Against Antirealism in Quantum Mechanics (my Philosophy Master's thesis)

[@KyleK913]

Physicist here 😀, and my quantum philosophy favors DeBroglie-Bohm pilot wave theory. But I must emphasize that a good scientist does their best to de-emphasize their own philosophical view of nature in favor of evidence/data/reason (whenever there is evidence). Now, my criticism/recommendation for your further study is regarding the uncertainty principle. From where you were "exasperated" and several minutes afterward showed some technical holes in your understanding of quantum weirdness. That is, the uncertainty principle is a stronger theory than a simply an empirical error bar, which is what you seem to treat it as (claiming that better equipment/experiment might break the uncertainty limit). Certain pairs of conjugate quantities are inextricably linked due to wave nature (I'll give an example in a moment). So while quantum mechanical interpretations do allow possibility that "be-ables" can have finer "real" structure than we can measure (e.g. corpuscle + guiding wave in pilot wave theory), quantum mechanics requires that such uncertainty limits must hold, in principle, due to inherent wave nature. What I mean is that individual objects retain a certain amount of fundamental unknowability. Now to my example of conjugate pairs in uncertainty, consider the Energy × Time version: energy of a photon is "hc/lambda" as you stated, so the uncertainty relation is related to the product of uncertainties in time and 1/wavelength. We can generally understand that the wavelength of light is how far it travels in the time it takes to complete one cycle of its oscillation, or equivalently the length of that cycle. But what happens if you "turn on your laser" for less time than the nominal wavelength? This corresponds to a precise definition of time, wavelength is no longer uniquely defined. A wave at the wavelength you may have expected simply cannot exist in that short time duration without addition wavelength components mixed in. So, there is uncertainty in the wavelenth (i.e. its Energy). One may shift uncertainty between the two quantities, but a fundamental limit exists in wave structures. I hope I have stayed at an understandable technical level 😅 Two last things: 1) if you want an additional level of thought-provoking quantum weirdness, check out double-slit with "quantum eraser" 2) check out PBS Spacetime on KZbin. I am a big fan of their channel, and they do a great job of tackling high-level physics theories at a level that can be accessible by both interested laypeople and scientists. I watched all of your personality typology stuff, back then, but I never had the taste for the philosophy stuff -- until you brought it to my turf 😁. Congrats on the thesis Michael.

[@MichaelPiercePhilosophy]

I am very grateful for the feedback! I have a few clarificatory comments and questions: It is not clear to me from what you said why objects would retain "fundamental unknowability". It sounds as though the problem is simply that quantum mechanics, as it is currently formulated, has a limited pixel resolution (as it were). But this does not mean that reality shares that same limited resolution (a "pixelated" reality, if you will). It just means we are stuck with a blunt tool. The universe could, of course, be pixelated in this way! That would be a fascinating metaphysical claim for Heisenberg to make! But I've never had the uncertainty principle explained to me in a way that made this clear. The assumption I am making is that if something exists, it can, in principle, be known. The last digit of pi does not exist, so it cannot be known. But the 200 trillionth digit of pi DOES exist, so it can in principle be known. In the same way, if a photon DOES NOT HAVE a property at a given time, then we cannot know that property, since there is nothing to be known. But if it DOES have that property, and we are simply prevented from knowing it by practical considerations, then we are not barred from knowing it in principle, but only in practice. And practice is always capable of improvement. But setting that aside, if the uncertainty principle forbids that I know something or other, but concedes that the thing really does exist, could I not simply guess what it is, and happen to get it right? Would this count as knowledge? If not, then we need a more rigorous account of what knowledge even is, and what qualifies as knowledge. And these are not questions that the uncertain principle seems to have anything to do with. My main point is that you cannot make claims about knowability without also making claims about existence.

