Doubting "I Think" (The Cogito)

[@BelegaerTheGreat]

[Man, I love your energy in this video!] Firstly, I dislike this exclusively causal proposition of thought. 2:15 Umm, no, believing something is already within the definition of "thinking". 4:00 He says it himself, and objects to it saying that we have no premise to know we are thinking. And that is hilariously incorrect, because the essence of Descartes' argument is that we need NO premise to know we are thinking! The act of thought and doubting justifies itself! 5:50 "It is always true that you are thinking, but you might not know it." Fine. It just so happens that I do know it whenever I want, because I am smart and self-conscious.

[@coreylapinas1000]

It seems this is all undone by the fact it must be rationally considered in the first place.

[@andystitt3887]

Isn't forming a belief thinking?

[@souravmohapatra2501]

but if we don't know whether we exist how can we know that we are having a sensation and then label them differently? The skeptical scenario itself presupposes that we exist

[@ahmedbellankas2549]

1- I sense p and I believe that I think ( sensing p caused me to believe that I think); 2- p is an illusion; 3- within my attention that I believe that I think ( I attend to ( I believe that I think)); 4- if f is within my attention then I attend to f; 5- if I attend to f then there's a mental thing seen by me in my mind; 6- if there's a mental thing seen by me in my mind then I think or I'm conscious; C- if I believe that I think then I think or I'm conscious, no matter whether what induced such a belief is an illusion or not. -You can say p is x or y. - also, it seems that you assume T and T= that sensing doesn't happen within one's attention immediately, it's like you assume that there's within the individual ( person) the thinking box and the sensing box, and what happens in the sensing box goes to the thinking box through a nomological structure NS ( x induces pain belief and y induces thinking belief) and NS can go wrong and the going from the sensing box to the thinking box is not immediate. Why should I believe T? By the way I love your channel and your reasoning.

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

Sensation X (which generally makes you think of state Y)... ... but you do not form the belief that X>Y" There is a fundamental contradiction built into this: how can you _generally think_ that X>Y is true but not believe that that same X>Y is possible? I think there is a confusion between what others believe and what you believe. For example, he thinks "punching > pain" but she, having congenital insensitivity to pain (CIT), doesn't believe that "punch>pain" since she has no access to "pain". Thus, if he punches her and she says "I am not in pain as I don't have access to it"... ... is he being rational by insisting" *You don't know what you're thinking* ; the truth is that you _are_ in pain." ? After all, *his* _generally thinks_ is not *her* _generally thinks_ and thus their tautologies are not equal, but only equivalent.

[@cliffordhodge1449]

1) This is wrong for reasons similar to Zeno's famous paradox about trying to get from point A to point B. Like space, mental states do not seem to be broken into discrete units. We have to break things up that way for logical analysis, and conversation generally, because we have no choice - we don't know how to do otherwise. But if I draw myself as a stick figure because that's my best effort at paper-and-pencil representation of myself, it does not make me a stick figure, and stick figure analysis will fail. 2) Further, to wax phenomenalistic for a moment, "I" is not separated from the current total mental state except in our imperfect analysis or deliberate reflection; or maybe you prefer to say it is separated by an unbridgeable nothingness. My experience exists as a tickled thing or as a suffering thing. Though I use a process of logical reasoning to arrive at the proper words to use in a proposition to represent myself at that moment, I no more conclude I am a suffering thing from a logical process than I reason to determine the rock in front of me has extension, shape, color; I just experience it AS extended, shaped, colored. I.e., Awareness of the suffering or tickled quality of my being is the starting point of any reasoning process that may take place. The cogito argument may well be re-stated in ways to underscore why it is taken to be such a weighty argument. "I err, therefore I am," "I have a mental state, therefore I am," or simply, "I......, therefore I am." In some analyses I have heard, the emphasis was heavily placed on the ability to posit the "I". And I do think that is all I need for an indefeasible argument for my existence. And that is what must be attacked as uncertain in order to undermine Descartes' basic idea.

[@GhostlyJorg]

I'm not going by my passive sensation here to determine whether I am thinking or not. I AM the one DOING the thinking. This is in stark contrast to being tickled. Someone else is - presumably - thinking they want to tickle me, and now their thought and will is being the cause of them actually doing the tickeling TO ME

[@justtheouch]

So the argument is that I could experience sensation X, which would normally lead to the belief that I am being tickled, but mistakenly form the belief that I am thinking. Therefore I might have never been thinking (sensation Y) but just being tickled (sensation X). With this in mind, my issue with this it that surely, through forming the belief that you are thinking, you are in fact thinking. Even if the belief that you are thinking is false, the formation of that belief is a thought in itself. You could argue that the belief that you are forming the belief that you are thinking is also unjustified, but this only opens the door to infinite regress as I have to form the belief that I am forming the belief that I am forming the belief...that I am thinking. There has to be the formation of a belief that is justified and true to start the chain and that proves that at some point there is a thought.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

