Defending Australia: A strategy based on attrition.

[@jamesmaddox7507]

Thank you Paul for your courage, and wisdom. I agree with most of your points, especially on the failures of the DSR, the Defense Department and the fleet review. I feel our greatest hurdle is convincing the Australian people we are in a pre-war period. I am afraid that we are sleep walking into another war, just like we did in WW2.

[@aggressivecalm]

A very well thought out, and rational presentation! Ultimately the issue with the ADF is that it has become more a political animal than a military one. To explain, the ADF has embraced DEI, CRT, and a generally woke culture. A culture/values I will add that do/does not reflect the majority of Australians, rather it speculates the culture/values of an elite bureaucratic circle that has captured much of Australia's political, and managerial positions. I add all this because… A modern twenty-first-century military requires a functioning bureaucracy. What a modern twenty-first-century military does not require is a nonoperational inadequate military, steered by an inflated discriminatory warped ‘Diversity Equity and Inclusion’ bureaucracy. To be even less delicate. Australia is in its most perilous situation since World War 2, while we have allies these allies are not guarantees. There are no guarantees in war. Australia has been aware of the increasingly dangerous environment for over a decade, and yet have made no real moves to adapt, acclimate, and come to terms with the increasingly dangerous environment. Indeed the ADF has made far greater inroads into its political appointments, and internal adoption of intense Diversity Equity and Inclusion procedures, ways and means. This state of affairs would be troubling even in our more peaceful and tranquil points in Australian history.

[@lostarrow861]

That was an excellent presentation, I learned a lot. Based on the Ukrainian conflict, ramping up home grown missile and drone capability is an essential component but developing loitering sub-sea drone technology would keep any invading fleet away from our shores, as the Ukrainians have done to the Russian Black Sea fleet with surface drones and the occasional Neptune missile.

[@kenfowler1980]

Great presentation! And yes, war is all about attrition. I do like your idea for the professional army (which was sought of happening during the late '80's with the move of 1st brigade to Darwin). create a very spikey continent! The reserve army could be achieved by using carrots - like access to better social security, trade training, free university, housing access etc. And as for the RAN and the RAAF - spot on! as for the Department of Defence Department, you are correct its dysfunctional. As for your closing arguments, again is spot on! And as for Civil Defence, it could be the other side of the military recruitment! Instead of 12 months carrying a rifle, train up it the combined skill sets of the Rural fire services/ SES & move those two organisations to the Feds, so common equipment and training will be applied across the country. Well done Paul hopefully someone in power is listening!

[@CmdTomalak255-gu1yp]

