Five lessons about warfare from Ukraine

[@agffans5725]

Just to add some insight. Denmark has been training Ukrainian soldiers in the UK in Operation Orbital since 2015, so a long time ago Denmark signed a deal to send 130 instructors to the UK to train Ukrainian troops, and to speed up the training it works this way that no less than 65 Danish military instructors are training a team of only 200 Ukrainians at a time, to complete a five-week basic course in military skills. Because of the many instructors, the content of what they are able to learn is roughly equivalent to what a NATO conscript goes through in four months of training and after they return home they receive a further 4 weeks of training in Ukraine, before being ready for action. So most people are greatly underestimating the volume of intensified training these Ukrainians are getting in the UK, I quote : "These Ukrainians come straight from the street, and they are people of all ages from 20 to 50 years old. Morale is high, and they are clearly very motivated to be trained to take part in Ukraine's defense against Russia", said Lieutenant Colonel Michael Frandsen, head of the defense education support team for Ukraine. "What we give them is basic training. It's a quantum leap in terms of the knowledge they bring. If they are to go to the frontline, they will need additional training to operate in a combat unit. I am confident that the Ukrainian army will take care of this," Frandsen said. Denmark have also signed a deal with Ukraine for special training of Ukrainian officers in Denmark, just as 50 Ukrainian soldiers will also receive training in, among other things, minesweeping.

[@StevenHaze]

Australia sent 70 trainers in July this year as well, and I know this type of help will only increase! So England is becoming the base and the free world is sending the best NCO's and low level officers it can. this will only improve the Ukraine army in many ways. lol I hope they dont go home and crave vegemite though!

[@gorillaguerillaDK]

Yeah, one of the largest problems, and that goes for everything where you speed up the training process is on the physical side. Smaller injuries that still can be problematic when they hit the combat zone are just more likely to happen when you don't have the time to build people up on the physical side. But hey, even four months isn't always enough for that part - hence, the reason why the most common injury among soldiers deployed to a war zone is back injuries, knee injuries, and ankle injuries. Things that isn't lethal, but can make soldiers less effective and put them at higher risk... That being said, it's still impressive what can be done when a range of countries send some of their best instructors.

[@biaberg3448]

Heia Danmark!!

[@andrewharrison8436]

Good to know this is happening. However, pedantically, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Frandsen ought to be told that a "quantum leap" is the smallest possible movement. If he is going to play buzz word bingo I would suggest "step change".

[@agffans5725]

@@gorillaguerillaDK .. the five-week basic course is very tough and highly intense, but the 4 weeks of training in Ukraine is mainly to make them ready to operate in a combat unit, so that is not that intense and probably also to relax a bit and build up their strength.

[@larswhitt1549]

Thank you Anders, was very intersting. May you have a merry Chrsitmas when that is time for you.

[@newshound64]

The leaders of the Ukrainian railroad company Immediately dispersed and moved around their officials, starting on the very first day of the Russian invasion. That precaution enabled the railroads to continue to operate throughout the war.

[@The_ZeroLine]

Great detail. Thank you. Where did you see that?

[@newshound64]

@@The_ZeroLine The New York Times several weeks ago had a feature article (illustrate) about the Ukrainian state railroad. Maybe you can search for it on their website. I learned so much from that article.

[@p.bckman2997]

With Russian style warfare, applying some of the military lessons to civilian infrastructure seems a necessity.

[@michaelkimber6203]

Thank you Anders. Very useful post. Keep up your excellent work. Slava Ukraini 🇺🇦💪🇺🇦🇧🇻🇬🇧

[@kenlawson554]

And then Russia turned off the power. Electric trains can't run without ...electricity.

[@deepinthewoods8078]

As this is the first major and (sort of) symmetrical war in decades, there are so many lessons to be learned here...

[@klowen7778]

'Fer sure, and we're also probably gonna see the increasing role of A.I. in Electronic Warfare, just to handle that rapid & complex 'juggling' of spectrum.

[@warrenpeas]

@@klowen7778 it would be really interesting to see how USA would have fought a conventional war vs Russsia How would we defeatr their air defenses is my #1 question.

[@Grimdarkog]

@@warrenpeas dont worry youll find out soon

[@Google_Does_Evil_Now]

NATO is not using it's arsenal. Ukraine is being limited. Russia is using all it has. But also China and Russia are doing a naval exercise near to Taiwan, yesterday or today. The issue will be if China and Russia join forces. And if Iran develops nuclear weapons, and joins the Russian Chinese coalition. Most of everything we buy is made in China, so it would be very complex and difficult if there's a very large war.

[@deepinthewoods8078]

@@Google_Does_Evil_Now NATO may have smaller reserves of some items, but as a whole it has a bigger production capacity than Russia. NATO also keeps a strategic reserve for itself, while Russia seems to throw it all into the war. Putin knows NATO will never attack Russia directly...

[@gunnarisaksson8677]

Thanks for a very interesting video. Regarding dispersal, old Swedish kings used that to keep the soldiers healthy. Large koncentrations of soldiers increases their probability to get sick from flu or worse illness.

[@TurboHappyCar]

19th century social distancing 😂

[@Cptnbond]

It is a pity that the large numbers of fully operable "cold war" dispersed Swedish airbases are echo-emptying words today.

[@N00B283]

@@TurboHappyCar but of course since they ain’t got them vaccines, only good ole inoculation

[@beam3819]

I think Russian army have much more infections than we hear of. As you point out, a healty army is crusial. As we know by now only a small fraction of elite groups have sufficient provisions and equipment. Now general winter is on the battle field and with Russnian army in many cases dont even have water I hope illness will help UA win!

[@lukejackson1575]

People have speculated the Ukrainian soldiers often keep cats around specifically to reduce the spread of disease by rats. But I expect it's more to do with individual morale.

[@aaron3890]

Excellent work as always, Anders! Thank you for your insights.

