Bad design can kill: Missile defense and user fatigue

[@aaronclair4489]

This video is actually way too short, not way too long. Phenomenal video, subscribed right away. I have a few questions that I haven't been able to answer for myself: 1. Moskva had pretty old, unmodernized radars. Moskva had two different 3D long range air search radars: the MR-800 and the MR-710. Both radars were mounted high on the mast, so I imagine that Moskva had a good radar horizon for air search. What I don't understand is why Moskva had two different radar systems with similar capabilities but different designs, both seemingly doing the same job. I also haven't been able to figure out if either the MR-800 or MR-710 had a Pulse Doppler mode. I imagine seeing a sea skimming ASCM would be very hard without Pulse Doppler (otherwise, the missile disappears into the ground clutter). 2. I don't know what the electronics on a Neptune ASCM are like. Neptune is an old airframe with brand new electronics. The manufacturer for Neptune advertises the missile's ECM system. As Moskva was built in Mykolaiv, it's possible that the Neptune's radar and ECM were designed to defeat the Moskva, using inside info from Mykolaiv. I don't know how plausible this is: people keep EW details secret. But yes, your video's point is excellent. User fatigue is a big deal when you need to watch something boring. A psychologist once told me that people have trouble focusing on one thing for more than two hours, but I believe this varies by task. A radar scope is very tedious, and I think many organizations and designers allow themselves to ignore user fatigue. Excellent video, thanks for sharing.

[@anderspuck]

Thanks. I'm glad you like it. I'm afraid I don't know the answers to your questions. But it's a good point that the Ukrainians could have inside knowledge about the systems on Moskva, and that the missile could be optimized to beat them.

[@christianpatton9364]

Even with radars mounted high on a mast the warning time from detection to impact for a subsonic missile is only around 90 seconds, very short. Also they were apparently tracking a Ukrainian drone at the time so they were distracted. Interestingly from the picture of the burning Moskva you can see the short range SAM systems and main fire control system for the long range SAM are in the stowed position suggesting they weren’t on high alert.

[@adrianholroyd4533]

@@anderspuck I wonder if the Ukrainian strike may have been timed for late in a shift, rather than when operators were fresher at beginning of shift. And they knew what the shifts were because they knew the Russians would adhere to the same old shifts they'd had back when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Navy? They would know of Moskva's radar weaknesses in rain; combine that with a night-time low-level strike late in shift.

[@freedomandsecurity5632]

1). Bad weather and then you put on interference, which the operators believe is due to the weather and changes the sensitivity of the radar. You only get a single experience of a real missile attack if you do not succeed in doing the right thing. They have 60-90 seconds to get an order on what to do about the problem. 2). It is not entirely impossible that they went close to land to be able to use a mobile network. Which I think NATO is happy to ensure that they can connect with. What no one knows inside, you get that information there. 3). Russians are the world's best at breaking all rules and ignoring information. In zoos other tourist places run all over the world that Russians visit, it says in the country's language and English. "Do not feed the animals!" / "Do not touch the objects". But also in the Russian language because they shit in rules and every information.

[@Talashaoriginal]

There is even a nearly finished sistership of the Mosqua in Mykolaiv as far as i know.

[@piccolo917]

that "being bored and non-attentive while watching a screen where nothing happens" bit hit close to home. I'm a biomedical scientist and during my bachelor's internship I had to operate a Strong Cation Liquid Exchange Chromoatographer. That's a machine that sorts peptide fragments based on how positively they are charged. I needed that to collect the fragments that were most likely to contain a certain crosslink I was looking for. Operating that machine was boring as all hell, though. The cycle took 45 min, of which the first 15 and last 10 preparation and washing, respectively. During the 20 min I did have to pay attention, I was looking at a line that was sllloooooowly climbing and once in a blue moon spiked a little. during that time, I had to move an eppendorf tube underneath the machine to capture the peaks and make sure that tube didn't overflow. afterwards, I had to drop those in a container of liquid nitrogen and later freeze dry them. The problem was that I needed to go through that at least 120 times. The first 10-20 are interesting, but after that, it becomes horrendously boring. And when you have the choice of playing with liquid nitrogen and watching a line move, yea, sometimes you get distracted.

[@usedcarsokinawa]

Very good point you made about operator fatigue. It is impossible to be on alert on a normal daily basis. People get complacent, especially when you think you are undefeatable. When you are Goliath you don't pay enough attention to David.

[@peterl7346]

Agreed. Well thought through and the most valid sounding thoughts on what went wrong onboard.

[@mikethespike7579]

When I was studying industrial design back in the 1980s we had a professor whose field of expertise were user interfaces. I'm sure he 'd have had a field-day with all this Russian stuff.

[@tyronemarcucci8395]

Their rigid way of doing things stems from the days of Stalin. When he told them to make exact copies of the B29's that landed in Siberia,they even used Boeing on the control l and rudder pedals. That exact.

[@carrolbrooks2143]

It appears China has the same problem, just watch a video of their parades, their vehicles look just like Hummers and Abrams Tanks!?!!

[@dhc4ever]

On that B29, they also included a battle damage repair patch on the tail.

[@zereprd3911]

I don't know if this might be considered a different perspective, but when you refer to operator fatigue that speaks to me about an individual's ability to maintain as a function of their stamina. Yet the perspective I wondered about is what might be similar in comparison to night-time driving, which I've heard termed as "highway hypnosis". Mundane, repetitive observations over a prolonged period of time can tend to lull the operator into a hypnotized zombie state as well, which could cause the observer to miss changes or updates that they are particularly watching for. I hope you see the distinction I'm trying to highlight there? Is there truly a distinction?

[@nunyabidness674]

There is a slight difference, but the outcome can be similar. An old saying in the US is that combat is 10 hours of boredom followed by 10 minutes of terror. When fatigued, and the fertilizer hits the fan you only have so much of a reserve of attention you can use to respond. When the daily norm is seeing the same thing and looking for something different, you might not notice immediately but when you do you are the most attentive you have ever been. The real trick is noticing something is happening on the first place.

[@taylorbotnewsomtest5860]

I'm unable to recall at this moment the name of the article or it's source, but I have read that studies indicate our brains work against us here. When repeating the same exact action over and over, especially over extended time frames without rest or in situations of stress and fatigue, our brains will subconsciously try to filter out what it decides after a while is unnecessary information. For example, when you physically feel the need to take a piss, you've actually needed to for about 20 minutes, but your brain ignores the nerve signals telling you that until they reach an intensity that makes you notice. It's believed to be the case that similar outcomes can occur with any process your brain becomes accustomed too.

[@memespeech]

boredom applies to any work, especially with long hours, add to this something like adhd makes a person less capable of it

[@TheBelrick]

There is currently no evidence Moskva was hit by anything. Where are the photos of holes blown in the ship? The burning shots i see show an internal fire with no missile holes. Compare that to USS Stark for example. Now let us be clear, Ukraine is a vile globalist pig of a state engaged in highly effective propaganda, if you say evidence for the missile strikes comes from Moskva comes from Ukraine heresy then youre an idiot. My money is on sabotage. Still a victory for Ukraine and way more believable.

[@MrBlackHawk888]

I would agree that these 2 are a bit different things, you have a point there. First is about generally being tired after many stressful shifts and lack of sleeping time between them. And second is indeed about being "made tired" after observing unchanging situation on the screen. Seems like author messed these up a bit, but eventually result is almost the same - dangerous loss of concentration. I heard that they in Norway build tunnel lights in a way, that they emit different spectre on different parts of tunnel so that drivers would see changing colours as they travel the tunnel. Thus, addressing the "highway hypnosis" issue, because genuinely there is not much of anything else going on in a tunnel...

[@jimgraham6722]

Besides small, very low flying missiles being simply hard to detect, when I was in the AS business we would put in early evening feints to wear the crew down and plan our main attack for around 3-4am. Also the ASMs in lightly armoured launch tubes on deck could easily cook off and seem a recipe for disaster.

[@hansachter5657]

Now that seems a good explanation and tie in of the drone distraction everyone is talking about. Not at the same time as the Neptune attack but to wear them down earlier in the shift with a bunch of nonsense.

[@KillerKiller655]

Such a crap..... and biased .... looking into particular cases ..... of this and that you made a crappy construction of issues.... go study maths and after make a serious analysis

[@hansachter5657]

@@KillerKiller655 wow, what an amazing in-depth analysis! I think you have everyone convinced of your command of "maths" and calling it crap.

[@a24396]

@@KillerKiller655 What?

[@antonfarquar8799]

"Also the ASMs in lightly armoured launch tubes on deck could easily cook off and seem a recipe for disaster." BINGO !!!!!

[@maximthemagnificent]

On a similar topic, I am convinced I couldn't be attentive enough for hours on end to respond safely to a rare, unknown, and sudden failure in Tesla's driving systems.

[@donjones4719]

This will be a problem going forward. A young driver will have very little experience handling a car manually and yet when they do need to take control it may be to do some very quick and extreme maneuvers that would tax even a very experienced driver in the present. The more years that go by, the more non-capable drivers there will be on the road. I imagine this is why Tesla wants to press forward to truly full self driving vehicles.

[@johndor7793]

Very good point. People shouldnt put their trust yet today in age of computers where "glitchiness" can be life and death.

