Did the British stop for tea at Nijmegen bridge? | The Nijmegen Controversy | September 1944

[@livethforevermore]

Note: We did originally feature the ‘stopping for tea’ scene from the film ‘A Bridge Too Far’, however, copyright issues meant we had to remove it, otherwise KZbin wouldn’t allow the video to be published.

[@johnburns4017]

In that scene in the film, everything around was pristine. The Germans had swept up the road and grass for them.

[@Pseudonym-aka-alias]

@livethforevermore I'm glad that you couldn't show it. It always adds fuel to the fire that it was a true event.

[@ondrejdobrota7344]

No, British were just defeated by Germans and taht is even worse than muslim made British tea

[@dondouglass6415]

Another myth just like the one about a US submarine capturing an enigma machine... Oh deary deary me.. 😮

[@colindunnigan8621]

@@dondouglass6415 Never heard of that one. Of course there was that ghastly movie from 2000.

[@johnburns4017]

U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of British tanks, four of them, crossed the Waal road bridge at *1830 hours.* Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said: _“They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”_ Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report states: _“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."_ The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at *1915* hours. *45 minutes.* after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at *1938 hours.* This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, *one hour 8 mins* after the first tank crossed. The records state at *1938 hours:* _“All seemed quiet at this point, with the enemy disorganised and in great confusion, suffering heavy losses. Prior to the physical occupation of the northern end of the bridge by 504th PIR, eight British light tanks had [already] crossed. Two of these were destroyed just north of the bridge”._ The second troop of tanks crossed at least half an hour after the first. Burris was there under the approach road when the second troop rolled over, thinking they were the first tanks over. Lord Carington's tank was one of them. Eight rolled over the bridge, with two hit, being there to consolidate the bridgehead and ensure the Germans did not take the bridge back. Horrock of XXX Corps in his plan had the 43 Wessex infantry to seize the ground from Nijmegen bridge to Arnhem, destroying anti-tank weapons. It was not tank country. The tanks were to follow behind the infantry. The tanks would have been sitting ducks if they went first. The 43rd Wessex were to do the river crossing in two columns. There was a contingency planned if the bridge was blown. The Wessex were to use dedicated assault boats, which they had in Nijmegen, and DUKW amphibious craft. But to save face as they failed to seize the bridge, Gavin of the 82nd pestered Horrocks for his men to do the crossing, Horrocks agreed. It appears that the 82nd did not know of the DUKW amphibious craft using collapsible bridge engineers boats to cross the Waal. Or the Wessex did not want to give them fearing the valuable craft would be lost with an 82nd river assault failure - that needs more research. Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at *1830,* or at *1915* when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at *1830 hours.* Thirty-four machine guns, an 88mm gun, and two 20mm cannons were found to be on the road bridge itself, and at least six anti-tank guns and a few 88mm guns were situated around the northern end. All this nonsense of drinking tea by the British tankers disinterested in the battle seems to have started as an American diversion, after inquiries by the Official US historian Charles MacDonald into why the Nijmegen bridges were not taken on the first day.

[@georgehead6780]

Typical?

[@ashcarrier6606]

I read something about Montgomery a year or so ago that has stuck with me. After the war he told an interviewer that at this point the British government told him they could supply replacement soldiers for three months. After that, they would have to start breaking up existing regiments and parceling the men out. Americans will criticize Monty for being a set piece chess player while Patton was a high risk poker player. But Britain had be doing it since 1939. I give Monty the benefit of the doubt.

[@johnburns4017]

Patton was a US media creation. He was average at best, achieving zero of note. Market Garden was an FAAA operation, led by USAAF General Brereton, using elements of Dempsey's Second Army as the ground element.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Thing is, Patton made cautious decisions in the Lorraine, to the detriment of his own army. A post war official US Army history of the Lorraine criticised Patton for his caution and fighting with his army dispersed instead of concentrated. German general Hermann Balck also said the cautious and hesitating American 3rd Army command helped his situation a great deal and he was able to resist for a long time.

[@watkinsrory]

@@lyndoncmp5751 Like the time he attacked a POW camp ( Not sanctioned ) to rescue his son in law ? 300 men went 35 returned. All tanks and equipment lost. Yes very cautious indeed.

[@stgeorge1459]

I like the comment from actual soldiers in Band of Brothers about "blood & guts" Patton. It was their blood & guts he sacrificed..not his own. As for Monty..one look at US made Battle of the Bulge sums up US WW2 historical accuracy. For a true account from US & even German officers involved..one should read Charles Whiting's Battle of the Bulge Britains Untold Story. This true account shows how Monty took charge and stopped the German advance with US, British and Canadian forces. The US top command were so embarrassed..as they had been in the rear having Xmas lunch with their mistresses..that they threatened to resign. This forced Churchill to wind Monty back in. The lies the US told about Monty in WW2 is a travesty....alongside this "taking tea" B/S to cover up US failure.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@watkinsrory Yes there is that, but I was talking about his cautious Lorraine campaign September to December 1944. Over 3 months, 52,000 battle casualties (and another 40,000 non battle casualties) and barely 50 miles of ground taken. Probably the most costly allied failure of autumn 1944.

[@faeembrugh]

I worked with a XXX Corps veteran in the early 1980s. I asked him if he had seen 'A Bridge Too Far'. He was furious about the film as he said that they turned up at the bridge expecting it to be open for them to advance and found the 82nd hadn't done this. As he put it 'they were the ones sitting around doing nothing - but they were drinking coffee not tea!'

[@nickdanger3802]

Vandeleur had time for champagne with a female war correspondent

[@skibbideeskitch9894]

@@nickdanger3802 ...and do you know *why* (according to Cornelius Ryan) Joe Vandeleur had time to drink champagne in the first place? Because it was Day 3/4 of the Operation, and Guards Armoured was stuck waiting around on the southern side of the Waal while Corps command was busy formulating a plan to make good Gavin's failure to take the bridge on Day 1!

[@nickdanger3802]

@@skibbideeskitch9894 according to Beevor he also had a swim while he waited for hours for a tac air mission he had called. any tac air missions called on Nijmegen ?

[@OldWolflad]

@@nickdanger3802 Beevor 🤣

[@betsm5842]

@@nickdanger3802 heck if it had been an american, correspondent would have been assaulted

[@laurencetilley9194]

Thank you for this well researched project. You have provided the evidence required to ensure the soldiers that took part in this important battle are given due credit. Propaganda by all sides during the war never gave consideration to the brave men that were required to follow orders, orders often given by those that were nowhere near the battle fronts and in many cases designed to bring about personal glory, promotion, and recognition. Thank you for sharing.

[@Korporaal1]

a problem with a lot of the well-known historical books is that they are not so much historical as journalistic. And that the authors to what journalists do most often: Repeat other journalists... And not what historians do: Look for original sources. Then you get what we have here: A whole slew of -otherwise well written- books that repeat each other and thus spread the inaccuracies at a faster pace than proper historians can correct them. That's why I'm so happy with channels like this one: They have wide reach and are dedicated to spreading the real histories.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

Yeah this content involves critical thinking.

[@davemac1197]

Cornelius Ryan (author of A Bridge Too Far, 1974) was a newspaper journalist who wanted to tell the story through a series of personal accounts rather than as a historical account.

[@inisipisTV]

I beg to differ. I read Cornelius Ryan book. It clearly stated that it's British tanks that broke through the heavily defended German defensive barricade in the Southern side of the bridge, after Gen. Gavin's 82nd Airborne failure to secure the bridge but opted to capture the high ground. He wrote after after the Niijmagen bridge was secured 5 British rush into Arnhem but well secured German anti-tank defenses. 4 of the tanks immediately lit up since they're well exposed and unable to maneuver since the road is up a high dike. The last tank reverse back and call for Air-support to deal with the German artillery. The Air support didn't came because of fog. The british with the help of Dutch resistance went around West of the bridge where a small farming support road is passable. They reach the river West of Arnhem and met with the Polish Airborne that was still trying to cross the bridge 8n order to reinforce the British Airborne on the other side of River West of Arnhem, that are slowly being encircled by the Germans. The British XXX armour decided to act as artillery and linen their tanks by river bank and tried to bombard the German forces, in order to give the British Airborne some time. A lot of these things were not in the movie for some unknown reason. The British armor tried again to reach the bridge, now supported by Polish Airborne, by going by the road hugging the river and heading east towards the bridge. However, to was heavily defended by German anti-tank guns and large German panzers. I don't remember about the drinking tea thing. The only mention of British halting was after first disastrous first charge to Arnhem and them waiting for airsupprt that only came a day later and didn't even dent the Heavy German defense. By that time British moved on to the side road. All those are from the Movie which heavily diviate a lot from the book. (I.e. The umbrella guy in real life didn't. The guy that catched the airdrop packed with Beret didn't die too but only cried laughing for risking his life. General Browning was portrayed to be arrogant snob that dismisses any negative intelligence report. In real life he's a affable and rather caring person, well liked by staff, and in book showed he was deeply troubled by intelligence report of bigger German presence in Arnhem that he continually asks for more Airborne troops and gliders to fly them there. Actor Dirk Bogarde who plays General Browning on film, ironically was junior staff officer of General Browning during the war, and knew the man well. He was appalled at false portrayal of General Browning when he read the script and vainly asks the Director Richard Attenborough to lessen the negative aspects given to the Character) So many things are wrong. Best watch the British Movie/Documentary "Their is the Glory." A film made right after WWII about the Battle for Arnhem bridge. Most of the cast are the actual soldiers who were actually there during the battle. Far more accurate.