[@KyleK913]

Great questions and ideas! Here is what my understanding of physics has to say about them. Reality itself likely does have properties that have higher resolution than we can currently measure/prove. Absolutely. I think there is also hope that humanity may one day learn more details of that underlying framework. However, your assumption claiming that existence implies knowability is actually not true. I am not an expert in this, but I will do my best. There is Math (not even needing physics) that shows that some systems can have truths which cannot be proven (including mathematics itself). Veritasium does a video on this "Math's Fundamental Flaw". In quantum mechanics, this manifests as a fundamental uncertainty about the collective properties of a given quantum object. We can know that a particle has position and momentum, and we can know each of those (in principle) to nearly arbitrary precision. However, that information is gained by interacting with the system through its conjugate property, at the expense of reduced information about that conjugate property. I don't think this concept places any limitation on knowledge of the governing laws of the system (e.g. someday maybe we will know which quantum interpretation is correct, and maybe we will know how quantum gravity works). The knowledge limitation is on the configuration of a particular quantum object. Regarding guessing versus knowledge, my response is in the same spirit, and I think this depends on what you're describing. If you mean guessing the guiding physical principles and laws, and you get them right, excellent! (And I don't think this is forbidden, in fact that is basically the goal of theoretical science, to guess the laws and test them against nature's "answers"). However, if you were referring to guessing the quantum properties of an object, you are welcome to guess, and quantum mechanics describes the probability that you will be correct, statistically. When you say "what if I guess and get it right", basically the "and get it right" part means that you have to measure/prove that guess by interacting with the system. If you don't want to prove that your guess is right, there is no limit on guessing correctly, but you just wouldn't know either way, haha. I hope this is helpful.

[@thishandleistacken]

Just stumbled across your channel and was nervous that this would be a "wooey" discussion but from what I've heard so far I'm hooked

[@mckryall]

(I have not watched the video) I can't believe this channel I followed in high school for good descriptions of jungian typology is now releasing a thesis dealing with physics, even if it is on a philosophical question. I'm even more surprised to see how many people are watching and providing criticism to a TWO HOUR THESIS DEFENSE, on their own time, on a channel which is nearly unrelated to this video. I'm still more surprised to see that a lot of it is constructive. I'm excited to see if your views change after reading all of this and, presumably, presenting it for a real thesis defense. (I now feel that jungian functions, or at least typologies, are discredited. I don't even watch the zarathusra series, as I'm just not into Nietzsche. I just remember that this guy was able to make sense of a lot of disparate information in a clear way, so I've been following him even as I've unfollowed other people, just because I thought he was a neat person, so seeing a thesis on the PHILOSOPHY of quantum mechanics, a subject I'm concerned about being full of disparate, near-magical thinking, I was excited to see what he had to say.) (For jungian stuff, the only part I think holds water is the concept that a way of judging or perceiving, as described by this guy, can be focused internally or externally and the talent of a person at any one of these may affect their talent in another, whether predictably or not.)

[@decaffeinatedvegan]

What made you conclude jungian functions/typologies are discredited? I’m Not arguing, I’m just genuinely curious and would love to hear your perspective.

[@TheDragonStratagem]