Excellent work Paul, I’m very glad to see an Australian advocating for change in our defence strategy, particularly since you don’t try to validate your position by claiming to be an expert, instead simply proving your points with logic and reasoning. That being said, I would like to offer some counter points to your position. Not because I think you are wrong in how to go about preventing a ground invasion of Australia, in fact I am going to order your book so I can read more about your position. Instead, I disagree with your plan because it seems to take far too narrow a view of conflict with China, or any other future threat. The first and most important point is that Australia is and realistically always has been a maritime nation. We realistically will remain so into the future, not because we will always need to import fuel or goods or because we will ever need to import food, rather, it is because our way of life and future prosperity relies on economic growth. Being completely disconnected from any other land mass, we will always need to transport our goods offshore by sea to gain wealth, we aren’t going to have a functioning economy without trade. Without a functioning economy we cannot exist in the 21st century. Just compare nations like North Korea and China. Both have resources (Obviously proportional to their size), both have relatively large populations, both have authoritarian governments, both started from a limited industrial base and both are opposed to the West. Yet only one conducts maritime trade and it’s quite obvious what the broad effects are. A strategy that focuses only on preventing an enemy coming near Australia or invading Australian shores ignores the fact that Australia’s maritime trade doesn’t need to be blocked at its source. It can be intercepted at sea or at the destination. This is definitely beyond any army to prevent occurring, it is even beyond any Air Force to prevent occurring. Simply put, neither have the range. As an example, the distance to the Red Sea is about 9,500nm, give or take a few thousand. This leaves only strategic bombers available for operations, something that is too risky as the use of strategic bombers like the Fw200 in WW2 shows. We could hope that we would have bases in the area but that is not a safe assumption. The only branch of the ADF that could ever hope to carry out commerce protection is the Navy. Confining ourselves to a fortress mentality (Albeit, an effective one) would only allow China or any future opponent to freely destroy our own merchants, dissuade neutrals through the leverage of being unopposed and strangle our economy into destruction, example, Britain vs France in the Napoleonic wars, we are setting ourselves up to be a France without a border to march over. An enemy that cuts off our trade could cripple the population and therefore the military without even sighting the Australian mainland. My next point is very clearly tied to my first. Being a maritime nation, we will always require and be able to justify maintaining a powerful navy. Our most likely opponent, China, as well as other possible opponents, are going to be land powers, meaning their attention will always have to be divided. This leaves them at a disadvantage on the sea. So, like Britain, Venice and Athens before us, we can face down the most powerful land powers in the world with confidence that they will flinch first on the sea, they aren’t going to be able to devote their whole nation to fight a war on the sea like we can. Example, Britain against France (Take your pick of which conflict, I note the Napoleonic and 7 years war particularly). The applicable scenario for Australia would be China and Indias hostility to one another. Simply put, our survival depends on the sea, there’s does not. Counterintuitively, this gives us the advantage. I think these two points should have encapsulated the reasoning behind never limiting ourselves to our own region (Something the DSR also mistook) and also why we can have a chance of being a maritime power capable of filling at least the Risk strategy role (Search up Admiral Tirpitz risk strategy if you don’t know what I’m talking about) in relation to continental powers like China. My third point will be more specific to your plan to defeat naval task groups approaching Australian shores. Drones and cheap missiles like the Shaheed have gained their economy by sacrificing damaging power and their ability to penetrate air defence. Whilst it is true that currently missiles are the most frequently used system for shooting down drones, there are more economical solutions in development and ones already in existence (Although these get little praise). A hostile power would be aware of massed batteries of drones and can design their force to defend against it. In this role there are existing systems like the Oto Melera Super Rapid gun system which has been used in the Red Sea successfully to defend the ship it was mounted on. Unfortunately this is effectively just point defence so can’t protect something like a merchantmen, but since China will be sending warships, not merchantmen, in this scenario, it is safe to assume they would have an equivalent system. This creates a probleem for your scenario because gun systems can be resupplied at sea effectively and would even be cheaper than drones. This then begins to limit our options for depleting the more dangerous missile magazines, we would have to use missiles capable enough that the gun systems can’t safely defeat it. This increases cost and decreases available ammunition making it less effective at driving off or destroying hostile naval forces. I have a lot more points I could bring up and many more independent thought processes but I think this comment is long enough already. Again, great job (Even if I disagree with your plan) and great to see someone doing this sort of work. As a young Australian it is frustrating watching those in power mess up the defence of the nation my generation and others like it will inherit, this makes finding content like this reassuring that there are some people that are willing to start the debate.

[@PaulEvans-x2l]

Well said! A little background. I read Hugh white's book first and that was the genesis for mine. I strongly recommend that you read his as well. These presentations actually started in response to an article in ASPI which was the results of a survey of American officers posted to Australia. I was quite shocked at their lack of understanding of Australian geography and the capabilities of the ADF. That led to the second and third presentation. At that point I realised that some topics were better in a presentation, some in writing. Both complete each other. So, in my book, the RAN has a much more prominent role but supported by a paramilitary merchant marine. It addresses some of the issues you raise. I also agreed with you on CIWS complicating the attrition strategy I recommend. There were 2 factors that I couldn't cover in the presentation. Why the Chinese would not modify their ships, as well as a much more prominent role for the RAN. Essentially, its fire-power and mobility would, at times give the fortress zones extra oomph. I don't remember the exact phrase, but it was along the line of forcing the Chinese to treat all missiles as a major threat to be defeated at a distance. There is some interesting reports out of Ukraine about them mating an attack with advanced missiles with older stock. The Russian AD has difficulty distinguishing between them. I do not know if the same can be achieved by missiles arriving at the same time but at different speeds. However, I also discussed the possibility of using different munitions on each missile to deal with different defences. I did use the concept of CIWS being added to ships from the merchant marine operating with the RAN. The Americans dismiss this concept, I think they call them suicide or sacrificial ships. To me, the second battle of Latvia, though dated, provides a counter-point.