[@davemac1197]

@@inisipisTV - Gavin did not 'opt' to capture the high ground - the 508th was to secure the high ground as their initial objective, but Gavin expected the 1st Battalion to go directly to the bridge as quickly as possible. Colonel Lindquist was not a good field officer and did not interpret his orders correctly, thinking he had to clear the drop zone and secure his other objectives before committing a large force to the bridge. By the time Gavin found out the battalion was not moving, it was too late and the Germans were moving SS units into the city and reinforcing the bridges. The German blocking line north of Nijmegen was at Ressen on a line constructed between the 'hedgehog' positions in the villages of Oosterhout-Ressen-Bemmel. It was nowhere near Arnhem and still south of Elst - the town about halfway between Nijmegen and Arnhem on the main road and rail line. The air support at this time did not work because of a failure of primary and spare RAF control radio sets - the planes were frustratingly overhead waiting for instructions, not grounded by fog. The Polish Brigade landing at Driel to the west of Arnhem made no attempts to reach the highway bridge. That was not their mission or the reason for landing there - it was to reinforce the British Airborne Divisional perimeter at Oosterbeek using the Driel-Heveadorp ferry, which had been scuttled by the Dutch ferryman shortly before the Poles arrived, fearing it would be captured by the Germans. The film did not include many of these details and the book does not go into the failure of Lindquist to follow Gavin's instruction. Browning dismissed the aerial photograph showing tanks near Arnhem on 12 September because he believed it showed obsolete panzer tanks that ruled out a 1944 panzer division, and this was finally verified when the photo was found in a Dutch archive in 2015 and the training unit the tanks belonged to identified and located near the 101st Airborne's drop zone on 17 September. Browning also wanted the airborne troops landed closer to their objectives and at a faster rate, but the double airlift on D-Day and the glider assaults on the main bridges were deleted by the USAAF air planners, and Gavin also discarded a suggestion to drop a battalion directly onto the northern approaches to the Nijmegen bridges. This is not in Cornelius Ryan's book, nor is the evolution of the MARKET plan from Browning's original operation COMET and his proposed operation SIXTEEN outline replacement upgrade. Dirk Bogarde served in the RAF attached to Dempsey's 2nd Army staff identifying bombing targets from (ironically) aerial photographs, and he did know the key players like Browning and Montgomery. He played Browning's character as well as he could, but could not mitigate the script, which deeply upset Browning's widow as being grossly unfair to her husband.

[@hellcatdwe]

Writers like Anthony Beevor help to perpetuate this sort of divisive stuff. In his book about D-Day, he claims that the Americans and Canadians 'looked askance' at British soldiers brewing up on the beaches, rather than pushing on inland. Really? Didn't the Americans have enough problems on their own beaches to take notice of what the British were doing? There is also wartime camera footage of Canadian soldiers on their landing beach, with a caption saying 'French-speaking Canadian soldiers chat to local people on the beach, as they brew-up'. My father was with the Guards Armoured Division and felt deeply offended by these allegations, in view of the bitter fighting and heavy casualties they suffered, and vehemently denied that any such delay happened.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

Max Hastings is just as bad.

[@hellcatdwe]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Agreed. Anything to sell books, especially to the American market. Never mind the quality...

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@hellcatdwe 'Never mind the quality...' Or the truth.

[@Apollo890]

I've been saying this for years. I'm glad to see many young Brits are finally seeing this nonsense for the utter shite that it is. Unfortunately most Americans still believe it and it's a shame. It's a shame that they feel it necessary to make up derogatory things about British servicemen to stroke their ego's instead of just letting the brave actions of American servicemen speak for themselves.

[@OldWolflad]

Summarised perfectly. You can see the anger and frustration on this thread.

[@garypulliam3421]

The British stopping to have tea is meant to be derogatory. That myth was perpetuated every time the Americans didn't get their way in arguments with the British in WW2.

[@nickdanger3802]

Vandeleur had time for champagne with a female war correspondent

[@JGM1800]

If it wasn’t for the Americans the UK would’ve been starved to death. Thus no base to invade fortress Europe

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@JGM1800 Not at all, the UK implemented a rationing system to stop that.

[@JGM1800]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- LOL. Not even close to true. In 1941 alone the US supplied UK with over a million TONS of food. Rationing in UK didn’t end till 1954. Educate yiurself before you speak

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@JGM1800 Sit down and stop exaggerating facts. During the war Britain responded to the Germans by increasing its own agricultural production, shifting what kinds of food were eaten, and reducing luxury foods that might have tasted good but were nutritionally/calorically inefficient. At NO point during the Battle of the Atlantic was Britain in any danger of not having enough food. Because of rationing, while the calories eaten by the most well off decreased, it actually increased for the poorest. The other thing to know is that Britain essentially defeated the U-Boat threat by mid-late 1941. The U-Boats managed to hide this defeat because the US entry into the war provided new targets of opportunity on the US Eastern Seaboard and the Caribbean Sea. That increased shipping losses for the Allies, but it did nothing to threaten the British Isles.

[@AC-kg8vy]

Great analysis and detail to counter rumour and stories. It is crazy to criticise the British for not pushing forward with half a troop of tanks unsupported while still in close combat in Nijmegen.

[@Signals927]

Why do the Americans have a thing about us drinking tea? and why is it in movies American officers are always shown with a cigar hanging out of the corner of their mouth is to make them look tough.

[@OldWolflad]

The British tanks completed the crossing at 1830 hours not 1900 hours, its in divisional 82nd US and several official British war office records. The first attempt was made at 1813 hours, and the second attempt at 1820 hours. There is some confusion as to which time zone various people were quoting (they were an hour apart), but the 82nd Divisional post-battle records actually includes a sketch that shows the British tanks completed the crossing at 1830 hours, and the first US troops at the bridge were just a handful at 1915 hours. The US troops then arrived in some larger force there at 1938 hours. US 82nd Division Captain Kappell (who was responsible for writing the post battle report), stated that at 1830 hours ........"at this time British tanks were already on the north shore". Carrington claimed that crossing the bridge under the risk of detonation was the longest three minutes of his life' so at full speed at 30mph they did not hang around on it. Otherwise, it is an excellent analysis, much of which I have been researching over some years, looking at the same documents you examine. So congratulations on an otherwise excellent piece of work. You will still get the usual detractors trying to lay blame at 30 Corps though (I can actually name two of the most likely detractors), a refusal to accept that any blame lays elsewhere despite the presentation of facts. I think the US commanders were subsequently trying to make up for their inaction since arriving on 17th September, and failing to take the Nijmegen road-bridge that same day. The Grenadier Guards and US 505th PIR actually did most of the work, clearing the Germans out of the town and taking the crucial southern end of the bridge. The 504th PIR were absolutely heroic but they were on their last legs and running out of ammunition on the northern shore, but despite what Burriss subsequently claimed, they were nearly a mile away from the main bridge. His arrival actually coincided with the second troop of tanks forty-five minutes later, when things were much quieter, as Burris himself acknowledges. The 4 British tanks that actually took the bridge were fired upon all the way across, under heavy fire with two tanks taken out. A totally different scenario to what Burriss described. Maybe he did believe he was the first to arrive, but actually I very much doubt it. Sadly, I think it was simply part of a concerted campaign to shove the blame onto 30 Corps. But they have been found out! Furthermore, on the evening of the 20th, most of 30 Corps were either back along the line resecuring route 69 in 101st Division's sector or in the case of the Coldstream and Welsh Guards helping out the American 82nd on their rear Nijmegen perimeter. And for anyone (like Burriss) trying to say there was just a single heavy gun between Nijmegen and Arnhem that night, guess what, this is another myth, as you rightly highlight. Within 2-3 miles were situated up to 24 heavy guns that night, though several may have been taken out that morning in RAF raids, though the vast majority were still active. Most of these were not 88 mm guns but captured French 75mm guns which had a very similar profile to the famous German gun. It is increasingly becoming perfectly clear that there has been a lot of embellishment on behalf of certain US troops - mud sticks etc but it is disgusting.

[@jdgooner4845]

Thank you for putting the record straight, even in a Play Station-3 war game they actually laugh at how slow the British was at reaching tha Falais gap, what they failed to say was the British & Canadians took on 10-devitions of the cream off the Germans panzer deviation, sorry about my spelling, & the Americans had to face just 1

[@rhannay39]

It would not even be an issue if the American commanders had obeyed orders and gone straight for the bridge instead of wasting time securing their eastern flank against a non-existent threat. Unfortunately a repeat of Freyburg's mistake on Crete.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Most excellent presentation of reality. Burriss even claimed there was "whole Corps of tanks" there that just sat and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night, and 2 of those were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.

[@nickdanger3802]

@@rhannay39 how many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ? "securing their eastern flank against a non-existent threat" British AO, British intel

[@rhannay39]

@@nickdanger3802 British intel informed them that there was no threat but that intel was ignored.

[@osledmag6878]

It is interesting that Sgt Peter Robinson, who cleared the way across the bridge, got the DCM, while Lord Carrington, who followed, got the MC.

[@coling3957]

Wasn't the MC for commissioned officers only?

[@randywise5241]

My dad said the movie was not historically accurate. His uncle was there in the 504. He said the general in charge didn't take the bridge according to schedule because he was afraid of an attack from the Germans on his flank. Then they took one bridge but not the main one. He said the British lost some tanks doing that and were stuck on the other side divided by Germans infiltrating between them. They would not have held the bridgehead without the tanks that got through. British tanks had tea makers built into the tank. It would be hard to take them out and set them up outside. There was still fighting going on in town behind them holding up reinforcements. There was no way to go forward till they got through. That took another day.

[@wessexdruid7598]

British tanks didn't have BVs (boiling vessels) until very late in the war, when the Centurion was introduced. But any significant stop allows a brew to go on - British soldiers have this down to a fine art and have done so for a very long time. (I speak from personal experience...)

[@thevillaaston7811]

'British tanks had tea makers built into the tank.' Get real.

[@nickdanger3802]

before 1st AB got 740 men to the north end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at that time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@nickdanger3802 'before 1st AB got 740 men to the north end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at that time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)' Your words And US General Brereton's FAAA landed those US troops a hell of a lot closer to those targets than they did for British troops at Anhem. And what was the strength of the opposition at Grave, the Maas Waal canal, and at the Groesbeek heights?.. Shall we check? The Groesbeek Heights were a target for US forces regardless of whether Browning's HQ brought was to be landed there. Oh, and those gliders for Browning's HQ were taken for the aircraft allocation for 1st Airborne, not the aircraft allocation for US forces. Do try to get at least one thing right.

[@Scaleyback317]

I have for long wondered if the bluster of many of the US forces involved was merely a cover for the unforgiveable fact that the 82nd had not taken the bridge at both ends the moment they landed. It was the reason they were dropped into Nijmegen and had the first companies landed taken the bridge they would have found it defended by a couple of dozen Germans only. They did everything except take the bridge including charging around the hills and forest looking for a thousand non-existent German tanks!. XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen within the parameters set expecting to be able to cross the bridge unopposed and in great numbers as was the plan. The failure of the US airborne to take and hold that bridge was incompetence or maybe worse (but that would be getting into the realms of conspiracy theorism and I really do not wish to indulge in that no matter how strong the evidence to support that concern may be) There has always been the stench of something fishy about Gavin and his actions and why there was no immediate enquiry with the culprit(s) being put under the strongest of scrutiny from a mlitary court. Had a British or Polish unit been reponsible for that level of incompetence and it was US forces being slaughtered as a result of it, how different might the allied reaction to the dereliction of duty have been - instantly! Would the British or Polish commander have been cashiered or left to continue his command with no detriment to himself?