[@WilliamCunninghamII]

Excellent information, as usual. To some extent these are re-learned lessons. Stockpiles in particular. I had an opportunity to visit Subic Bay shortly after it was abandoned by the USN in the 90s. Driving through the hills to the Southwest on the old base I encountered naval ammo bunker after ammo bunker after ammo bunker in the Ilanin Forrest. It was a city of bunkers. I asked myself, what the heck? How much ammo and storage does the USN need for goodness sake. Well.... now I know. You cannot have enough, that's how much.

[@NmaeUnavailablesigh]

Also demonstrates the first point with having many bunkers rather than one massive one.

[@TheRedKing247]

Funnily enough it goes back even to the First World War, where the British and the French both ran into massive problems at the start with supplying their artillery with enough shells for the trench warfare, using an entire years allotment of shells in just 2 months. It's the reason why so many war factories popped up all over Britain during the war there.

[@hedgehog3180]

I feel like the reason why this "lesson" keeps being "re-learned" has nothing to do with people forgetting it and is just a symptom of the fact that crises tend to break out when you least expect them and it's hard to predict what you'll need in the future. Stockpiles become small during peacetime because it isn't cheap to store large amounts of ammo and to any military the choice between storing more ammo you don't need right now and having more active units is an obvious one. Like no one has actually forgotten that war requires a lot of ammo, we're just dealing with a fact of reality that unexpected crises are unexpected. The real lesson to take away shouldn't be that we need to always at all times keep massive stockpiles, that's not really fiscally responsible and it's incompatible with rapidly advancing technology, the lesson should more so be that you need to have the ability to rapidly increase ammo production in response to global events. For the west this firstly means that governments need to be proactive in keeping industry in the west rather than letting it move to third world countries in order to exploit cheap unorganized labor. The model of responding to rising living standards by moving industry to somewhere where the workers have less rights has put the west in a situation where it doesn't have industry to retool for wartime production once a crisis hits. A simple way to do this would be to impose punitive tariffs based on human rights records in order to encourage industry to stay home. I'm not an expert or anything but with how often I keep seeing this point repeated both in the current climate and historically I just get the impression that perhaps armies aren't stupid and forget such a simple lesson but rather are prioritizing their limited resources. It's much harder to train up new professional units and equip them with gear rapidly in a crisis than it is to ramp up ammo production, so of course armies across the world prioritize maintaining capabilities and units over maintaining large stockpiles.

[@leonidfro8302]

Re-learned? It seems people in West forget how to use multiplication table. What is being "re-learned" is that full-scale ground war is possible.

[@WilliamCunninghamII]

@@hedgehog3180 Agree with your industrial base argument. Labor, however, is a red herring IMO. Having said that, a standard artillery shell costs about $2K. The war is demonstrating consumption upwards of 10K shells per day per side. That is $20 million per day (each side) times six months of fires = $3.6 billion dollars in artillery ammo as a bare minimum or around two million shells available at all times. Double that to four million for risk mitigation. Double it again to eight million due to the extensive potential front in Europe and needs in the Pacific. So the USA should have eight million artillery rounds in storage. Assume complete inventory replacement every 5 years and you are looking at a 1.6 million shells per year, or 3.2 billion annually to maintain a fresh inventory of 155 ammo. Somehow we should be able to manage this with a $825 billion dollar defense budget. We are currently producing about 1.25 percent of the ammo we should be manufacturing. That is set to increase to 2.5% due to the war but is still woefully inadequate.

[@aptroed]

Man, you give good info! Battlefield and strategic tactics are changing before our eyes. From the front, to the back : shoot and scoot!

[@yvonnetomenga5726]

@Anders Puck Nielsen • Thanks for providing a link to the report. Russia driving out so many of its educated, tech-savy younger generation may give other militaries an edge in electronic warfare. Its an aspect of war I need to educate myself on.

[@chrystya]

Thank you. This has been so much more informative than other videos I have seen.

[@TheNecromancer6666]

Diminishing returns of tevhnology: Compare a 155mm "precision guidance kit", which gets screwed into the nose of a shell, like a standard fuze and is around 10.000 Euro a pop, with Excalibur shells. They cost between 90.000 and 50.000 Dollars a shot and take three times as long to manufacture. Also their production capacity is very very limited, while precision nose guidance kits and normal 155 shells can be produced in any quantity needed. Germany is now replacing/upgrading all its 155mm stock to precision guidance kits.

[@mortenp1985]

Tak!

[@anderspuck]

Mange tak for støtten.

[@thilomanten8701]

1st lesson - huge stockpiles in a well distributed reserve are a must! 2nd - an defense industrial base that suits your national security interests - Germany is alaughing stock almost!

[@gorillaguerillaDK]

Thank you for keeping us updated Anders, I highly value every time you take the time to give us your perspective! Tak for det Anders!

[@iberiksoderblom]

What I read is, that we need the Harrier back/must copy the Swedish system for airfields (civilian roads). Eliminating artillery is a priority and must be done by other means than old-school counterbattery fire, maybe intelligent drones that can actively hunt artillery peices. Older soldiers can turn out to be valuable as instructors. Decentralised stockpiles are crucial, and if production facilities are few/vulnerable and/or have difficult logistics, then having ample stockpiles are even more important.

[@steevesdd]

These lessons speak to the supply chain and the issues that current armies have with complicated supply chains and the need for heavy lift to move the big , heavy , bulky weapons into theatre. Light forces hace an advantage by reducing the lift requirements and the logistic requirements. Maintenance also requires centralized specialists. This again is less complicated with smaller units with less heavy equipment. This all points to the importance of drones to give fire power to dispersed units while minimizing supply chain issues. Industrial capacity is again reduced with drones because you reduce the need for heavy industry to provide the specialized materials that only have military application. In my mind these issues will reduce the importance of the tank. Not because the tank is not important on battle field but because the tank becomes this expense piece of iron when the supply chain gets disrupted. The resources needed to keep the tank operational create a problem.

[@worfoz]

It's weird to think about supply chain problems when you read about Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and even Caesar in Gaul. Siege towers are replaced by tanks, trebuchets by Howitzers: now supply chain are needed, no more just "live off the land".

[@bradgardner4299]

Mycka bra, Tack!