[@PaulEvans-x2l]

Sorry. Hit the wrong button. It was the second battle of Latakia. Going back a step, when I finished the original 3 presentations I drew up a list of issues that had to be addressed. One of them was on procurement. I was actually quite disturbed with the results for the RAN. Its quite possible, even likely, that we will only get 3 Hunters, mainly due to funding AUKUS. If so, even with a small number of GP frigates, the navy's ability to protect our trade is severely limited. As an aside, I also raised the issue of foreign owned ships and insurance rates. Neither really covered the issue of globalisation in a multi-polar world. I doubt it can continue to exist, which means a return to the old-style empirical trade blocks. If so, it's another risk we have to prepare for. Please put any comments about both books in these comments to share. Looking forward to it. Finally, I'm away for a week. It takes me forever to type on my phone. I will try to reply to as many as I can when I get back. Otherwise I may well be my books first, and hopefully only, casualty. Great to hear from you.

[@Lawdylawdy651]

Really appreciate your love of country and efforts to try to improve it despite a few inaccuracies. I would argue that the gulf and boar wars were not wars of attrition (at least from Australia’s perspective). You also fail to mention that unlike the US, conscription in Australia during Vietnam just obliged national service and not going to Vietnam to fight in the war to replace the casualties as you suggest.

[@tacitdionysus3220]

Yes, I think you are on to something there. Access/area denial can serve as a deterrent to moderate threats. However, against a force that is larger and less sensitive about losses, access/area denial is predictably overcome by an enemy with a higher capability for attrition. Once attrited there is little other defence available, unless you also have a coastal/ground defence that is oriented in doctrine , equipment and training to its specific locations, and capable of still effectively operating in a resources, transport and communications degraded environment. That creates a defence with a deeper dilemma for a larger enemy, even if all the area/access denial weapons are expended. There also needs to be consideration for essential supplies, notably fuel; and a deep connection between that 'Reserve Army' and the local communities it protects. That extends to being able to operate with severed lines of support, using localised resources as much as possible, and using equipment that is more 'off the shelf' and easy to maintain with local skills and resources. The Reserve Army (or 'Guards' or whatever other title may be suitable) should be open in recruitment to a wider range of the community, with attractive conditions such as access to relevant vocational training). This force may include officers / NCOs leaving after many years of service in other forces, providing an opportunity to continue to share their skills in the military, but where a more stable placement is the norm. Conversely it could also be a source of identified interest and talent in younger members to be recruited into the other forces. It should include units oriented to all the 'garrison' type functions needed in an expanded service in time of extended conflict. It also needs a strong training wing to enable further mobilisation, perhaps something inspired by the old Australian Instructional Corps. The defence of Australia tends to make assumptions about the threat invariably being from the north. However, if the threat is large and well resourced, it may be from a much wider direction. During WW2, for example, the threat involved attacks at sea all around the coast, a possible threat to WA, and major campaigns in islands not only to the north, but to the north east (e.g. the Solomons). Given that the range and sophistication of modern surveillance and weapons is somewhat greater, suggests (for the other forces with an expeditionary capability) focussing attention much broader than just the near north might be wise.

[@johnbarker7720]

Drones can make up for a lack of numbers in Air, Sea and Land.

[@geoffreyhunt8495]

I’m sorry but I find your arguments riddled with contradictions and out-of-date thinking that is reminiscent of the 1950’s not the 2020s. The idea of a small professional army and a large reserve army is a direct throwback to the CMF of the 1950’s which was conceived as a 3rd AIF-in-being. Attrition is not a strategy, it’s the result of not having a winning strategy. The whole point of denial as a strategy is to keep China as far away from our shores as possible. If you’re planning to fight major battles on the Australian mainland, then you’ve already lost. And there’s not much point in having a large mechanised army if you don’t have the means to get it to the battle. So your constraint criticism of the LHDs is quite baffling. How else is our army meant to get to the fight if not by ships like the Canberra class LHD?

[@KnightOps290]

You can move via land mate. How do you think we get nearly two brigades to training areas in a remote bumfuck nowhere every year....by road. Whilst the coastal defence is slowing them, it gives the main divisions times to deploy. Two weeks and you can move a division anywhere in Australia. I disagree with the fighting on the mainland argument(sort of). In WW2 England was still getting 50 percent of its supplies past the German U-boats. If we bolster local manufacturing now the impact will be much less, allowing us to continue fighting even when the sea lanes are contested and the enemy is at the gates.