{! Disclaimer (2.S): I am a hobbyist hypothetical physicist, an amateur conjectural theologian, and an aspiring philosophical sci-fi/fantasy author. The ideas posited and owned by the author of this comment are entirely fantasy fictional or science fictional, and are not representations of actual reality or existence, but are only and exclusively abstract philosophical nonsense known as Beginnlessnessism for the purpose of curiosity and entertainment, only. Beginlessnessism is not a religion, but is a philosophy, also known as a meta-religion. Being a meta-religion does not make Beginlessnessium a religion but a philosophy about religion in general. !} I watched the video all the way through. In fact, I had to restart it several times to try to understand it completely and thoroughly enough to be able to respond to it. The concepts laid out in this video seem to dovetail nicely into concepts contained within the Super Fractalon Field Hypothesis. You were saying that you used to be on the side of anti-realism and now you have changed your position, but not 180° more like 90°. It seems to me that you are arguing that a position against anti-realism can be more nuanced than a complete rejection. I used the same type of nuance to approach the development of the premise behind the Super Fractalon Field Hypothesis. The premise behind the super fractalon field is that these fields can generate super fractalons. These super fractalon fields are in some places, composed of rigid space and inert time. Rigid space is non-warped space. Inert time is nonreactive time in which nothing changes. In order to produce a super fractalon the super fractalon field needs to experience a change in the probability of existence. In some places in the super fractalon field, in rigid space and inert time, hereafter we will just call the super fractalon field, there is zero probability of existence. When the probability of existence in some place in the field is a positive number, however small but still positive, this is where a super fractalon forms. Therefore, a super fractalon is where space warps symmetrically, but time remains inert. Since in the place in the field where the super fractalon is has a greater than zero probability of something to exist this place collapses or warp faster than the thing that might have occurred as spontaneous existence could arrive within the super fractalon. This super collapsing, replaces the entire super fractalon with another super fractalon that has not yet had any space into which something could spontaneously exist until it warped to become a space where something could spontaneously exist. This process preserves inert time, but maintains the probability of existence, and disallows existence itself. Therefore, a super fractalon can be said to be real, i.e. a non-zero probability of existence, but non-existent because nothing occurs as the space is replaced with another space that has not experienced probability of occurrence because it did not have any space for that occurrence to take place within relative to inert time. If only one of these super fractalons occurs, this is only real but non-existence if in the super fractal field, there is not a place where there is a non-positive probability of existence to occur then this is nonreal and nonexistence. The super fractalon remains an empty space devoid of any occurrences because there is no preferred existence within the super fractalon. If more than one of these super fractalons occur within different places within the field, but at different moments in inert time, they will exhibit different scales, and different occurrences of appearance of new super fractalond to erase the already empty super fractalons within the field. Through super relativity, if these super fractalon were to collide, they would begin to merge, and because they are at different scales and different moments of the replacement of the super fractalon with new super fractalons to prevent existence, they would overlap asymmetrically, and since they are inherently infinite the finite differences between the two infinite spaces would initiate asymmetrical probabilistic resolution, and thus existence would form. The properties of the existence that forms are inherent to the condition under which the merger of the two fractalons occurred and is evident by the measurement of properties within the existence itself and not possible to be predetermined before the super relative interactions because super relativistic interactions do not have a continuum of causalities. Thus any universes that form because of the merger of the super fractalons would have similar properties and characteristics to each other. One of the consequences inert time would be the age in inert time of the super fractalon that merge. Very similar aged super fractalons that merge will form very small universes with properties that correspond to a low mass, low energy, and low information universe. Whereas on the other hand, very dissimilar aged, super fractalons that merge, i.e. very old super fractalons that merge with very young super fractalons, would form very massive, very energetic, and very high information containing universes with properties appropriate to those characteristics. The formation of any universe within the super fractalon field is proposed to be non-infinite, but with varying random amounts of unlimited finite capacities within their characteristics. So, Super Fractalon Field Hypothesis dovetails into the Big Bang Theory as well in that before the Big Bang time was inert and part of the super fractalon field and probabilities were a spatial characteristic rather than a temporal characteristic of the field. Inert time can only experience probability after existence is exhibited within the field interactions within super fractalon interactions, thus inert time transforms into reactive time at the formation of a universe at the Big Bang. So to summarize reality is where probability as a spatial characteristic has no preferred existence exhibited by the refreshment of super fractalons super collapsing, preventing any occurrence of existence, maintaining the nonpreferred status of any existence within reality. When existence occurs at a big bang the super fractal field exhibits a preferred set of characteristics that are related to the difference in the age in inert time of the interaction of super fractalon. This existence is a non-real characteristic of the super fractalon field and reality is a non-existent characteristic of the super fractal field. Antirealism only occurs in rigid space and inert time which are exhibiting 0% probability of existence, but over inert time, these probabilities change as a spatial characteristic rather than temporal ones. And thus reality is formed and existence has still not transpired until super fractalon interactions occur in inert time. Thus my hypothesis is a 90° angle from anti-realism and realism since it distinguishes reality from existence in profound and meaningful ways.

[@AeonBaudrillard]

A much better video than the Nietzsche series, at any rate. I listened to the whole thing and waited for a reply to the Cartesian thesis but all I could find was "I love being lied to"? You are correct when describing, first, that the Cartesian thesis entails an absolute incontinence of data and/or "nature" and, second, that this would, indeed, entail a "nature with no nature"-however, this is precisely the point: reality is TOO accessible and, moreover, it itself is that which excessively, criminally, accesses you (on that note, if you ever end up throwing Nietzsche in the trash, where he belongs, I suggest looking into the phrase "the pipe smokes me"). The properly Cartesian thesis is not so much that "nothing is real", but applying a particular scansion to this phrase-that, through the pornographic eruption of reality (whose screen you are forced to be), it is only the "nothing", the excremental totality (all but literally so), that is real. Or, in Theological terms, the properly Cartesian thesis is not so much that you are fooled by a demon, lulled into an illusion at the detriment of reality, but that the illusion is reality as such and the demon is God himself.

