel* I have never once received an adequate answer for why we should believe in a loving god as opposed to a mischievous one. To me, neither make any sense. To theists, feelings are the only thing guiding that preference.

[@amaizenblue44]

I would add, though, that I don't think an evil god suffers from "the problem of good" in the same way that the Christian view has to deal with "the problem of evil." An evil god has no constraints on necessarily being all evil all the time due to the fact that temporary good or the illusion of it can still be part of a larger evil in the way that the opposite is not true. A good god is restricted from deception as that in itself is not benevolent. An evil god has no such limitations.

[@onemorebrown]

This is a good point. In fact now that I think about it, it seems like an evil god would be motivated to make some good in so far as it makes the evil that exists that much worse.

[@armand9120]

​@amaizenblue44 I'll take a very simple formulation of the problem of good: P1) If (evil) God exists, then there's no good. P2) But there is good. C) So there is no such God. Correct me if I'm wrong, but your point is that one need not accept P2 bcs all seemingly good things can in fact be necessary for some greater evil. But a similar response is also available to the theist when they reject P2 of the problem of evil (there exists gratuitous evil). You think these theists have to contend with the fact that many of us see/misperceive evil in the world, which, if true, is deceptive from God and would be an example of gratuitous evil. But they don't have to grant that there's any kind of deception going on here, nor that such deception isn't necessary for some greater good.

[@amaizenblue44]

@@armand9120 no, my point is that P1 is not valid. We have defined what evil and good are. They aren't things that are intrinsically real, but social constructs. They're just how we describe things that affect our well being positively or negatively. It is trivially easy to imagine a scenario where an evil god allows what we perceive as good as a false sense of comfort, like a killer allowing a victim to think they are going to get away, only to dash the hope later. Apologists try to use the greater good excuse and the results are absurd. Because they appeal to other "evil" sensitivities like deception, lack of compassion/empathy, injustice, inadequate communication, etc. Any "greater good" is furrher nullified with the promise of an existence where evil is not only not necessary, but doesn't exist at all.

[@armand9120]

@amaizenblue44 It sounds to me like you're making a different point now, but I'll address it anyway. Saying that premise 1 is invalid doesn't make much sense to me. Arguments can be valid or invalid, but that's not the case for propositions like premise 1. Maybe you wanna say P1 is incoherent/unintelligible? A theist might think that evil and good is just a matter of God's stances/desires, without committing themselves to any intrinsically real stuff (what I consider to be realist nonsense). Anyway, I agree with the basic point that the evil God hypothesis is just as, if not more, likely given the data

[@clashmanthethird]

Do you think the simulation hypothesis is better than the multiverse as a solution to the fine tuning problem, or do you just think the simulation hypothesis is better than theism? Personally, it seems like most of the arguments for the likelyhood of the simulation hypothesis focus on us being historical sims with the universes above us having roughly the same physics and similar histories. So if the simulation hypothesis is supposed to solve the fine tuning problem, the universe running the simulations would need to have radically different physics, meaning this sim wouldn't be able to reveal anything about their universe's history. It's not clear to me why they invented our made up physics for a simulated universe that looks nothing like their universe, when this sim wouldn't have much "real world" utility. It could just be "for fun", but I don't see why this version of the simulation hypothesis is less mysterious or more plausible than the multiverse, or even some kind of natural teleology.

[@truthseeker2275]

I.m.o. Simulation pushes the "creator" problem back one level. i.e. Who created the simulator? I think something like Roger Penrose's "Conformal cyclic cosmology" where each epoc can fluctuate the constants would at some point yield a condition for some kind of life.

[@timtopsnav]

Hey Richard, why do you find fine tuning a compelling argument? Basically i have in mind what you called "coincidence" being the given alternative, but I'd phrase it not just as coincidence, but as there being no likelihood involved when the set statistically analysed contains only one entity, i.e. the world. Why is that not what you go for? Thanks

[@uninspired3583]

The "coincidence" also becomes less interesting when you compare the amount of space life occupies with the amount it doesn't. It seems to fit well that the chances of life emerging is very small, it's also very rare in the known universe.

