Episode 18, Jeremy Koons, On the Euthyphro Dilemma

In this episode, Alex talks with Prof. Jeremy Koons (gufaculty360.g...) about his paper 'Can God’s Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro?' (philpapers.org....
At one point, Jeremy refers to a book but couldn't remember its name. It was Richard Kraut's Against Absolute Goodness (www.oxfordscho...)
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[@JohnFisherChoir]

Cool! I remember reading Koons's paper when I just started to become interested in philosophy at around 17 y/o. Flash forward to present day and I'll be starting my phd in philosophy in a couple of months, what a nice throw back!

[@MajestyofReason]

That's hilarious -- that's precisely the age I read his paper and precisely around the time I got hardcore into philosophy (~16 y/o)!

[@JohnFisherChoir]

@@MajestyofReason awesome man!

[@hunterweaver6013]

@JohnFisherChoir Lol, I’m 17, I’ve just recently read the paper, and I’ve been interested in philosophy for a few months now.

[@hunterweaver6013]

@Majesty of Reason What do you think of the paper? Do you think that it succeeds in rendering God’s goodness unintelligible? I’ve only read the paper within the last week or so, and I’ve been trying to find out what other philosophers think of it.

[@hunterweaver6013]

@Majesty of Reason Btw, I’m in the process of reading your book. Loving it so far!

[@jolssoni2499]

The man himself! In my opinion Koons' paper is the best statement (and hopefully the last word) on DCT.

[@MajestyofReason]

6:55 "I know a lot of theists and they're not sociopaths... for the most part."

[@NN-wc7dl]

Yes, that's a 👍

[@DavidSmith-zd6nn]

To think I’d just thought myself... “I think I’ll watch some Thoughtology with my morning coffee.” Great timing.

[@romanbesel4759]

Nice topic and great guest! I thoroughly enjoyed his paper. Thanks for doing this podcast, Alex.

[@ftfarias15]

Thanks for bringing some high top quality discussions into internet! I’m learning more in your channel than 2 years of philosophy classes!

[@chad969]

Great content Alex

[@qqqmyes4509]

I really enjoy hearing you discuss ethics

[@IoannesBaptista]

This is a great channel, lots of interesting conversations! I think no matter if you're a theist or a non-theist, these conversations about philosophy of religion are highly interesting/important/etc. I'm a student of philosophy and theology and I'm just so happy to be able to hear diverse, intelligent and thoughtful conversation about these topics. Thank you!

[@wimsweden]

Thanks for this new episode Alex and thank you to your guest Prof. Koons. I enjoyed your conversation. :D

[@anglozombie2485]

Finally a new episode

[@esauponce9759]

Brilliant! 🙌

[@NN-wc7dl]

Excellent conversation!

[@jacobjohansen6007]

Great work, Alex! I thoroughly enjoyed this episode.

[@HumblyQuestioning]

One "out" theists might have is a claim that language is the reason we can't capture the goodness. That an essential property of an infinite being can't have an explanation in a finite language. To me that's just as acceptable as "it just is"

[@Euthyphro]

Also, ive been waiting for either your or Ozy to address Jeremy's papers for years now. Thank you :D

[@poklar]

I was so pleased to learn that you’d interviewed Dr. Koons. His is one of my favorite papers on the topic! I was wondering, is there any chance you’d be able or willing to have Jeff Speaks as a guest? He’s author of The Greatest Possible Being, which examines the notion of greatness at the heart of ontological arguments for God. It’s an interesting book and his objection is one I’ve wondered about (and considered more difficult and fundamental than others) for some time. I’d love to see you two dialogue if y’all would be up for it!

[@philipcervenjak2493]

Although I'm not an expert on this subject, I think I have an answer to Alex's question about why couldn't a theist define goodness as simply having certain consequences in the same way that an electron's negative charge has certain consequences. The problem is one of a lack of generality. That is, simply listing out some of the consequences of God's goodness (that one knows of so far) doesn't give you a general rule for figuring out every consequence of God's goodness. I like to think of God's goodness as a black box function that has an associated truth table (which may be infinite in size). So it might take some moral action (in some context) as input and give an output of either Morally Permissable, Morally Obligatory or Immoral. Now what the theists in question could do, as Alex suggested, is simply define some of the outputs of the truth table of this black box. But the problem is that it wouldn't tell you what the function inside the black box actually is. Therefore, one cannot generalise to other moral actions whose outputs are unknown. On the other hand, all possible interactions of an electron's charge are defined (as far as I know) because there is a general rule for it's interactions (which might be something like Quantum Field Theory).

[@andreimacarie1564]

Alex, great discussion! could you please post the link to your friend's video you mentioned at the end?