[@THELITTLERIVERNERD]

In the photon traveling from quasar example it is worth noting that the photon could be said to have had no interactions with anything whatsoever over those 4 billion years (i.e. traveling straight through empty space), and with a relativistic perspective the photon itself experienced no time passing. Given this level of weirdness, it doesn't seem (to my not terribly philosophically sophisticated brain) substantially more weird to say that it "did not exist".

[@THELITTLERIVERNERD]

At 1:43:00 when discussing the impact of measurement on an electron or a photon, you seem to conflate measurement of the state of a single particle, with measurement of an interference pattern across a large number of particles. I'm not sure how important this is to the overall conclusion of this essay, but there definitely seems to be a misunderstanding at play in this section.

[@THELITTLERIVERNERD]

I don't think the above conflicts with your high level point. I do think a deeper understanding of the uncertainty principle is needed prior to proclaiming it an "appeal to ignorance".

[@MichaelPiercePhilosophy]

I am delighted by your engagement with the video! I have a few clarificatory comments and questions: Regarding your first comment: I would reply that it IS substantially weirder to say that the photon "did not exist" than to say that it was in some sort of timeless state. What is at issue for me is that, if the photon does not exist until measurement, then there are no conditions under which I could measure the photon vs. not measure the photon. If there are limiting conditions for when I shall see a photon, then this implies that the photon exists in some way before observation/interaction (say, in a timeless state, as you were suggesting, though even here I am having trouble understanding how something in a timeless state could be measured by something in a time state...) Regarding your second comment: it seems clear to me that we can deduce the momentum a single particle from the behavior of the ensemble of particles in which it participates. Presumably, every photon which contributes to forming a given interference pattern must have the same momentum as the other photons forming that pattern, otherwise the pattern would not form. So it seems to me that we can't know the momentum of a single particle AT ALL unless we deduce it from the interference pattern it helps to form. So, if we find out the position of a particle in a blue-light interference pattern, then we know both its position (directly) and its momentum (indirectly). I do not see how this could not be the case. Which leads into your third comment, which I am inclined to agree with. I would like to understand the uncertainty principle better. Could you explain it to me?

[@THELITTLERIVERNERD]

@@MichaelPiercePhilosophy On the first comment, fair enough. I think it's kind of silly (of me) to bring up the photon's perspective of time in the first place. My subjective judgement of weirdness is not really relevant. On the second topic, deducing momentum from the ensemble is not possible. The momentum itself has its own quantum indeterminacy (both as an ensemble and in terms of the individual particles). There is no guarantee that any given photon has a momentum that exactly matches the mean or medium momentum of the beam of light. The pattern is visible in aggregate, but you cannot derive much at all about a given photon from that pattern. The formation of the pattern does not require exactly matching momentum/frequency values for all of the photons which contribute to its creation. On the third topic, I wish I could, but I only have an undergrad degree from a decade ago, so I don't really feel that I understand it well enough to explain myself. That said, I think the Bell's Inequality section points to some of the more fundamental nature of the uncertainty. As I understand it, Bell's Inequality shows that there cannot be some unmeasurable local state present in the pre-measurement photon. I wish I could grok it more fully and explain, but I'm the wrong person to do that.

[@CorbinSimpson]

Congrats on your defense. This must have been a lot of work. I'm not going to say that you're wrong. There are several concepts I found missing, particularly discussion of spin. I would like to know your thoughts on the Stern-Gerlach experiment, the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem, the emergence of Heisenberg Uncertainty from the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem and Fourier analysis, and the current lack of ontic models for QM. There are even more: the Free Will theorem and Gleason's theorem are two obvious examples. However, I think that you need to be able to address the basics of spin and quantum logic first.

[@MichaelPiercePhilosophy]

Thank you for watching it! It was quite a bit of work, indeed. I assume that when you say certain concepts were "missing", you mean that my ambition for broader claims about quantum mechanics cannot be founded on the double-slit experiment alone. To which I agree, and intend to remedy with further research and writings. That being said, I have a few preliminary thoughts. First, I don't see how spin poses a problem for my thesis. For, my point is that the photon must, in some shape or form, exist. There must be a way in which it IS, in which it EXISTS---and this way of being, I would add, must be in principle describable, knowable, or measurable. That's my main point. Of the experiments and theorems you described, are there any that would disrupt this point? The same goes for spin and quantum logic. Is there something about these subjects that contradicts my point in the paper? I find it odd that you included "the current lack of ontic models for QM". I'm not sure what you mean. There are several popular ontic models: pilot wave theory, multiverse theory, objective collapse theory... The question is whether any of these are correct. But the fact there is still controversy does not mean an ontic model is impossible. That's just how science works.

