2. Finitely Repeated Games: History, stage game Nash equilibrium, and SPNE (Game Theory Playlist 8)

In this episode we continue our study on finitely repeated games. Key takeaway concepts are history and stage game Nash equilibrium. We argue an important theorem, stating that in any repeated game, repetition of the stage game NE in every subgame is an SPNE of that game. It is however, important to note that there may be other SPNE of repeated games, as we show in later episodes.
It's crucial to watch lecture videos in the proper order to ensure effective learning. This is because the concepts in each video build upon those introduced in previous videos. To help you with this, I recommend visiting my website, www.selcukozyurt.com, for a recommended course outline.

[@dim7918]

Thank you sir! God bless you!

[@ph11non-polar]

Great explain. It helps me a lot.

[@inocentlema5574]

Thank you for assistance. How to write the final payoff after second stage pls I was waiting it but u skip🤔. To write payoff on two stage repeats game if the game is perfect information and if the game is imperfect. Please

[@anushabooks]

Skipping some parts. Bad