[@parametalhead]

+Alex Malpass is there a way to get the slide presentation you made for Logic 101 on Helena Handbaskit’s video. I’d love to have it to follow along in your video and learn from it.

[@greatunwashed9116]

Hey Alex, great vid. Fascinating stuff. Could you post a link to the vid that you mentioned towards the end of the conversation. The one you said you would send to your interlocutor. Thanks

[@thoughtology7732]

I did in response to Alex Kennedy’s comment

[@qqqmyes4509]

Will you upload Thoughtology episodes to Apple podcasts? Looks like you stopped at episode 11

[@TheNonAlchemist]

Really interesting conversation. Also - I’m not sure how often you check your thoughtology email, but I sent you something about potentially having a conversation on my channel if you’re interested. I’ve had ppl like Graham Oppy, Ryan Mullins, etc on in the past and would be really interested in talking with you!

[@HumblyQuestioning]

If the theists says "well sometimes god defines 'good' as killing the Amalekites" then my question back is "ok so some theists say the holocaust or Rwandan genocide etc was good and some say it was bad. How do we know god's position on these events?"

[@BornOnThursday]

I recently watched another debate on the resurrection of Jesus, and it briefly touched on Jesus changing God's laws. When Jesus said, a man is not made unclean by what goes into his mouth, but by what comes out (I'm paraphrasing), which was in opposition to the previous law that some items were considered unclean to eat. The theist in this debate said that God could make those items clean at any time, but did so when Jesus came and offered redemption for humanity. The athiest argued that this presented the problem the Jewish community/culture had with Jesus (partly), which was that he was changing God's laws which were supposed to be unchanging. This, to me, is the tricky part about religions that have such a belief, that what is moral and immoral is based on the words of God and not the reasons of God, and despite almost all Christians believing murder is wrong, if God said, kill in my name for it is the greatest good one can achieve, they'd either have to have faith and do as God commands, or "reject" God and be sentenced to eternity in hell (maybe). Based in what I've read and heard, God can appear to you and if you can't tell if it's God or a trickster, then that is a failure on your part which I believe is based on the idea that God gives us the knowledge we need and he would let us know if it was really him, implying that if you were tricked, you knew you were being deceived and went along with it (some bs, imo).

[@NomadOfOmelas]

Fantastic conversation! I wondered, have you looked into the potential solution to the dilemma that JL Mackie put forward? I only came across it in his book Ethics p.229-232, but perhaps he has explicated elsewhere a bit further? Essentially, my understanding is that the standard of goodness does stand outside of God's nature, yet because of His omniscience, he knows descriptively what is indeed Good for man. He then, through his creative will, made man in such a way to make their obedience to such descriptive rules in man's best interest, and can therefore provide objectively prescriptive declarations that are not arbitrary. Given that the descriptive moral facts stand beyond human epistemological methods, but not beyond God's, it seems this might work to resolve the dilemma? Or, more specifically, it at least shifts the goal posts back to whether there's sufficient evidence to believe in such a God. Would be very curious your thoughts!!!

[@taihavard549]

Not a philosopher at all, but the first question that occurs to me is, if the standard of good does lay outside of gods nature then where did that standard of good come from? If god created that standard external to himself then why chose that standard as opposed to another? If god did not create that standard then god is just a messenger. Someone might be willing to accept that god is just a messenger. However if this is the case then god can't be the ultimate grounding for morality, the standard external to god is the ultimate grounding. But what is the external standard the ultimate grounding? Where did it come from, why is it what it is? Also if the standard is external to god but also god didn't create it, where did it come from? What created it?

[@NomadOfOmelas]

@@taihavard549 Great questions! As a non-philosopher to a non-philosopher, here are my thoughts! :) 1) Well I guess here it depends what one means when they say 'outside' God's nature. I would think of morality as akin to something like democracy. Democracy is not something that is 'defined by God's nature', and it's not really as if God created it, either. It sort of emerged based on the interactions of other things (humans) that God did (allegedly) create. So, in a similar way to how we can talk objectively about what actions make government/society more/less democratic, we can do the same with morality. I suppose, a theist could just accept a sort of moral realism grounded in an approach similar to that of Derek Parfit. If one grants that morality (and I would argue applies to most anything) can be grounded ontologically without a God, then this theist response to the Dilemma would just accept that moral realism is true, and approach the dilemma this way, without necessarily having the answer to how morality is grounded (which would be a separate question to explore). 2) Unless it's considered that God created everything, including democracy etc, then I don't think we have to address the 'why' question as to what morality is and why it's that way. But if one thinks God did create everything, I'd be happy to explore those implications as well! 3) I agree this would imply God is a messenger, but not *just* a messenger, given his omniscience allows us perfect access to act in the manner that is objectively moral. Correct, God would not be the ultimate grounding of morality, in the same way he is not the ultimate grounding of democracy. Not knowing the ultimate answer to question of 'the essence of something' (like morality or democracy) doesn't seem to imply a lack of objectivity in that realm when answering questions about it. Not sure if this makes any sense? And also curious if there's something about morality that makes it sufficiently disanalagous to democracy!