[@davemac1197]

Most of the fault lies with Colonel Lindquist of the 508th, who was charged with taking the bridge with his 1st Battalion as soon as possible. LIndquist only sent a reinforeced platoon recon patrol to the bridge and most of them got lost, separated from the three leading scouts fom the battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, who reached the brudge, took seven prisoners at the southern end and waited about an hour until dark for reinforcements that never arrived before deciding to withdraw. They could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end as they were leaving, so these were the first elements of SS panzer troops arriving in the city. Gavin was quite open about Lindquist, and perhaps his own mistakes, in his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far: Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight. He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.” Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east. When Gavin learned that Lindquist’s troops were pinned down within a few hundred yards of the bridge on the night of the 17th, he asked him if he had sent them into town by way of the flats. Lindquist said that he had not; that a member of the Dutch underground had come along and offered to lead the men in through the city and that he “thought this would be all right.” It’s interesting to note that Gavin was without an assistant division commander throughout the war. Ridgway refused to promote Lindquist to brigadier and, since Lindquist was senior colonel in the division, was reluctant to jump Tucker, Billingslea or Eckman over him. The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized. Instead, and in effect, Gavin decided to operated [sic] out of what he described as a "power center"; broadly, a strong, centralized circle of power from which he could move in strength upon his objectives. That power center was located, for the most part, in the Groesbeek heights area. (box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) So Gavin was at fault for assigning his least aggressive and experienced regiment to the critical Nijmegen mission, but it seems that he thought giving Lindquist an instruction to send a battalion directly to the bridge and showing him on a map the exact route he wanted the 1st Battalion to take would be enough. He was clearly very angry when he found out thishad not been done: Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.” (Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012) Also in the Cornelius Ryan Collection is the answer to the mystery of the tanks in the Reichswald. Gavin sent Ryan some papers by Dutch researcher TA Boeree, who had tracked the route of the Hohenstufen Division's withdrawal from Belgium and into the Netherlands, crossing the Maas at Maastricht on 4 September, concentrating near Sittard, and then on 8 September ordered north to Arnhem and the Veluwe region for refitting. Its route went through Nijmegen and apparently made a stop in the Reichswald. When Gavin was assigned Nijmegen for MARKET he went over to the 1st Airborne HQ to see their intel and plans, because they were to drop there for COMET and he saw the reports. Gavin only now realised in his 1966 covering letter to Ryan the armour was the Hohenstaufen in transit. It's in box 101, folder 09, page 48 for the cover letter.

[@johnburns4017]

Good post. Good points.

[@infantryricky6807]

This video exonerates the Brits and my high regard for them remains undiminished.

[@Peoples_Republic_of_Devonshire]

Excellent video! Very informative! Have you considered covering the Last Stand of the 2nd Devons at Bois Des Buttes?

[@Philip-ss4qd]

I never believed the “stopping for tea crap” even after reading several books about Market Garden. What is an eye opener for me is the fact that the road to Arnhem was NOT open as Cornelius Ryan stated in his book and that only 2 operational tanks made it across. I knew there was a reason they did not push all the way and besides even if the 2 or 3 tanks made it to Arnhem the German tanks there were far superior in numbers and quality and would have wiped out the Shermans in no time. Shermans are great tanks when they fight in numbers.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Absolutely. The simple reason why less than a handful of tanks didn't push on was because their orders were to take the bridge and stop the Germans taking it back that night. They had no other orders. The plan was to keep hold of the bridge that night and then advance properly in force the next day, not half baked through the night with just a few tanks.

[@Gfc22]

Never let the facts get in the way of a good story.

[@stepheneaston8354]

Thanks for this. My uncle served as a Sergeant in Lord Carrington’s battalion of the Grenadiers and this myth has always interested me. How three tanks with no resupply capability in place could make a difference by charging to Arnhem, even if they had got there, is beyond me. Band of Brothers I recall includes a similar “incident” of British tank crews drinking tea rather than fighting, no doubt inspired by these myths too. Of course, war is full of one sided myth. The mainstream post war history of the Eastern Front was mainly written by German generals and pandered to both American and British prejudice about the Red Army. As well as making themselves look good at the same time. Authors such as Robert Citino have mainly debunked it now but the populist histories are still are very much all in on it.

[@nickdanger3802]

"Band of Brothers I recall includes a similar “incident” of British tank crews drinking tea rather than fighting" which episode ?

[@tobermory8341]

A contributing factor to the growth of this myth was the World At War TV series which in 1974 provided an opportunity for the likes of Gavin and Stephen Ambrose to put forward their views of Operation Market Garden. Given the 1st Airborne's communication problems, its very hard to believe the 82nd Airborne staff knew exactly what the situation was in Arnhem itself and its particularly unlikely any information about British paratroopers 'hanging on by their fingernails' had made its way down to company level. Despite their post war claims, the primary concern of Reuben Tucker - and certainly a 504th captain - at the time would quite rightly have been the problems facing their own men. My father vividly remembered being stuck outside Nijmegen with the Guards Armoured when German troops cut the road ahead and behind them, preventing ammunition and reinforcements getting through to the city and making it impossible to supply an advance to Arnhem. He certainly had no knowledge at all of what was happening to the 1st Airborne.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

You are absolutely right. Hindsight talk. No more.

[@stepheneaston8354]

Exactly. My uncle served in the Grenadier Guards in a Sherman tank. He did not speak so much about the war but one sense I got was that he only really knew what was going on in his own tank and maybe the others in his troop. Beyond that, it was simply a case of doing his job, not letting his mates down and trying to stay alive. The idea that junior commanders such as Captain Peter Carrington would have the strategic appreciation to order unsupported piecemeal advances with zero logistics support towards distant objectives to “save” another division seems totally fanciful. It’s the sort of plot right out of those 1970s war films where nobody ever runs out of ammunition or fuel and never needs to be resupplied or ever requires their tanks to be repaired.

[@Teapot69]

Another myth allowed to be perpetuated by olivier on the world of war series is the closing of the malaise gap. The yank spokesmans critucal comment was allowed to be immortalised without redress. Montgomerys american opposite general Bradley said himself the problem was the problem friendly fire Incidents. He sent american troops off into relative open countryside in the direction of Paris which could have helped close the gap. I'm not saying it's another general clark type move on rome😊.

[@beansgas6821]

Excellent research young man, and the facts as recorded by both US & British forces at the time, tell the real story of events. As the old saying goes "never let the truth, get in the way of a good story".

[@ducatiboy6668]

A total myth even American records support the British account.

[@marknieuweboer8099]

The Dutch one I read does so as well. It goes even one step further: before 1939 the Dutch military already knew how easily defensible the road from Nijmegen to Arnhem was. Some artillery was enough to halt an entire colonne of tanks. This was one of several huge flaws in the plan.

[@neilhooper8759]

Unfortunatly people don't read these accounts, they believe authors and films, sad as it is,

[@dovetonsturdee7033]

@@neilhooper8759 Sadly they think that 'it was in the movie so it must be true' A Bridge Too Far was made for an American audience, and one of the 'big stars' Robert Redford wanted a heroic scene to himself. The individual he portrayed (lampooned?) Julian Cook, objected to his performance, and apparently made his objections totally clear to those responsible for the movie. The 'drinking tea' scene was imaginative, but entirely made up.

[@skibbideeskitch9894]

@@marknieuweboer8099 True. That said, had XXX Corps been able to press on to the Arnhem-Nijmegen "Island" on the morning of 19 September, they would've had two significant factors mitigating in their favour: 1) Ample air support (weather conditions were good on that day) 2) Frost's men still controlling the northern end of the Arnhem road bridge - preventing the Germans from flooding the "Island" with reinforcements. Of course, after the delay in taking Nijmegen, neither of these factors were in place.

[@sean640307]

@@marknieuweboer8099 I have studied Market Garden for years and have well over 20 books on the subject. A few mention this so-called Dutch military exam, but in all I have and in all I have read, not once have I ever come across this "exam". You'd think that someone, somewhere would have it, but it just doesn't exist. I think it's a myth. Even if it DID exist, at the time that it was "a thing", the Dutch military never had anything like the arsenal that 30 Corps was bringing to the battle. 43rd Wessex, alone, was greater in firepower than the entire Dutch army had been, and that's before we start looking at the RHA, the Guards armoured, 30 Corps' own engineers, etc.

[@colinmartin2921]

According to General Horrocks, after the four Shermans stormed the bridge, no other tanks were available to cross the bridge because they were all heavily engaged in fierce fighting in Niijmegen, and so it would have been suicide for a few tanks on their own, at night, to have tried to reach Arnhem, even if the road was undefended, because there were no forces available because they were all tied down in Niijmegen. Thank you for putting the record straight.

[@desydukuk291]

What, Gavin did not take the bridge for three days!

[@lyndoncmp5751]

The Guards tanks were indeed split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere. Even at the time the 504th PIR were crossing the river in boats the Germans opened up a counter attack at Mook and the Coldstream Guards tanks were requested to help out by Bill Eckman of the 505th PIR which was in danger of being overrun there at Mook.

[@nickdanger3802]

not the only reason, tanks had used up most ammo in support of river crossing and no arrangements had been made for resupply or for British infantry to support an advance

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@nickdanger3802The Guards Armoured Division had to deviate from their mission, which was to drive up the road to Arnhem. The various Guards tank groups (Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Irish Guards and Welsh Guards) had to be split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere. Due to Brereton's stubbornness in insisting on 3 day drops the 82nd were short of reinforcements as they didn't arrive because of the weather and so the Guards tanks had to be used in that role all over the landing sector after the 82nd requested their assistance to help combat German counter attacks. This took up precious ammo and fuel. This was not foreseen to happen. The Guards tanks were not supposed to be parcelled out all over the place. Nijmegen was supposed to be taken and cleared by the 82nd before they got there.