You seem to be claiming: "If I form the belief "I am thinking" then I must be thinking because belief is a type of thought." The question is, how to you know that you actually have formed that belief, perhaps you see it presented to you instead. Imagine that ED has you set up such that whenever he puts a statement x in front of some visual receptor, you become utterly convinced of the claim "I believe x" however this is not because you have assented to x, but rather because you are doing something drastically different from thinking, but rather you are seeing x. In this case you are not thinking, you are rather seeing, and mistaking seeing for thinking. Note that you are actually thinking in this case, since you form the meta-belief that you believe that you are thinking, but your justification for actually claiming that you are thinking is undermined. Another way of tackling this might be to claim that maybe you are mistaken about the meaning of the words thought and belief. Perhaps, in fact, belief does not imply thought, you are simply convinced that it does by ED. In fact, you for your whole life up to that moment used thought and belief as entirely different concepts, but ED tricked you and then changed your memories to convince you otherwise. It does nto actually follow then that belief is a kind of thought so the argument fails. Here's more on doubting absolutely everything: kzbin.info/www/bejne/jp-Tf6aVbamLd8k

[@justtheouch]

Carneades.org I would argue that your first response is simply a reconstruction of the original claim, and fails for the same reasons (overlooking your second response for now). It states that I experience sensation Z (in this case the visual presentation of the statement) which leads me to form the belief that would normally be formed by sensation Y (namely that I am thinking). Given that you allow that we are thinking in this case, then I can accept that my original belief that I am thinking could be mistaken or justified for the wrong reasons, but not the meta-belief formed by believing that I am thinking. With this understanding I can know that I am thinking (or perhaps more accurately, that there are thoughts) without the original belief that "I am thinking" being correct or justified. Having said that, your second response is far stronger and more challenging to avoid. The only reply I can think of right now (and I'm not currently sure how strong this one is) is that this is an issue with language instead of the mental events themselves. I could be mistaken in my ideas of the meaning of belief and thought and the nature of their entailment (or lack thereof), but this misunderstanding of the terms does not mean that the nameless events I think I am referring to do not exist in this way. The event of mentally assenting to a proposition ("belief") and an event of the mind ("thought") are logically entailed, even if the terms we use are not. Our language is irrelevant compared to the nature of reality, if we could replace the words with the event itself I don't believe there would be a problem.

[@pontifrancesco439]

Putting aside the fact that it's quite controversial the thesis that you can form a direct phenomenal belief which is so misguided, you still cannot bring home your skeptical point if you do take for granted that there is a belief there. In fact,granting that the first order belief that i'm thinking from a pain-experience is unjustified, we could resort to an higher order belief:namely the belief that i believe that i'm thinking. That wouldn't be neither possibly false nor unjustified. In fact its justification is the correct apprehension of the first order belief.

[@gogl0l386]

But it feels like having the belief of having a sensation is the definition of having that sensation, thus it is impossible per definition to have a sensation which is not in accordance with the belief you have of which sensation you have.

[@guillatra]

Descartes might respond: "Okay, but I'm tickled, therefor I am." I think it is better for your aims to describe what's happening without using "I" as a subejct.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Thanks, but I don't think that's required. Here's why. Descartes can no more know that he is being tickled than he is thinking. In the example, when he comes to have the belief "I think" he is in fact being tickled, but has no idea that he is being tickled. He could just as easily be in pain. There is no way for him to know what experience he is having.

[@ronlongo]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene But Descartes might recognize that the concept of thinking can apply recursively; one can think about thinking. He might also recognize that the concept of tickling cannot apply recursively; it doesn't seem that one can tickle about tickling. Such reasoning may give him some comfort that he is not being tickled. I'm sure it doesn't increase the certainty he's actually thinking since there are many other things that can be applied recursively and hence confused with thinking. Anyway it's unimportant because, *thinking* is not the reason Descartes concludes he exists. What proves he exists is the fact that he's *mentioned* in the assumption, "I think". In classical logic mention entails existence. Formally, from Pa (saying that object 'a' has property 'P') we can apply the Existential Introduction inference rule concluding Ex:Px (something exists that's P). Which is as close as we can get in first-order classical logic to saying, 'a exists'. This is because quantifiers can only rule over variables not constants (i.e. Saying something like 'Ea:Pa' (exists a such that a is P) is not well formed while 'Ex:Px' (exists x such that x is P) is a well formed formula because x is a variable. Anyway, Descartes's premise "I think", is merely a carryover from his long descent into skepticism. Where everything else he found reason to doubt but he stated he could not doubt that he is doubting, and doubting is a kind of thinking, so he feels certain that he's thinking. So, now that he's identified some property (thinking) that he cannot doubt 'i' has, he's able to concludes using Existential Introduction that "i exists".

