Propositional Logic and Ordinary English

[@PessimisticIdealism]

Looking forward to this! Thanks so much, Dr. Brown.

[@gabrielteo3636]

This is off topic, but i just saw your video with Tjump on Addition and Quadition and Rules and I didn't know where else to message you. The solution is nominalism. There are no universals. There is no "rules". There is only particular physical brain states.

[@onemorebrown]

Thanks, so you endorse the claim that there is no meaning?

[@gabrielteo3636]

@@onemorebrown Sure there is meanings, but they are particular physical brain states. Your meanings and my meanings are different, because our brains are different. Imagine 2 squirrels. They have different brains. They both will go after acorns, but the meanings of "acorns" are different for each squirrel. Our brains simplify what we call reality, because there is just too much information to process in a timely manner and we create mental concepts our brains can more easily manipulate. "Rules" and "meanings" are just abstract mental concepts built on the particular physical structure of brains. When we are thirsty, we will still drink water, but "drinking" and "water" are different things to each of us. Maybe I misunderstood what you meant when you wrote "no meaning". I can try to manipulate my mental concept of "meaning" to try to approximate, yours, but it will never be the same unless we have identical physical brain states.

[@onemorebrown]

In virtue of what do these mental/brain states have meaning? And how does it answer the skeptical challenge that all of the squirrels past behavior is compatible with it meaning something besides 'acorn' with that brain state (in its past instantiations)?

[@gabrielteo3636]

@@onemorebrown The brain states have meaning for themselves, because it helps them survive and get things they want. I didn't quite understand your: "the skeptical challenge that all of the squirrels past behavior is compatible with it meaning something besides 'acorn' with that brain state (in its past instantiations)?" ...but I'll try to answer. Previously in time the conception of "acorn" was different for the squirrel, because he had a different brain state. Does that stop him from going after it and eating it? No. Maybe this is more clear. I point to this thing and say "apple". You point to it and say "pom". We are both correct in our personal meanings/rules. I just now know to say "pom" when talking to you. It doesn't matter what we label that thing. We might agree we from now on say "popple" for that thing. Furthermore, "popple" will be different each time we see that object for each of us, but that won't stop either of us from eating it. Imagine you are a baby. Ever time you say "mama" the long haired one comes to you. Who cares if the long haired one has a different conception of "mama"? Did that answer your question? Maybe thinking in a materialist perspective might help? Here is some questions for you. What creates and sustains meaning? Is meaning objective or subjective? Is meaning identical for everyone? Does meaning change? How does it change? What can change meaning? How do we access meaning?

[@onemorebrown]

Sorry, I thought you had watched the discussion with TJump and so were familiar with the basic puzzle, but let's back up a step. The issue is that we can always define a predicate that partially overlaps with any given predicate and then the question is what determines that you meant one versus the other. So, in the 'plus' 'quus' example we define 'quus' as giving the same result as some finite subset of arithmetic and '5' after that (so, for example everything is normal until you get to numbers over a million or whatever). In the past, when you were adding, we suppose that you haven't added numbers in the range past the cutoff so everything you have done is in line with both plus and quus. So, in the past, when you were were 'adding' 2+2' and getting four, what makes it the case that you were adding instead of using quus? they both agree that for 2+2 you get 4, but they will diverge at some point (which you have not ever got to, by stipulation). The problem can be generalized so that we can do the same for 'acorn' or whatever we want. How do you know that a given brain state which you say meant 'acorn' didn't really mean 'playcorn' in a way similar to 'plus' and 'quus'? I don't think thinking like a materialist will help you out of the mess!