[@timtopsnav]

@@uninspired3583 i see what you mean, though I think the fine tuning argument claims that life couldn't have happened at all with most other constants, only with ours and some small set of others. So it's not a matter of how much life there is in our world, but rather that there is at all

[@uninspired3583]

@timtopsnav right. Life coming about by chance and fine tuning are different arguments. This only addressed the incredulity of thinking the chances are so improbable they might as well be zero. By the same token the ratio of life to non life is so small it might as well be zero, as long as we're rou ding down... I would say if the universe was fine tuned for life I'd expect a lot more of it. It seems the universe was better tuned for black holes than for life.

[@onemorebrown]

@timtopsnav this is a good point, and one I am in favor of. Part of me finds the Robbin's style of argument persuasive, in the sense that we count something as evidence if its occurrence is more likely given a certain theory. If there were some sort of designer, then that would make the occurrence of fine-tuning likely (or expected) but without a designer, it is very unlikely. I don't think that is a knock down argument ad yours is oe respectable way to respond. In addition, once you take the multiverse seriously then I think maybe there is a set of things to statistically analyze.

[@timtopsnav]

@@onemorebrown i want to say something like, theorising is only possible with living beings like us, and so posing the question assumes that there is life. The question couldn't ever be put in a possible world with no life, so life just tags along as a brute fact to any philosophical investigation. But yeah, I don't know anything about multiverse theories really. Though, wouldn't there being a plenitude of universes answer the fine tuning argument directly, as at least some universe would be expected to harbour life? I guess that might depend on how many universes are taken to exist though, yeah

[@danletras]

Pay $16 a month to KZbin and you never get any commercials.

[@kregorovillupo3625]

it's three times what I pay netflix for. For what? Avoiding intrusive on purpose, unskippable, interminable, and often inappropriate or scummy ads? No, thanks, give me firefox with UBlock all day long.

[@vecumex9466]

From Hauerwas I learned that Christians witness to the truth not by witnessing to their beliefs, but by leading lives that show the world the truth of their beliefs.

[@uninspired3583]

Someone could lead a life of a non believer and enact the same goods. The beliefs could be false and the person is solely responsible for the good they've done. The idea that lives lived out demonstrates the truth of a belief is full of epistemic holes.

[@vecumex9466]

@@uninspired3583 Nonbelievers who live a life enacting the same goods are welcome to join forces. Having said that it is your quarrel with the faithful-believers not mine. Once again Christians witness to the truth not by actively preaching or proselytizing their beliefs, but by living lives that demonstrably embody the truth of their Christian faith, allowing the world to see the reality of their convictions through their actions and character. If a nonbeliever can do the same he/she is welcome. There are no epistemic holes on this statement.

[@uninspired3583]

@vecumex9466 the epistemic hole is the fact that living out a faith doesn't tell us whether the contents of that faith is real or mistaken. For example living out the tenants of Islam doesn't show us Islam is true, only that this person thinks it is. They could be wrong, as you could about your faith.

[@vecumex9466]

@@uninspired3583 Living out one's faith is not about proving whether is real or mistaken. Term such as real or mistaken are terms which carry with them emergent components. I cannot speak for Islam and doubt that you would having said that Christianity is about emphasizing one's character and virtue as elements of decision making and spiritual values such as nonviolence as critical for shaping our understanding of the faith's ethics. Furthermore Christian theology is about the story of God's intervention in the world, rather than what should be universal which makes your epistemic reference irrelevant. We are not arguing here some universal understanding of right or wrong because that will be ludicrous. The problem here is that the church has adopted a voluntaristic conception of what it means to be a Christian, and that it has become similar to a secular society. Hauerwas also argue that in our country Christians have been given a false sense of security that has undermined the need for faith. Christianity is unintelligible without witnesses, that is, without people whose practices exhibit their committed assent to a particular way of structuring the whole. This is the function of faith regardless of your reference. We are not trying to prove how a scientific method works temporarily rather make a claim rooted on faithfulness, loyalty to certain values proven through out history to be beneficial to society,.

[@kregorovillupo3625]

"This famous atheist: never heard of Philip Goff?" "Who?" And again with this thing: Agnostic doesn't mean "atheism light". One can't be agnostic without specify if he's a theist or an atheist, it makes no sense just saying "I'm agnostic".

[@Jacob-Vivimord]

Kind of disappointed that Goff didn't go for a more pantheistic/mystic recognition of awareness as divinity. Of nondual realisation as the recognition of God within. Certainly fits perfectly well within an idealist framework. (And, frankly, isn't tremendously far from a kind of atheism in a lot of ways.) But I guess he's traditionally avoided the idealist label-I guess because it really doesn't match how he feels.