[@williambarck5958]

Incredibly astute analysis, Mr Nielsen, and in all likelihood, dead accuraten I'm reminded of the Falklands war, 40 years before this, when inattention by combat and operator fatigue probably played a similar role in the sinking of the HMS Sheffield by a low-flying Skyhawk with an Exocet caused the loss of the ship and numerous crew casualties, and the antiquated antisubmarine defenses of the Argentine cruiser Admiral Belgrano sunk by the Royal Navy submarines torpedoes. The combination of operator error or inattention plus inadequate user interfaces might have played a significant role at that point in history, and the confusion and "Fog of War" that accompanied these events were to make the whole endeavor vastly more costly than if either side had better training and preparation.

[@georgehollingsworth2428]

Having actually had to BE on Radar Watch for long periods back in the 1970s, I can testify as to how mind numbing it is. I also note that the consoles appear identical to what we had on commercial vessels in the 1970s.

[@Mithranos]

Also the weather conditions where reported to be very stormy with high waves. These conditions can adversely effect defensive systems. Basically they hit it at the right time.

[@woozock]

Whoa great video material for a job interview at the DOD. Nice analysis doc 😉

[@watdeneuk]

1:30 minute in and I'm subscribing. Good stuff.

[@AntonHinxman]

I like the phrase "before the accident happened"🙃

[@bellumpullum9734]

One thing I'd add to the other causes that attributed to slow reaction time is the rigid hierarchical structure of the Russian Military, western nations give more autonomy to the lower level guys in making quick defensive decisions whereas the Russians have to firmly adhere (from what I've gathered over the years) to their command structure. I'll now refer to your earlier subject of the ships adhereing as firmly as possible to navigation instructions and speeds even though the situations called for a more flexible approach.

[@0xCAFEF00D]

It may be too long for a general KZbin audience but I've watched countless 1 hour presentations here on KZbin about the Ukraine War now.

[@SenorTucano]

Attributing the sinking to Neptune missiles is plausible but yet to be confirmed. The Moskva was an antique warship with poor standards of maintenance and crew training and an accident cannot be ruled out. For those wishing to dismiss this as fanciful keep in mind that HMAS Westralia was almost lost in 1988 due to a catastrophic fire resulting from poor maintenance.

[@andygass9096]

Excellent interpretation of actual crew performances, I would like to point out that during the Falklands War when the UK type 42 Destroyer, HMS Sheffield was attacked by a air launched Exocet, the ship was at "high alert" but not action stations. The Captain was in his cabin, the Air defence officer was having a coffee in the Wardroom (officers rest room) and his deputy had gone to the toilet.. Also the threat radar detection system was masked by transmissions from the sat-com system that had chosen to transmit at that moment.. The lookouts did detect the missile but that gave insufficient time for the Watch keeper to do anything other than a "hit the deck" warning over the ships tannoy.(loudspeaker).

[@ramagefreak]

a thought is that if a drone was involved. UK operators know approx the distance the radar reaches. keep dipping the drone into and out of that range. annoy the operators. later dip further in, but never loiter. once they stop reacting to that "attack". you then launch your attack. that 2 minutes is now a minute before the operator realizes it is not just another bother and a real attack.

[@johnwhitehurst474]

Anders I agree, all Military have a problem with that. Knowing a shift change can be key, we all get tire dat the end of a shift. It is a tedious job and one gets bored as you state. Some Users have enhanced system to assist, I do not believer the Russian's have such, cost to much.

[@nathanworthington4451]

This video is perfect if you're having trouble going to sleep.

[@jamoecw]

you hit the nail on the head i think. Russian military is very centralized, and all of that is a function of centralized control. the US military has been centralizing over the past few decades as well, and we have the same problems developing. the old fashioned way of dealing with operator fatigue is shorter watches and redundancy. two people watching the RADAR makes it easier to catch things, and they can talk to each other about the screen or something else to keep their minds active. on paper this looks like laziness, and thus with centralization this tends to go away and you end up with longer watches and less redundancy. that works with experienced crews, but it doesn't allow less experienced crews to learn the ropes so they can be as proficient (dealing with such fatigue is a mind thing and thus you can't teach it in a classroom setting or with short classes).

[@wolves201]

40 years ago, the Falklands war was a wake-up call to the threat of sea skimming missiles, air defence radars operating close to land and the lack of close in weapons (CIWS). HMS Sheffield got hit because her crew were not properly prepared. Other ships picked up the threat and successfully decoyed the missile. In fact, of all the Exocets launched three hit their targets. Sheffield, Atlantic Conveyor and HMS Glamorgan. Atlantic Conveyor was a merchant ship and had no self defence systems, not even chaff. As a result, when HMS Alacrity fired its chaff the missile was decoyed but instead picked up the bulk of the Atlantic Conveyor. HMS Glamorgan is a fascinating story. One of her officers calculated that a turn away at a certain angle may deflect the missile. Glamorgan almost achieved this fete but the missile exploded in the hangar. The crew put out the subsequent fires and Glamorgan was able to steam away. The conflict highlighted the need for reliable, fast reacting weapons as radar failures, weapon jams and lack of close in weaponry all contributed to the Royal Navy taking a bit of a battering. The tale of all this is that the Moskva was operating some 60 miles offshore when she was attacked. Complacency, lack of preparedness, believing that Ukraine did not possess sea-skimming capable weapons that could threaten the ship, poor reaction times/drills, radar malfunctions etc all may have contributed. And, as happened with Sheffield, if the ship was not closed down properly and had many of her doors and hatches open then a fireball could have quickly spread through the ship and reached magazines and live munitions.

[@Gsoda35]

we call that incompetence when you are not prepared for enemy attacks.

[@petersmythe6462]

"This looks like something from the 1980s." It probably is. And if everything else in Russia is being taken into account, that's probably also when the last inspection date was.

[@danwylie-sears1134]

I would expect a radar operator to react more slowly and less reliably if they frequently get false alarms. So if I'd been in charge of targeting Moskva, I would have flown Bayraktars (or anything else I could get) within range of its radar but not close enough to be a threat, in the weeks before the actual attack, often enough that seeing something on the radar and ignoring it became routine for the operators. Ideally, I would do the harassing missions so that the operator has to alert the next person in the process, so that the next person is also used to getting alerts from the radar operator and ignoring them.

[@robertlaw4073]

Good video. If you are going to commit to manpower over technology, you have to go all-in, meaning you have to install parallel processes and redundancy. Lean-and-mean requires the leverage of productivity enhancing tech. If you have two operators watching on identical scopes, it can still happen they will both be fatigued at same time, but you have more flexibility to do things like offset the shift rotations, as well as design rules for reward to incentivize continued engagement. Because in a single system, you are only judged by failures or successes but in a paraellel system you are judged relative to the guy or gal on the other scope. I would also say that in this scenario, there is a myriad of options to increase the "fatigue" factor. The Ukrainians my not have had the drones out flying loop-d-loops on the night of the attack, but if they had sent them up with a similar radar picture to what was seen on the actual missle approach, then called back the drones, when the tech would have seen it for the umph-teenth time the same radar signature, they would maybe not be as concerned until the point of deviation, which could have been that 1 minute "too late to respond" window.

[@davhot4107]

The same thing happen to the U.S.S. Stark. All defense systems she was build for failed. And as a result she was hit by two Exocet missiles from a bussines class jet.

[@Satchmoeddie]

Soviet Russia's air force was very heavily dependent upon instruction from Soviet Russian ground controllers. Micromanagement was rampant within The USSR, and there seems to be some carryovers from the USSR days into The Russian Federation's everything.

[@Bjowolf2]

"It will go down in naval history ... " - well, it has already gone down 😂

[@mister0zorg]

But if a dot is coming on the radar screen, is there no alert sound?

[@jonsouth1545]

I just forwarded this video to the likes of Drach, Dr Clarke and Jamie from Armoured carriers they will love this and so will there fanbase this is amazing

[@57thorns]

Honestly the russian sailors looked very professional, like professional actors in a propaganda piece.

[@robertomanalo6346]

The reason why Moskva Class was Bad desogned ? Moskva Class was already obsolute designed date back 1976 and his Air Defense System and his Anti Ship missile and other defense mechanism system are already obsolute they never upgrade their system . Due lack of logistic support and add more injuries Economic sanction by the West in 2014 Annexation of Crimea . Russia relayed to much on Western Chips on there Military Hardware and Equipment .

[@Subsandsoda]

First Moskva, now Admiral Makarov. Pretty impressive to lose two ships to a country that basically has no navy.

[@davidandrew6357]

This "Things were to boring" prior to the attack, theory sounds close to the mark to me, as a former US Navy sailor. My own ship had several incidents occur while I was on board, that were the result of similar cases of things getting to routine and repetitive. So I remember thinking that about the same thing had happened when the USS Stark was struck by an Iraqi missile attack in 1987.

[@bluemarlin8138]

Right, but the Stark wasn’t an active combatant in a war, and was fooled because the plane that launched the Exocets was a converted civilian aircraft and was showing up as such on the radar. It was also 40 years ago. I’m sure US air defenses have advanced a lot since then. Russian defenses, not so much.

[@jimhutchinson9817]

I was a radar man in the US Navy in the early sixties in peace time I think we would have spotted the target within 5 or 10 sweeps and have reported and started tracking it

[@teeanahera8949]

Sorry to nitpick but some words are important to spell correctly for your point to make sense. An example, I know a road sign that says “Are You Going To Fast?”, now that literally means there is a town called Fast and the question is whether you’re going there. So “things were *too boring” makes sense and likewise *too routine would be the only way that would make sense. To and too have no connection and are not interchangeable.

[@michaelcorbidge7914]

@@teeanahera8949 or it could .mean '' do you intend to fast '' .

