A Damned Serious Business. La Haye Sainte Waterloo strongpoint

Brendan Simms, Professor of the History of International Relations at Cambridge, explains the vital role taken by four hundred men of the King’s German Legion at Waterloo, in relation to the University Library’s exhibition ‘A damned serious business: Waterloo 1815, the battle and its books’.
" It has been a damned serious business. Blücher and I have lost 30,000 men. It has been a damned nice thing-the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life. - The Duke of Wellington, 19 June 1815, quoted by Thomas Creevey.
The Battle of Waterloo was fought on Sunday 18 June 1815, ten miles south of Brussels in what was then the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It was the climactic engagement of a campaign that pitted an invading French army under Napoleon Bonaparte against a combined force of Allied troops-chiefly British, Netherlandish and Hanoverian-commanded by the Duke of Wellington and a Prussian army led by Gebhard von Blücher. The French were routed, and the warfare that had plagued Europe for more than two decades was definitively ended: there were to be no hostilities on such a scale on the continent until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Through its impact on the politics and power-relationships of a Europe approaching the height of its worldwide influence, the outcome of Waterloo remains significant to this day.
Although Cambridge University Library has never set out to assemble a specific, single collection relating to Waterloo, the strength and breadth of our accessioning activity mean that over the course of two hundred years we have amassed a rich and fascinating variety of written records, maps and book arts relating to the battle and the era in which it played so significant a part. To mark the bicentenary of Waterloo, this Digital Library collection presents a sample of such material, encompassing military drill-books, manuscript letters, hand-coloured engravings, battlefield plans, printed mementos and tourist reminiscences.
Virtual Exhibition
exhibitions.lib.cam.ac.uk/wat...
Cambridge Digital Library
cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/collections...
Music: British Grenadiers Fife by Bryan Davis. Music ID#:27502885
Film made by: Blazej Mikula
www.bmikula.com/

[@hilarylazard7554]

My great great grandfather was a Captain in the King’s German League, he was severely injured in this battle, but survived to return to Hanover and continued his army career.

[@richardglady3009]

What a beautiful video. Thank you. Your description was great and using paintings about the battle was very handy in helping understand the situation. I even liked the photo that had all the smoke…accurate in the days of black powder. Thanks.

[@technodemic6258]

Any documentary that begins with referencing the battle to the Abba song sets alarm bells ringing, bigtime!

[@SilverShamrock71]

Well, it's historically accurate and it was the hungover Germans

[@Jackthesmilingblack]

Baring's troops ran out of ammunition as their ammunition wagon tipped over on the road. And their weapons took a different size ball.

[@MrDidz]

That's actually not true and I suspect it was a cover story quickly contrived at the time by Alten or one of the officers responsible for preserving the defense of this sector of the battlelfield. My guess is that there was a collective command meltdown on this section of the front as the French continued to push forward up the ridge and everything that Alten had tried to do just seemed to make things worse. He had already sacrificed two whole battalions trying to keep the lines of communication with La Haie Saint open, he had been rescued once by Uxbridge and the Allied cavalry but there was no chance that Uxbridge was going to rescue him a second time and i just think he'd given up and was looking for an excuse to fail at this point. We know he had already ordered all the battalions in the area to save their colors by sending them to the rear. But as far as my understanding is concerned the Baker Rifle was perfectly capable of firing normal standard musket ammunition. It was one of several reasons it was chosen by the Ordinance Department as the standard British rifle. One can also read from the memoirs of Rifleman Harris that in Spain it was pretty much standard practice to discard the cumbersome powder and ball accouterments and replace them with standard musket cartridges which were much simpler to load.

[@DasLamm68]

The KGL is a wrongly forgotten part of the napoleonic era as they went through all slaughterhouses in Spain and Portugal. Their final brutality was La Haye Saint indeed with almost 90% losses and after the battle their commander Georg Baring had a mental breakdown .

[@danverbeck]

Professor Simms writes ( and speaks ) in a compelling style. He brings history to life with original research.