[@CorbinSimpson]

@@MichaelPiercePhilosophy Hi! I'm gonna just split my posts for readability. First, yeah, your argument is probably fine *for photons*. Spin class matters; some effects are class-dependent. But what about electrons? I mentioned Stern-Gerlach: the spin of ions is measurable. Also, Kochen-Specker: (sometimes) the spin is not determined by any function, including any function of past measurements. You do explain contextuality well when imagining it like a "be-able machine" which converts a context into a meaasured value, but it's not a deterministic machine due to Kochen-Specker.

[@CorbinSimpson]

@@MichaelPiercePhilosophy Finally, ontic models. So, yeah, there's piles of candidates. However, most of them fail to meet Bell's requirements; I'll admit that Bell tests of e.g. pilot waves are pending, but I'm not optimistic. Multiverse theory just kicks the can. Wolfram's CA models have been proven to not meet Bell's standard. Special shoutout to GRW collapse, which has somehow not yet been disproven. The gap is tightening and we might actually settle the question of objective collapse. Exciting! Frankly, though, I feel like most folks say this sort of thing in order to not confront the Free Will theorem, a natural reading of Bell + Kochen-Specker + EPR: if humans have free will, then so do some particles; we transfer a modicum of free will when we perform certain measurements. Either we're all predetermined, or humans are not special in our ability to make choices for ourselves.

[@CorbinSimpson]

​@@MichaelPiercePhilosophy Oh, and let me reply to *this* post. The thing is, I'm not an anti-realist so much as unwilling to give up locality. Bell, Kochen, Specker, and Conway showed that I can't keep both. Suppose we have a Feynman diagram with, I dunno, four particles. There's more than four particles, though. So imagine a fifth particle nearby the diagram. How close does it need to be in order to be included in the diagram as having a predictable and measurable effect? There is an apparent concept of *distance between particles*, at least spatially if not temporally. In this sense, locality isn't just a holdover from Newtonian or Einsteinian reasoning. It's a fundamental ingredient for indicating the range of a quantum effect. And it's not something abstract; one can build a cloud chamber at their desk. Time travel or tachyons are right out, sorry. I'd need *really strong* experimental evidence before considering giving up special relativity.

[@johnschultzbarnes3196]

Ok so at the risk of looking very dumb, what if quantum mechanics is not actually that weird? It seems to me that all natural substances have a shape and potential for pinball-esque local causation. The shape non-locally constrains the possible local pinball causations for all substances. A keyhole for example needs a specific kind and series of pinball events for the keyhole to unlock. The shape of the key constrains the possibility of a number of pinball events such that the key reliably opens the lock. Quantum stuff is exactly the same but with the discovery that these pinball events require a definite amount of energy and that light can be made low energy enough such that its non-local shape is maintained, but the local pinball events can only happen in one place at a time. The other difference is that when a substance is composed of other smaller substances, a reductionist can (supposedly) explain all the effects by the action of these smaller substances. Because quantum stuff is simple, we don’t see the possibility of explaining the effect of shape via the pinball events that shape constrains. The error of the quantum theorists is simply that they load the weight of substance solely on pinball effects, but all substances are a union of both shape and potential pinball effects. Even the case of entanglement seems to be explicable in these terms. If I know the shape of a coin and one side lands heads up, I immediately (non-locally) know that the other side is heads down.

[@sillygoofygoofball]

1:43:00 ish, don’t worry you’re not the only one confused by this argument. It’s never explained very well and it would probably take a lot of digging to figure out what’s actually going on here

[@y2kmedia118]

This is going to be a treat.

[@MichaelPiercePhilosophy]

I sure hope so!