[@TheOregonians]

My interpretation of the word "think" seems to be a little different. Any felt-experience has associated to it a thought. I wouldn't need to explicitly believe that I was in pain, or have any linguistic concepts of pain or the subject I or the verb am to hold in abstraction that I was, indeed, in pain. The fact that an felt-experience is had in the first place seems to me a justification of the sentence "I think." Whether or not such thought is accurate and precise is a separate subject, no?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Interesting. In order for this argument to work, you need to prove the claim "Any felt experience has associated to it a thought." Not only is this claim dutiable (perhaps an evil deceiver is making you feel things all the time but preventing you from thinking of them), but it seems just false. Here are my three examples: 1) Imagine that you are watching TV. While doing so you scratch your head and then continue watching. You never notice that you scratched your head, and you would not remember if asked a minute later, but I think you would say that you had the "felt experience" of an itch, without ever thinking "I have an itch on my head." 2) While there may be some evidence to show that higher primates may have phenomenological consciousness, or thought it is doubtful that things like mice do. And yet we say that mice feel pain, even though they are unable to form the thought "I feel pain". Therefore it seems that there can be pain without thought. 3) Finally, if you were to take a piece of human tissue separate from the body and poke it such that the nerves would signal that pain was being felt, I doubt anyone would say that thinking was going on even though there was the experience of pain.

[@TheOregonians]

Carneades.org Your third counterexample seems a little disconnected, specific tissues haven't a mental life to begin with, so it seems to be a case of mistaken categories to suggest that the nerve firings of a tissue sample could treated as pain; that's a reductionist analogy. I take your first and second counterexamples as good rebuttals. Still, my reading of Descartes begs that I advance his position further. Descartes felt that anything could be doubted, but it could not be doubted that you were experiencing at one specific moment. Complex "thoughts" are not required for experience; experience can be simple sensory inputs. I think the Stoics called these things cognitive impressions. When I see an orange, the complex, say, botanical and linguistic ideas associated with oranges are irrelevant to my cognitive impression of an orange - all that matters is that I see the orange. Is this not what Descartes meant by "think"? After all, he does not initiate his epistemology with the notion of complex, thoughtful reasoning. He begins it with experience. He claims to be able to experience some sort of perfect thing, and from that experience he initiates his now infamous Cartesian circle. In summary, might his argument have been better stated as "I experience - I am."

[@danielcappell]

Not convinced the Gettier problem bolsters the skeptic here that much. The believer can bypass it just by saying "I think ∨ I'm in pain ∨ I'm sad ∨ . . . " . So, going off the Gettier problem and the skeptical scenario combination, there might doubt for "I think," but there is justification for the proposition I put in quotes in the last sentence. You would need something else from your skeptical bag of tricks to refute this proposition!

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

I'm not sure that this will solve the issue. It seems like there are sensations in the world which you have never experienced, tastes that you have not tasted, sounds you have not heard, things you have not seen. So you as a finite being could not form the belief which constitutes and infinite disjunction, since you can't include that which you know not of. Similarly the evil deceiver is not limited to just substituting sensations, he might switch in something which is not a sensation, a type of thing that we cannot even conceive of. So I'm not sure that we can even think of that proposition, let alone have it be exhaustive.

[@AntiCitizenX]

Trading labels for a sensation does not make the sensation wrong.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Imagine every day Bob walks out of his house, stubs his toe on the door, and feels pain. Then one day Bob stubs his toe on the door, experiences the exact same sensation, but accidentally thinks that he was tickled only for a moment and then realizes he is in pain. On any other day he would refer to that experience as pain, and in retrospect he says, yes he was wrong to think that he was being tickled. How was his claim "I am being tickled" right? (Note that the sensation was the same, it was the belief that he formed that was incorrect).

[@AntiCitizenX]

Carneades.org There is a difference between "I am being tickled" and "I feel as though I am being tickled." The feeling is what it is, no matter what label you assign to it and no matter what external stimulus is causing it.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

AntiCitizenX But the point is that one is not mistaken about the stimulus, one is mistaken in the belief that one forms. First your mind receives the stimulus and experiences the feeling of pain, then the language center of your brain looks for a word to describe it, but instead of 'pain' it finds 'tickle'. Your brain forms the belief "I am being tickled", when if fact you are experiencing the feeling of pain.

[@forrestfyre925]

I agree that we might form mistaken judgments about sensations, but your language center doesn't play a causal role in formulating your beliefs in the manner in which you describe. Beliefs can be, and probably usually are, formulated independent of the phrasing of them in our native language.

[@AntiCitizenX]

Guys, it doesn't matter what you choose to call the sensation. *The sensation itself is never wrong.* You can label the sensation however you want. If being stabbed in the foot makes you laugh and giggle, then as far as your brain is concerned, you're being tickled. If I recall apple juice for breakfast when really it was orange juice, so what? I still recall the apple juice. If that memory then immediately changes into milk instead, again, so what? Memory and sensation is just dynamic.