[@chrisedwards2539]

Something I have noticed that differentiates the Ukranian war from previous wars is the quantity and availability of high level expert and informed opinion fir the general public. Experts are sharing their the fruits of their skills knowledge and analysis which previously was only available to governments. Other honourable mentions to Suchomimus, Jake broe, Ryan Mcbeth, William Spaniel, and Artur Rehi and others too numerous to mention. Obviously I an including you in this Anders. Good work guys! Feliz Navidad!

[@war-painter]

As an oil painter coming late to your videos I’m really getting a wealth of information. Electronic warfare is a challenge to depict visually in a painting about the Russo-Ukrainian War. Your explanation is a big help for someone just learning military technology. Drone warfare is such a fascinating subject to paint, especially in contrast with the mud, trench warfare and old WW2 Russian tanks in Eastern Europe. Thanks much.

[@marcusm808]

If all these lessons are put together it really points to that the NATO decisions about warfare are the best provided that equipment is maintained and training is continuous. While slack capacity is important, it is in the capacity to do combined warfare and not artillery duels. Being locked in place slugging it out with artillery is counterproductive for both military gains as well as civilian protection. Ukraine is only stuck in these pointless artillery battles because the started the war with large stockpiles of soviet remnants and very little equipment for combined arms assaults. They obviously know how to perform maneuver warfare quite well, but they are not fully equipped for it so they are stuck in a cycle where they make gains then have to spend months waiting for NATO resupply and upgrades before they move forward again. Combined arms warfare requires everything to be working together from orbit to subterranean bunkers in sufficient quantity to multiply the efforts of all units. Ukraine is missing too many pieces of the puzzle to keep maneuver warfare happening consistently so they get stuck in trenches which plays to russia's strength. It is plainly obvious that artillery and trenches are not an effective way to create progress on the battlefield compared to combined arms blitz maneuvers after a short period of damaging enemy infrastructure with long-range precision weapons. Air power (and long-range precision missiles or drones) can't do it all and neither can infantry, but working together in proper cycles they are unstoppable. The russian model of throwing mass conscripts into machine-gun emplacements after an artillery barrage should be completely irrelevant by now but slow NATO decisions about supplying Ukraine has made it keep happening.

[@jeervin]

Slack capacity? Reminds me reading about what happened in the beginning of WW I, how quickly people realized how many more bullets and shells they needed and fast.

[@Xsh755]

Interesting to learn about for a person like me with no military or other defence background. Thanks again for a very interesting video.

[@bc-guy852]

Your lessons / lectures are always so well laid out, organized and with such strong supporting evidence that when you're done I think - 'Well yeah, when you say it like that - it all makes sense.' Thank you for your time and effort. I guess putin has made many of us, who never would have considered these aspects of a war no one expected, to be studied and discussed by so many. Hopefully that will speed the resolution. Slava Ukraini.

[@jaywulf]

Every post is a goldmine. Thanks again Anders.

[@doprisi]

I think what is missed is the importance of concealment of troops and overhead cover on trench systems due to the increased surveillance and accurate artillery/drone strikes if you should have to entrench. Many soldiers get killed by precise artillery or light weights ordinance dropped from a drone. It's interesting too see the acknowledgement of the need to move around to avoid loosing to many units. Nothing is resistant enough to take hits

[@JurekOK]

He said, "Hardened cover works," i.e. bunkers. He did say that bunkers work well against general (non-specialized) artillery and light drones. Heavy tanks and APCs are also impervious to these, hence, not obsolete.

[@robertboemke9614]

Regarding the "quantity over quality"-argument (which you only very carefully made): On the other hand, the very few Western high-precision weapon systems that were delivered (something like 16 HIMARS I think?) had a HUGE impact. So, in a way, there are both lessons: You need a LOT of ammunition and therefore it needs to be reasonably cheap, but precision is also incredibly important and can be an effective counterweight to much more dumb ammunition.

[@SRFriso94]

In 2021, the British Army held an exercise that was meant to last for ten days. They had to cancel it after eight, because they ran out of ammo. This was a known issue before the war in Ukraine, they just didn't do anything with this knowledge.

[@kirstinevad347]

Same in Denmark until the invasion. Somehow we found shools, hospitals, care for the elderly and windmills to be more important... Well, we need to step up now.

[@allangibson8494]

@@kirstinevad347 Wind Turbines turned out to be very important - Russian gas supply remember? Logistics in war is king unless you fold in days (and tactically communications are critical).

[@agffans5725]

@@allangibson8494 .. Well, personally I neither use gas or oil, but only renewables where I live (in the outskirts of the 2nd largest city in Denmark), still my electricity and heating bill have gone up by around $20 a month combined, but on the other hand my wages are up to $37.5 an hour before taxes.

[@allangibson8494]

@@agffans5725 The price for electricity is linked to the price of gas regardless of where you think you are getting power from (power companies like charging a significant premium for “green” power above the going rate for blue or brown (and happily pocket the very tangible profits)).

[@agffans5725]

@@allangibson8494 .. yes it's only my electricity bill that has gone up, while my heating bill has actually slightly dropped.

[@dlmsarge8329]

Thank you very much for the work you present here! Your insights and evaluations help many of us make better sense of the news regarding this horrific war.

[@Romanowski_808]

Anders thank you so much for the informative video

[@ronboe6325]

Coming from a position in the US I think these lessons, for the most part (mainly lesson #1) will only apply when two warring parties are close to parity. Ukraine vs Russia is kinda asymmetrical (less so with the limited support from the West) and in some ways is a weird war. Neither has air superiority and most Western armies will try hard to achieve that (especially if they get help from the US). Air defense (missile defense in the case of Ukraine) is also very important. So if you are looking at a potential war with someone, one needs ask what lessons from the Ukraine/Russia conflict apply in my case. You quickly get into the pickle that the US command always seems to be in: applying lessons from the last war to the current war; which means you're fighting the wrong war. In the lesson on slack; not only will you have to disperse command, intel and troops - but manufacturing. Hard to spin up production if the factory has already been targeted. So I think a keen lesson not mentioned: one needs to harden or better protect the electrical grid and water supply.