[@jackdonith]

Indeed, that's my experience too. And I laugh at some scenarios that the drone drove their attention away as if if you are watcking the screen for the one sign you won't notive a 2nd or 3rd one. I've even heard that the radars focused on the other side. I mean don't they check 360 degrees? What are radars? Flashlights?

[@WilliamDaugherty]

USAF/DOD funded a lot of research on "vigilance" at the University of Cincinnati when I was a student there in the 1990s. I will tell you, as someone who spent many sessions in the isolation booth watching a radar screen in the dark and quiet, it was absolute torture after an hour. That said, this could easily be a major factor in the ship's failure to defend itself.

[@TimberwolfC14]

Was talking to a crew member of a warship where the Captain would swap his people around every 20 min mainly because after that time the rate of alertness nosedives, so he trains his people in multiple systems and can then rotate them around thereby keeping a strong alert level amongst the crew.

[@DanKaschel]

In many industries that have similar issues, a powerful technique is to introduce frequent tests. For example, the software can introduce frequent artificial signals to flag. This changes the expectation of the user and keeps them more engaged. That said, frequent rotation is also very effective and also forces frequent breaks, a necessity for that kind of work. Plus, it doesn't require any special software. :)

[@pRahvi0]

@@DanKaschel That's also a way to keep people alerf for scam emails - send them a fake scam email every now and then and give points for spotting them. I've had that kind of system in many jobs and it really does work.

[@colinm3130]

Thank you Putin and the oligarchs for embezzling all the money that would have been used to build a powerful military!

[@TheJacobshapiro]

It’s a pretty well-known fact in aerospace circles that Soviet-era human factors engineering was basically non-existent. Don’t believe me? Compare the cockpits of a 1980s MiG-29 and an F-16C from the same era. The difference is night and day. The Soviet plane’s cockpit is a cluttered mess. Russia has improved on these designs, but given that the Moskva was a Soviet-era ship and the Russian MoD has been strapped for cash, it makes sense that the missiles may not have been noticed or were noticed too late by a sailor manning an old, cluttered and unintuitive console.

[@XOmrfloyd]

Well, imho not good comparsion. F16 had from start multifunction display and digital fly by wire system while Sovite due the lack of tehnology had to use analog systems. 1 instrument = 1 function. Now, could Mig29s instrument panel have more ergonomic layout with same number of instruments.....dont know.

[@ndx6779]

@@XOmrfloyd Why do you think it's a bad comparison if your reply is simply just restating what he said, in more specific detail? Yeah, MiG-29 cockpit was a cluttered mess, as he said...because of the analog systems, as you said.

[@_Addi_]

Not to mention the insane lack of training all russian service members have. Im pretty sure fighter pilots only get 8 hours of flight a week. That is not even nearly enough to keep familiarized with all the systems on the aircraft, let alone do more complex things such as carrier landings or sead ops.

[@DanKaschel]

​@@_Addi_I suppose I'm glad Ukrainians aren't fighting a better prepared foe, but I still feel bad for the Russian pilots and sailors. It's awful that humans are treated as disposable.

[@HistoryonYouTube]

Whilst doing some research, I looked at video from the 2008 war with Georgia in which Russian sailors were at battle stations stripped to the waist which struck me as quite odd. Within my knowledge of the Russian armed forces, initiative is not encouraged and standing orders and procedures have to be followed. I was in Ukraine at the time of the sinking of the Moskva, morale was already quite high but that made it go ballistic!

[@adnev47]

Nice pun 👌

[@HistoryonYouTube]

@@adnev47 I thought it was quite good too Adam!

[@Ariccio123]

Stripped to the waist for what reason? Heat?

[@HistoryonYouTube]

@@Ariccio123 Lots of people do it in hot weather Alexander - although in military situations it shows a complete lack of discipline.

[@Ariccio123]

@@HistoryonKZbin I also have a feeling that sailors who are on the edge of heat stroke are not combat effective 😉

[@dudleyshaw4823]

Right on! Operator fatigue is not only a problem for the military but also for operators of nuclear plants, refineries, chemical plants etc. Design of the user interface is critical. The 30 minute limit you mentioned comes from a WWII study that tried to find the limit for lookouts on ships (before radar). After about 30 minutes the lookout couldn’t see a large plane coming right at them. The more stressful the situation the SHORTER the time.

[@joyhouse4625]

The truth is a Russian cruiser rader would of had hundreds of triggers on it's rader? Everyone forget jet's fighter's were flying around too and missiles from Russian warships. It would of been impossible to tell friendly missiles from enemie missiles in war zone . The problem the Russian have is communicating friendly / enemie missiles. 2nd problem is a battle cruiser shouldn't be next too enemies land base's and coasted line for long-period of time or in daylight. Would be a easier trigger for artillery fire 🔥 too. Know way of 100% protection against good train 🚆 sea coast-line defence 🌊 .

[@johanselander7708]

Yea I remember reading about the 30 minute time limit when I was in university studying psychology. I also got to experience it personally when we were sailing recreationaly in the Swedish archipelago in heavy fogg, me, my sister and her husband, many years ago. Maybe not the smartest thing to do but it was a short distances with not mush wind. I steard extremely focused at the compass and almost att exact 30 min or a bit before that my eyes started get watery and I started blinking uncontrolled. It was impossible to read the compass at al and my brother in law took over. Very interesting to experience that reality totally matched the written knowledge.

[@karstenburger9031]

@@johanselander7708 yes and if the screen flickers that is even much worse.

[@mungo7136]

There was an advice regarding giving speech, lesson etc. - people can keep attention for about 20 minutes, afterwards they start to wander away, think about their own issues, fall asleep. Thus you either limit your speech to max. 20 min. or when you have to make longer talks, you should add points to once again draw attention back - make a joke, add some story and so on. I guess that watching same picture over the screen must be even worse.

[@rodncin]

@@joyhouse4625 Uss Wisconsin was damaged by 155mm howitzers because she strayed too close to the shore during the Korean war. To her credit, she returned fire oblierating the battery and all of its support equipment. Just a fun fact to back up your insights

[@russeldavis1787]

Boredom, shock and confusion in the Ops room and bridge crew was a symptom identified by the post action report over the loss of the Sheffield. The shock to the crew and a loss of Central command then carried across into the damage control/ firefighting efforts , which were further hampered by design and equipment failings about the ship. Much as your argument follows here

[@neilgriffiths6427]

HMS Sheffield, 1982, to give context to our non-UK (and Argentinian) viewers...

[@sirmalus5153]

Probably a simmilar situation was happening on the MOSKVA. When documentaries come out about this war in the comming years (gotta love discovery channel) We will most likely be told a horror story of equipment that didn't work and a young crew that didn't know what they were doing (mostly) Those missiles most likely gave seconds of warning, if they were seen at all (probaby not)

[@maj.romuloortiz7832]

@@sirmalus5153 Training, Discipline, Morale and Competent Command are key.

[@geneard639]

From my experience? 20 years in the US Navy working electronics? The traditional radar emitter/antenna is actually quite directional. It can scan the sky, or it can scan the near surface of the sea and most scan the sky not realizing that most anti-ship missiles are programmed to fly less than 50 feet over the water. If they depress the radar scan to 'see' those low flying missiles it picks up a lot of garbage reflections from waves so most do not bother. Another issue is many ships electronic warfare systems designed to find and ID the inbound are not connected directly to defense/offense systems for fear of a misfire that hits a friendly so it requires a human to see the target on the screen, order the weapons system on line and to fire and... even if the radar system is depressed to look for those low fliers the time between scan, discover, and firing an automated system may not be quick enough. That is one reason why the US Navy still uses guns for close in anti-missile work and not rockets.

[@springbloom5940]

From my experience, its bullshit. What are the chances that this actually happened and Ukraine didn't make a propaganda video for it? Before going any further, take some time to really consider that. Pentagon said it was an accident, after Ukraine claimed a missile strike. The truth is it was almost certainly a drone torpedo the US delivered recently. Officially, they're unmanned surface vessels, but its a closed hull and the superstructure is modular and can be mostly removed to give it a very low profile. Among the potential applications that have been discussed, are using them as a short range missile platform; and loading them with a warhead for direct attack. When they were delivered, there was a lot of winking and nodding about whether they were a defensive, or offensive system. This would explain why Ukraine and Pentagon are both lying and why Russia thought it was an accident.

[@RobertTapia]

Rain and rough sea helped the missiles hide in the reflections.

[@ehsnils]

I'd also consider the possibility of false positives showing up and that could delay the response as well.

[@jonathanpfeffer3716]

Why would that be a reason for the USN to use gun based CIWS over missile based CIWS? Aren’t they transitioning over to missile based CIWS anyways, with the SeaRAM systems?

[@valueinvestor77]

@@RobertTapia the sea looked like a mirror when that film of the burning ship was made.

[@johngiddens5442]

Great explanation of how the missiles got through the defenses. After they hit (looking at your discussion about the crew’s dress at action stations) there would have been high casualties because of the lack of anti-flash, fireproof clothing and personal equipment. Then, there are the damage control teams. Were they any better trained,worked up and alert than the CIC, or were they also fatigued and not ready to do their job? A Cruiser would be expected to survive a certain amount of action damage. The fact that they didn’t, and they lost the entire ship so quickly suggests a) flaws with the crew training, equipment and alertness, and b) possibly design flaws in the vessel.