[@MoleDownunder]

I am, therefore I think :3

[@RELLGazen]

Doubting is thinking. Therefore you thought. THEREFORE YOU ARE. YOU ALONE ARE.

[@alittax]

How would you doubt the fact that you are having an experience? It doesn't have to be any specific experience (thought, feeling, sensation etc), but just the fact that you are experiencing something (which could be true or false, doesn't matter). Whether or not the experience you have is a result of a dream, delusion, a thought/feeling/sensation/etc implanted in you by God or a deceitful demon, or a computer simulation, or something else, you couldn't deny the fact that you are having an experience. You could then say "I'm experiencing something," instead of "think" (the latter of which may perhaps be doubted, but not the former, unless you think it can, in which case I'd be interested do hear how you think that might be possible). Thanks for the video!

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

My first question would be how do you define "experiencing something?" What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being an "experience"? Would the claim be false if that something does not exist? I.e. if you say "I heard something fall down the chimney," but discovered that in fact you imagined it and there was nothing to fall down the chimney do you think your belief that I heard something fall down the chimney be false? It seems to me most people would say yes, if there was nothing to fall down the chimney then your belief that you heard something fall down the chimney is false. Similarly if you said "I am experiencing something" and the something you thought you were experiencing did not exist, would you think that statement was false? Would the claim be false if you had the belief "I am experiencing something" implanted in your mind, but never experienced anything? It seems to me that belief is different than experience, but I don't know exactly what you mean by experience.

[@alittax]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene Hi, thanks for the response. > My first question would be how do you define "experiencing something?" What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being an "experience"? I mean experience in the widest possible sense of the word, such as any thought, feeling, sensation etc. > Would the claim be false if that something does not exist? No, all this claim means is that there was some sort of experience. Whether or not that experience is connected to anything else doesn't matter (see below). > I.e. if you say "I heard something fall down the chimney," but discovered that in fact you imagined it and there was nothing to fall down the chimney do you think your belief that I heard something fall down the chimney be false? It seems to me most people would say yes, if there was nothing to fall down the chimney then your belief that you heard something fall down the chimney is false. The question isn't if the experience is true or false, all that matters is that there is some sort of experience. If I hear a noise but it turns out that I just hallucinated, for example, then it doesn't matter if the noise wasn't connected with anything in the real world, what matters is that I've had the experience of hearing something. As I said in my original comment: "Whether or not the experience you have is a result of a dream, delusion, a thought/feeling/sensation/etc implanted in you by God or a deceitful demon, or a computer simulation, or something else, you couldn't deny the fact that you are having an experience." > Similarly if you said "I am experiencing something" and the something you thought you were experiencing did not exist, would you think that statement was false? See above. > It seems to me that belief is different than experience, but I don't know exactly what you mean by experience. Belief is a kind of experience, but not all experience is belief. See my first note. I've checked some videos in hopes that they may better explain my point, these ones do it very well (only the timestamped parts are relevant): kzbin.info/www/bejne/on3Yl4GdhqmHhas kzbin.info/www/bejne/e3ndkGB5nNt0rZI Nietzsche according to these videos said that "There are thoughts"/"Thinking is going on" is the only appropriate claim, but I think this also isn't precise, because "thoughts" may exclude emotions according to some people, which is why I think it's better to use the word "experience," because everything is an experience. So instead of saying "I think," one should say "There are experiences/Experiences are being had." (Of course, one can have only "thoughts," i.e. not emotions, but rational ideas, or imagined sensations without any emotional colouring, etc.) I hope this helped make my point clear.

[@alittax]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene Thank you for the thorough response. By "experience" I simply mean qualia.

[@ralphshively808]

That was very unenlightening. There can be multiple respective justifications for any given proposition and this video did not actually address the issue of justifying "I think". Furthermore, The example given in the video was never made concrete. It claims that X and Y switch at some point, but there is no demonstration of what this would look like in real life. It wasn't horrible, but it could have been better.

[@jonathankey6444]

An example of “I” being problematic would be: what if you’re actually a Zeus-like god so to keep your power contained you were fooled by an illusionist into believing you were a mere mortal and therefore you thought in a very limited context, like a human would. You say to yourself, “I think, therefore I am,” but under the assumption that you are a mere mortal. Would you really be confirming *your* existence or would you be confirming the existence of a god. An example of “think” being problematic is: what if you’re merely a character in a book God is writing, and you think to yourself, “I think, therefore I am.” But it is actually just God writing on his page, “The protagonist thinks to himself, ‘I think, therefore I am.’” You were not performing any action, all it was was lines on a paper. But you may protest that you feel conscious and that feeling cannot be represented on a piece of paper. First of all, we don’t truly know what sensation is so perhaps it could be represented on a piece of paper, but even if it couldn’t, now you are relying on an *experience* and *sentience* to confirm your existence rather than a line of logic, so we’ve moved away from the original tenant. And, as described in the video, feelings can be not inherently representative of reality. But the best rejection of “I think, therefore I am,” imo would be that this is a logical statement and logic is subject to tampering should said demonic deceiver be so inclined.