[@nihal8352]

very good 👍

[@ferdinandvonschill4512]

"Give me night or give me Blücher"

[@TermiteUSA]

Kinda fun watching these videos and playing the Waterloo scenarios in Steam. Just single player though. It's a zoo in there.

[@BaronsHistoryTimes]

But the French walking through walls in the game is funny too.

[@BaronsHistoryTimes]

There is an 'e' at the end of Sainte in the name, so the 'T' is sounded - "sant"

[@sdporres]

Total War, or Scourge of War?

[@jonathandelavega4291]

Very respectfully, I disagree with the notion that A French victory at Waterloo would have delivered Europe back under the heels of the emperor. The remnant victorious French army would simply be unable to stop the massive Russian and Austrian armies heading towards France. There is simply not enough resources to pull off another Marengo or Austerlitz. Napoleon would have ended up in St. Helena just the same. Perhaps the sailing time would be a bit delayed.

[@theccpisaparasite8813]

You are correct. The Anglo-Allies were the smallest Coalition army. The Austro-Hungarian and Russian Armies have yet to be heard from. Those were the heavy hitters. He was facing the same problem he had in 1814, insufficient cavalry, being vastly outnumbered, and no money.

[@melbea03]

The Emperor had handled those massive armies before

[@ashleyKennedy5]

Wellington fought for a hierarchical Europe dominated by England. That a non hierarchical system evolved was not his intention.

[@johnwatts8346]

i dont get why wellington and co didnt send more (far more) reinforcements to la haye sainte?

[@DasLamm68]

he could't as on the other end Hougoumount had to be defended too and he risked to be encircled if he moved reinforcements tu the center.

[@technodemic6258]

Historians make such a fuss about Waterloo, as if the fate of the universe had depended on the outcome. The truth is - even if Bonaparte had broken us and reached Brussels, it would have done him little good. His Empire had depended on his alliances - Poles, Italians, Saxons, Dutch, Swiss, Westphalians, Bavarians, Wurttembergers, Belgians.....even Irish and Spanish, at times. None of these applied by 1815. And, by then, France's own armies had been decimated by Napoleons' military blunders of the three previous years, that had seen the Grande Armee firstly obliterated in the retreat from Russia; then, once again, at Leipzig - until its enemies had succeeded in arriving at the very gates of Paris. There would have been an eventual repetition of the pre-abdication campaign, against an alliance between all the other major powers of Europe, with an inevitable French surrender to follow.

[@flemhawker9134]

Techno Demic The fuss is made because Waterloo is one of the most well documented battles in European history, with many ordinary, literate soldiers leaving us their observations. It’s fascinating, it’s awful gut wrenching stuff, it’s history. And, Napoleon “wasn’t” defeated sometime later on by the combined weight of the allied armies of the 7th coalition. He was defeated at Waterloo. That’s where it happened, at the battle of Waterloo.

[@raka522]

@WillMansell "but hey, it was Napoleon," and there was the biggest mistake! As a German, I have now dealt more specifically with the Prussian prehistory in relation to Waterloo. Napoleon's genius and success were largely based on responding to traditional warfare with new tactics. (remember the Blitzkrieg-taktics in WW2 ) After the Prussians in Jena and Auerstedt failed so badly against Napoleon, the entire military system was redesigned. From the 148 generals from that period, only 6 were still in service in 1815, the rest were dismissed and replaced. The success was evident in the wars of liberation against France until 1814. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst had reached the military level of a Napoleon, and in conjunction with the tactician Blucher, this was a challenge for Napoleon. He began to win as many battles as he did losing against them. Napoleon was himself his greatest weakness. His ego was so huge that he began to underestimate his opponents, and he repeated mistakes that others would have learned from! In 1814 he fought Blucher off Paris, won the battle and thought the Prussians were defeated, and then took action against the Austrian army. And while he was doing that, the Prussians marched into Paris and ended the war. 1815 Ligny? 2 days before Waterloo, and after the battle he thought the Prussians were defeated again and we all know what happened afterwards :-D What would Napoleon have won in Waterloo? He had only had to deal with 1/3 of the Prussian army, there were still 200,000 men under arms who would have marched against him, not to mention the Russians and Austrians who were already on their way to France ... It is often said that the rainy weather delayed Napoleon's attack by 2 hours and that he lacked the time to defeat Wellington before the Prussians arrived on the battlefield ... and nobody thinks of that the Prussians marching from Wavre all day as well were hampered in their progress by the weighted ground! Without this disability, they would probably have been able to intervene more than 2 hours earlier. Wellington was only able to fend off the old guard's attack because he was able to move troops from his left flank to his center, because they had previously been replaced by troops from the 1st Prussian Corps under General Ziethen. ;-)