[@kevinwarburton2938]

Switching to Renewables helps ...decentralising eg instead of one big power plant have several mini plants/battery farms. Solar & Mini-Wind Turbines on every roof and every building with own battery farm in basement. Also same for food production ...container, rooftop, vertical farms, synthetic meat Factory-Labs in cities and a lot more undergrounding ...we need to start building groundscrapers.

[@hedgehog3180]

Grid hardening is also just a general issue, especially with the threat of global warming creating more resilient grids (and infrastructure in general) that can handle the more chaotic weather of the future is paramount. Texas showed us what can happen if you cheap out on your grid.

[@ronboe6325]

@@hedgehog3180 And to keep random home grown terrorist from shooting up your substations.

[@finkum09]

@@hedgehog3180 ... and don't harden your infrastructure about freezing conditions across vast geographical areas.

[@aubiece5787]

Slavia Ukrainia ! Herojam Slava!👍 Thank you for sharing your expertise ! Your channel is so good !

[@tellyboy17]

Lesson nr 6: most kills are made by artillery; find a way to dispatch enemy artillery efficiently is a ticket to winning the war.

[@anderspuck]

Good point. The importance of artillery has definitely been demonstrated.

[@davidradtke160]

@@anderspuckassuming the air space is contested. I suspect a conflict with a different AirPower dynamic would look very different.

[@dwwolf4636]

Airpower = Big arty with limited availability but with the ability to rapidly move around. Prove me wrong.

[@tellyboy17]

@@dwwolf4636 What's happening in Ukraine proves you wrong every day: airspace above Ukraine is too heavily contested for both sides to risk their planes and helicopters. They play a marginal role in this war with cringy low points like attack helicopters resorting to this useless routine where they pitch up noses far from the front to lob some unguided missiles in the general direction of the enemy. It's the only way to keep them alive on a battle field saturated with air defense systems.

[@davidradtke160]

@@dwwolf4636 more or less true in terms of results. AirPower does offer capabilities that traditional artillery cannot match or replicate but largely the effect is the same as artillery. That doesn’t change my point. Dispatching artillery and contesting airspace are two very different tasks. Destroying enemy artillery won’t win a war of the enemy has substantial AirPower and the ability to achieve air superiority. This conflict maybe teaching a lesson about artillery that wouldn’t apply if the air dynamic was different is my point.

[@SlavicCelery]

I love the fact that war requires a whole lot of ammunition is something every army has discovered since time began. I'm pretty sure that's in the footnotes of every new war.

[@CarsonRH]

Infantry loads have only increased for a reason.

[@robertbehrendt8685]

Rheinmetall had to wait 19 years for a order for artillery shells from German Government, a former colonel stated.

[@C4H6As]

@@robertbehrendt8685 In Germany, the military has been developing an increasingly bad image since the end of the cold war. More and more people started thinking it would never be needed again in times of globalisation. The forces were seen as instruments for attack primarily, the need for defense was becoming more and more unpopular. Will be hard and expensive to bring it back to a sufficient level of capabilities. Hopefully before russians are heading for Berlin again.

[@2Greenlid]

Yes, Ammunition is always needed, but politicians don’t get re-elected by building those inventories, they get re-elected by starting new social programs……..

[@b_lumenkraft]

Haha, Mr. Puck pulling a Perun. I like the format. Keep it coming. :)

[@tordsteiro9838]

Thanks lot, I really enjoy how you structure your content and provides a summary at the end👍

[@bro_dBow]

Fascinating study, thank you for bringing it to my attention. Refreshingly, sensible, that is lost in politics and economy of warfare.

[@andrzejbarcelonafrlk6416]

Edit / erase. I was answering another post, Sorry.

[@jantjarks7946]

1st lesson: Don't start a war if you are not prepared for the worst outcome right from the beginning. 🤺🤷😉

[@speggeri90]

That's the first lesson for warfare since the beginning of time.

[@JuanPablo-en9jk]

Most of us learnt that in the play ground. Don’t start what you can’t finish

[@allangibson8494]

And losing is always an option regardless of how prepared you think you are.

[@danielorth7267]

@@JuanPablo-en9jk No, only men get this lesson

[@JuanPablo-en9jk]

@@allangibson8494 should have spoken to Tony Blair about rule 2, “don’t go to war on a lie”

[@eklhaft4531]

I might be oversimplifying but for downing consumer drones there exists a "gun" that sends strong directed jamming signal at the drone and the drone either falls of the sky or lands itself. It's a gun, it's directional and is only used for short time periods so might not be too disruptive to communications?

[@davidhawkins7138]

clear - concise - useful. Thank you!

[@robertroot3790]

Cmdr Nielsen, you’re a real professional-thx again and as always

[@apuuvah]

Drone is a (very) slow cruise missile, albeit much cheaper. Less explosives and range.

[@fnersch3367]

Thanks!

[@anderspuck]

Thanks for your support.

[@janethompson5153]

This was really good 👍 👏 👌 I'm learning so much 👍 Looking forward to your next observations . Glory, Victory, and Peace to Ukraine 🇬🇧 🇺🇦

[@ΝικοςΚαλοχριστιανακης-μ2ζ]

I hope NATO will make "special" schools or trainers to give knowledge and solutions that derives from those "costly" lessons! Preparation is better than suffering in a war! I think NATO was not completely ready for this war , from the occupation of Crimea till one year ago I believe they were not so prepared! What if China invade Taiwan are they ready cause there is the sea around much more difficult in all aspects! Can you make a video corresponding lessons learned from Russia Ukraine war in a China Taiwan full war?

[@surfingonmars8979]

Re distance: nothing has changed but the scale and scope of vulnerability - WWII saw long range bombers and destruction from afar. Now, it is just farther and more accurate.

[@btolley100]

Maybe he meant at smaller operational levels, such as battalion command post. Combined with increased precision, it can be very dangerous to stay in one place too long.

[@rapter229]

@@btolley100 that lesson was also apparent in WW2. The Germans learned it post D-day when the overwhelming allied air power meant that hilltop HQs that they used on the Eastern front were quickly identified and attacked on the Western front.

[@mattiasthorslund6467]

You always provide informative and relevant content! I trust that many of these insights are well known to military professionals, but it's also helpful and important that civilian decision makers (politicians and others) understand more about these things.