[@robtbo]

The definition of what thinking is doesn't reference any method by which a thought is formed, nor if the thought is correct, but only that a thought is formed or held. I'd sooner posit a "consciousness recording device", the playback of which would result in an artificial, but indistinguishable consciousness from the original, so neither qualifies as "I" nor "Think" from our understanding. What I consider "I" to be could be such a recording.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

But the question is not the metaphysical question "Are you thinking?" The question is the epistemic question "Can you know that you are thinking?" which does require you to have a correct path to the thought. I would love to hear more about this "consciousness recording device" that sounds like an interesting thought experiment.

[@robtbo]

Carneades.org Concerning the definition, it's required to doubt that the definition accurately defines thought. That's where the consciousness recording machine comes in. Assuming I am the original which is being recorded, the playback is a "consciousness" which "thinks" exactly what I think. It would not be self-aware. There's no way it could know if it's a recording. It would assume it is "I" and that it is "thinking" and it would be wrong.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

robtbo Cool idea! It is actually someone else/something else thinking your thoughts. It brings to mind some of the problems for personal identity.

[@robtbo]

Carneades.org Thanks. The fun part is that if such a thing is possible, I couldn't know if I'm a recording being played back. :)

[@PaulTheSkeptic]

Sometimes I think, "Wow, this philosophy stuff is fascinating." and other times it's more like, "This philosophy stuff is stupid. It's all wrong. Of course I know I exist. It's obvious." Take your example of Sherlock holmes who doesn't exist but thinks. You said yourself that you weren't very happy with that. As though you could somehow sense that there's a flaw in the logic. This raises the question of intuition. I've used the argument myself that one can't rely on intuition because Aristotle, heavy objects fall faster than lighter ones etc. but now I'm rethinking. Can we rely on our intuition in some cases? Maybe it can lead us down the wrong path but we have the scientific method and experimentation to correct that. Maybe science mixed with naive realism is an accurate and correct way to think? Convince me I'm wrong. It'll be fun.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

You should read Daniel Dennett's "Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking" it asks some good questions about intuition. If your question is if, for example, science and intuition are at odds, which should we use? The problem is that we do not have any way to objectively say what system is better. One might bring more happiness, one might bring more useful ideas, but we don't know which is true. By what criterion should we preference one over the other?

[@PaulTheSkeptic]

Carneades.org It was more of a hesitant appeal to naive realism. Watching your videos kind of gets me thinking in circles and wondering what the hell is the right way to think about the world. Weren't things so much simpler when you were like 16 yo and all you really cared about was if she knows I exist? I had everything figured out back then. Life, the universe, everything, childs play. Simple. Of course I was deluded.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Paul TheSkeptic Ignorance is bliss. Or at least ignorance of your own ignorance seems to be.

[@PaulTheSkeptic]

Carneades.org Lol.

[@ostihpem]

Why not the shortcut: Imagine we live in a world that is actually embedded in a one-valued (true) logic meta-world with an omnipotent god that can do anything. Then by definition Descartes' "I think' could be wrong, no matter what. And since we cannot disprove such a god we can't be certain. With such a tool one can kill anything from any epistemologist^^.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

ostihpem This sounds like a really interesting argument, but I'm a little uncertain of what you mean by being embedded in a one valued logic meta world. Is this a world where all propositions are true? How is our world embedded in a world with a different logical framework?

[@ostihpem]

Imagine a world where anything is true by nature, i.e. you could describe this world with a logic that has only one truth-value: true, and behaves classical apart from that. In this world lives an omnipotent god. Occaisonally he looks down to a small dot called 'Earth' where we live and where evolution has given us a restricted brain that runs on and with classical logic. That fits our existence, but not more. Under such circumstances you can easily prove that god could do anything to us and since we can't disprove such an scenario we can't rule it out -> skepticism. It makes it a lot simpler to doubt things like the cogito or the truth of a tautology. Here's an even more abstract idea: Maybe there is something out there that is unthinkable for us and that causes any p to be false. You can't disprove that by its very definition and therefore have to stay skeptic. Such an skeptic argument is even shorter.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

ostihpem Interesting arguments. I still have trouble imagining a world that you could describe with a single truth value logic. Are things true as soon as they are said? But maybe that is the force of the second point, that there are scenarios that we cannot imagine out there that could make any p false. Just because you can't conceive of one, doe snot mean that it does not exist.