[@Ocrilat]

I think you're spot on there. I also wonder if some arrogance crept into the equation too. That the mighty Moscova could be vulnerable to the backwards Ukrainians might have also lulled people into being less that vigilant, or that being concerned about the Ukrainian threat might be seen as defeatist.

[@grahamstrouse1165]

Russian warships from this era also had the same problem that Japanese cruisers and destroyers had in WWII. They carry their heavy ASM ordinance above deck where it’s incredibly vulnerable to attack or accident.

[@christopherg2347]

12:53 Ukraine does the "late painting" a lot with the Stugna-P. Watch the video where they used it to take out 4 tanks in ~ 3 minutes. Or the one where they took out a helicopter with it. It follows the same patern: 1. Line up the shot without the laser active 2. Just a single horizontal or vertical move off the target 3. Fire the missle 4. Wait till it is near 5. Only then point the laser onto the target, allowing the missile to track right into the target Minimal warning time. Nearly guaranteed hits.

[@orlock20]

The U.S. has missiles meant to fool an operator. It looks like the missile will miss but change course at the last minute.

[@christopherg2347]

@@orlock20 Sounds more like a counter to CIWS type systems. Also not really what I meant. I talk about giving any Missile incomming/lockon detection/automates smokescreen as little time as possible before impact.

[@ponygroom]

@@orlock20 The Neptune nav is able to follow waypoints. Not necessarily a straight line to target. Also, it has a search radar, which it turns on only near the end of it's run. In the video he mentions this radar briefly. If the radar was active too far in advance of the time to strike, the missile could more easily be targeted itself.

[@stevemartin4088]

@@ponygroom the R360 is not equipped with a laser seeker, only active radar terminal homing

[@ponygroom]

@@stevemartin4088 I didn't say it was equipped with a laser seeker. Perhaps you meant to reply to someone else? Also I am aware the spec sheet says it has active radar terminal homing.

[@paulkellman5477]

Fantastic video, all of your points about the 'mechanical'-doctrinaire nature of Russian Naval approaches, and discussions of crew quality were particularly adroit. Also I've never seen someone go in like this on Russian UI issues and its great. I do agree and feel that poor crew qaulity, due to some combination of unprofessional training, fatigue, and distraction played a significant role in the sinking, but as someone else in the space, I dispute the idea that there was no TB-2 present/that it played little to no role. Additionally there is a third means of defeating an Air Defense System that you did not highlight: Electronic Warfare and Jamming. Also to my knowledge the Air Search Radars and engagement radars for the S-300F are capable of very low altitude detection and engagement, but either way your point regarding OSA and AK-630 being the critical failure points is correct. The basis of my disputation of your analysis regarding the TB-2 is the strike itself; the Ukrainians clearly felt the Moskva was in a uniquely vulnerable point, so much so that they felt a relatively anemic volley of 2 Neptunes would be enough to bypass her Air Defense Systems. The Ukrainians have one (likely partial) Neptune Battery, so utilizing these extremely precious munitions, and possibly revealing the battery's position if the Russians were lucky enough to have an ISR asset in area, was a decision that had to have been taken with huge consideration. The launch of only 2 missiles, rather than a battery level launch to attempt to out-sature Russian AD indicates they genuinely did feel they had a good shot to take. They have no means of knowing if the Radar Operator is smoking a cigarette or tired or making a mistake to ensure such favorable calculuse, which indicates that they must have some means of enabling. Something had to facilitate the Ukrainians feeling they had a strong enough hand here to take on Moskva with only 2 R-360s. The claim of a TB-2 is plausible in this regard. Supported by shore or UkrAF based EW elements, it's easy to see how, especially with fatigued Radar Operators lookign at a poor interface with insufficient computer support, would definitely miss small inbounds, and perhaps even the radiation-activation alarm. Assuming a tough EW environment, or any sort of tailored EW approaches against Moskva's air search radars, even if the activation alarms occurred, it would be difficult to resolve a solid position rather than an ambiguity zone, much less an engagement grade track, especially for OSA, until it was too late. It would also heighten the confusion/reaction delays in the OODA loop you so expertly highlighted. One last point I BELIEVE that the Moskva's short refit included a new Battle Management system that supposedly had a TEWA capability, but a. I'm not 100% sure on that and b. I think we're all familiar with the idea that certain Russian capacities may only exist on paper. Excellent video, and I mean no disrespect or direct challenge in my critique/alternate explanation. Thank you for your excellent work, and in particular, the crew quality and user interface stuff you've offered. Truly fascinating stuff.

[@simplexj4298]

Great video, and for me as a software designer an absolutely valid approach! I've worked on so many badly designed user interfaces, I can hardly count them all.

[@gregwarner3753]

Remembering my experience crossing the Pacific Ocean on a WW2 Liberty ship converted to a small craft repair ship (USS Tutuila ARG-4) over 50 years ago, the experience was intense boredom, sleep deprivation and hyper caffeination to stay functional. Mistakes were easy to make. I agree with the idea that these Russian sailors were sleep deprived, exhausted and bored so they did not notice their instruments were reporting, if they were even turned on, the incoming missiles until it was too late or not at all. While I have no sympathy for the Russian command and their political monsters, I do send my sympathies to the sailors that died just doing their jobs.

[@TheEDFLegacy]

Same. I want nothing more than for Russia to lose, those who feel they have no choice but to participate or face prison or execution, I feel for them.

[@ThorstenStaerk]

maybe I oversimplify, then please tell me where I do. If I was a commander of a crew with sleep deprivation, I'd say, here is the deal, 5 guys can sleep as long as they want, but they have to watch the damn radar in 6 hour shifts round the clock. Am I a genious for having this idea? I think not. So, what's happening on navy ships?

[@ThorstenStaerk]

@@ts757arse thanks for this great answer!

[@arandompasserby7940]

"While I have no sympathy for the Russian command and their political monsters, I do send my sympathies to the sailors that died just doing their jobs." That's the real problem with war - The people who demand it are never the ones to lose their friends, kids and family members in it. It's everyone else who has to foot the bill with their lives.

[@slappy8941]

You're exactly right; fatigue effects attention, cognitive skills, and reflexes very greatly.

[@RobRoam]

You're right on the money. I use to be an OS in the RAN on old school FFGs. They had the same tech you showed on the RU ship. Fatigue is a real thing but there is one important point you left out and that is the morale of the individual. Sitting at a console for hours at a time is boring (as you point out). My experience in the RAN was that very few people have a high level of motivation, whether that is on operations or excercise. Most people lack a level of professionalisum that you would expect. So with that said I think a combination of fatigue, idiot bosses and really not giving a stuff (because they thought they were invincible) was the reason/s for the sinking of this ship...

[@horrido666]

Keep in mind the sea condition. Its night, and seas are extremely high, tossing the ship around. Absolutely everyone on that boat who didn't have their sea legs was sick. I also think there's a possibility that Ukraine fired more missles, and is just not saying. It is more believable that the battery fired all missiles if they knew it was the Moskva. That's the standard way of doing it. Firing missiles piecemeal is a way to waste your missiles. The doctrine is to fire all at the same time.

[@RunPJs]

That's a good point! If that was so then it's quite possible they did shoot down missiles, and some got through. Basically, unless we were present in that very moment it's hard to know what really happened.

[@MarcosElMalo2]

@@horrido666 I agree with your assessment of how many Neptunes were fired. The vehicle used for launch has four tubes. Now consider this: what if the Neptune differs from its predecessors by having a much lower skim height. It would run the risk of hitting a larger swell, but in this case, two got through.

[@frankryan2505]

I've worked on a few ran bases and know what you're saying.. When you see the same group of out of shape guys on their 4th smoke break a few hours into shift you know it's not tip of spear (as a tradie I signed into the building same time as them every morning so was pretty surprised how bludgey they seemed) I honestly expected a bit more if they were frontline though. Quick question though, half the rooms In the building I was working on had legit hatches,how common is this.

[@frankryan2505]

I've worked on a few ran bases and know what you're saying.. When you see the same group of out of shape guys on their 4th smoke break a few hours into shift you know it's not tip of spear (as a tradie I signed into the building same time as them every morning so was pretty surprised how bludgey they seemed) I honestly expected a bit more if they were frontline though. Quick question though, half the rooms In the building I was working on had legit hatches,how common is this.

[@frednone]

Train as you fight, yeah, we learned that the hard way. I was on board Ranger in 83, a couple of the guys who were killed were found with the Oxygen masks behind their heads. They'd done everything right in activating their OBA, but since when we trained we put the masks behind our head so it was easier to breath and see, when it was for real they followed habit and it killed them.

[@noahway13]

Yep, how you practice is how you play. (Little Legue version)

[@sulevturnpuu5491]

I'm willing to bet the russians have never thought anything more than the navy blues is needed inside ship turing combat. Body armor does little to help save the ship and lives of men have never been important in russian armed forces.

[@Deckape75]

Fire resistant uniforms, flash hoods/gloves, and helmets are the bare minimum during drills in the USN even during the military drawdown in the mid-90's when I served.

[@johnfisher1755]

As a former "old crow" I found this article very informative

[@olivere5497]

@@Deckape75 flashhoods have been around since 1915.

[@poppi510]

“I literally can’t think of anything that Ukraine could hit that would have been a more costly target” I could, Putins Mansion.

[@additudeobx]

While he was sitting on the bidet with water squirting into his Azz....

[@x67th]

I've been saying this often. Why aren't they targeting that billion dollar Palace on/along the Black Sea? Highly valuable asset to which ever Russian owns it

[@bluemarlin8138]

@@x67th Might be out of Neptune/Harpoon range. Maybe we can send Ukraine some Tomahawks so they can help Vlad celebrate May 9th?