[@PaulEvans-x2l]

Hi Geoffrey Thank you for your reply. Its important to have as many ideas as possible included in these comments. I uploaded this presentation, but I think I've managed to reply under a different email. Sorry. Interesting point about my going back to the 1950s. May I point out, rather cheekily, that I actually go back 1500 years to the 550s. Dad jokes aside, I do find your statement that attrition is not a war winning strategy rather interesting. Since the 1950s, I would suggest all the following victories were based on using attrition, often, but not always, against an opponent with what we would consider an advanced military: Vietnam, NVA, 1966 to 1972 (75) Iran Iraq war, Iran 1980 to 1988 South Africa, ANC umbrella sub-orgs, 1960s to late 1990s Iraq, US, 2002 to mid 2010s, even then you'd have to call it a qualified victory based around the use of local militias, with an interesting outcome for American aims. Afghanistan, Taliban, 2002 2022. The russian invasion of Ukraine is an interesting example - counter example. The initial Russian invasion was based around a powerful mobile force backed by special forces. The surprising Ukrainian victory was the result of incredible courage, but it helped that after the mobilisation of their reserves they outnumbered the russian attacking force anywhere from 2 to 1, up to 4 to 1. Also, never forget the massive amount of hardware provided almost immediately (British ATM'S, around 200 Polish MTBs). Courage, ability to suffer losses and stay in the field, material replenishment. It is the definition of attritional warfare. After their defeat, the Russians reverted to attritional warfare. Mass artillery. Mass drones. Constant replenishment of manpower losses. Sadly, unfortunately, they are winning. The entire war from day 1 revolves around attrition. I'd like to use the Germans as a rebuttal to your comment about the 1950s. Back then, the main armies to defend Western Europe against a soviet attack were the yanks, the Brits, and the French. Their idea of a war of manouervre was to fall back to the Rhine and abandon all of West Germany. The Germans, by turning to mass, became such a major force that they actually changed NATO strategy to the concept of forward defence on the border. Rather than east west manouervre, it was north south. There's a lot more to this, including nuclear weapons, that I could discuss. However, from a strategic point, mass gives depth and policy independence (or at least a stronger voice). Excluding the 1st Gulf War, which was fairly unique, I can't think of any war in which mass was not decisive. Happy to discuss different views. However, if I am correct, than preparing for a war of attrition is the only winning strategy and, more importantly, the strongest deterrent. Yes, I don't like the Canberra class ships. I am not alone in this. In his book Hugh White also has the same opinion. Outside of Defence, I don't know of anyone who disagrees. The reasons are obvious. They soak up too many crew. They don't add to the combat strength of the navy. Their design, given our F35 variant, doesn't make sense. While they have a tremendous capacity, the needs of a Reserve Army are best suited by the logistics corp using trucks. Same for the Hercules, hence their reduction. Not having all your eggs in one basket makes logistics far less vulnerable and much more versatile. Finally, I argue (time prevents fully covering this) that the 2nd pillar does not, never had and never will exist as wished. Therefore, outside of MACA, the Canberra's have no role that could justify the resources put into them. As I noted in the presentation, my recommendations preclude even that role. Therefore, they should go. Love to discuss further. Hopefully, when I get back, I can stop typing all this on my phone and actually use a keyboard. I'll check with my son, who laughs at my it skills, but would love you to do a counter point to my presentations and conclusions and upload to this channel. Why do you reach different conclusions based on my assessments of geographic scale, procurement pipeline (chronology) the threat from China, etc.? It's a big ask, and I'm not trying to put you on the spot, but having this discussion is important for a public debate. I hope you agree with me that is the most important issue in deciding Australia's strategic policy, but also know how difficult it is to find the time to do so. Again. Thank you for taking part in these comments.