[@afs101]

The 82nd fluffed their lines in Nijmegen for various reasons, but I suspect a lot the dodgy 'recollections' are down to them wanting to hide the fact that XXX corps had to take the town and bridge that were their day 1 objectives, and the reason they couldn't advance to arnhem was the force that should have been available to do that was busy. The germans in Nijmegen when the Guards arrived were not in Nijmegen 3 days earlier when 82nd airborne arrived, and if the 82nd had done what Frost did at arnhem, this story would have been dramatically different.

[@StevenUpton14-18]

Thank you for finally putting this issue to rest. My father was with the 43rd Div., XXX Corps and got as far as Elst when they did advance, probably the next day.

[@ijm1963]

@@StevenUpton14-18 I doubt it will ever be put to rest but it’s good to see someone presenting facts and not myth. 😊

[@wessexdruid7598]

My username is a link to my service with the units that followed on after the 43rd Wessex Division.

[@StevenUpton14-18]

@@wessexdruid7598 - My father was in the 94th Field Regt. Royal Artillery, a 25 pounder battery, from Normandy to Hanover.

[@wessexdruid7598]

@@StevenUpton14-18 My uncle was a gunner (well Bombardier) too. 🙂As an ex-infantryman, the artillery are the kings of the battlefield.

[@ivanconnolly7332]

Was the Nimjegen bridge not supposed to secured by the 82nd on day 1, is the tea break story not a blame shift.

[@davemac1197]

Yes absolutely, and I think yes. I do think much of the rancour comes from guilt or embarrassment and the natural response is a cover up - MARKET GARDENGATE anyone? Apart from the USAAF air commanders compromsing the operation by scheduling all flights in daylight and deleting Browning's proposed double airlifts on D-Day and the glider coup de main assaults on the main bridges, Gavin compromised his own divisional plan by discarding a British request to drop a battalion on the northern end of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main, because of his experience in Sicily he told Cornelius Ryan. He then compounded it by assigning his least aggressive and experienced regiment - the 508th PIR - to the critical Nijmegen mission, instructing Colonel Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing on D-Day. Lindquist was not a good field commander (he was a gifted administrator) and had not performed well in Normandy on the 508th's first operation, and he simply did not understand the urgency of moving the battalion as soon as it hit the ground, thinking he had to clear the drop zone and secure his other objectives first. Lindquist did send a reinforced platoon recon patrol to check on the condition of the bridge, despite already getting a first hand report from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees at the initial objective on the Groesbeek ridge that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only 18 men guarding the bridge, but apart from three scouts from the 1st Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, the patrol got lost and couldn't find the way to the bridge. The delay allowed the 10.SS-panzer-Division to send units into the city and reinforce its bridges. Despite the default XXX Corps plan for a scenario in which the Nijmegen bridges were still intact, but strongly held by the enemy, being an assault crossing of the Waal to the west by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with either one brigade (operation BESSIE) or two brigades up (operation BASIL), Gavin twice intervened to insist on using his own troops to make the crossing and asked for boats to be supplied. Although 43rd Division was put on a warning order for BASIL on 19 September, Gavin's plan was accepted the second time of asking and there was a debacle in supplying the boats because it was assumed they would have to be brought up the corridor from supplies in Belgium. Nobody had thought to ask the Royal Engineers in Guards Armoured Division for their boats - they actually had 34 already at Nijmegen. It's most likely these were the 26 finally used, after an artillery shell hit one of the trucks in Nijmegen, losing 8 boats. Sources: Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (box 101 folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) Bridging The Club Route - Guards Armoured Division’s Engineers During Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2015, 2016) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)

[@ukmediawarrior]

Yes and yes, lol, but it is a game of musical chairs as to who is to blame. General Gavin stated he was ordered to take the Maas-Waal canal bridge, the Grave bridge as well as securing the Groesbeek Heights to the east of Nijmegen to prevent a German counter attack from the Reichswald forest, to prevent German artillery spotters working from the heights and to keep the landing zones clear for follow up drops. Only then was he to proceed to the Nijmegen bridge and secure it. He states that Browning agreed with these orders. However since then there has been a blame game. Browning states Gavin worked off his own initiative and didn't send men to Nijmegen until is was to late. Gavin also stated he gave Lt.Col Linquist of the 508th a verbal order to send men to the Nijmegen bridge straight after dropping, but Linquist says as far as he understood his orders he was to secure the bridges he had been tasked with first, and only then send men north to Nijmegen. Supposedly the 508th were still sitting around having taken their assigned bridges at 1800 when Gavin asked if they had secured the Nijmegen bridge yet, which they had not even marched on.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@ukmediawarrior This is also similar to the Falaise Gap controversy.

[@davemac1197]

@@ukmediawarrior - Browning wanted all the key bridges taken as quickly as possible on D-Day and this included the Nijmegen highway bridge. He first had the three main bridges at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave planned to be taken by glider coup de main assaults in Operation COMET. After that operation was cancelled, the proposed replacement operation SIXTEEN expanded on the same plan by adding the US divisions at Nijmegen-Grave (82nd) and to secure the corridor between Valkenswaard and Uden (101st). Brereton and Williams removed the double airlift and the dawn glider assaults by deciding to conduct all flights in daylight for MARKET. Then, Gavin told Cornelius Ryan: 'The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized. Instead, and in effect, Gavin decided to operated [sic] out of what he described as a "power center"; broadly, a strong, centralized circle of power from which he could move in strength upon his objectives. That power center was located, for the most part, in the Groesbeek heights area.' (box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) The Maas-Waal canal bridges would be attacked on D-Day by the 504th and 505th at Heumen and Malden. The 508th was to take the Groesbeek ridge, less D Company to clear the drop zone and 1st Battalion to take the Nijmegen bridge. Lindquist was given the instruction to take the Nijmegen bridge two days before take-off, not after landing. Gavin stated this in a letter to US Historical Officer Captain Westover in a 17 July 1945 letter: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald. So I personally directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the city." He re-iterated this again in his 20 January 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan: 'Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.' (box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) This has been further confirmed by eye-witness accounts in two books published in 2012: As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote. Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." (September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus 2012) Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." (Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012) It was only later in the day when Gavin started receiving reports on initial progress that he found out the battalion was not moving on the bridge: Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.” “A Dutch Underground worker [Geert van Hees] who had contacted regimental headquarters had stated that the highway bridge over the Waal River was defended by a noncommissioned officer and seventeen men. This Dutch patriot also volunteered to guide the battalion into town.” (Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012)

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@davemac1197Excellent post, as usual. 👍

[@ronti2492]

The story about the Brits 'stopping for tea' was reinforced by the 1977 movie,' A bridge too far'. This has only strengthened and unfortunately increased the acceptance of this story.

[@youtubeis...]

because Americans think movies are reality

[@madcyclist58]

That's the problem of allowing others to tell "our story". We should make our own films.

[@samuel10125]

Though the Brit stopping for tea isn't exactly a myth because the British soldier was heavily unionised but in this case its complete bollocks it like at the famous battle in Normandy Villars Bucage turn out the force that stopped to drink tea was actually a rear Gaurd advance force had already pushed thorough and took their objects LazerPig has a very good video on this called The Myth of Wittman.

[@terrified057t4]

Which I consider really fucking dumb, because even in the movie the tankers tell the 82nd that their infantry are still fighting in the city.

[@steveforster9764]

The British army as never been. " Unionized "

[@marcuswardle3180]

A Dutch historian has recently published a book claiming that it wasn’t the British fault Market Garden failed but was due to the Americans at Nijmegen. Their failure to capture the bridge on day one and their pre-occupation with securing the nearby drop sites led the Germans to reinforce the defences. It then took the famous boat crossing of the river to secure the bridge. The Arnhem bridge was a fiasco but they could have got away with more troops and maybe, just maybe, have secured the bridge.

[@sean640307]

even with their river crossing, the 504PIR from 82nd AB never did capture the road bridge at Nijmegen. They DID capture the rail bridge, but the road bridge was captured by the tanks for the Grenadier Guards, led by Sgt Robinson.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Market Garden failed due to the caution of the air commanders Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst.

[@TomThumb-d1r]

The truth is. Gavin was out of his depth as a commander.

[@OldWolflad]

@@TomThumb-d1r I think he was an excellent Commander in general, but he just fecked up here, or communication with his 508th PIR Colonel Lindquist failed. No doubt, the 82nd and 101st AB Divisions (just like their British counterparts) were superb fighting units.

[@OldWolflad]

Best analytical book on MG is by Swedish author Christer Bergstrom - the second volume - and it holds no punches as to where the primary responsibility for its failure should lie.

[@brunozeigerts6379]

A Bridge Too Far is one of my favourite movies, but it did contain numerous inaccuracies. I didn't realize the 'stopping for tea' was one of them. There was the soldier who dies retrieving a supply cannister containing berets... he actually survived and was understandably annoyed about risking his life for a cannister of berets. The officer with the umbrella dying... the real officer survived.(there's a youtube video about him.) Essentially, the movie seemed to place the blame on the British.... the Americans, of course, did everything right. The movie shows a line of Shermans sitting idly... not two. Also, the movie only depicts the assault on one bridge... I wasn't aware there were two until now.

[@nickdanger3802]

directed by Baron Attenborough, CBE nominated for 8 BAFTA's, won 4 not nominated for any Academy Awards

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Financed by Americans and with eyes on making a lot of money in the most lucrative market, the USA. The real 'villain' of Market Garden, Brereton, was not even mentioned anywhere in the film. Nor his equally cautious fellow USAAF general Paul Williams. Both were conveniently omitted from the film.

[@victornewman9904]

The "active" Americans and "slow" British meme is a continuation of the American revolutionary war mythology. The opposite is invariably the case. Taking the wrong bridge and then being saved by Guards' Armed wouldn't maintain their favourite mythology of independent vitality.

[@inisipisTV]

​@@nickdanger3802- Not really, he proposed the plan to Eisenhower and Eisenhower agreed to the plan and totally support it. Even Patton was impressed by it too that he got on board with it, since if the operation did succeed it would totally knock out German war production and cut off all supply to most Germany, ending the war much sooner . It's a joint British American operation. Most of the Planning was done by General Browning but was alarmed at such an ambitious operation and hearing reports of bigger German presence. He and Monty asks for more Aircraft and Gliders so they can fly and drop all the Airborne troops in their target in one day in order to take the Germans by suprise. Unfortunately they can only came up with only 1/3 of what they asks and the delivery of troops will be staggered and in the course of 3 days. Plus, the troops barely received any real Air-support during the battle. Even in Arnhem the Germans were hardly bombed by Air-support.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@inisipisTVThe lack of tactical ground attack air support in Market Garden was because of Brereton. He wanted to skies cleared for his 3 days of drops which ballooned into a week due to the weather. That's on Brereton.