[@ExarchGaming]

@@bluemarlin8138 it's certainly the range, and the capabilities... the neptune is a modified KH-35, which is a subsonic soviet era cruise missile. It wouldn't make it past the coastal air defenses, (at least.....that's what I would have said, before they sunk the moskava and today hit the Admiral Makarov, I don't know if they sunk it yet) They'd need a much longer ranged cruise missile launched from the sea, or a large ballistic missile with a conventional HE or FA warhead. But i'm afraid launching a missile with the range of a short range ballistic missile might be misidentified as an incoming nuclear strike to hit it from the ground.

[@KalatSaar]

@JZ's Best Friend that one where he is in in that Moment when the Missile hits !!!

[@SaHaRaSquad]

Another interesting tidbit about naval user interfaces: the US actually went back to slightly older (still computer-based) systems because the new touchscreen-based controls they were testing caused issues in stressful situations which led to multiple collisions. One of the reasons was that the flexibility of touchscreens allowed the transfer of any kind of controls to any terminal, which can lead to confusion right when you want to avoid it the most.

[@dinkoz1]

The first wrong assumption is that Russian crews are trained and motivated, the incompetent is legendary in the Russian fleet. Furthermore, a junior officer and an NCO may not act without orders from senior officers, if neither is currently on duty they must seek approval for any trifle not to mention permission to use weapon systems. Maintenance is very poor, much of the system works just enough to be considered operational. Most of the crew still consists of sailors on compulsory military service with minimal training and experience, etc., etc.

[@Wyatt1314.]

Their general education system must be complete fkn garbage. Poor kids!

[@Don.Challenger]

If when you make a mistake you are berated and embarrassed publicly like Putin did to his Intelligence chief or threatened with a beating like that General wanted that officer to receive, then you stick strictly to the planned path and pace - no deviation.

[@purplefood1]

The Russian Navy has been the last consideration for a long time for the Russian defense budget, they've been losing ships in port for years with no facilities to perform repairs aside from the yards they now occupy in Crimea.

[@philgiglio7922]

Which is one of the reasons Vlad wants his land bridge. Also wonder if the middle's impact was on one of the exposed missle housings

[@justacomment1657]

Just curious, but where did you get your inside informations about the crews of ruissan ships? I am just curious, as basic damage controls training does not cost any money, the same is with readyness drills.... You can do those basicly every day and it won't cost anything as the crew is on board anyway...

[@lecoqjeannot3358]

Watch change is the perfect time for an attack. There is usually a few minutes of "floating" when you hand over your screen to the guy taking over. Submarines sometimes played this game. We played it also and slightly advanced or delayed watch changes. Operator fatigue and lack of attention as they were patrolling the same area since weeks, and nothing ever happened. I was radar operator, French Navy in the 70's and yes it takes a lot of will to monitor your screen at top attention during 4 hours. Missiles low over the water at high speed, you have indeed less than 2 minutes warning. Been caught a few times by very low flying planes, where when you see it on the screen, the time to announce it to the Ops Room Officer, give the bearing and range to the artillery guys, you hear the thing screaming over your head....And you think "if this had been for real" we would be ****** by now.

[@soonerfrac4611]

The old adage still remains: complacency kills.

[@shitoryu8]

Fascinating

[@ehsnils]

I wouldn't rule out another factor too - that anything reported has to go to the commander for decision. No own initiative is permitted.

[@soonerfrac4611]

The NCO corps is basically nonexistent in the Soviet military. Or at least not to the extent that they are used in the US & most Western militaries where the NCO’s are the backbone of the force.

[@sailawayteam]

Yes, as the collision of KSM Helge Ingstad with a tanker well demonstrated.

[@WillHayes44]

Former Operator from K130 corvettes here. Well and mostly great explanation of conduct of operations and procedures, I consider the slight inaccuracies are based on too detailed and therefore confidential matter on board. My only criticism is even he actually focused on it but also dragged out the main message of this video: If you don't see the incoming missile, you can't fight it. I remember the awful long transits and watches. To counter the routine my OpsO used to suddenly pop up behind me, starting a brief counter-missile exercise for me. Just to manifest reporting and measures to fight. I also remember his usual quote. "The missile to hit us, is the missile we don't see." All the most sophisticated weapons and counter-missile systems are useless if you don't recognize the threat as a trackable dot on your screen. Doesn't matter if you are distracted or your air radar is just badly performing. You are done. Also don't underestimate the relevance of the electronic warfare division, but whatever they do, that's highly confidential. Russia seems to be confronted with in any regard multi-systemic failure of corruption, disregard of maintenance procedures, no reporting of issues, ignorance and even arrogance of superiors of its military and defense politicians towards Ukraine but also their own enlisted ranks. It appears that the Russian armed forces as a whole aren't combat ready at all. But that's another debate. Well done video. Edit: I apologize; BRAVO ZULU

[@dimasakbar7668]

Question though, do the procedures on corvettes differ greatly with ship in bigger tonnage and system like a cruisers? Are there any redundancy element to prevent a crew negligence from becoming a danger to vessel?

[@ShakesB13r]

I would even go a step further and say: The west's humanitarian views about humans having weaknesses is what russia seems to be lacking, even in the design of these systems. Only if you believe you can punish or sanction an ape to concentrate for 8h on a black screen, you would build something like that. Videogames have just the right approach to glueing an ape to a screen, and it does not use punishments or sanctions. If the Radar plays a game with the soldier and he can get a highscore for catching most simulated rokets during his shift, that would be another league of concentration.

[@HANKTHEDANKEST]

As to your last point, it's nice to see Operators and other experts confirming what a lot of us armchair guys have been saying all along: the Russians are a JOKE--the entire armed forces appear to be completely broken from top to bottom. It's like watching a car crash in slow motion.

[@WillHayes44]

@@dimasakbar7668 Depending on what the Unit is capable to and what doctrines are implemented. A german warship basically always (i guess like danish as well) follows NATO procedures, so it doesn't matter if its a danish major air defender or a german coastal defense corvette. Difference can outplay as a mine hunting unit. Vastly smaller, not capable to all warfare fields but specialized to mine warfare. Though, basic procedures like internal fight (stopping water intake, or just wearing appropriate gear) will be the same. Additionally all European Naval NATO Units gain NATO certification by the british via BOST (basic operational sea training) or GOST (german operational sea training) in Plymouth. Smaller Units also need certification but gain theirs somewhere else. Americans do that themselves but sometimes participate in Plymouth as well (commonly achieving lower grades). US Navy is a good example in that regard. To be NATO Unit, you must be registered in NATO to get allied publications. While all of german Navy is registered and can train to be certified as NATO Unit to eventually participate in a NATO Force, US Navy is splitted in half (pacific and atlantic). Pacific deployed US Navy are not NATO registered. Therefore they cannot be trained, certified and participate in a force as a NATO Unit. Pacific conducts US National procedures and/or pacific partners procedures (Australia, NZ, Japan, South Korea). Broadly, most professional Navies will have similar standards and procedures. We germans trained with west african Navies and more, the brits will do their thing, and a lot of other Navies (lets say Israel, Chile, India and more) buy Units from Germany, France and Britain which require just how they are built similar procedures. But also can be in a UN Force to police Lebanese Imports requiring more than just similar procedures but no official certification. Lesser known EUs ATALANTA mission off Somalia does the same but has EU potentially not NATO members as Units in its force. As you see even it is way more complicated, basically yes, procedures worldwide should roughly be quite similar. But some nations pretend to be more unique and different than others and therefore know "better". Best examples Russia and China. While I'm astonished how russian standards are (British BOST low grade) "below standard". I expect chinese procedures lacking basics as well, but maybe i underestimate them. Hope that helps. Have a good one.

[@WillHayes44]

@@ShakesB13r I appreciate your point.

[@4325air]

What an outstanding analysis. When I first became aware of the missile hits on the Moskva, I immediately thought of 17 May 1987, when two Exocet missiles, fired by an Iraqi Mirage, struck and almost sank USS Stark in the Persian Gulf. But for the damage control design and the training/courage of its entire crew in fighting the fires, she would have sunk... like Moskva. Would be neat to hear Anders compare/contrast the two incidents. Oh, speaking of Russian disinformation: Stark suffered 37 crew killed; Russia claims only one sailor aboard Moskva killed. Sure.

[@ey6008]

Hi hi

[@gerryodonnell321]

Very good point - if you don't acknowledge and learn from your mistakes, this can be fatal. The Russian military are so clever they never make mistakes. This is why the Russians are doomed to failure.

[@4325air]

@@gerryodonnell321 Bingo, Gerry! Right, you are!

[@johnrusac6894]

The first casualty of this “Special Operation “ has been truth. I’m repeatedly surprised at how inept the lies have been. I once believed that misdirection was a strong suit of the Russians. Wrong! Instead of little, subtle believable lies, they keep telling whoppers…and falling on their faces.

[@ludmilascoles1195]

Add to this the Moskva was also upgraded less that 3 years ago, so it had some more modern equipment on the sensor side of things. The other point was there was no radar picket it was operating alone add that in. I think you hit the nail on the head. Most of us ex Navy types agree 100% on your analysis.

[@orlock20]

More modern is relative and who knew if any of it actually worked.

[@scott4766]

Yes I've notice they don't have other ship's protecting it because when the British navy are out at see in a war zone they always have the over ships protecting each other and helicopter's and a wax up to give even more cover. I think Russia have slipped back into how they were at the start of ww 2 but I'm pretty sure they will get there act together very soon. I hope they do anyway.