[@keemanaan1734]

Merry Christmas and thanks for the high quality, considered insight. Seems to me (as an armchair analyst) that the truly new lesson is that of drones... The others seem to be as old as airborne, electronic mechanised warfare. However as you say it will be worthwhile to read the rusi report to get modern context to those older lessons. Ever since the "Killbots" KZbin video the challenge of small, cheap drones has been a worry to me It's just that the funding has never really been available to develop at speed. The EW challenge has been one for specialists and I've never really thought about it beyond local level so the insights were new to me but I suspect old news for those in the profession. Thanks again for everything:)

[@kasperchristensen8416]

Excellent insight as always, Anders! da: Jeg er virkelig imponeret over din forståelse og indsigt i alle de tekniske detaljer om krigen fra et strategisk synspunkt! Bliv endelig ved med at dele din viden og analyse af krigen 👍

[@klobiforpresident2254]

KZbin has a feature that allows machine translation of comments. Turns out it's not horrible anymore and very useful under videos like these (don't speak a lick of Danish). I assume the "da:" before the Danish text stands for Danish. Google translate turned it into "en:". Spooky!

[@goobah01]

Thanks

[@anderspuck]

Thanks for helping.

[@marcusott2973]

Much awaited much appreciated excellent insights as always.

[@_dionisio]

Thanks Anders, it is always a pleasure listening your point of view

[@Niels-ErikJensen]

Thank you for interesting updating of the war in Ukraine. Have you ever thaugt over that a jammer also of the same time can be used for communication between own forces.

[@chrisanderson7820]

I think one way of conceptualising the drone issue is that their most important performance statistic is not payload or range but price (and by extension volume). Ukrainian soldiers were saying that the average lifespan of one of those GoPro style camera drones was maybe 3-5ish recons before it got shot down. Ideally you don't want 1 drone (especially not 1 super drone) you want a large variety of specialised drones, from $50 backpack camera drones, to $500 munition dropping drones, to $10,000 anti-tank drones, to $100,000 long range suicide emplacement killer or EWAR drones, to $5 million air superiority drones. Do one thing well for the lowest price you can get away with. Also the lesson about dispersal and movement (along with the increase in artillery and shrapnel injuries) is why I think the US is making a mistake downgrading its MRAP fleet.

[@jannarkiewicz633]

I like your stuff. I saw a good comparison between the RUSI report and a handbook written by Russian veterans on how to survive the war (compare and contrast, "I live, I fight, I win, blah, blah"). I still like your analysis. What happened to the tie? You were the best-dressed vlogger on KZbin. Merry Christmas!!! Here is the link comparing the RUSI report with "I live, I fight, I win." Do not take this as a criticism. Just an FYI. I really like your posts.

[@gorillaguerillaDK]

He's in vacation... 😜

[@thoughttransmitter5555]

The fact sabotage is quite cheap to commission, yet extremely expensive for the enemy; should also be noted.

[@simplyamazing880]

So I wonder, if we put as much effort into preventing wars, as we do in preparing to fight wars, could we have a lot more resources to conduct a productive life on this earth? Here's the answer. People who prevent problems are never popular. People who solve problems after they are fully involved are heroes.

[@anderspuck]

I would say that military forces are mostly meant to prevent wars. It would be nice if there were other ways, but until now I think deterrence is a necessary part of preventing aggression. I did make a video about deterrence as a concept, if you are interested. kzbin.info/www/bejne/p5PdnGCnqsdojbM

[@steffenb.jrgensen2014]

Not being prepared for war is handing over all power to those most willing to start a war.

[@georgemorley1029]

@@steffenb.jrgensen2014 As Jack Handey so adeptly put it: “I can picture in my mind a world without war, a world without hate. And I can picture us attacking that world, because they'd never expect it.”

[@jamescole1786]

12/20/22. A+Anders on your RUSI summary re: war in Ukraine. Merry Christmas sir, from deep south 🇺🇸 USA. Much appreciate your dedication to indepth reporting, analyzing the more technical aspects ( logistics, inventory of people [soldiers], variety of weapons) & effectiveness of Ukraine military. 2day your report of RUSI' overview was great! Just enjoy learning/hearing how serious military analysists list the various categories which dramatically impact the outcomes on the battlefield. Thanks again for your dedication to educating we (more than casual) YT viewers on such an outrageous Russian attitude of 'we can do whatever we want because we have the inventory of weapons [& oil money] & you little [puny] neighbors don't have enough [guns/bullet/soldiers] to stop us'! The Rusdian attitude is the old Hollywood gangster motto: (slurred Italian accent) 'aye, catch us if you can, & if you can...whats-yua-gonna-do-about-it? Aye?' Thanks again for helping educate we viewers with technical analysis from that UK(?) RUSI Military analytical group. Stay safe & carry on Sir!👍👍👍👏😊

[@richardhasler6718]

Thanks Anders, as always. The important lessons I have seen in the Ukraine conflict, specifically for Ukrainian forces are their ability to adapt, using multiple different weapon systems from the west, using quad bikes etc when the ground is soft, adapting western missiles for soviet warplanes, monitoring social media as intel on Russian troops. I also think Ukrainian tactics (with western intel) have been excellent by confusing and concealing attacks in Kharkiv and Kherson, targeting ammunitions and other supplies when you're out gunned, knowledge of the terrain and allowing Russian troops to repeat the same mistakes on the battlefield. I also think the 'surrender hotline' for Russian soldiers was a masterpiece to demoralise the enemy.

[@06colkurtz]

They had to adapt because their equipment was crap. They did a great job with what they had but they did not have shit. They were using knives and cap and ball to save their country. The only reason the Russians didn't kick their ass was because the Russian army is also total crap. their equipment is crap. their organization is crap. they can't engage in close combat and depend on using infantry to fix the opponent so they can pound them with masses of artillery Its a version of Napoleonic tactics. Any their artillery is inaccurate and performs badly. Their crews are poorly trained and can't hit a target, which is ok because the Russian doctrine is to saturate a grid square and smash everything in it. No need to aim. Any modern army would slaughter them in a few days, and they would be running for home.