[@ChristerAnd]

Indeed, another interpretation of Christianity emerges. Cameron seems pleased, as usual; he finds joy whenever a notable figure speaks positively of Christianity. And undoubtedly, Philip Goff will be remembered in the annals as the intellectual who proposed a convincing argument for a transcendent almighty spirit. Salvation appears to be at hand! God exists and is happy, Cameron is very happy, and everyone else will be happy once they realize that Goff is more akin to the image of God than anyone else. Good days ahead!

[@desdenova1]

I can't tell if this is Poe's law or not.

[@JamieWoodhouse]

It's all too easy to tritely dismiss panpsychist and theistic thinking via their connections but it does seem there are some strong links in Philip's thinking. Maybe one link is revelation. Both the ineffable, private, direct, incontrovertible revelation Philip says we have (I disagree) of our own conscious experience and the more traditional revelation of religious or spiritual experience (he says "I think I've always been a spiritual person" and "ultimately it's about the experience... lived spiritual experience... it's got to resonate at a spiritual level")? The handy thing about these two "revelations" is that they feel like they truly reveal foundational things like deities and non-physical consciousness - while at the same time not having to explain either as coherent hypotheses. The purity of the revelation means there's no need for mechanisms, causes, components, rationales, substances, behaviour, interactions with the physical world... They simply are declared foundational, perfectly simple (!!) and unchallengeable - with no corroboration required. I do think personal experiences are a form of evidence - but if we grant revelations this sort of dogmatic, all-powerful status I think we've abandoned a naturalistic epistemology altogether. We've slipped towards good old fashioned fideism and dogmatism. That's probably a charge Philip would resist - but I think it sticks. As a layman it saddens me that the ineffable and mystical and magical (maybe it's unfair to use these words but...) remain powerful magnets for the minds of people much, much cleverer than I am 🙂. Regardless of the philosophical arguments either way the psychological and social reasons why us humans came up with and are drawn to these sorts of hypotheses are fascinating. Those psych & social reasons alone should give us pause for thought as we aspire / pretend to approach these questions "intellectually". Sorry for the essay - loved your analysis Richard!

[@zelenisok]

wouldnt the simulation view have huge downsides in terms of external coherence theoretical virtues compared to (non-religious, non-omni) theism, being that it asks us to reject our basic views about the nature of external reality we perceive, that chairs we are perceiving are actually chairs, etc, etc, whereas the theism doesnt..?

[@clashmanthethird]

We still perceive actual chairs, they'd just be chairs made up of bits of information instead of bits of matter. I don't really see what the problem is here.

[@zelenisok]

so we arent perceiving chairs, but simulation of chairs. unlike the actual chairs that exist in the room where the simulators are presumably.

[@clashmanthethird]

@@zelenisok Define "actual"

[@MrGustavier]

Good point. I think Richard is a realist. So I'm not sure how he articulates a simulation hypothesis with realism (I assume that by *"actual",* you meant "real" ?). I am not a realist, so there is no downside regarding that.

[@onemorebrown]

@zelenisok I think a lot depends on where you come from, so to speak. If I have always lived in a simulation then my 'actual chairs' are the ones I sit on and stand on to reach the light bulb, etc. Those actual chairs would be simulated chairs and that would be a fact about their ultimate nature. They are still real, and still really chairs. If, on the other hand, I live in the non-simulated world then the chairs in the simulation are simulated chairs as opposed to the physical chairs I (in the non-simulated world) sit on etc. Ion such a case I think the simulated chairs are still real, and that they are chairs, but they are digital chairs.

[@uninspired3583]

Doesnt the simulation theory entail an archetect, some being outside our reality that designed our spacetime? Is there a meanful difference between a simulation archetect and a god concept? Imo if god arguments aren't convincing the simulation hypothesis should be equally unconvincing.

[@amaizenblue44]

I dont find the simulation hypothesis convincing, but it still has advantages over theism or deism, depending on how you define god. The architect need not have the "omni" attributes. Need not know the future. Need not be immaterial. Need not be any of the attributes that lead to the paradoxes which are great hindrances for most people's definition of god. Ultimately, it's a *better* answer for the fine-tuning argument than god....I just don't find the fine-tuning argument particularly compelling.