[@ostihpem]

Yes. Anything would be true in such a world. You could prove that you are wrong in any given way, but you could also prove that you are omnipotent. So since you couldn't rule out anything in such a world you could not be a dogmatic, you would have to be a skeptic and since we couldn't disprove the existence of such a world we cannot be cocksure about anything. And I agree with you: Just because it's unthinkable or impossible for us means not it is indeed. For an ant it is impossible and unthinkable to grasp the beauty of the Mona Lisa....

[@JT-jt2id]

ostihpem Px: x is a propositon T: the property of being true ₩: Uiversal quanrifier 1. ₩x(Px>Tx) 2.Pa Ergo3. Ta 1. ₩x (Px>Tx) 2. P (~a) Ergo 3.T (~a) 1.a 2.~a Ergo 3.(a & ~a)

[@philo2903]

This argument is problematic. Thinking and tickling are in fact just names for the sensations or experiences these experiences are clear to you so you won't confuse them. If you are in sensation Y you wont think you are in sensation X

[@DeconvertedMan]

I am tickled therefor I am.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Funny. The problem is that no part of that statement can be substantiated. I am being tickled is just as suspect as I think, because you might in fact be thinking instead of being tickled, or be in pain. You cannot know that you are being tickled, thinking or experiencing anything else, because you might be mistaken.

[@DeconvertedMan]

Carneades.org Oh. Well. Umm. bleep. :) Hurry up and do the logic stuff :)

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Don't worry, January is going to be "Logic Month" (a logic video every day) barring any interruptions that prevent such videos from being made.

[@DeconvertedMan]

Yay!

[@DeconvertedMan]

Carneades.org can I be in one please please oh please? :D

[@dantefernandez2455]

Sensation == thinking

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

So nerve fibers in a petri dish can think?

[@dantefernandez2455]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene Wow, thanks for replying so fast! Yes, they can think, but they probably lack the neurological structures to be able to recursively perceive themselves or to remember. In that sense they cannot have sensation, so my point without context is null. In the video however, it seems you use sensation as if it must be remembered in so far as one needs to remember it to form a belief, so in terms of how you use it, sensation seems nearly identical to thought. You probably don't think this so I'd like to hear your take. I'd also like to hear what you would tell someone who believes to be tickled, feel pain, etc, requires thought.

[@Wittgensteinism]

This is a horrible objection as i see it (and let me further point out, that's it's a strawman in terms of trying to relate this objection to my video on presuppositionalism, since i don't rely on the cogito to make my claims). It's not that "i have sensation X and then form the belief that I'm in pain", but rather, i simply label "sensation X" with the sign "pain". So the sign "pain" is just a label that refers to (signifies) "Sensation X". Whether i call it "pain" or "tickling" is just a matter of semantics (whether i want to attach one sign to that signified over some other sign). It doesn't change the nature of the thing signified (Sensation X) to merely CALL it one sign (e.g. "tickling") over another (e.g. "pain"). So it's really quite tautological to say "When Sensation X occurs, Sensation X occurs". In other words, given that Sensation X is occuring, i cannot be "mistaken" that "Sensation X is occuring". And when i say "i'm in pain", it's just MEANS "Sensation X is occuring". So your hypothetical about "Sensation X occuring and then forming the belief i am being tickled" is nonsensical and irrelevant given what i just said, because it would only mean that you're now arbitrarily labeling "Sensation X" with the signifier "tickling". It doesn't change the nature of "Sensation X" to call it "tickling"; it just changes the semantics. And of course, changing the semantics doesn't change the truth value of the statement either. It's still "justified" under the law of identity in that if now i'm calling "Sensation X" "tickling", it's still just as true to say "If Sensation X ("tickling") is occuring, then Sensation X ('tickling') is occuring" because i'm now referring to that sensation using the signifier "Tickling". So in other words, you're just playing with semantics, and none of that changes the fact that "Sensation X occurs". All that it changes is what i Name "Sensation X" i.e. what sign i'm using to signify "Sensation X".

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

I'm not talking about the Cogito alone here, but the claim that you cannot be mistake in your claims about your own perceptions (which I believe that you put forward in your video. So to be clear you believe that it is impossible for one to be in pain without forming a belief? That in fact forming that belief is simply equivalent to feeling a sensation? According to this view it seems that creatures that cannot form propositional beliefs cannot feel pain (babies don't feel pain, animals don't feel pain etc.) Equating sensations with beliefs jsut seems to be misunderstanding what a sensation and a belief are. Here's my argument for why Sensation X and the belief "I am in pain" are not the same. 1) A belief is a propositional statement that can be true or false. (Def.) 2) Sensations cannot be true or false. (Def.) 3) Something cannot both have and not have a property. (Law of Non-contradiction) 4) If Sensation X is a belief and a sensation then it both has and does not have a property: the ability to be true or false (1,2) 5) Sensation X is not a belief. (3,4 Modus Tollens)