[@tango6nf477]

The Americans were against the whole operation from the start and enjoyed making fun of the British as to them they were stuffy and pompous. One of the things they made fun of most was our love of tea, forgetting their love of coffee. It was a well known fact and still is there was even a gig musical hit in 1938 which referred to "everything stops for tea"! The idea that the British Army would stop everything for a brew is not only stupid, it is insulting especially to the men who were lost.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Well, the operation had to be green lit by Americans, Eisenhower and Brereton. Both were in favour of it. Eisenhower, Brereton, Williams, Gavin and Taylor were all Americans with crucial input into the operation.

[@alanpearson7554]

I note that Captain Carrington received the MC for his efforts at the bridge, I'm curious as to whether the 2 sergeants who made it to Lent were also decorated. Another excellent article, thanks

[@georgerobartes2008]

Peter Lord Carrington continued to serve this country long after WW2 in a very successful political career with the Conservative party serving as Defence Secretary under Margaret Thatcher .

[@Antonnick]

Also my thoughts. It seems that the primary drive was made by Carey and Robinson.

[@johnburns4017]

The vid omits that no US troops were on the bridge when taken by the tanks. Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped expecting to see American troops. The War Office report states: _“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on._

[@lyndoncmp5751]

They didn't come across any American troops until they got to Lent, one kilometre from the bridge.

[@johnburns4017]

@@lyndoncmp5751 Correct. The second wave of tanks 45 mins later at 1915hr, inc Carington's lone tank, met the just arrived 82nd men at the riverbank, about 15 of them. One was killed by a German sniper in the bridge girders. At 1938hr the 82nd men arrived in greater force at the riverbank. The tanks went over in three waves. 1st was four tanks (two hit), 45 minutes later the 2nd wave, which was one tank, 3rd wave soon after was three.

[@grayharker6271]

Right!? And just how did the British tanks clear the bridge head on the Nijmegen end of the bridge ? They didn't it was the 82nd that the bridge so they could cross.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@grayharker6271There were Germans on the north end of the bridge when the tanks crossed and engaged them. That's how the tanks got battle damage. The 82nd didn't clear the end of the bridge. The 82nd was a kilometre to the north at the railway viaduct in Lent.

[@CC-wd4rp]

Thanks for putting the record straight. It appears a lot of the false accusations arose from the failure to take the final objective ( Arnhem ) and people were eager to point the finger of blame regardless of their remarks being true or false. Puzzles me why Operation Market Garden is largely seen as a failure when the Allies punched a large hole in enemy lines opening up a new front. Admittedly Arnhem was the key but it was a big territorial gain nonetheless. Arnhem wasn't the whole battle.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. Nearly 100km of German held ground taken in just 3 days. Compare that to the months of getting nowhere in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine.

[@johnburns4017]

Taking Noord Brabant was the rime aim, jumping over the Rhine at Arnhem was an added extra.

[@stuartburton1167]

What!!! You mean Hollywood didn't get the facts right. My world has been rocked.

[@davemac1197]

The American response usually goes - "Of course we know that Hollywood isn't accurate! Do you think we're stupid and don't know that? But the British definitely stopped for tea!"

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@davemac1197 Sot on.

[@davemac1197]

@@thevillaaston7811 *spot on? For the benefit of our international audience, that's "dead on" in Ireland and "tru dat" in Baltimore.

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@davemac1197 Apologies. Spot on. Its been a long day

[@davemac1197]

@@thevillaaston7811 - I get it: you're over-extended, fatigued, been on the go continuously since hitting the beach in June... it happens!

[@mortimusmaximus8725]

If the Nijmegen bridge, had been captured on day 1, all of this could have been avoided.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Most excellent presentation of reality. Burriss even claimed there was "whole Corps of tanks" there that just sat and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night, and 2 of those were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.

[@johnburns4017]

Only seven tanks got over the bridge - one with only one crew member. On the initial wave of four tanks, two were hit on the northern section. One was got moving again by only Sgt Knight who run over the bridge and up to Lent to meet the tanks of Pacey and Robinson. Knight's tank was useless as it only had one crew member, him. Carington's tank, moving onto the bridge passing a knocked out British tank, 45 minutes behind the leading four tanks, later joined them at Lent after staying static at the northern end of the bridge on its northern ramp near the riverbank. The riverbank is where 82nd captain Burriss met Carington in his stationary tank. Burriss did not know tanks had already moved over the bridge 45 minutes before he reached it with about 15 men. He thought Carington's tank was the first. Carington moved on to Lent when reinforcements came over the bridge. Another three tanks went over the bridge making eight in all with one knocked out and one with a crew of one, giving a firepower of six.

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@johnburns4017 Lyndon, John Yep. Great stuff.

[@thevillaaston7811]

We await a measured contribution from Para Dave?

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@thevillaaston7811Good grief let's hope he doesn't come and ruin yet another video. Im sure one of his alter egos will turn up sadly.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@johnburns4017I did not know another two tanks came across later. I know infantry and other vehicles, such as armoured cars, came across later but I wasn't aware of more tanks that night, just those five. Cheers.

[@onepointfive5710]

On the 21st of September the Irish Guards Group tried to fight their way through to Arnhem but they were shot to pieces by german anti tank guns, so the idea that three tanks could have reached Arnhem on the 20th is simply not true as this video clearly proofs.

[@sean640307]

the difference was that had the bridge been in US hands when 30 Corps arrived initially, then they would have been able to roll right on through to Arnhem, brushing aside the meagre German units that were between Nijmegen and Frost's men at Arnhem. On the night of the 20th, though, there was no possible way that four tanks (one damaged, and with mixed US/British personnel) were going to be able to go on through the night to Arnhem without infantry and air and/or artillery support.

[@johnburns4017]

@@sean640307 The orders for the tanks was to secure the bridge preventing the Germans from taking it back, not wander off into the night.

[@sean640307]

@@johnburns4017 exactly right.

[@nickdanger3802]

@@sean640307 when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem having averaged just over 2 miles/3km per hour on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water

[@sean640307]

@@nickdanger3802 they would still have reached Frost's men before those German reinforcements arrived. The distance between Son and Grave was covered in a little over two hours so trying to factor in what happened before and averaging it out is disingenuous and mischievous. It's also fair to suggest that as 30 Corps got closer, they would have had become more energised, as that is human nature.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

The sad truth is that Thirty Corps was smeared as too slow because of the falsehood of Gavin who claimed that Thirty Corps was 36 hours late on reaching the bridge, which is clearly nonsense as the operation had only started 42 hours before Thirty Corps reached the Nijmegen bridge, a distance of 50 miles. The fatal delay for this operation was at Nijmegen, not in the advance before then.

[@desydukuk291]

British XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on time, but the Americans failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, the British had to take it for them. Gavin screwed up, he failed to take the bridge at Nijmegen, seeing it as a secondary matter to protecting his Eastern flank from a phantom German tank army! Read Robin Neillands book The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe. This history book is not the Hollywood film version of Arnhem but a well researched book. Gavin's poor choices, warts and all, different chains of command back to Washington, lack of strategic vision by Eisenhower, duplicity of Ike's subordinate commanders and the huge level of American corruption in supplying its Armies in Europe all contributed to this American led failure.

[@2naturesownplace]

And if you believe all that rubbish. You're a tart that would believe American Paratroopers were kissing brits like shared here. Americans, especially Paratroopers Despised that stuff.

[@kevincarroll6490]

100% British armour arrived on the afternoon of the 19th, and no bridge was captured. The hole point of the opposition was the bridges. But Boy Browning has to take some of the blame

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

One could round snd round. Gavin didn’t take Nijmegen because pompous Browning ordered him to hold the heights.

[@strongbrew9116]

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d Nope. Browning ordered Gavin to take the bridge. Gavin landed first and decided to prioritize the heights. It's time to stop accepting Gavin's own account and post-war lies as fact. He was the main reason why Market Garden failed.

[@johnburns4017]

_At nightfall on D plus 3, the British had at Nijmegen only the Guards Armoured Division. Because inclement weather continued to deny arrival of the 82nd Airborne Division's glider infantry, the Guards Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the airborne division. This left but two armored groups to go across the Waal. Even these did not make it until the next day (D plus 4, 21 September), primarily because of die-hard German defenders who had to be ferreted from the super-structure and underpinnings of the bridge._ *_Once on the north bank, much of the British armor and infantry was used to help hold and improve the bridgehead that the two battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry had forged._* - US Official History

[@gnosticbrian3980]

Odd that the Americans fail to mention the failure of the 82nd Airborne Division to attach maximum importance to the early capture of Nijmegen Bridge. If the bridge had been taken in strength and with all speed, then it is possible that British tanks would have reached Arnhem Bridge before Frost was forced to surrender.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Again.. who was the commander? British!!!! General Browning who was next to Gavin

[@johndawes9337]

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d Gavin failed to follow Brereton's orders

[@marknieuweboer8099]

Every Dutchman who has read about M-G knows this.

[@skibbideeskitch9894]

​@@user-mc4sq3fk5dGavin "the decision [to prioritise the Groesebeek Heights] was *made by me* , and approved by my Corps commander" Similarly, it was the 82nd who were obsessed with the Reichwald to the point of distraction (not Browning's Corps HQ - and no credible threat emerged from the forest until Day 4), and it was Gavin and Lindqvist who either failed to issue pre drop orders to move against the bridge - or failed to execute said orders. It was nightfall by the time a token force of the 82nd tried to sieze the Waal bridge. But blame the nearest Brit, am I right?

[@inisipisTV]

​General Browning was there as an observer and to coordinate with the approuching of XXX corps (he's totally reliant on Gavin's command for intelligence and movement of US and German troops). He doesn't want to undermine Gavin's command because Niijmagen area is 82nd Airborne's responsibility. He did advise Gavin to take the bridge first, but General Gavin was worried of approaching German reinforcement from the East that he decided to capture high ground near area to cover his flank. By the time they focused on the bridge the Germans was able to heavily fortify the entire town in Southern approach of the bridge. 3 days of fierce street fighting by 82nd Airborne in the town but they were unable to break even close the German defenses near the bridge. They have to wait for the arrival of the British tanks for it.