[@jacob_massengale]

I sympathize with your frustration. It seams that what you are arguing against is postmodernism as it pertains to physics. There are more presupositions that go into the postmodern anti realist interpretation of experiments than just biased acts of measurement or the yes or no question. It also utilizes a radical rewriting of common sense based on the assumption of cultural equality; as everyone is a clean slate at birth, culture gives us the images we summon when making a hypothesis, which determines the kind of experiments we can conceive, or so the story goes. Language is the tool that constructs any coherent world view, including science, but it's origines are ultimately irrational and based primarily on power relations. If you were a bhuddist or hindu monist you would also interpret these experiments in a kind of anti-realism: spefically that there is only one be-able because distinctions are at bottom incoherent. So you can say that anti-realism is not just an antithesis that cannot be falsified, but a radical reconceptualization of reality into cultural constructions that fabrocate apparent 'reality' with there paradigmatic assumptions. Basically, hard relativism I also find this world view problematic but for different reasons and I feel like you have done a fantastic job of criticizing it, but without considering it's other more radical/cynical pillars that support it. I would love to see some comentary from you about the new metamodernist philosophers and meta-theorists who try to solve the problems of cultural bias, deconstruction and transend some of the impasses of postmodernism. I'm still at the beginning of my scholarship but It seems like there are higher order principles that can facilitate interdisciplinary understanding.

[@NicK_Tipologia]

yay! cool stuff!

[@terhitormanen]

Hmmm... I think you misunderstand some basic principles of quantum physics. Quantum basically concerns the realm of very small "objects", so it really isn't worthwhile to think about physical macroscopic balls hitting each other when thinking about observations and measurements of photons and electrons... However, it is absolutely interesting and worthwhile to think about the interpretations of quantum mechanics, but in terms of physics, and not necessarily only in terms of philosophy and logic. I don't claim to understand quantum mechanics deeply but I think it shows that in quantum level nature "is weird" (compared to our "everyday" understanding of reality).

[@MichaelPiercePhilosophy]

Thank you for your comment! I have a few follow-up questions. First, you say that "Quantum...concerns the realm of very small 'objects'," and therefore it "isn't worthwhile to think about [photons and electrons as] physical macroscopic balls hitting each other..." I'm not sure how these two clauses are related. What does size have to do with it? Why can't I conceptualize quantum objects as balls colliding, as opposed to anything else? Couldn't they just be very, very small balls? I am not saying that this is what quantum objects really are, by the way. I do not know what quantum objects are. Rather, my point is that, in order for you to tell me why I can't compare photons and electrons to little balls, you have to say that they are NOT like little balls. Well, if they aren't ball-like, what are they like instead? Are they field-like? Gnome-like? My point in the paper is simply that, to say they are not like anything at all cannot be strictly correct, for even if they do not perfectly resemble any one thing from macroscopic experience, surely we can construct a chimera of such features to approximate it. There must be certain things which they are MORE like and certain other things they are LESS like. And it is THIS which I want clearly stated and worked out. My second question is, what do you mean when you say it is "worthwhile to think about the interpretations of quantum mechanics, but in terms of physics, and not necessarily only in terms of philosophy and logic"? For, I don't think of those three subjects as easily extricable from each other. I don't think you can do physics without philosophy and logic; I don't know what that would look like. Philosophical and logical assumptions underlie everything form of knowledge. But even if I am mistaken about this, and physics is a separable subject, my question would be WHY I should explore the interpretations through physics instead of philosophy/logic? Will philosophy somehow lead me astray? Why can't physics do the same thing? As a final note, I am quite happy with the quantum level being "weird". But I'm not satisfied with leaving it at that. Saying something is "weird" is not an explanation but an observation. Newton's conception of gravity was very, very weird back in the 1700s, but we don't think of it as "weird" now. The question is precisely HOW it is weird, and why we should consider that to be more weird than anything else.

[@AeonBaudrillard]

@@MichaelPiercePhilosophy Your second paragraph here is very ironic since, as a Plato enjoyer, you must surely notice that, for example, "the center" in the classical sense cannot be said to be MORE or LESS distant from any one of the points with which it communicates, or, as a Nietzsche enjoyer, that the "natural" conclusion of valuation (mercantile abjection) makes it such that money cannot be said to be MORE or LESS fungible relative to anything and everything that it might be exchanged for. That is to say, the only agent that you can (rightly) accuse of "antirealism" is reality itself.

[@benjaminburt4285]

Congratulations Michael!