6. Tit for Tat Strategies and Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (Game Theory Playlist 8)

In this episode I talk about tit-for-tat strategies and show that they don't form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in infinite horizon repeated prisoners' dilemma game.
It's crucial to watch lecture videos in the proper order to ensure effective learning. This is because the concepts in each video build upon those introduced in previous videos. To help you with this, I recommend visiting my website, www.selcukozyurt.com, for a recommended course outline.

[@sabrinagu6602]

Cant thank you enough about how you make my game theory course so much easier to understand. Thank you again!!

[@hongyuduan6811]

Thanks Professor! You always made the most difficult part much easier to comprehend and offered many distinctive and insightful observations.

[@mohammedmahinuralam2796]

Thank you very much for your lucid explanation. I think the series 1+delta^2+delta^4+delta^6+... ... ... is a gemetric series. Common ratio of any two consecutive terms=delta^2. Since 0

[@sevdasattari7425]

Best explanation EVER!

[@burcuozcan6113]

Dear Professor, this video really helps me. thank you very much for your great explanation and effort!

[@nencydhameja]

Dear Sir, thank you so much for your videos. Excellent explanations clears all concepts so beautifully. Incredible. Watched so many and shall continue. I extremely Grateful 🙏 . If I pass would be because of your videos 🙏

[@sheetalsaklani4460]

Very well explained!

[@joaquingeller567]

Amazing!

[@ecg7841]

First of all, thank you for these amazing videos. They have been of extreme support throughout my economics program. I have a doubt, however: Can tit for tat strategies form a SPNE when delta = 1/2? or they can never? It wasn't very clear for me. I mean, in this setup, is there a SPNE or not?

[@berkayerylmaz630]

Thanks!

[@volcanoash2445]

Nb

[@noushinroshni4963]

Thanks a bunch 🤍