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

frank dunleavy It seems to me that you are right about the first claim. Beliefs are generally considered propositional attitudes. Your philosophy of language seems incorrect however. If I say "There is an orange in the freezer" but I mean that there is an apple in the freezer. I am not in control of the extension of those words. I can't make the word 'orange' mean an apple, just because I think it does. Just because I mean apple when I say orange, it does not mean that 'orange' refers to apple or that the statement 'There is an orange in the freezer' is true We are not in control of the extensions of our words. Note that the truth value of a proposition is separate from our beliefs about it. Truth is metaphysical. Belief is epistemic. Check out some work on the philosophy of language. As Hilary Putnam said meaning ain't just in the head. Twin Earth (Thought Experiment)

[@Wittgensteinism]

Carneades.org Talk about a "mistaken philosophy of language". So you're a semantic externalist?? The most absurd philosophical position ever? It literally devolves into meaningless nonsense because it literally cannot be understood if true (again, whatever hell that would even mean, which is necessarily undefinable in this view). So when you say something absurd like "truth is metaphysical", i would just ask, "Is that true?" And if so, then your own statement about truth being metaphysical cannot be know to be true, much less understood in any meaningful way if meaning too then becomes "metaphysical". In short, i would ask "what do you mean by 'truth is metaphysical'?" and in order to answer it meaningfully to me, you'd necessarily be refuting yourself.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

frank dunleavy Interesting. I want to be really clear on your argument before offering a response, because it seems I have a sense of it, but I am not sure. It is always so difficult to be working in the same medium that you are discussing. Oh philosophy of language. And don't worry about the bulky comment, mine is bigger, I'm sure. There are two different propositions that we are talking about. (T1) I am being tickled. (P1) I am in pain. We are also talking about two separate statements, call them (T2) 'I am being tickled' (P2) 'I am in pain' The statements are what is actually said, the propositions are what is referenced by those statements. Now to be clear as to your claim, you are saying that when our subject, Let's call him Ludwig, says T2, he intends to reference P1. While he is mistaken about the words that he is using, the proposition that is the target of his statement is correct. To be clear, Ludwig has the correct propositional attitude, as he has the attitude of belief towards P1, even if he expresses it incorrectly. Therefore, while his claim that (T2) 'I am being tickled' is incorrect, his propositional attitude of (P) I am in pain correctly represents the world. Is this your claim? Or am I still confused? If it is, here's my response: It seems that there is another set of conditions that have not actually been considered. It is quite hard to distinguish these as they must be stated in language, and yet are inherently prelingual. They might be something like: (P0) First person pain state (T0) First person tickle state The important distinction between these and (P1) and (T1) is once again a category distinction. (P0) and (T0) are sensations, not propositions. If my interpretation of your argument is correct, you seem to be claiming that if one is in (P0) one must assent to (P1). If there was some case in which someone could be in (P0) and not assent to (P1) but rather to (T1), this would serve as an objection to your argument. Let me offer a couple of possible scenarios. Imagine a stubborn man named Josef who is an anti-dogmatist. While a skeptic represents a lack of dogmatic beliefs, an anti-dogmatist actively believes the opposite of what he perceives (in the hopes of thwarting any evil deceivers out there). When Josef sees a duck, he forms the belief that there is no duck there, or that he is seeing a hippopotamus. Basically he tries to fool the evil deceiver with the assumption that the evil deceiver is trying to trick him and therefore nothing is as it appears to be. When he feels pain (P0), he is utterly convinced that he is not in pain (P1), and rather the evil deceiver is tricking him. In order to thwart the evil deceiver he actively believes something else in the hopes that he might get it right. He believes instead that he is being tickled. It seems that Josef has the sensation of (P0) but lacks the propositional attitude of belief towards (P1) required for belief. However, perhaps Josef is too odd a case. Imagine now a very absent minded man named Johann. Johann is a constant daydreamer. His mind is always somewhere else. He often forgets things. One day he travels to Wildspitze in the Alps. His body gives him the sensations of it getting colder and colder, but the change is so gradual, and his mind is so distracted by other things that he never forms the belief I am cold. He experiences cold (C0), but he does not hold the propositional attitude I am cold (C1) as he has not thought of the proposition. It seems that Johann is experiencing the sensation of cold but does not assent to it. Perhaps if the subject were brought up to him, he would assent, however we seem to have two very different propositional attitudes here: Belief: Does assent to a proposition. Conditional Belief: Would assent to a proposition if presented with it. The latter does not seem to be sufficient for knowledge as though if presented with the claim that 2^10=1024, many people would assent, (if they understood the concepts), however we would not want to say that all of these people know that 2^10=1024. Similarly, it seems that someone that is in pain (P0) might not actually assent to it or have the correct propositional attitude (P1), only a conditional propositional attitude. However perhaps you are still unsatisfied, so let's try for an example that will hopefully give you everything that you want. Imagine a person named Witty. Witty is quite clever, and is trying really hard to form true beliefs. He remembers that his friend Ludwig got tripped up when he mis-attributed the wrong word to the wrong concept. Witty is going to do better than this. He believes that so long as he gets the right concept, he will be fine, even if he says the wrong word. Witty gets poked with a needle. He feels the sensation of pain (P0). He correctly attributes the concept of pain to this sensation. He assents to the proposition I am in pain (P1). He then says the phrase "I am in pain" (P2). It seems that he has made no mistakes. However, later Witty gets burned by a stove. He feels the sensation of pain (P0). He correctly attributes the concept of pain to this sensation. He assents to the proposition I am in pain (P1). He then says the phrase "I am being tickled" (T2). Uh oh. Witty seems to have made a mistake. He claimed that he was being tickled when in fact he meant that he was in pain. However, he believes that he is still correct as the proposition that he assented to what correct. However later that day Witty stubs his toe on a table. He feels the sensation of pain (P0). He correctly attributes the concept of pain to this sensation. An evil deceiver forces him into assenting to the proposition I am being tickled and prevents him from assenting to the proposition I am in pain. (T1). He then says the phrase "I am being tickled" (T2). Witty has some real problems here. Not only did he say the wrong word, but he actually assented to the wrong proposition. Maybe in other circumstances, he would have assented to P1, but as we noted in the case of Johann, conditional belief is not sufficient for belief. If our judge of truth is whether or not we have assented to a true proposition, then Witty seems to have assented to a false proposition, and is therefore incorrect in the proposition that he is in pain. However, poor Witty has not had enough. Being an individual entirely devoid of luck, Witty is in a horrible car accident. He feels the sensation of pain (P0). Due to traumatic brain injury, Witty attibutes the concept of tickle to the sensation. He assents to the proposition I am being tickled. (T1). He then says the phrase "I am being tickled" (T2). The above seems to be quite a plausible situation. For whatever reason, Witty's brain has replaced the concept of pain which tells you that part of your body is injured with the concept of tickle. Note that if asked, Witty would say he is being tickled and that he should be laughing an having a good time, however if asked about the specific sensation, he would describe it like being hit with a two by four in the head. he would just think that not only does that feeling mean that you should be laughing and having a good time, but that that sensation (that we would usually call pain) is called tickle. I hope that these examples are sufficient to demonstrate that there are situations in which one may have a pain sensation (P0), but not assent to the proposition I am in pain (P2).