[@bridgeteyles4940]

Had my uncle been alive, I would have asked him, as he was one of the infantry they were waiting for

[@Rschaltegger]

Thinking that 3 Tanks...should advance alone at night into enemy terretory is just stupid.

[@kevinfright8195]

The smearing of XXX Corp is the same as the Americans never talk about Overloon or the Maisy Battery...WW2 politics

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Or Metz, or Hurtgen Forest or Operation Queen......

[@OldWolflad]

very true- Overloon was where British 3rd Division had to do the job American divisions had previously failed at

[@killacamfoo]

This channel so underrated. Great research and storytelling here.

[@paulnutter1713]

Every tank the us came across was a tiger, the 8th AF always bombed precisely, the same force shot down twice as many planes that the Germans had and general Patton's shit smells of roses.......all true, I've seen the film

[@uxsobm2792]

Let’s not forget the 2 Sherman we’re low on amo Don’t me started on Hollywood changing our history for abit of drama

[@johnarmstrong1578]

It was the same as Ambrose's account of Omaha. Royal Navy personnel that crewed the landing craft some were accused of cowardice for being reluctant to go in and had to be threatened with shooting to get them to go in. The veterans of the US 'Bedfordshires' agreed with the RN vets that they had no record of any such incidents occurring. The RN and US vets approached Ambrose to correct this slur, he ignored them.

[@davidcorbett62]

@@johnarmstrong1578 like the movie U 571 where the yanks captured an enigma machine. In reality one had been captured a year before

[@neon3690]

Captain Moffat Burris account sounds like something out of a Hollywood writer's room.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Especially his claim that "a whole Corps of tanks" just sat there and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night and 2 were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.

[@tokencivilian8507]

"History lies in the heart of the debate." Great stuff bringing these facts to light with this vid, adding to the discussion of Market Garden.

[@garymartin4550]

The battle was lost when the road bridge had not been captured on the 17th or 18th when it was very lightly guarded. Guards Armoured arrived at Nijmegen on morning of 19th at about D+44 hours (schedule was 2 - 3 days). Unfortunately instead of driving across the bridge and pushing up to Arnhem, against minimal opposition (due to the Arnhem bridge being under 1AD control, German reinforcements were having to be ferried across the Rhine causing significant delays), they had to deploy 3/4 of their combat power to support Goosbeak Heights, the west of Nijmegen and South to help keep Hell’s Highway open. After the heavy fighting in Nijmegen there was nothing left in the tank, and (I think) 43rd Wessex Division would make the final push toward Arnhem. Historians have to sell books so going against established narrative is difficult. Up to the 80’s many of the key personalities were still around, and giving personal interviews, inevitably establishing good relationships with the historians. The historians then find it difficult to be anything but empathetic, causing them to be over supportive. The last 25 years has seen a much more neutral tackling of the issues, hence the obvious failure to capture Nijmegen bridge, as the main point of failure, has only really got an airing relatively recently.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Great post, but one slight inaccuracy. 1st Airborne never controlled the Arnhem bridge. They only controlled a section of the northern end and a few houses, which dwindled each day. 1st Airborne already failed in Arnhem due to the caution of Brereton and Hollinghurst. The Germans always controlled the bridge off ramp and 99.9% of Arnhem. The objective was the entire bridge and most of Arnhem, so that XXX Corps could cross the bridge, get off it and fan out through most of Arnhem, forming a bridgehead. That objective already failed on day one, sorry to say. Market Garden was screwed by the caution of the USAAF and RAF commanders.

[@johnburns4017]

@@lyndoncmp5751 But First Airborne denied the use of the Arnhem bridge to the Germans. This left the island between the two bridges lightly defended.

[@northernskys]

Thank you for clearly, and precisely, dispelling this horrendous myth. Shame on those "historians", and writers, who fail to do their due diligence, and continue to propagate this lie.

[@LordGeorgeRodney]

The reality here is it was the Americans who stopped for coffee and therefore didn't capture the Nijmegan bridge, resulting in the de facto scupper of Market Garden.

[@CJs.]

This is what lets the film a Bridge to far down

[@martinoreilly1525]

Great account. Well done!

[@johnarmstrong1578]

I'm glad that this matter has been cleared up as I found it difficult to believe.

[@geebards]

Your content, as always is superb and goes to a level of detail rarely published in wider histories. For the record, I am neither British or American and it seems to be a British cultural habit to all too readily self-criticize and take blame in contrast to American tendencies to shift blame and self-deny. I believe this was to excuse the failure of US Airborne to take the bridge when they had the chance and the need more generally for historical authors to placate a US readership to secure sales. Thanks for your efforts and keep them coming.

[@martinford4553]

It's pretty sad because Market Garden saw the US blame the brits for faults if its own making. Then the brits scapegoat the polish commander for nothing too. The failure of Market Garden lies with Gavin and Brownings inaction.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@martinford4553 Browning was scapegoated. Browning was "convinced" to leave the Airborne. He was got rid of and shunted off out to Burma in an administration position (a lowly comedown after being an Airborne Corps Commander) already before the end of 1944. Sosabowski was dismissed not because of Market Garden but because of his general argumentative and non cooperative manner. This rubbed a number of people up the wrong way. It was his attitude, not ability.

[@bigantplowright5711]

Total rubbish, my uncle crossed the bridge in his Sherman. The whole column was strung and under constant attack. They done their best RIP.

[@onepointfive5710]

outstanding video.

[@Staghound]

Also even if they post war had proved the road was clear past the anti tank guns The Brits couldn't have known the road was clear, it's obvious they were acting on the best possible intelligence they had at that point which turned out to be mostly right

[@OldWolflad]

It wasn't clear though - thats the point. Another myth

[@johnburns4017]

The initial tanks over the bridge were to form a bridgehead on the northern bank with the US 82nd men. The idea was to prevent the Germans taking the bridge back, not wander off in the dark on a raised exposed road.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Indeed. Captain Carrington had no orders to blindly go off ten miles to Arnhem.

[@johnburns4017]

​@@lyndoncmp5751 Of the four tanks over the bridge on the first wave two were hit by hand held panzerfausts. The tankers would be very aware that there would be some of them around the raised road. Robinson's two leading tanks were near hit by two anti-tank guns at Lent.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@johnburns4017Yes very true. They would also have been aware that their orders were to stop the Germans taking the bridge back that night, seeing as there were still Germans around. No half baked attempt to get to Arnhem would have suceeded that night. Better to get a, stronger force and try and do it properly in daylight the next day. Three times already in Market Garden the Guards Armoured Division had been held up by German anti tank guns. At kick off on the first day, then at Aalst, just before Eindhoven, on the second day and then in front of the Nijmegen bridge on the third and fourth days.

[@1701enter]

Something said often enough becomes a “truth"

[@desydukuk291]

Especially when Hollywood writes the script.

[@Pseudonym-aka-alias]

If they had taken the bridge on the first day, which was possible as the bridge was only lightly held by the Germans, then the 504th crossing of the Waal would not have been necessary.

[@nicksykes4575]

For the Americans here, Capt Carrington would later be a minister in Margret Thatcher's government.

[@OldWolflad]

Not really something to be proud of (:-. I say that as a Brit

[@victorocallaghan6791]

The tea scene is an insult to Lord Peter Carrington. I was privileged to be at Arnhem for the 80th anniversary

[@lyndoncmp5751]

And Secretary General of NATO. He was given a congressional award by the Reagan presidency.

[@wessexdruid7598]

@@OldWolflad Peter Carrington was a decent, honorable man. How many ministers since, have resigned when their departments cocked up?

[@T.S.Birkby]

It’s unfair on the Grenadier Guards. Market Garden seems get to everyones blood boiled up.

[@Lykas_mitts]

People want to find someone else to blame for the failure of it, of course they'll start making allegations. After all, if you don't find someone else to blame then maybe you might be at fault yourself, and for most people that's too uncomfortable.

[@Peoples_Republic_of_Devonshire]

It's a failed operation, so naturally nobody wants responsibility. The Americans blame the British, the British blame the Americans, the Airborne forces blame 30 Corps, 30 Corps blames the Germans and the terrain.......

[@desydukuk291]

@@Lykas_mitts It was Gavin because he caused 3 days delay.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@Peoples_Republic_of_Devonshire Same principle with the Falaise Pocket.

[@Peoples_Republic_of_Devonshire]

@@desydukuk291 there's no one cause it blame. It was a very high risk strategy, in which too many things could go wrong. Ultimately it was the fault of Montgomery and Eisenhower

[@lewyocom4724]

I’m nearly 60 and I remember my grandfathers and my father’s generation having a lot of anti British sentiment, I never understood where it came from but it was definitely present in WWII generation of Americans so that may explain some of it, also CYA on the US airborne troops who should have taken that bridge the first day.

[@desydukuk291]

Hollywood wrote this version of history. British XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on time, but the Americans failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, the British had to take it for them. Gavin screwed up, he failed to take the bridge at Nijmegen, seeing it as a secondary matter to protecting his Eastern flank from a phantom German tank army! Read Robin Neillands book The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe. This history book is not the Hollywood film version of Arnhem but a well researched book. Gavin's poor choices, warts and all, different chains of command back to Washington, lack of strategic vision by Eisenhower, duplicity of Ike's subordinate commanders and the huge level of American corruption in supplying its Armies in Europe all contributed to this American led failure.

[@youtubeis...]

no reading allowed! Only fictional movies will be used as our sources

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

Pure Bull Shit. None of the Airborne Divisions accomplished all their objectives without XXX Corps help. There were to many of them and the Germans got a say in things. The 82nd Eventually accomplished all their objectives - with XXX Corps help. 1st Airborne accomplished NONE of theirs partly because - as the farthest away - XXX Corps couldn't get to them. Most importantly 1st Aiborne failed to accomplish taking both ends of the Arnhem Highway Bridge. That mean that the Germans could have blown it up any time they wanted. If XXX Corps were about to take the South End of the Arnhem Highway Bridge - the Germans would have blown it up. Are you to stupid to see that? .

[@pfcsantiago8852]

Nothing wrong with having a cupa

[@Morbius1963]

We live in the post enlightenment era where facts and evidence don't get in the way of storytelling. A few years ago, I had occasion to review an American high school history book. Fairytales. Thank you for this factual account. btw, 50 odd years ago I participated in the Nijmegen marches. I don't know if they still happen.

[@wessexdruid7598]

Yes, they still do - mid-July, every year.

