A Lesson from the Past: What We Can All Learn from LBJ’s and McNamara’s Vietnam Strategy

[@nmelkhunter1]

The end said it all even though we didn’t hear what the CAG said. In other words, well done on your part.

[@MilitaryHistory317]

Told him to Strafe the bridge! The reason is even more sinister.

[@nmelkhunter1]

@@MilitaryHistory317 I found the video on YT and I’ll watch it tonight. Thank you for all of your videos!

[@nmelkhunter1]

⁠@@MilitaryHistory317I watched the video and you’re right, the reason was even more sinister…

[@EricRush]

I watched "Air Wars in Vietnam". Fascinating analysis not only of the air war there but air power in general.

[@curtislowe4577]

I don't now recall where I was read it but the gist was LBJ convinced himself that Vietnam could be "won" like Korea was "won". Somehow three factors were overlooked which rendered the American lives lost and messed up in Vietnam an unforgivable waste. 1. The Diem regime was seen by the majority of Vietnamese in the south as a holdover of the French Colonial Administration and as such they felt antagonism toward the Diem regime. The regime's leadership was largely Catholic in a nation that was 90% Buddhist. There was outright hatred between the Buddhist monks and the Diems. South Korea on the other hand had a government of ordinary, normal Koreans. There was no endemic antagonism with most of the country. 2. Being a peninsula with a rugged coastline South Korea did not suffer from the geographical features that facilitated robust guerilla forces in South Vietnam. 3. World Politics changed. Several members of the UN sent men to fight for South Korea. In Vietnam only Australia and the Philippines helped America. The rest of the world felt no responsibility to help a holdover of the French Colonial Administration retain power. This relates to the Ends/Ways/Means discussion in that there were Means in place in Korea in the form of background realities (political, religious, geographical) which materially assisted achieving the Ends that were conspicuously absent in Vietnam. Yes, hindsight is 20-20 but surely anyone with basic country data could have written a compelling report that unlike Korea, Vietnam would inevitably play out like Little Big Horn rather than Gettysburg.

[@ralphklinestiver511]

My uncle flew the F 105 in Vietnam. They were limited on what they could bomb and had to fly the same routes on every mission. Which made it easier to be shot down and insult to injury the LBJ gave the North Vietnamese a heads up on what targets the US would bomb a day prior to avoid their military advisers from being killed by our bombs. Lesson learned never fight a limited war if you want to win.

[@robertschultz6922]

What is your thoughts on general Westmorland?

[@MilitaryHistory317]

He was a great soldier, and Maxwell Taylor was his mentor, but he was out of his element as Commander of MACV. His focus on body count is a classic case of failing to create measures of effectiveness. Now, the U.S. made an even worse mistake after Iraqi Freedom by measuring the number of police trained. Many of those "trained" policemen were members of the various militias or death squads.

[@jackK5FIT]

Being a Vietnam War veteran I saw first hand the awful mistakes and their results first hand. Not having senior military involved in planning by non professional politicians is unexcusable. Still true today.

[@srec539]

Whoever clicks link of "air wars in vietnam", watch audio only, video is mostly shoving prof talking, and what he has to show was ofscreen, whoever handled video is amateur. Why do i write that here, well bcs someone can not take critics, so disabling things is the way to make it better, nice teachings in war college...

[@carmenrosavillachirre2042]

No me gusta.