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Wittgensteinism Oh my, you are so contemptuous towards positions that you disagree with. Let's be clear. I'm a skeptic. I don't assent to any claims. It's simple. It seems that you are correct that I did not put in a sufficient amount of "it seems that" phrases in the earlier comment, or enough questions instead of statements. Sometimes I do this for expediency as I assume that the other participants in the discussion understand that I am not assenting to any claims that I make, merely putting them out there as possibilities and seemings. However if you want the full version, I'll restate and edit the comment and highlight the parts the demonstrate that I do not mean to be stating this with certainty, but rather in the context of the indirect proof that I direct at all arguments presented to me. It *seems* to me that you are right about the first claim. Beliefs are *generally considered* propositional attitudes. Your philosophy of language *seems* incorrect however. If I say "There is an orange in the freezer" but I mean that there is an apple in the freezer. *It does not seem that* am not in control of the extension of those words. It does not seem that I can make the word 'orange' mean an apple, just because I think it does. *It does not seem that* just because I mean apple when I say orange, it does not mean that 'orange' refers to apple or that the statement 'There is an orange in the freezer' is true *It does not seem that* we are in control of the extensions of our words. *It seems to be that* that the truth value of a proposition is separate from our beliefs about it. Truth *seems* metaphysical. Belief *seems* epistemic. Check out some work on the philosophy of language. As Hilary Putnam said meaning ain't just in the head. Twin Earth (Thought Experiment) If you have an argument that any of these claims are false, please present it. I'll address what I mean when I said that it seems that truth is metaphysical. It seems to me that whether or not something is true is dependent on the real world, not on our beliefs about the world. But I could be wrong. Do you claim that truth is based on something other than the metaphysical? Present me with an sound argument, and I would love to assent to such a claim. It was my understanding that most philosophers placed truth as a relation to the real world, and I therefore was taking such a position provisionally to argue against the common view of philosophy by demonstrating that it reduces to an absurdity. I'd love to hear what you think truth is if it is not metaphysical. Just tone down the vitriolic rhetoric.

[@spitama1234]

Tnxxx (y)

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Soren Spitama Thanks for watching!

[@hertweaux1672]

ego igitur ego facio notitia est. google translation. i experience information, therefore i exist. there, sorted. socrates did this ages ago.