[@andrewbagshaw3095]

You could argue that Napoleon was likely doomed from when he decided to take on the first coalition in 1805, but an army he commanded was not defeated in the field until Leipzig in 1813, and that was by a force that outnumbered his army by over 80,000 men, with a 2:1 advantage in artillery. Furthermore, that defeat was not as decisive as Waterloo, and it didn't finish his career. Napoleon achieved several tactical victories against massive odds in the campaigns of 1814 and was only forced to abdicate by the multiple coalition armies stealing a march on Paris. Although he would still have been outnumbered by converging armies had he won Waterloo, he had won in such situations before, and he might have recruited fresh troops and allies following a major victory.

[@raka522]

@@andrewbagshaw3095 His Russian campaign cannot be considered a victory either ... Of course, Leipzig ended his career in the end. All of his forced allies fell away and he had to learn to lose battles. For years he has terrorized German countries with his occupation policy. (There was an incident after the battle in Leipzig, where Blucher and his Silesian army chased Napoleon on the run and found wounded and starving Frenchmen everywhere along the way. They no longer dared to go to any place to ask for food fear of simply being killed by the people there) Napoleon's tactical victories, however, were often bought through greater losses than those of his opponents. He was offered to keep his throne on the condition that France would restrict itself to its old borders before its wars, but he refused! He couldn't have won Waterloo under any circumstances. In Ligny he was no longer able to achieve more than a tactical victory with the help of his old guard. What would have happened if Blucher hadn't placed his troops as he did because he was counting on Wellington's army, but had concentrated on the fact that his 4th Corps under Bülow would still have been there and that he would have fought Napoleon alone? The name Napoleon no longer stood for a sure victory. (In the Battle of Bautzen in 1813, with a total of 195,000 soldiers, he was far superior to his opponent with only 100,000, but only a tactical victory was all he gets) Yes, Napoleon was certainly a very good general, but many of his early victories were largely due to his more modern form of warfare, but his opponents learned more and more ...

[@andrewbagshaw3095]

@@raka522 I agree with some of that, particularly that Napoleon's Russia campaign, where he lost hundreds of thousands of men to cold and starvation, was particularly damaging, but he wasn't defeated in the field there. Also, I know a lot of his victories were less decisive than, for example Austerlitz, where he annihilated a Coalition army, and that some came at heavy cost. However, he invariably won the field and almost always inflicted more casualties than his enemy. This may have been due to partly to methodology, and it's recognized that the Coalition armies did learn better methods over the years they fought Napoleon, with one example being their introduction of his corps system. With that said, it is also recognized that Napoleon's presence on a battlefield was great for French morale. Wellington, who was not prone to hubris, said that it was worth 50,000 men. He also recognized Napoleon's tactical ability, which he said was particularly well exemplified by the 1814 campaigns. I disagree that Napoleon could not have won Waterloo under any circumstances. The Prussians were defeated at Lingy, losing 20,000 men including 8,000 deserters, and even two days later at Waterloo they were only able to engage the French directly with the ¬8,000 men of von Bulow's corps, which had not been engaged at Lingy. This gave Napoleon a numerical advantage that included a 250:150 advantage in artillery, and artillery was often a decisive weapon in his hands. Were it not for Wellington's generalship and the great quality of the troops under his command (which had also been proven on the Peninsula) Napoleon would still have posed a threat to Europe.

[@mikidoo]

It's unbelievable what Cambridge University has done to Dr David Starkey recently. Shame on you.