[@Davey-Boyd]

Thank you

[@jamesmccann355]

The Americans are not our "ALLIES".....and the "SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP" is a very abusive use of political and financial leverage by the Americans to assert their influence over the political landscape in the country.

[@traceyj321]

My father, a Dunkirk, Torbruk and Al Alamein veteran, best friend was at Arnhem. When the disgraceful Attenborough directed film came out, they along with other Arnhem vets were disgusted by the Attenborough film. In fact, I recall some old paras writing in anger to the director. There was a lot of jealousy by the Americans towards Montgomery and it is often said in the past that the radios that were supplied to the paras to maintain contact with each other, were deliberately sabotaged, if I recall correctly they were given by the American forces. Along with being dropped in on top of an SS division the fact that there was very little ability to communicate due to these radios was felt to be a major contributory factor to the disaster that happened. 40 years on from that film a lot of those who were alive to tell the tale are no longer here. It is vital that the truth is still talked after all, there is a generation that has grown up believing the Americans won the war single handed.

[@johnburns4017]

There was no armour in Arnhem on he jump day. RAF reconnaissance confirms this. The ground in the area is heavily mixed with iron affecting the radios.

[@davemac1197]

@@johnburns4017 - apart from the three Panzer V Panthers and two Flakpanzer IV 'Möbelwagen' belonging to SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 hidden under trees on Heijenoordseweg in the western suburbs of Arnhem. I have a local Dutch historical article that tells the story from a resident living in the house on the corner of Callunastraat and Heijenoordseweg who received a knock on the kitchen door on the Friday morning (15 September) to find two SS panzer crewmen there asking for any spare ersatz coffee. They explained they had taken their tanks out of the barracks (SS-Pz.Rgt.9 was in the Saksen-Weimar kazerne) and hidden them under the trees across the road to avoid possible bombing of the barracks.

[@coling3957]

A myth pushed originally by americans. But hinted at in movie A Bridge Too Far.. Ppl dont realise that the whole road to Arnhem was under repeated attack by German units including armour. The narrow one road was highly dangerous for duration of operation.

[@johnburns4017]

The road from Nijmegen to Arnhem was pretty empty until First Airborne capitulated, which was when the Guards tanks crossed the Waal bridge. Then the Germans ran south over the Arnhem bridge Tiger tanks.

[@PersonalityMalfunction]

Well, it's not exactly the first time America attempts to claim credit for the feats of others. Just leave them be, their military history is sad enough without rubbing salt in their wounds.

[@EK-gr9gd]

They had no infantry with them. No tanker enters a town without infantry cover. They hadn't trained 82nd and British tanks that they could cooperate in such an operation. "God Call Him God" Peter Carington made the right decision.

[@paularinaga1576]

My thought exactly. They were extremely brave to advance without infantry support and through an urban area no less.

[@simongee8928]

Apparently, the British stopped 'for the night's because otherwise it would have involved a night advance / attack which without knowing the exact disposition of the Germans would have been a very risky thing to do. Pity it wasn't explained better to the Americans.

[@generalg.b.mcclellan3079]

They lied ! Wow, it's worse than I thought. Not so much a 'Band of Brothers' then, it's more like a 'Bunch of Lying Bastards'... They wouldn't have done this without higher approval. It seems to me that someone didn't want Market Garden to succeed and put the fix in. Not something that you're gonna find in written account though.

[@skibbideeskitch9894]

Long story short: the Americans were happy to try and smear XXX Corps as being "too slow", in an attempt to divert attention away from the 82nd Airborne Division's failure to take the Waal bridge on time - the key factor in Market Garden disintegrating. XXX Corps were *not* the reason the plan failed, and they arrived at Nijmegen *on time* Nonetheless, bad historians repeated this falsehood for some time afterwards. It's good to see the traditional Cornelius Ryan narrative of the battle losing its grip on popular discourse. It's about time.

[@thehellyousay]

that burriss story sounds like "what i wish i'd said and done" that becomes the memory almost before the dust has settled.

[@siras2]

Just a small point, but the British Army have never called our tank crews "Tankers", we have "Tankies".

[@cookudysu90]

It was General Gavin's fault for not grabbing the Nijmegen road bridge on day one!

[@lyndoncmp5751]

It was Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst of the USAAF and RAF with their cautious decisions.

[@victornewman9904]

Someone should do a video on Gavin's 48 hour delay before Nijmegen bridge.

[@catlee8064]

2007, taking musa qaleh, Afghan. Yes we did stop to have a brew......

[@johndawes9337]

with plenty of sugar.

[@catlee8064]

@@johndawes9337 damn right !!

[@mentalneil]

Thank you for giving me more history on this area of the war, and for highlighting the book on the Guards Armoured, a subject deep in my heart

[@leefisher816]

Super coverage

[@CyrilSneer123]

so the americans were trying to cover their assess after they assured the british the bridge was fully captured but in actuality the americans only captured the rail bridge not the road bridge.

[@desydukuk291]

Ass covering is the least, Gavin by his negligence allowed a British Airborne Division plus a Polish Brigade die, unforgiveable and Hollywood are guilty of promoting lies.

[@desydukuk291]

Didn't even capture that.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Uh yes, after one of the bravest river crossings of WW2 with 50% casualties.

[@OldWolflad]

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d Heroic they were undoubtedly my friend, but they didn't capture the road bridge and please don't put belated blame on the British.

[@alganhar1]

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d Does not remove the fact that had the Bridge been taken ON DAY ONE, when it SHOULD have been, that heroic river crossing would NOT HAVE BEEN NEEDED. The entire purpose of 82nd being dropped there was to capture that road bridge. It was their primary objective. The very REASON for them being dropped. To take that bridge so that when XXX Corp arrived they could drive across it and on to Arnhem. The Bridge was not taken on day one, when it should have been, and when it was defended by, at best, a scratch company with no heavy weapons and virtually no support. Had Gavin moved quickly on the bridge, like he was SUPPOSED to, then those US Airborne casualties during the crossing would not have been needed. And THATS the issue, the fact that the crossing was heroic is not the point, the point is that it should not have been necessary, and would not have been had Gavin done what he was actually there to do and capture the road bridge on day one.

[@grayharker6271]

1/504 Captain's Moffitt Burris and Maggie Margolis recounted the same story. They both also covered the British retreat after being over run at Anzio! I met them both during an 82ABN reunion in 1981!

[@martinford4553]

The blame lies on Gavin. Both the other airborne divisions took their objectives in a timely manner even with heavy resistance. If the Nijmegen bridge was taken on the first day then the outcome could have been different. It proved costly to wait and to defend the heights you needed only a portion of the troops that they had.

[@johnburns4017]

The 101st failed to seize the Zon bridge. XXX Corps had to run over a Bailey bridge.

[@nickdanger3802]

Arnhem rail bridge 4 miles/6km from LZ Z, destroyed 4 hours after 1st AB landed Arnhem road bridge BLOCKED when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem having averaged just over 2 miles/3km per hour on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water and Frost was informed no more effort would be made to reach the last intact bridge in Arnhem area

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

Pure Bull Shit. 1st Airborne took NONE of it's objectives. 82nd took all their objectives - they just needed XXX Corps help because there were so many of them. All three Airborne units needed XXX Corps help - they just couldn't get to 1st Airborne. The Germans held the South End of the Arnhem Bridge. They could blow it up any time they wanted. If XXX Corps had come rumbling up the road about to take the South End of the Bridge - the Germans would have blown it up. .

[@martinford4553]

@@BobSmith-dk8nw The 1st had taken Arnhem bridge (their primary objective) on the first day. Yes they didn't hold it but they were facing substantial resistance and held for days until out of ammo. If the 82nd had completed their primary objective of taking the bridge at Nijmegen before 30 Corps arrived then not only would have getting to the 1st been quicker but their own fight at Nijmegen would have been easier(as the Germans were now ready but also reinforced through the bridge that wasnt taken) and they wouldn't have needed a costly amphibious assault. In that they failed their objective. The fault lies with Gavin and Browning for this, ignoring their primary task for a unsubstantiated threat that kept the majority of their forces prepared to fight shadows. Yes the 101st also lost an objective but it wasn't as important as Nijmegen was. The Allies may have taken Nijmegen but they lost Market Garden there too.

[@johnburns4017]

@@BobSmith-dk8nw What planet is this one on?

[@philipwells2793]

Lord Carrington must have been pretty pissed when the film came out, however, I have no memory of anything being said by him. Gavin's plan for the 82nd was flawed as it included no serious attempt to take the Njimegan bridge on day one of Market Garden, with joint responsibility of General Browning who approved it as well as utilising valuable resources to move his HQ into the Njimegan area which played to significant role in the entire operation.

[@davemac1197]

"no serious attempt to take the Njimegan bridge on day one of Market Garden, with joint responsibility of General Browning who approved it" is not true at all. Gavin instructed Colonel Lindquist 48 hours before take-off to send his 1st Battlaion directly to the bridge after landing, and Lindquist failed to do this. Lindquist was not a good field commander and had not performed well in Normandy, but Gavin thought that instructing Lindquist by showing him on a map the exact route he wanted the 1st Battalion to take to the bridge would be enough. When Gavin found out the battalion was not moving, "I never saw Gavin so mad" said the 508th liaison officer Captain Chet Graham, who was the unfortunate messenger. Browning had his intended double airlift on D-Day and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the three main bridges at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave deleted by Brereton and Williams when the outline plan was handed over to 1st Allied Airborne Army, and Gavin said the British then wanted him to drop a battalion on the northern end of the Nijmegen bridge to takeit by coup de main, which was an idea he said he toyed with, but eventually discarded because of his experience in Sicily with a scattered drop and a division disorganised for days. Browning had objected to a previous Brereton plan for operation LINNET II (Liège-Maastricht bridges) scheduled on just 36 hours notice, with no time to print and distribute maps for briefings, and threatened to resign over it. Brereton planned to accept his resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation, but thankfully the operation was cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident. The problem was that Browning now knew what would happen if he objected to another Brereton plan and all attempts to influence planning for MARKET were frustrated by American officers. Browning's late decision to move up the transport of his Corps HQ from 2nd to 1st lift should be seen in the context that thanks to Brereton and Williams' changes the 2nd lift was pushed back from the late afternoon of D-Day to the late morning of D+1, and the displaced units were some anti-tank guns for Division HQ defence and second line ammunition trailers and Jeeps for the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery at Arnhem, which did not have an impact on events at Arnhem in the first 24 hours. Browning was clearly more concerned about the Nijmegen bridge, and events at Nijmegen proved he was right to be concerned about it. He did not agree to, or approve, anything he had a real choice over and seems to have decided to support the americans with whatever they wanted and they would have to live with it. I don't think Browning had any idea before he passed in 1965 that he would get screwed over by Cornelius Ryan and generations of historians and the American public after the publication of A Bridge Too Far (1974) and the 1977 film adaptation. It should also be noted that according to David Belchem, who was standing in for Montgomery's hospitalised Chief of Staff Freddie De Guingand, 21st Army Group were not notified of the changes to the outline plan SIXTEEN approved by Eisenhower when it was presented by Montgomery on 10 September until after the 14 September cut-off date set by Brereton for any further amendments to MARKET. If Montgomery had intervened (and he wrote after the war he regretted not doing so), he would probably have to appeal to Eisenhower to adjudicate, and Eisenhower would probably have consulted his Air Chief, Arthur Tedder, who was not well disposed towards Montgomery. If Brereton had been overruled, then he could simply have cancelled the operation, which he had the authority to do, having already rejected a previous Montgomery request for an airborne drop (INFATUATE) on the island of Walcheren to assist the Canadians in opening Antwerp.