[@ipadista]

That the Russians often repeat failed attacks is not due to superior Ukrainian war tactics. It is due to the long chain of command in the Russian army preventing any agile rapid responses, see it more as a gift than an Ukranian achievement. But overall I agree, Ukraine has consistently punched way above what was expected!

[@ArchOfficial]

The MiG HARM kit is not an Ukrainian development, it's an US one.

[@markwilson2992]

Thanks Anders! Very cogent, informative presentation.

[@anderspuck]

Glad you liked it!

[@markwilson2992]

@@anderspuck I had already subscribed before because I love your analyses - great work you do! I've heard really good things about Danish Frogmen. You should a presentation on them.

[@larsrons7937]

@@markwilson2992 That would be an exciting topic, and I think Anders could have interesting perspectives on them.

[@KS-PNW]

​@@anderspuckjust discovered your channel this morning. Really enjoyed the newest content and this one, thanks for putting these together 👍👍

[@jacqueslheureux9161]

Not enough ammos is always a problem in war. Already in the WW1 the strockpiles where used in 2 month.

[@worfoz]

..while it took years to run out of their stockpiles of youngh men...

[@richardbenjamin8341]

This is the most thought provoking military video I’ve seen in a long while. Extra points for brevity.

[@LakPak2000]

Hi Anders. I love you're video's! I really like that you try to be objective and see things from both sides. I'm a former Danish army infantryman who served in Afghanistan while we took the fight to the taliban. I have one observation and concern regarding this. I think the movement of troops is necessary. But you haven't mentioned the added stress and hampering of regeneration of fighting capacity because of this. On the unit level this would concern me..

[@alexstergaard3551]

Thanks for another interesting video Anders. Will there be one concerning Belarus and Lukasjenkos big "damned if he does, damn if he doesn't" dilemma with regard to entering the war, now that Putin and all the Russian brass went to Minsk?

[@DavidOfWhitehills]

ISW latest assessment is that he successfully rebuffed the arm-twisting, and maintains a defense posture against invasion from Poland.

[@alexstergaard3551]

@@DavidOfWhitehills Yes I've heard that as well. What interest me is the potential consequences of that move compared to giving in to the pressure from the Kremlin. It's been the prevailing analysis that Lukasjenko were essentially kept in power by Putin to make sure he had a puppet in Belarus he could control. If the puppet doesn't dance then what purpose does it serve? Is Belarus at at point we're Lukasjenko might have to risk his own leadership to avoid a defacto annexation by Russia? Or will Putin keep him in power to avoid an unpredictable alternative? What happens in the event of renewed demonstrations against Lukasjenko with so many russian soldiers in Belarus? Does Putin outright take Belarus?

[@antebratincevic6764]

​@@alexstergaard3551 And what if the Belarusians do not want the same thing to happen to Belarus as it did to Ukraine . . . ? I don't know the name of the square in Minsk like it was the Maidan square in Kyiv in 2014. Speaking of puppets, is it better to be a puppet like Zelensky or a puppet like Lukashenko . . . ?

[@alexstergaard3551]

@@antebratincevic6764 A democratic revolution you mean? It kinda did in 2020. But Lukasjenko were able to crush it with the help of Putin and russian soldiers. That's what you don't seem to understand. While the Western countries might share a political bloc with the US, their policies aren't dictated by them. Just like NATO isn't expansionistic, it is a defence pact that countries ask to join of their own free will. It's not something countries are forced into by the US.

[@antebratincevic6764]

​@@alexstergaard3551 Yes, but the question is whether the glass is half full or half empty. Maybe in Minsk 2020, Victoria fuck the EU Nuland was missing to hand out cakes to tired protesters, so they didn't have enough strength to take down Lukashenko, who in 2020 refused to receive 900 million dollars from the West in order to introduce a lockdown in Belarus . . . or to put it more simply, the CIA failed to carry out a color revolution in Minsk 2020.

[@anthonybullard4441]

One thing I'm curious about: how much are our smaller stockpiles of artillery shells really a result of bad assumptions about how much capacity we'll need in modern conflict and how much are they the result of doctrine that just doesn't lean as heavily on artillery? And if it's more the second, has that also been called into question?

[@antebratincevic6764]

Do not worry. Stockpiles of propaganda are endless . . . :)

[@buddermonger2000]

I do have to wonder if the West simply leans more heavily on the Air Force as a secondary artillery park. The USA for sure does this with an incredibly high number of aircraft, though looking at the British their aircraft inventory is roughly 5%-10% of the American numbers which seems to be an incredibly high mismatch for what should be a similar doctrine. In terms of a doctrine that leans heavily on artillery, the British seem to have recently gone to that type of artillery heavy doctrine with their deep strike doctrine. Thus, for them specifically, they are 100% ill equipped in terms of stockpile for that kind of doctrine.

[@oohhboy-funhouse]

Peace dividend, the big adversary, USSR had fallen, there was little need to be armed for WW3, so spending was rightly reduced. Gulf War showed you could do a lot more with less if you were precise and quick. To hit a target, you no longer needed to erase a grid square, nor repeat as you immediately overran the position, reducing demand for artillery further. Russians still erase grid squares as doctrine and they don't have a choice, their artillery isn't accurate. The far more accurate Ukrainians have so many requests to service, you blow through that ammo. Libya was pretty clear on this, per weapon efficiency was about as good as it can be, still ran out because there are always more targets. Scale and length. Combination of points one and two. Everyone thinks wars are now quick, American style blitz through countries in a couple of weeks, so you can take time to restock. Or messing militias, insurgents, terrorist and other slow burn conflicts, on a scale of 1 - 10 is 0 pressure on production. Ukraine's front line is 1300km. If each km only fired 1 shell a day, that's 9100 a week just to stay still, we are now at month 10, that's 364000 rounds. Another point is the western demand for artillery is lower because there is so much aerial fire support, local fire superiority from armour and man portable systems that let you hit a hard target like a pill box. Listening to stories coming out of the International legion early war is pretty crazy. One thing related to this is the American soldiers were freaking out because they were so used to being able to call massive support 24/7 arriving in minutes. On the surface, both have their strengths and weaknesses. If I was a military planner forced to choose between accuracy or volume, even now, I would still choose accuracy on the assumption that production can be ramped up and there is the political will to do so. The maths works out a lot better as benifits of accuracy isn't linear. More importantly, gaining the technology to be accurate is much harder than scaling up production or having a plan or ability to do so. It's why America keeps making tanks despite the army telling them they don't need more, it's to keep the production line alive in case they need to ramp up.