[@jamiecullum5567]

What have they done to him

[@johnottr]

Very respectfully, I disagree with the notion that Napoleon could not have maneuvered at Waterloo. It is my opinion that he could have maneuvered to the West therefore bypassing Hougoumont and the other two strongholds/farms, and more importantly, putting more distance between himself and the Prussians. Wellington would have had to turn to his right to defend Brussels.

[@friggingbomb88]

when you pronounce La Haye Saint, "H" is silent, so it should be something like "La-Ay-Son"

[@jasonsmith1158]

friggingbomb88 La-Ay-San !

[@captainnolan5062]

In answer to your question @ 0:20, of course the answer is The Battle of New Orleans, by Tommy Horton in 1959: kzbin.info/www/bejne/oHzSq2Zphp6Xa8k

[@davidberlow9858]

But he completely exaggerates the importance of what a victory for Napoleon would have left, nothing. He would have ended up with 60,000 exhausted soldiers, no ammunition or horses and three more armies of at least 100,000 men each, converging on Paris, or wherever he was. Conscriptions, mounts and chemicals and metal needed to make more war were all gone. So, even if he wins he still looses.

[@ilsagutrune2372]

After 1814 Napoleon was not going to rule Europe

[@andrewbagshaw3095]

With all due respect to the KGL, a moderate degree of historical knowledge and common sense dictate that there were several much more important engagements at Waterloo, notably the defeat of D'Erlon's corps, the defeat of Ney's cavalry, the defense of Hougoumont and the defeat of the Imperial Guard. Without decisive victories in all of these engagements, Wellington's army would have been in far greater danger of defeat than if La Haye Sainte had been lost earlier in the day. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that the strongpoint there did not significantly inhibit D'Erlon's corps in their early attack, as they simply surrounded and bypassed it. Further, the attack by the French Imperial Guard in that sector late in the day was decisively defeated (precipitating the rout Napoleon's army in what was, in my view, the most decisive action of the day), despite the fact that the French captured the La Haye Sainte farmhouse prior to that attack. I think it's also notable that the defense of Hougoumont farm is more celebrated than that of La Haye Sainte for several other good reasons, and not just for the heroic actions of British Guardsmen there. Not only did it anchor Wellington's right flank, it was subject to focused attacks by massively superior numbers throughout the day, and as I recall, one source estimated that 6,500 men were killed in the fighting there.

[@Hizzey1896]

"With all due respect to the KGL......" doesnt matter anyway the kgl (and other hanoverian brigades) were involved in defending Hougoumont. Im not arguing la haye saint was more important but it was - at least - equaly as important. It was Napoleons plan to attack through the centre and split wellingtons army he needed La Haye saint for that to get controll of the crossroads* , anyone with "a moderate degree of historical knowledge and common sense" knows that. And Hugemoount received plenty of reinforcements la haye saint didnt, and if la haye saint would have been captured earlier its fair to assume that alot of french forces would have been reallocated to the centre. Basically napoleons plan worked to some degree. wellington completely focused on his flanks, but the weakend centre still hold and la haye saint played an absolutely vitale role in that.( Obv defending Hougoumont was crucial as well, had it been captured, napoleon could focus on a flank attack, or proceed attacking the center with more sucess because wellington had to commit more forces to the flank) By the time La haye saint was captured napoloeons plan was already screwed , because he had to deploy the majority of his reserves (including most of the young guard) to plancenoit, that also forced napoleon to commit his imperial guard to rush the centre in an absolutely unfavourable engagment - that was a super desperate move of napoleon to turn the tide of the battle, he was forced to rush wellingtons army in order to then turn around and fight blucher.

[@Hizzey1896]

* controlling the crossroads would have enabled napoleon to bring his artillary closer and shoot at the centre and at the then exposed flanks , which is exactly what happened , and even in the short time that they were able to do that it nearly broke the Allied centre ( According to several reports of britisch officers) , but again they couldnt wait any longer because of the prussians.