[@ludmilascoles1195]

@@scott4766In all NATO navies you never go out alone you are always working in a team. 3 or 4 ships min when doing ASW. Just think of it this way you have your most valuable asset you always want to prtected it no matter how good it's AA systems the law of incoming fire always applies. 'Something will always get through' For example I saw the USS Gerald Ford headin out os San Diago going to dyrdock in San Francisco, It still had an attending cruiser with it and no doubt a sub under it. I was either complete disregard or distain of the enemy or just incompetence that is almost incomprehensible.

[@donjones4719]

@@ludmilascoles1195 To not operate with multiple assets to protect the most valuable asset seems nearly impossibly incompetent. Combined elements are an absolute requirement in modern warfare. Yet the Russian Army has consistently operated their tanks and AFVs without air cover of any kind, not even drones.* The overall reporting on this war shows the deterioration of their military is much worse than anyone anticipated. This lack of coordination is now made evident in their Navy, at the cost of their best ship there. My guess is post-war history will show many ships of the Black Sea Fleet were in poor repair and couldn't sustain an operational tempo. *OK, the news video coverage likely has some observer bias. Perhaps Russian tanks with good air cover weren't successfully attacked, thus no celebratory videos.

[@69navyboy]

As a former sailor with the RCN, I can tell you even with T.EVAL. Applications based systems there is still a high degree of operator fatigue. My add on would be the sea skimmer missile was lost in the surface wave radar clutter. It seems the weather was bad and wave levels were high on the day of the attack. Many of the Russian automatic radars that were controling the short range SAM and CWIS systems can't differentiate a wave crest and a missile. Either a lack of multiple depth perception radar filtering systems and or inability to combine data from multiple radars from multiple points of view.

[@bluemarlin8138]

Winds were 4 knots on the day of the attack. The photo of Moskva after the attack shows very calm seas. I’m not saying storms can’t blow up quickly, but the only people reporting this are the Russians. They started using it as an excuse for why the Moskva sank after the “ammunition explosion,” and people have now seized on it as a reason for why the ship was hit in the first place. In my opinion, given the poor performance of Russian military equipment so far, the most likely explanation is that Russian missile defenses-especially naval ones-just aren’t very good. As the video said, they might be serviceable if competently manned, but they’re obviously heavily reliant on training and are not equipped to deal with multiple threats. AEGIS or any modern NATO system would have dealt with this attack easily.

[@TheEDFLegacy]

Don't lie to us! We only have inflatable boats with 50 calibre machine guns, towed by beavers! 😅 j/k🇨🇦

[@Kromaatikse]

@@bluemarlin8138 There was a big weather system in the eastern part of the Black Sea around that time, but not in the northwestern part near Odessa.

[@chrisroach8345]

@@bluemarlin8138 'AEGIS or any modern NATO system would "probably" have dealt with this attack easily.'

[@Dirk80241]

Excellent explanation of why the Moskva’s crew may not have been paying attention. User fatigue due to attention intensive equipment and long hours of nothing happening is an intelligent explanation that makes a lot of sense to me.

[@cv990a4]

It's a good video, I think Nielsen is possibly a bit too kind, if anything. To me, one of the most damning things is the appearance of the Moskva in the pictures that were leaked of it as it was sinking (and after the crew had abandoned the boat), specifically the clear signs of smoke emitted from throughout the hull, even all the way to the rear of the ship. If you're in a war-zone, presumably the boat should be buttoned-up, with all the bulkheads closed. They clearly weren't. That's consistent with the crew being sloppy as to procedures. That likely fed through also to other aspects of operations on the ship. Not saying it's a certainty, just that it's a reasonable guess. I think a decent working hypothesis is that the crew was complacent and sloppy and this was a major factor in (1) not detecting the missiles in the first place (perhaps at all, but certainly until way too late) (2) the ship being in a vulnerable state in terms of open bulkheads, etc, at the time the missiles hit and (3) poor damage control once the ship was hit and that each of these helped take it down. To be a bit fair, it does appear that the ship was hit in a particularly bad place (knocking out main systems, including the ops center for damage control). But I think it's entirely possible that the first time they knew they were under attack was when the missiles hit. One thing that's become apparent in this war is the Russian military equipment and training is a lot worse than was generally believed. It's reasonable to think this is something that affects their navy as well as army and air force.

[@ursodermatt8809]

i think the sailors were distracted because of not being able to loot, rape and levelling cities in ukraine.

[@BillBrandon]

Dirk Boersma what time were the Neptunes launched at Moskva, and when was the watch changed? If the crew was still at Sea Detail (or whatever the Russians call it) fatigue could be part of the problem. If the normal underway watch had just been set, not so much problem with attentiveness. Maybe. At the same time, had Moskva been killing time in the Black Sea for the better part of two months or longer (Snake Island?) An idle sailor’s mind is the Devil’s workshop and not an effective place for supporting good order and discipline. Depending on the state of a Russian conscript’s mind under those conditions.

[@inse001]

Punishment for sleeping at the RADAR: death sentence (carried out immediately)

[@messrsandersonco5985]

@@BillBrandon Of course, they could have just thought, "It won't happen to us". Complacency is a killer during a war.

[@crichtonbruce4329]

A friend of mine was an officer in the US navy. He told me a story of how he was the helmsman on an aircraft carrier entering port. He said he had done multiple 14 hr. days, and was beyond exhausted. Anyway a small ship was sort of in the path of the carrier and the captain ordered a change of heading away from the ship but my friend steered towards it instead. The captain repeated his order and my friend steered even more in the opposite direction ordered. The captain's next command... "Mr. Stewart, please leave the bridge". So, yes, fatigue can screw you up big time.

[@WWeronko]

Officers are not helmsmen. That is an enlisted man's job.

[@user-lh1ef1st9k]

your friend was homer Simpson eh

[@irafair3015]

A carrier would not steer clear of a smaller ship. "The rules of the Road" dictate that the smaller ship or boat, because it is more maneuverable, is the vessel tasked with getting out of the way. Carriers cannot be expected to get out of the way because they don't just turn on a dime, plus there may not be room for them to turn. Not to mention, the captain would not be driving the ship while entering port. That is the job of the Officer of the Deck on the bridge or his equivalent.

[@andrew2677]

​@@irafair3015 Not true. A carrier is still a power driven vessel so if it finds itself in a crossing situation where it is the give way vessel, then the carrier needs to give way. Now the caveat to that is if the carrier was in a narrow channel in which case yes, the carrier would become the stand on vessel.

[@irafair3015]

@@andrew2677 A narrow channel situation is what I was describing. The commenter stated that the carrier was entering port which is usually done in a channel situation where carriers cannot maneuver easily, that's one reason why you have tugs. I was stationed in San Diego, CA for many years and there's no way a carrier can maneuver in or out of that channel safely if it has to perform sudden maneuvers to avoid smaller vessels. The smaller vessels are charged with maneuvering to avoid collisions when the potential arises. Not to mention, if you have crossing situations in San Diego harbor then something is very, very wrong since all vessels in the harbor are moving in only one of two directions: into port or out to sea.

[@scottt5521]

Excellent video analysis. I served in the US Navy for 6 years and 4+ of them on a nuclear cruiser during the cold war. Naval topics can receive strong interest (see the Drachinifel channel) but are typically historical. Covering recent Naval events and new developments should be a winner with the content quality you put into your videos.

[@joethegeographer]

Excellent brief! Your explanation of how Moskva was hit has a lot going for it. Her loss, on the other hand, likely has to do with damage control and possibly also due to design flaws, possibly unapparent ones until the incident. It should have taken 30 missiles or more to flood the defensive systems and 5 to 6 hits to kill her, in my humble opinion; yet Ukraine did it with two missiles. Thanks for sharing your expertise, I'm really enjoying your channel!

[@InteractiveIdea]

There was hidden attack on flat earthers in this video. 🤫

[@bobbyrayofthefamilysmith24]

Flat earthers will soon be on bottom of the sea with the moskva

[@freggo6604]

One fact I have not noticed being mentioned... Replacing Moskva is basically not possible. The Black Sea is a big 'lake'. The only way to get a warship into and out of the Black Sea is thru the Bosporus and Turkey is, at least for now, not going to let that happen.

[@x67th]

Turkey have no reason to open it back up. It actually benefits them in the long term.

[@johndododoe1411]

Well, one option is to sail down a Russian river in a transfer only configuration. That's what we did 1000 years ago, with layovers in places like Moscow. Once in Sevastopol, reconfigure for Black Sea conditions.

[@Aengus42]

Very interesting that in your last sentence you used the word "accident" to describe the sinking of the Moskva. Not even "incident". I think your use of "accident" sums up your point perfectly. This was the first of your videos I've watched. It definitely won't be my last. Subscribed! Edit: It really wasn't too long. I detest this trend for shorter & shorter videos. If it's interesting then the longer the better! I have a passion for watching university lectures online. These may be two hours or more in length. So please don't feel constrained by duration. Duration should be determined by subject, not fashion!

[@Pyriphlegeton]

"This video is probably way too long" On the contrary. Look at the channel "Perun", he's currently blowing up because of his detailed, 1h+ analyses of the war. People love this stuff in long form.

[@douglasturner6153]

The Ukrainians must have been studying, probing and stalking this ship for a few weeks. They probably struck when they thought Muskva most vulnerable. So Russian crew incompetence and weather, defenses and other factors likely shaped the exact method and timing of their attack. Lots of credit to their skills.