[@petercarter6261]

@@KnightOps290 if we are moving our armies by land to battle the enemy its means the enemy is on our mainland and we've already lost. For China to attack Australia they will need a base to stage an attack from somewhere in the island archipelago to our north from sumatra to Fiji. Denying the enemy such a base defends Australia. You can't move troops by land to do that

[@geoffreyhunt8495]

@ I welcome your invitation to continue this debate. I think we both agree it is a very important issue that deserves community participation. I think the principal cause of our disagreement lies in a fundamental difference of opinion with respect to the nature of the threat we face. You seem to be focused on a scenario in which China is able to land a full-scale invasion of the Australian mainland, well beyond the scale of a raiding force. Whereas, I, and I think the vast majority of the Defence community, consider this to be extremely remote. It’s not to say such a scenario could never happen, it could. But there are a range of far more likely scenarios which would have to play out first before China could find itself in a position to contemplate such an undertaking as the invasion of Australia. Most likely of these, in my opinion, would be a conflict in the South-China Sea. In such a scenario I think Australia has a very clear national interest to help our friends and neighbors to our north to defend themselves against Chinese aggression. And that requires precisely the kind of expeditionary force the DSR is seeking to build.

[@lukewarm2075]

Hmm cant see my comment wonder why? Seems a bit short sighted to delete someones commwnt that doesnt agree with you

[@PaulEvans-x2l]

Hi Luke I promise I haven't deleted anyone's post, at least not deliberately. I welcome criticism because what I really want is a debate. There's no point only letting people who agree with me comment. Best answer is that I shouldn't be doing this on my phone.please repost and give me a week to reply. I really would like to see your thoughts.

[@Aaronsmith-cu8ii]

It’s a nice speech and presentation but Australia lacks basic depth and mass of our military, additionally our military has been allowed to atrophy for the better past of 30yrs notwithstanding cuts and with no maintenance or upkeep of recruitment and retention further worsens the nightmare. Furthermore Australia lacks a combined and independent national strategy against China at all levels as we have gone for an appeasement approach thinking we can reason with a Beast. Also This is not to mention our weak foreign policy and timid leadership at the helm which has and continues to neglect a tattered strategic alliances in our own region something we didn’t get right from the start all of which combine to make the perfect storm which is dangerous in times especially in a Trump esq world. Any military move from China against us within the next 10-15yrs and we’re basically going to get reamed. Australia would be in Chinese hands within 4-5 days and after that our cities would fall within days. We could inject a trillion bucks into our military and that won’t do shit as we’ve been asleep behind the wheel for a long time and we’re only just waking up now. We are in a bad place at the wrong time surrounded by unsure friends.

[@KnightOps290]

You completely missed the point. Australia was able to amass a massive force in WW2 with a much smaller population. His plan to use the current army as coastal defence whilst spending significantly on reshaping the reserves to field several divisions has a lot of merit. I agreed with the mismanagement to date, though capitulation before it's even started is weak and short sighted.

[@Aaronsmith-cu8ii]

@ Australia and Australians were a different place and certainly different people back in the 30s-40s compared to now, different mindsets, values and priorities.

[@KnightOps290]

@@Aaronsmith-cu8ii Maybe so, without the materials and the plan. They will never get the chance to prove you and China wrong.

[@aggressivecalm]

I agree with the mismanagement to date, (this is impart the attitude of leftist governments.) And Australia has been uniparty moving left for decades. Any military move from China against us within the next 10-15yrs and we’re basically going to get renamed. Australia(New South China) would be in Chinese hands within 4-5 days and after that our cities would fall within days. We could inject a trillion dollars into the military and that won’t do much as we’ve (the inflated discriminatory warped ‘Diversity Equity and Inclusion’ bureaucracy) been asleep behind the wheel for so long and we’re only just possibly waking up now. We are in a very bad place at a very bad time surrounded by some unsure/uncertain friends. A modern twenty-first-century military requires a functioning bureaucracy. What a modern twenty-first-century military does not require is a nonoperational inadequate military, steered by an inflated discriminatory warped ‘Diversity Equity and Inclusion’ bureaucracy.

[@lostarrow861]

While I agree with many of your points, I think you overestimate the capability of the Chinese. They have a big navy but it’s not a blue water navy. They don’t yet even have the confidence or capability to launch an amphibious assault on Taiwan.

[@robertthomas3777]

Great information. Best of luck. Alike the IDF, Singapore and Scandinavia, initiate compulsory ‘National’ service. Defund the ABC and reduce the funding for the NIAA, NDIS…etc. We need a DOGE. Our way of life is worth the risk, but dying for the elites, NWO, WEF, corrupt politicians…etc, is not. We are not so naive.

[@questioneverythingalways820]

The people of this place we once called Australia must take back our direction from the politicians and bureaucracy which benefit none. Otherwise - we can do nothing to actually help people, let alone defend ourselves.