[@KS-PNW]

​@@buddermonger2000that's a big part of it. Russia has the world's second largest artillery force (behind P.L.A.R.F.) and it's a core part of their military doctrine. Western forces use aircraft for most of those roles.

[@euricoferreira2084]

👍 Obrigado. Thank you. Greetings from Portugal.

[@MyRendersonique]

Excellent. Keep up the good work Anders 👍

[@michaelnitake2534]

Very thoughtful and interesting

[@gregortidholm]

Another option would be to go underground. That would protect against most artillery and drone bombing. If the landscape was criss-crossed with underground, simple tunnels, etc., that would reduce most of the risks associated with stationary activities. If small nations have triumphed over much larger enemies by going underground, then that should be a lesson, even for those countries with stronger armed forces. I believe that this must be done first and foremost to protect human lives. There are munitions that blow up bunkers, but they are very big, expensive and harder to replace in large quantities.

[@grahamstrouse1165]

Both Ukraine & Russia have massive underground railway networks. That’s one Cold War holdover that’s proven quite useful.

[@sayantandas8876]

Exactly, the same strategy was used by North Vietnamese soldiers in Vietnam War to defeat US Marine platoons.

[@michaelkimber6203]

Thank you Anders. Very useful post. Keep up your excellent work. Slava Ukraini 🇺🇦💪🇺🇦🇧🇻🇬🇧

[@allanlank]

Excellent video. I have downloaded the report and look forward to reading it WITH your insightful input.

[@christopherellis2663]

The plural of staff is staff, except when speaking of staves.

[@praero551]

Anders, great info. Could you elaborate on the war with and without Starlink, and if any difference what would that be in relative and absolute effects so far ? Thanks in advance

[@lorenzoluisalbano3695]

In words we can understand... Tusind tak!

[@osvagt]

Watching after liking, as always

[@anderspuck]

That’s brave. This is a different kind of video than normal.

[@wespeakforthetrees]

Thanks for the insight. Keep up the great work. Your videos are much appreciated.

[@larsrons7937]

Very informative and thought provoking.

[@davidcpugh8743]

Well done. I fought in a very bureaucratic military. Where the disconnect between command and field produced constant threats. I survived. But I observed.

[@andersgrassman6583]

The Swedish airforce has had dispersion as a fundamental concept for wartime operations for many, many decades. So Swedish fighterjets have been designed to operate from countryside roads, rather than from airfields. And ground support systems have also beend designed for this. This explains Ukraine's interest in the Swedish Gripen fighterjet. It's a much sturdier platform, than for example F-16, which can't operate from a strip of plain road. Ground support is also basically done from a single support wehicle, and the design of the airplane allows for a very small support crew. (Major repair and service of course requires special facilities and personnel.)

[@testopatia106]

Thank you Anders... another exquisite lesson.

[@mmitak]

Greetings from Bulgaria. Awesome video, thanks for the synthesis. I wonder if electronic warfare measures by the occupiers at the start of the invasion contributed to the survival of the Ukrainian Air forces, and to the proliferation of Bairaktars used in strike role, by trying to jam Ukrainian anti-air systems (and at the same time their own), or if the occupiers' air defense was just not switched on to avoid HARM-like weapons/or as they just thought it would not be needed - in your opinion, are those viable alternatives to eachother, and which one is more likely?

[@swadeisno1]

I read that there was interference from russian countermeasures - on russias ability to operate in the air - so russia was not able to utilize their own countermeasures for a long period at the start - giving ukraine the ability to use the drones as they did. Ukraine cannot use the drones like they did at the start anymore.

[@wintermaryland3619]

Add in secure comms And Robust network, like starlink

[@stevemaxwell5559]

Thanks Anders, a synopsis like this, from someone I trust, is very useful. I'm not in the business of war, so don't need all the detail, but it is useful to get an overview as it all helps with the bigger picture.

[@ws1435]

Very interesting! A central theme in the 5 points is the importance of the human element. Human reconisanc, dispersed decision making, autonomous units and teaching commanders to accomplish objectives on the fly would be a change. Hard to teach and goes against the pyramid structure of most government and military organizations. It's also rare to find leaders that are capable to fill that roll.

[@jesperjfl]

As Always, great content. And that report is .. gonna be my pendling reading... :) God Jul.

[@2Cerealbox]

I love your analysis'. I don't work in defense, but I find the insights broadly applicable anyway. Its a good way to think about challenges in general, in any organizational structure.

[@GreenKnight2001]

What about mines? How important have they been?

[@deltonlomatai2309]

Passive Electronic warfare system can be used to track jamming and anti-jamming attack launched using artillery or missiles.

[@LuigiSimoncini]

As always great video and commentary, thanks, Anders. How is it that the air force doesn't seem to play any significant role in the war? Did I miss something? hope you cover this in a future video.

[@WhatAboutTheBee]

russia was always focused on AA as there was no way for them to complete head to head with NATO in the air. russian jets don't fly because Ukraine also has a significant AA capability. That is, both sides have a good capability to strike aircraft. I do not take this to mean the end of the air force. Neither side offers anything like NATO aviation.

[@gorillaguerillaDK]

They do - a lot of the drones that Ukraine has destroyed en route towards targets has been done by the Air Force. But planes, and pilots, are costly ressources - and Russia has learned the hard way that Ukraine are able to defend themselves fairly well against Russia's Air force. So now, most of what Russia is using their air force for is launching missiles from the airspace above Russia where they can feel fairly safe from Ukraines SAM and other AA capabilities...

[@oleksandrshchyrskyi6442]

Excellent analysis Anders

[@bernardodf9746]

Commander, you must make more videos. Your insights are needed in this everyday volcano of war information and propaganda!