[@LordDarthHarry]

Also the storm forced most of the other ships to retreat since they were much smaller than the Moskva.

[@DaweSMF]

Damn, Elon bought even Slava class?

[@loucyphers_nightmare]

There's a report out there that a P-8 possiden help target it

[@douglasturner6153]

@@loucyphers_nightmare I'd really like to know the full story. From the original planning to the execution. Should be quite interesting

[@loucyphers_nightmare]

@@douglasturner6153 : So do I, but if it's true we probably won't get any specifics of the operation until after the war, and we may never know, but the P-8 is more than capable of doing that job, hell, the P-8 could have sunken the ship all by itself

[@lorddorker3703]

With this it makes me realize just how bad the Russian doctrine of metal before meat. Meaning the amount of training that it would take to interpret the old school data vs todays is vast. So when you loose people, which Russia certainly doesn't mind, you loose tons of training and time it takes to retrain. Yikes.

[@Peterromer123]

This content is amazing and really trustworthy since you both predicted the war and predicted Ukraine would stand a chance against Russia. Thanks!

[@jont2576]

in 2006 a chinese made C802 anti ship missile fired by hezbollah struck the israeli billion dollar "stealth" warship ISN hanit about 26 km off the coast of lebanon.......the attack was televised live on television and left the ship disabled and engines damaged and the ship powerless in the water for nearly 8 hours.the israelis claimed its missile defense system was not deployed and its early warning system off.the israelis also claimed that they possessed no intelligence that the hezbollah possessed such sophisticated equipment.although further investigation showed that an israeli intelligence office gave a lecture in 2003 that hezbollah possibly possessed such land to sea missiles. was that also a groundbreaking event and showed the failure of the american systems as the ship was manufactured by northrop grumman that a billion dollar warship could be easily damaged by a bunch of rag tag terrorist with a cheap chinese missile?

[@Itried20takennames]

I agree that is impressive, although the war in Ukraine was likely 50-50 though. Russia has a long history of invading border countries, and even people like me with no military or political background didn’t believe Putin was amassing a huge bunch of troops/supplies at the border for “training.” But I heard pretty much no one predict Ukraine could hold their own, and only heard opposite …sad predictions that the country would likely fall in days.

[@Peterromer123]

@@Itried20takennames Yeah, I also had a feeling Ukraine stood a chance. There were other experts than Anders who predicted that Ukraine stood a chance and they generally seemed to look at many more factors than those other experts, who just said Russia would win. ... but that doesn't take any credit from Anders. Let's see how it goes. I'm sometimes also a bit afraid we are too optimistic.

[@rocksmo3384]

@@Itried20takennames I think we can be quite sure that Ukraine wont fall completly. It is more about how much territory they will loose and wether they might become landlocked or not.

[@kevinlawson6188]

@@rocksmo3384 Russia is losing and is in no position to demand any territory now. Of all the things Zelenskyy did well, pushing hard for more weapons from NATO countries may be the most consequential. Russia's biggest advantage was having the most resources for a war of attrition. They can see now that Ukraine is a bottomless pit where they can never win. And Ukraine can see that they have no reason to give up anything. They will fight now until Russia is gone, including Donbas. Slava Ukraini!

[@tomhaley52]

That was the first thing that came to my mind when this happened, -that someone wasn't paying attention for just a few moments/or was confused as what to do. I was a radar operator from the early 70's era.

[@67Ice]

Good analysis. Tragedy have not one reason, but it´s bunch of small failures chained together. Each one separately isn´t dangerous, but all chained together are deadly.

[@westwindsailer]

Or Swiss cheese model of accumulated errors or holes. Take a stack of these, if many slices overlap just right, and the holes will line up, =hole right through the stack.

[@richardsimms251]

Terrific video and extremely educational for the layman. RS. Canada.

[@wolfi9933]

I worked for a German optronics company that delivered and manufactured parts for the defense industry and i think that that usability, user interfaces etc. are far too underrated in the discussions about how and why Russian/Soviet equipment often fails.

[@midnightrider1100]

Great analysis. Enjoyed your logical theory. Again, common Russian military theme. Corruption - lack of funds - poor training - lack of maintenance - no modernization.

[@Dcook85]

There's also a period of time that is needed to identify WHAT a radar contact is. Even if the radar contact is seen, it's a blip usually on older systems especially. There are more modern systems that can identify many threats, but if it's just a simple radar blip, you can't just immediately engage or else risk a deadly mistake of friendly fire. It may seem obvious to us in hindsight that it was a missile, but there are protocols to avoid friendly fire incidents and that could have even further complicated proper identification, especially on older hardware and UI's.

[@tonyyates2012]

My theory is they used Snake Island as cover, if you look at the Southern most point of Ukraine you will see that its right behind Snake Island. The Moskva was North east of the Island when it was struck , if they fired the missiles from the mainland, used Snake Island to mask the missile track, rounded the Southern tip of the Island and came up aft of Moskva, the close in weapons system would have been seriously compromised, especially the AK CIWS, which has a very limited rear arc of fire. Just my humble theory.

[@clarkeugene5727]

Well, bravo to Snake Island for having more than a single mention in this war.

[@MarttiSuomivuori]

Anti-missile protection cannot rely on human response. What can you do in three minutes unless the ship is already on full alert? Say a prayer, max.

[@orlock20]

Also was any of the defenses kept operational. If it's broken, does it get fixed or just prey nobody attacks the ship?

[@MarttiSuomivuori]

@@orlock20 The Moskva supposedly had multiple layers of defense against subsonic missiles. The Russian navy is not up to high-tech warfare. They are sloppy and careless, they do not perform scheduled maintenances nor do they report observed problems. The lack of discipline is striking. They are more for a show than real fighting.

[@NothernNate]

Ukraine just got a shipment of Harpoons and launchers. I sure hope we see Russia's invasion fleet start getting picked off. 🤘💀🤘 Slava Ukraine! 💛💙💛💙

[@MostlyPennyCat]

_"Too fast, Vasily. Too fast. Those charts are laid out precisely... so many knots at such and such a course for so many seconds. And this thing handles like a pig"_

[@rickbase833]

Excellent analysis! I was an Operations Specialist in US Navy in the mid 80s. My job was to track air targets while underway. We stood 12 hour watch in CIC ( 5 on 7 off 7 on 5 off) and can attest to the fact that staring at a scope (SPS-48/SPS-49 air search radars) can cause user fatigue especially when cruising in open waters like the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea where there isn't much air traffic. At times I learned how to catch zzzzzs while sitting up straight in my chair due to boredom and lack of sleep. Not hard to be distracted either as you have shipmates sitting on either side of you and we would shoot the breeze. Never the less we still knew that there was always a chance we were being tracked by a Soviet sub that could launch ASCMs known in our line of work as Vampires.

[@MostlyPennyCat]

Consider transposing your experience over the Falklands War. They took: 8 Air defense Destroyers 13 General Purpose Frigates with point defense SAMs. 2 Carriers and 20 Harrier V/STOL attack and air defense fighters. And they came under almost immediate attack from fast fighter bombers with Exocet missiles. And they only lost 4 of those escort warships. All with near obsolete sensors and weapons And this is what they achieved: Total destroyed in the air: 45 by: Sea Harrier 21, Sea Dart 7, Sea Wolf 4, Stinger 2, Sea Cat 1, Rapier 1, Blowpipe 1, Combination/Gunfire 6, Friendly fire 2 Other side of the planet, no real supply lines to speak of, mostly 60s technology There were some CIC sailors out there who are absolute heroes. Days, WEEKS of staring at radar plots and barely missing a beat.

[@jeremypnet]

@@MostlyPennyCat after what happened to HMS Sheffield, I doubt there were many people catching zzzzzz sitting at their posts.

[@tomsmith3045]

@@MostlyPennyCat I don't know that I'd brag about the British fleet in that conflict. From my memory, most of those ships were effectively sunk by daylight fighters/trainers at the end of their effective range with iron bombs designed for land based attack. If the Argentine air force had modern aircraft and more than a couple of anti-ship missiles, the outcome likely would have been different. (Actually I believe a British admiral was quoted as saying if they'd had better fuses on their iron bombs, they would have lost the entire fleet.)

[@coloradoing9172]

You'd think there would be some audible alarm so that crew members don't have to focus on the radar screen all the time.

[@renegadeuvfunk]

This is so insightful, thank you for sharing!

[@bulwynkl]

I used to work 24x7 alarm monitoring fro a telco. highest SLA was a 15 minute response time. This was distressingly easy to breach, both becaue of operator fatigue, but also because o fthe shear number of systems we were monitoring - on top of all that there was about a 100:1 false alarm to incident ratio... But at least we had a dedicated team and system to manage alarms - everywhere else ust sends the alarms to email....

[@TheBauwssss]

very clever analisys! i think your theory cuts wood my friend, this seems like a very plausible explanation for the colossal blunder made by the Moskva defenders. they even has s-550 missile on the deck and yet they f-ked up big-time. i agree with thd other beautiful dudes in this comment section below me. this video was way too short! it would have been absolutely lovely for this video to be twice as long 🤩🤩🤩

[@harryb7216]

Excellent analysis. Thanks.

[@k.laurent2574]

Thank you Anders, for pointing out "user fatigue". This actually made me think how I can remove/automate some processes in our department. So, user fatigue most certainly also applies in civilian function. (du har i øvrigt en god tale rytme, der gør det let at følge med).