[@uninspired3583]

@amaizenblue44 i agree with your conclusion, but would push back on the omnis. The architect would have to be sufficiently knowing, powerful, etc. I'm not sure we can distinguish between sufficiently powerful and all powerful, from our perspective they look the same. I think this makes an architect indistinguishable from a deity from our view.

[@amaizenblue44]

@@uninspired3583 certainly. But it does depend on how one defines god. Such an architect can certainly appear all powerful, and for all intents and purposes could actually be all powerful RELATIVE to us, but it would not require omnipotence in the absolute sense. For instance, say humans are able to program a sentient AI SIMS universe, but with limitations programmed such that we have ultimate control over them. We would *appear* as god to them, but would not be omnipotent in the absolute sense. Pedantic really, but the reason for my "definition of god" caveat. And for stating the architect need not be omnipotent.

[@uninspired3583]

@amaizenblue44 does absolute vs sufficiently powerful matter? If we can't distinguish between them then a = a

[@amaizenblue44]

@@uninspired3583 sure. How we perceive it is irrelevant. The concept of a sufficiently intelligent simulation architect can be posited through natural advanced maturity and technology. Which inherently makes it a more plausible suggestion than a magic skydaddy who created absolutely everything *ex nihilo.* Regardless of if we could tell the difference or not. It would, of course, require evidence just the same. So they are equivalent in that respect.

[@nafowler]

I hope he is going to explain why Christianity but I guess not. I think the explanation that he was intellectually driven to this seems like motivated reasoning. I’ve always sensed Goff had religious spiritual motivations. I don’t know about this nitpicking out the things you don’t like. Like why do Christianity instead of just saying you believe in God.

[@MrGustavier]

I've been giving some thought to the simulation hypothesis recently, and I think I reached the same conclusion as you did, this seems much more probable than theism, since it fits way better with our background knowledge, and is also more parsimonious, since it doesn't require a supernatural ontology. However, I am not sure it addresses the typical cosmological concerns raised by the theists, like : "why something rather than nothing ?" and the notion of a first cause. If infinitism is false, then we don't have an infinite hierarchy of simulations...

[@onemorebrown]

This is a good point, but as I typically hear these arguments they are about the world around us. What is the first cause of this world? Why are these things existing? That is answered by the simulation hypothesis. We can't say much, if anything, about what a non-simulated world might be like . I don't think we can rule out an infinite series of simulations, or pretty much anything else.

[@MrGustavier]

@@onemorebrown *-"We can't say much, if anything, about what a non-simulated world might be like . I don't think we can rule out an infinite series of simulations, or pretty much anything else."* I would agree, but the problem is that you seem to sacrifice the explanatory power of the simulation theory. I don't know who proposed the following epistemic virtues (was it William James ?) : - Adequation with background knowledge. - Explanatory power. - Parsimony. One can sacrifice explanatory power to gain parsimony, or sacrifice adequation with background knowledge to gain explanatory power (all of this is captured by Bayes' theorem in my opinion by the way). Here, in your answer, you say *"we can't say much, if anything, about what a non-simulated world might be like".* This means to me that the simulation theory has poor explanatory power, because in order to explain the differente features of *"the world around us",* through the simulation theory, I would precisely need to list facts about the *"non simulated world"* that would ground the features of our world. This is what I expect from an "explanation". Therefore, by saying that we can't know anything about *"the non-simulated world",* you jeopardize the explanatory power of the simulation theory. In fact you might be killing it altogether, as possibly the simulation theory would fit ANY world. And "if a theory explains everything, it explains nothing" (a bayesian maxim). Now, the question is : does theism have a better explanatory power ? Because I think we would both agree that the simulation theory is more parsimonious, and that it is more inline with our background knowledge. So if theism is to be preferred, it can only be because it provides much more explanatory power. I think the question then goes to : - Are personal (volitional) explanations satisfying ? If they are, then arguably theism would have a better explanatory power... As long as the theist can explain how he knows about god's psychology...

[@Bhuyakasha]

Philip instills faith in me that even I could teach philosophy of religion class. Also, if not simulation argument, why not some form of deism if you're gonna throw out the bible anyway. By the way ublock origin works quite well for me to block the ads.

[@nicolasandre9886]

If theists could demonstrate that cosmological constants could be modified, maybe then I could waste some time considering the 'fine tuning' argument, until then it's just wishful thinking.

[@VaughanMcCue]

10 minutes and became the dearly departed. I am sure people fall for these superstitious reasons or life issues.