[@pnwdrifter5680]

another great presentation! Thanks for your work.

[@Oddingen]

Som vanlig; veldig interessant. Takk skal du ha. 👍

[@michaelnurse9089]

Another lesson is that artillery with GPS guided shells and drones doing target acquisition is a deadly combo that was never in play in prior conflicts. You can destroy a tank or a couple of infantry 28km away on the first shot - no need to dial the strike in.

[@someonespotatohmm9513]

With EU reluctance to get its ammo stockpiles in order. Do you think it would be a good idea to add a (updated) mandatory minimum to the NATO membership requirements? I know the 2% rules is already working wonders (/s), but perhaps with the war nations will actually start following those. And even the ones that do follow the 2% rules, like the UK, still don't have enough.

[@KS-PNW]

Well it's important to remember Russia is much more artillery oriented than NATO forces.

[@nomcognom2414]

There is a couple more things we might want to consider. One is artillery precision, which can be aided using different means (like drones, Excalibur-type ammo, etc). But let's ignore the various means here and just remark how much of a difference it makes, for the winning side (i.e. Ukraine), to be highly accurate in its firing, while the enemy is so inaccurate in comparison, overall, that a far greater firepower becomes less decisive than accuracy. I am impressed by the level and consistency of accuracy in Ukrainian fire. I had never seen it or even imagined it could be around the corner in a full-scale war. Luckily, the technology, the weapons, had already been there for quite a while, but just as luckily, we had never really needed nor seen them in action in a major war, opposing two sizeable armies. This is new for me, and it is proving a crucial factor when one side outperforms the other significantly The second factor worth considering has nothing to do with hardware. It has to do with holding the higher moral ground. This is a key factor which is dynamic and evolves during wartime, when well managed, increasing the advantage of the side bound to win. In this war, Ukraine has had an advantage from the very beginning, which has kept growing all along. In contrast, Russia started at a disadvantage, which has also kept growing all along. The starting advantage for Ukraine has been that of being unjustifiably aggressed, and enjoying a courageous leadership intent on fighting off the aggressor. Both things galvanized and unified the nation, greatly increasing combat effectiveness and civilian resilience. On the other side it was just the opposite. Russia had lied to the whole world, including its own soldiers and population. Many Russian civilians could still be made to trust their government through systematic propaganda, but soldiers on the ground are a different matter. Most fail to understand what they are doing in Ukraine, pretty soon if not from the beginning. No "banderites" to be found... Russian speakers asking everywhere what the Hell are Russian soldiers doing there... Invading soldiers poorly equiped and led, treated as cannon fodder... Seeing your own side murder the very people they were supposedly liberating, looting, terrorizing and destroying their villages... Personal experience of war at the front must be wholy demoralizing for most Russian soldiers. Since the aggressors started going through a lot more issues than expected, they tried to compensate for that applying savage brutality, targetting civilians, torturing and murdering them, destroying their villages and towns. This increased considerably the starting moral advantage of Ukraine. The victim nation was easily unified around the idea of being the goodies that fight evil, while the agressor nation sunk into moral depravation and a disconnect from reality that shock the world. Thus, this war has been, from the beginning, a clear matter of good vs evil. Nations and their political leaders should take seriously this issue of morality and virtue. Being right won't always guarantee victory, but it is a huge advantage in a war to be united, on the side of good. To be united by clearly being on the side of good. This has so much been the case in Ukraine, a country that was much impoverished, divided, and demoralized, that even Russianspeaking Ukrainians have joined the rest, overwhelmingly, in their rejection of Russian aggression. I do not have any military background but I think this couple additional lessons from the war are worth being learned. Make sure to be on the side of right vs wrong, and make sure to outperform the enemy in decisive warfare avenues (including the cyber front and the communicational front, i.e. how we communicate with our own population and the world at large).

[@newshound64]

Ukraine has a defense conglomerate, which has industrialized the rapid production of artillery shells.

[@thomasarmstrong3917]

The dispersal of a company over 3km is nuts. Goes against the principle of the concentration of force, and makes speed, surprise, and violence of action difficult. Interesting to see how tactics evolve, and how much hard kill ANTI-UAS at smaller unit level will enable recent tactics to go unchanged VS still have to adapt.

[@stephanledford9792]

I am not a military expert, but my lessons learned from this war are: (1) Logistics wins wars. Russia's units had what they could carry with them (ammunition, fuel, food) and got into trouble when those were gone, Ukraine showed the ability to receive a new piece of equipment at the Polish border and have it on the front lines in a day or two. (2) You never have enough replacement ammunition, and you probably don't have the ability to produce it at the factories fast enough to replace what is used. The HIMARS rockets are made in my state and the factory cannot produce these fast enough to replace what Ukraine is using. Russia is having to buy artillery shells from the North Koreans. This is different from the logistics issues (number 1) because you can have great logistical abilities to get the ammunition to where it is needed but have nothing to send because you cannot make it fast enough. (3) War is so expensive that we can hardly financially afford to have wars in the future. US cruise missiles are about $2 million each per Google, and Russian cruise missiles probably cost a similar amount. The cheapest tank price I found was $2.6 million for a Chinese tank - most cost between $6 and $10 million each. War is insanely expensive. (4) Motivation / morale wins wars. Ukrainian soldiers are fighting for their survival. There is never a moment when they are sitting in a cold, wet ditch and thinking, "why am I here at all?". They know why they are there and what is at stake. That is not true of the Russian soldiers, most of whom probably don't want to be there in the first place.

[@leojohn1615]

war has always been this expensive compared to the wealth of nations we are just richer now. even niccolo machiavelli talked about how "the sinews of war are not gold but good soldiers"

[@green-user8348]

Thank you, Anders. Very interesting.

[@hedgehog3180]

The pattern recognition thing you mention sounds pretty similar to age old EW principles, as far back as WWII you had radio operators learning to recognize the patterns of telegraph operators in order to figure out where units were. So this isn't really so much a new thing as the same old same old applying to a new arena, which means that the tools to deal with it already exists.