[@andrewbagshaw3095]

@@Hizzey1896 You say you're arguing that La Haye Sainte was equally important, but you didn't do that, you just asserted it. You didn't counter my arguments that La Haye Sainte was unimportant based on the facts that the French bypassed it in their initial attack, and that their final attack in the centre was defeated despite the fact that they captured La Haye Sainte prior to that attack. You say that they needed the crossroads, but that's also nonsense based on what I've already said - they just bypassed the farmhouse. Hougoumont received reinforcements because it was defended by a handful of troops against persistent attacks by an entire corps for the whole day. That defensive action was stunningly successful, holding Wellington's right against massive odds and killing several thousand French soldiers. Also contrary to your assertion, Wellington did not, in fact, even need to weaken his centre significantly to defend Hougoumont - it is well known that his reinforcements were "drip fed". Your next assertion was that French reserves would have been relocated to the centre had La Haye Sainte been captured. Are you aware of the course of the battle, or of any of Napoleon's other battles? Napoleon conducted large-scale attacks on Wellington's right and centre throughout the day but these were defeated. His keeping of the Imperial Guard as a reserve (in the centre) was his traditional plan, and in fact the Guard was never used in many of his battles. However, as the Guard was completely routed at the end of the battle of Waterloo, I think it's fair to assume that it would also have been defeated had it been used earlier. Your last point about Blucher is also erroneous. Blucher's 84,000 Prussians had been defeated by 68,000 French under Napoleon two days earlier, losing 20,000 men including 8,000 deserters. As a result they only managed to engage the French directly at Waterloo with von Bulow's corps, which attacked Plancenoit from mid-to-late afternoon. Even the role of that force has been overstated, as they were held there for several hours. As Hofschroer wrote, by the time the Prussians emerged to the West of Plancenoit, it was to the sight of massed French retreating from the British pursuit, and the Prussians couldn't fire for fear of hitting British soldiers. Moreover, as the action at Plancenoit was occurring immediately to the east of Napoleon's HQ on the Belle Alliance ridge, it's clear that his committing to the last attack on Wellington's centre by the Middle and Old Guard (and the Guard artillery and cavalry) shows that he was not worried about the apparent potential threat to his right flank by the Prussians despite complete knowledge of it. If he was worried, he could have retired to a better defensive position. Further, the touted effect of the Prussians on French morale is also likely overstated, based on the fact that Napoleon sent a message down the line prior to his last attack to reassure his troops that the cannon fire they heard to their east was Marshal Grouchy arriving to rescue them with his 33,000-strong force. It is well known that the defeat of the Imperial Guard was immediately followed by Wellington's general attack and the rout of Napoleon's army. As I said, it only takes a moderate degree of historical knowledge and common sense to appreciate these arguments. Simms's thesis is gimmicky, poorly supported and argued, transparently politically motivated, and plain wrong based on clear facts.

[@andrewbagshaw3095]

@@Hizzey1896 We know that the Imperial Guard (with its artillery in support) was able to knock back several Allied units in the final attack, but the evidence indicates this was not a serious danger to Wellington's army The Guard was very severely outnumbered, even in the sector in which it attacked, meeting larger reserve units that had not been in action previously. Also, there were other units available that were not used in the defense. No doubt the advanced artillery presented danger, but Wellington possessed significant cavalry reserves, for example the Household Brigade, and several Allied units, that could easily have been used to drive it off if necessary, though presumably the cost would have been significant.

[@Hizzey1896]

​@@andrewbagshaw3095 "evidence indicates this was not a serious danger " reports say they were about to crumble, but they didnt. so it doesnt really matter. But this has nothing to do with the strategic importance of la haye saint. Lay haye saint was captured between 17:30 and 18:30 6-7 hours after the battle has started, if it had been captured earlier french would have more time to wear down wellingtons centre and would have had signifiantly more forces to start the attack. collections.royalarmouries.org/battle-of-waterloo/timeline.html#?at=3NO " The allied line is close to sundering in the centre . Marschall Ney requests reinforcements ,eager to exploit this success,but none are available as they are commited to the battle of plancenoit "

[@robertjones-eb4xo]

Not very interesting at all. "Abba" a Pop group whats that got to do with History ?

[@1932denise]

english propaganda

[@JohnsonTheSecond]

I mean KGL was literally Germans but ok

[@david6532]

yup our politicians are good at that,even today