[@richardthomas6890]

Thank you for correcting an Hollywood wrong

[@dennis2376]

Another interesting account of Operation Market Garden. Thank you.

[@gregpower308]

Thank you for a clinical presentation of the facts. Nice work. 🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿

[@peterfindlay2756]

Thank you for this very interesting appraisal, backed up by evidence.

[@declanfeerysr1205]

Excellent details on the true story of what happened at the bridge. Keep up the excellent work.

[@quirkygreece]

Good, fact-based account of the real situation. Thank you for this.

[@OldWolflad]

Just so people know, the U.S. Army installed thirty-two mobile, trailer-mounted coffee-roasting and grinding units attached to field bakeries in July 1944, each operated by six specially-trained men. These units produced 90,000 lbs of coffee a day, every day. I guess they never stopped for coffee and doughnuts though (:-.

[@lesmoore6443]

Very interesting and well done. Well at least one American historian does not fault the British tanks for not attempting to head on to Arnhem. In "September Hope," John McManus recounts the basics of the incident, including the part about a US paratrooper threatening a British tank commander. But he makes an even stronger case than that made here that advance to Arnhem would have been unlikely to succeed. He doesn't go into detail, as is helpfully done here, about specific German units and strength, but emphasizes that the elevated (dike?) road was horrendous for unsupported armor, making them easy targets, and that in fact there was plenty of German power between Lent and Arnhem. He also adds the larger context that at this point the Allies were in no position to supply a strong force for a run to Arnhem. The thin one-road umbilical that was the spectacular fatal flaw of Market Garden was under attack at several points, Allied road traffic was backed up in several places, etc. He also notes that the US paratrooper frustration with the situation was almost certainly a direct result of the losses endured in the heroic assault across the Waal, which even the British overall commander of Market Garden witnessed and described as incredible. Heat of battle. Plus of course those paratroopers didn't/couldn't know the larger picture that made a run to Arnhem at that time out of the question.

[@MrTangolizard]

So a infantry officer while in combat took out his Tommy gun and cocked it and made threats to a tank commander yeah I smell bull crap firstly a infantryman in combat would already have his weapon cocked and ready and 2nd you threaten a tank with 4/5 men in it your going to get wasted by the other men simple as that

[@lyndoncmp5751]

We know it's bull crap because Burriss claimed a "whole Corps of tanks" were there, sitting and doing nothing. Only 5 tanks were there. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.

[@ijm1963]

The fact is the 82nd failed to take the bridge on day 1. This caused the delay. The discussion is whether Gavin or Browning are responsible.

[@sean640307]

Gavin, in his own book, says HE made the plans and presented them to Browning, who agreed with them and "ordered" Gavin to make it so. The truth is that Browning didn't care what order Gavin took his objectives, as long as he had the bridges before 30 Corps arrived. Browning does deserve some scorn, for taking his HQ to the battle as it was not ever intended to do so. Those 38 gliders would have been better used by 1st AB to get their additional troops on the ground on that first day, when they needed them most. That said, it needs to be pointed out that Gavin had the most numerous of objectives and was concerned about his LZ (which just so happened to be the site of Browning's HQ). If Brereton and Williams had allowed for double-tow of gliders and/or for two drops on that first day, then both Gavin and Urquhart would have had sufficient critical mass to not have had to make the decisions they made (in Urqhuart's case, it was to bring in all of the heavy gear on that first day at the expense of additional troops, which is why I say those 38 gliders would have been better utilised by 1st AB than Browning's HQ. 32 additional Horsa gliders would bring anything up to almost an extra 900 troops on that first day. The six remaining WACO gliders would probably have gone to 82nd AB but that's only an additional 60 or so troops, so not enough to make a big difference to Gavin's needs!

[@briancoleman971]

Perfect example of why you can’t take every account at fave value. Burris’s story probably got better with every retelling. 😂. I have cautioned people for years that even the bravest, most respected soldiers can tend to embellish the truth over time. Either to make themselves, a leader, or their unit look better. It’s human nature.

[@IndianaDel1]

I recall Lord Carrington as a Minister. Although I did not agree with his politics, I have never seen him as being a liar in that later capacity. Based on the contemporary records, and Lord Carrington's own recollection, the PIR Captain is false in his assertion. Oh and I did not know the US Paratroopers had only captured the Northern end of the railway bridge, although a simple reference to the map makes that obvious as an outcome.

[@joshthomasmoorenew]

I blame Gavin and Browning for all of this, Gavin was focused on the heights near Nijmegen on the first day and only send a single battalion off to the bridge late in the evening when the SS panzer was on the bridge and Browning who was there and was actually set up in Gavins HQ didn't stop Gavin. Now as to why this was well Gavin seemed to believe there was a German armoured element in the forest near the heights, now i'm not sure what lead him to believe that but that what he claimed, but the plan was for him to take the bridge and he completely neglected that, as for Browning i got nothing the guy might as well stayed at home because he basically did nothing except get in everyones way.

[@johnburns4017]

Browning having his HQ in the battlefield came from problems seen in Normandy. It was a practical not a ego move. Browning had no reason to distrust Gavin, his record up to that point was excellent. Browning was in the 82nd's sector, the largest, but was managing three divisions. He was *not* commanding the 82nd division, that was the trusted Gavin. He was not following the progress of the 82nd 508 who were supposedly moving to the bridge, which they were not, as that was Gavin's job as it was his division. Browning was not amused when informed the bridge had not been taken. But the 82nd had moved int and controlled the evacuated Nijmegen town. Browning put a stop to 82nd attacks on the Nijmegen bridge when he realised it was futile wasting ammunition and men, then waiting for XXX Corps to arrive soon to take the bridge. XXX Corps did arrive about 21 hours later being on schedule. Browning did allow Gavin to take his men from the bridge to defend a reported German attack on the LZ. The 82nd were not attacking the bridge any longer, so some of them can leave. He trusted Gavin who vastly overestimated the small futile German attack. He did not expect Gavin to totally evacuate Nijmegen town, giving it back to the Germans. The total evacuation created problems when XXX Corps arrived having to get the Germans back out of the town, who had reinforced the town with fresh troops who came over on the ferry.

[@joshthomasmoorenew]

@@johnburns4017 Ok I never accused Browning of pulling an ego move by placing his HQ with the 82nd HQ, my point was he was in the same building and could much more easily checked on what the 82nd was doing then 101st or 1st Airborn. And this is why i pin some of the blame on Browning, he should have been much more aware of what Gavin's situation was, which as overall airborn forces commander he should have known what all his units were doing and he wasn't, now some of this wasn't he fault the radios were faulty and comms with 101st and 1st British were spotty, which he can't be blamed for, but he could just walk into Gavins HQ and get an update on Gavins situation so he should have at least had a better grasp on whats 82nd's doing. He could and should have been able to see that the whole of 82nd was heading to the heights and not to the bridge which they shouldn't have been doing, Browning at any point in the first day could have checked a lot earlier as situation report and then see Gavin is going to wrong way and correct him. Yes, Browning is managing 3 divisions and a brigade and no he shouldn't be taking over Gavins Division that's not his job he should trust Gavin to do it, however if Browning as Gavin's senior commander finds out one of his sabordinates is not following the plan he should go to that commander, or radio call him, and ask why this is the case and if Gavins not got a good reason then tell him to get back on task. Browning completly failed to keep adequate eye's on the situation, if he had the 82nd's attack on the bridge would have been much earlier which means they could have at least had a contested bridge like at Arnhem meaning 30 Corps wouldn't have got stuck in Nijmegen fighting a battle they shouldn't have fought in the first place. Also i can't recall which officer it was but one of Browning's staff officers said Browning's HQ was really just getting in the way. Now i will concede Browning shoudn't be tracking 508 thats Gavins job and Gavin didn't do it, but they could have and should have been moving that way much sooner then late evening. Now i will also concede that Gavin did make way more mistakes then Browning did, the evac of Nijmegen and 508 ponderus pace as examples and Gavin is the source for the 36 hours late at Nijmegen idea when in fact 30 crops was on time when they reached Nijmegen and then lost the 36 hours at Nijmegen.

[@johnburns4017]

@@joshthomasmoorenew Browning was not there to micromanage a trusted Divisional general with an excellent and experienced record. If he did that his relationship with that general would deteriorate rapidly. When Browning knew that the prime bridge had not been taken he was not amused. He then started to interfere with the 82nd telling Gavin to halt any bridge attacks as they were futile. Browning was more interested in what was going on at Arnhem, not in the easy 82nd sector. Browning tells Gavin what he _wants_ not _how to do it._

[@joshthomasmoorenew]

@@johnburns4017 I'm not saying Browning is meant to micromanage a subordinate all the time, i'm saying Browning wasn't aware of what 82nd were doing until was too late to do anything. Yes a Commander doesn't micromange a subordinate, unless the subordinate in question is doing something wrong or making a mistake, then he needs to step in a stop them and thats what Browning didn't do when Gavin was making one. Also Browning focusing his attention on Arnhem and not keeping track of all his command is also a mistake becuase he didn't catch Gavins mistake of focusing on the heights in time to do something to prevent it before it became a disaster.