[@peterxyz3541]

YT channel “LaserPig” offered an interesting theory. It encompasses Operator Fatigue & maintenance resource issues.

[@cncmne7404]

I watched a video of a youtuber called Lazerpig in which he managed to come across a Russian naval report on the Moskva. Apparently , not only are a lot of systems outdated , they were in a sorry state of disrepair and most of the defensive systems were non functioning. This report was from early February i think. The ship in that sorry state didnt stand a chance regardless of its crews fatigue.

[@bravetiger1964]

Great explanation, makes a lot of sense. Same happened with MIG 29 of first generations that relied on Ground radar information and decisions and not on an individual radar onboard.

[@matti8633]

What you say sounds really reasonable. I drive trains for a living and a big part of being a train driver is the ability to maintain concentration during those long empty stretches of track when absolutely nothing happens or needs doing and you are tired and bored. It is really hard sometimes and it is a trait we are tested for during the admission process for training. So i have no problem in believing that someone looking at a radar console for hours on end would lose concentration while being bored out of his mind after a few weeks of it. One of my colleagues trained to be an air traffic controller and he told me they take a 1/2 hour break after every two hours to keep their eyes fresh and mind clear. I doubt Russian warships offer that sort of luxury for their radar operators

[@CigarRegal]

Are you guys allowed to listen to audiobooks while driving?

[@matti8633]

@@CigarRegal The company policy where i work is that we are not allowed to use headphones that cover both ears and you have to be able to hear if traffic controllers are calling you. The thing about listening to music or audio books is that it has to be something light and easy because if it is something that requires concentration you become prone to making stupid mistakes like forgetting how long the train you are driving is and stopping at the wrong place or even not paying attention to train traffic lights which may be a major problem leading to termination of employment even if there is no real accident. It is very important to know your own blind spots and just not do it when there is any risk of losing concentration. That said i do listen to audio books when the driving situation is calm and simple. It really helps with staying awake when i am tired.

[@EdMcF1]

As I understand it, at airport scanners, staff are regularly rotated from screen-vetting of luggage in scanners to interacting with passengers etc. due to fatigue and the need to keep them stimulated.

[@karstenburger9031]

Also screen flicker makes the problem of fatigue much worse.

[@FatherMartin]

And (at least here in the UK), at random intervals the scanner injects an image of an item of concern into the operator's picture. It may be that the injected image clears when the operator informs the system that they've noticed a threat; or it may be that the staff have to follow the suspect bag procedure first.

[@postie10111]

I used to work on those very machines, screening mail before it boarded the planes. We had a 15 minute rotation, with at least 30 mins off (loading and unloading the machine) before your next stint on the screen. We'd also regularly get tested with fake items to pull, we had an extensive debrief if we missed any training items. Miss too many test items and you were taken off screening. I was always on night shift due to how the mail system works and the 3-4am slot is awful.

[@karstenburger9031]

@@postie10111 yes I saw some older smiths-heimann machines which had problems with flicker.

[@beautifulfouse]

I do agree 100% and I also think the Russians absolutely could not believe Ukraine could do what they did. Russian Ego.

[@terencerucker3244]

This same explanation would work with the USS Stark incident and Stark had a fully automated response, Once Activated. I can imagine the Russian watchstander peering into the radar not really understanding what he was seeing. When the realization dawned on him that this could be serious trouble, he had to get the attention of a superior that himself, had to go through all the same mental calculations. Seconds ticking. By the time the officer in charge decided to ring the Bridge or the Captain for instructions, it was too late. Yes indeed, you fight like you train. Russian sailors are punished for initiative so there was nothing in it for the poor slob that had to tell the captain. The captain had to be informed the hard way.

[@honkhonk8009]

Thats probably why the US invests so heavily on AI and automation in general. I can imagine how usefull it would be if you had a few google TPU's monitoring that radar screen and giving an actual warning if something as obvious as a dot appears lol.

[@jwenting]

yes, and Stark's fully automated defenses were disabled because of the area they were in where a lot of unidentified closing targets were expected (mostly fishing boats and things like that, but also aircraft and helicopters). There the operators were too much used to their systems being fully automated and weren't paying close attention because of that overconfidence in automation. By the time someone noticed that one of those targets they'd seen hopping in and out of the air defense bubble was coming right at them at high speed it was too late to do anything, as the CIWS wasn't of course tracking the missile and worse, was probably pointed in the wrong direction. And that's without the time needed to go up and down the chain of command to ask for permission to engage, which under the ROE at the time almost certainly wasn't automatically granted to the watch officers.

[@ThePRCommander]

This is a really good explanation Anders. Thank you. And it could easily have been longer. The Russian naval technology, you use as an example, reminds me a bit of similar technology, used on the Juliet class, missile submarine. Decades back, I got a chance to do some voluntary work onboard it, while it was used as a museum-submarine, here in Copenhagen harbour. Plenty of manual working stations on board the ship, including the radar section. And just like the Moskva, the Juliet too had missiletubes placed outside the hull. So I am wondering if the fuel from the external anti-ship missiles could have flowed into the ship and started a fire? Also, in case of sea skimming, for now at least, I don't think it should be completely ruled out. Then again, I have no idea about Moskvas weather situation? And finally, why are big military ships not supported by drone-lifted radars, working on the other side of the horizon? As minimum four drone-lifted radars, each with their own radar operator and perhaps supported by a few droned-lifted anti-missile systems; like light laser systems? Like as follows: drone-lifted radar HORIZON drone-lifted radar HORIZON BIG MILITARY SHIP HORIZON drone-lifted radar HORIZON drone-lifted radar Just an idea.

[@AllanFolm]

The missile fuel was not liquid, but solid.

[@ThePRCommander]

@@AllanFolm Are you sure about that? "...Stages/Propellant One/ Liquid-fueled Turbojet" missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/russia/ss-n-12-sandbox/ Also, now I took another look on the Juliet; it carried the same missile. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juliett-class_submarine This is the sub Kaj parked as a museum in Copenhagen harbour. Today it's in Germany; not enough customer potential here in Denmark. Plus, the Germans have far stronger submarine traditions than do we. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juliett-class_submarine#/media/File:U_461_2592x1944.jpg As the military geek, I also was some 25 years ago, it was a once in a life time experience, to be allowed as part of the voluntary staff, on that museum. I met a lot of interesting people; naval ship designers, German and Danish sub-crews.

[@AllanFolm]

@@ThePRCommander The initial booster that throws the missile clear of the launcher is a solid propellant. The sustainer fuel for the jet engine is Iirc loaded into the missile udring launch prep.

[@ThePRCommander]

​@@AllanFolm Thanks for clearing it up. All right, well, then we can rule out the missile fuel. BTW; do you know why the procedure is designed as such? Will rocket fuel quality deteriorate over time, if placed inside a missile?

[@AllanFolm]

@@ThePRCommander Some of the additives to the base petroleum product will congealse and turn into a varnish over time. Clogs pumps and valves.

[@drofwarcnwahs2108]

In addition it has been reported that there is poor discipline in the Russian Navy. This is supported by various candid videos as well as a couple of fairly recent submarine incidents. More importantly the Russian navy does not emphasis damage control in either their systems or crew training. The US Navy learned this lesson in spades during several aircraft carrier fires during the Vietnam war and adjusted to address the failure point. To your point about Russian Navy rigidity, I have been told by someone who interacted with them that they are a "follow the book" organization. So long as you followed the book you are unlikely to get in trouble should something go wrong. Do something that is not in the book, even if it is the appropriate action, you will be crucified.

[@wintersbattleofbands1144]

Admitting the need for damage control forces acceptance of possible weakness. It's as much cultural as it is poor military policy.

[@CaesarTjalbo]

The US Navy had already excellent fire control capabilities on their carriers at the start of WW2, so they must have learned something even before that. The IJN didn't and lost their carriers relatively easily.

[@SudrianTales]

@@CaesarTjalbo the US had a few issues post ww2

[@JonFrumTheFirst]

Right at the end, Anders says 'accident.' Certainly this was no accident. There are those who make the correct point that 'drunk driving accident' is a misnomer. A drunk driving crash is not an accident - it could have been predicted. Nor is a missile attack on a ship an accident - the damage is intended. It's a success, not an accident.

[@markus717]

As a former FPS-19 radar operator, I can attest that everything you're saying is spot-on. Question: Do Russian sailors have access to alcohol on board, and could there be drinking on duty?

[@kenibnanak5554]

Good assessment. I note that in the released images of the ship going down none of the elevators with the air defense missiles were in the up position. This certainly supports no one important enough to engage them on the ship having noticed or being aware of the incoming missiles. Another factor is the Slava class cruisers lack automatic water tight doors and thus do not compartmentalize the internal compartments. .Their internal firefighting ability was minimal. A cumulative result was the lack of an ability to handle internal fires, explosions and incoming water. The other 2 cruisers also have these weaknesses. This isn't the first time we have been shocked by an anti ship missile. I remember also HMS Sheffield and the Exocet.

[@hughbarton5743]

A very interesting and informative video. Your theory is likely a significant factor in the sinking of Moskva. As an additional thought, the performance of Russian weapons systems in general ( particularly Soviet era gear) has been, by and large, unimpressive, particularly when facing Western systems ably utilized by well trained troops. There are certainly exceptions to this opinion, but with exception of small arms, they have been generally outperformed, particularly when on the offensive. It would not me shock if future forensic analysis of this particular action reveals technical flaws in ship design and/or maintenance.