[@taihavard549]

@@NomadOfOmelas Will have to think this over and possibly ask some follow up questions. Its really easy to get lost in the woods in these kinds of conversations and because my language is probably not precise enough I think I have a high chance of running headlong into equivocations. Point 3 I already agree with. I think if someone is committed to the idea that god must be something like the grounding or author of morality then I to me there appear to be some problems with this idea. However even if morality is grounded somehow apart from god then if god has the property of omniscience is a trait of god, humans might need god to know what's morally correct even if god were not required to ground morality. It would not work for a "standard" monotheist conception of god but it could work for a modified conception. I am trying to find my footing regarding where I currently stand on the general concept of an absolute morality of any kind, be it grounded by a god or in some other way. The idea that morality might function something like democracy, democracy here being seen as a kind of emergent property, is interesting. Honestly at the second I am not sure if that is analogous or not. More thought needed.

[@NomadOfOmelas]

@@taihavard549 Yea great points! It is indeed a tricky topic, often laden with jargon that can be difficult to sift through. I tend to avoid the language of 'absolute morality', as that's often equated with a sort of 'one rule fits all' far various given situations, which is different than an 'objective morality', meaning that there is a true answer regardless of whether we know what it is. This is largely akin to how Sam Harris describes it in his 2010 TedTalk, which is a great starting point on this issue. The only 'absolute statement' I could possibly get on board with would be something along the lines of "You should minimize suffering that results in a net negative state of well being for sentient creatures." But there, one might also have to add 'maximize wellbeing' if they want to avoid the conclusion that all sentient life should just be painlessly destroyed. So yea, that's why I tend to say that questions about the moral nature of various actions do have objective answers, regardless of whether we know what those answer are and how confident we can be in our current conclusion. For any sufficiently designed question, presuming one is willing to take a given definition of morality, I think this is the case. And for those who won't take on reasonable definition of morality, like something along the lines of 'questions have to do with the well being of sentient creatures', well then they are near impossible to have a conversation with (the same way a student who does not accept the definition of a France can't be argued with in history class). Refusing to accept a definition for a term can be done in any realm, shouldn't at all be unique to morality. Anyways I'm just ranting now, thanks for giving me some fun side stuff to think about! :)

[@adamkennedy3800]

Hey Alex 👋 What is the video you mentioned a couple times where your friend goes over Koons piece and Craig's response?

[@thoughtology7732]

This: kzbin.info/www/bejne/oXbGonVvrLxlgtk

[@felixsanchez4805]

In 18:32 can't one just say it's not applicable because if God wasn't in that world then he wouldn't be a necessary being and therefore not even a standard of goodness, to begin with, because he's contingent. But if one defines God as necessary he would be in that world because necessary beings exist in all possible worlds.

[@00lack]

Could that kind of evaluative particularist give the account of "what is good" as "that which one ought to do"?

[@christophernodvik1057]

What if it was this way? God is eternal and God is omniscient so God knows everything, now in ethics and moral philosophy philosophers have been saying they can find morality without God. Let’s say morality exists apart from God the best morality would be known by God for all eternity past. God is not a fool. God knowing the right for all time with no beginning he would the know these moral truths so his feelings would line up of course this was without a beginning. Hence rooted in His omniscience for his eternal existence and his feelings like anger and wrath words sin come from and follow his knowledge of the moral issues and questions.

[@felixsanchez4805]

I also don't see why it would be a dilemma if one proposes that if some set of properties are good because it's in line with the nature of God or is God good because he's in line with these properties. I'd personally take the former but I feel that to ask why any further would be incoherent because this would be the end as to the why something is a certain way. And I'd grant that you could still ask what goodness is but I'm not inclined to believe that asking "what" would entail some negation as to why that would be good.

[@HumblyQuestioning]

I want to call the people who actually believe modified divine command theory "moral presuppositionalists"

[@jolssoni2499]

The guys of Reasonable Doubts podcast also discussed Koons' paper: kzbin.info/www/bejne/eJbNXpR_YtaMhqM

[@FerencDojcsak]

I guess I'm mistaken somewhere, but I always thought this move of "God could only command what is in his nature" as a redherring, and to be honest, trivial. I see it not as a modified version of Dcommand Theory, but a consequence of Dcommand itself, and here's why: Dcommand states that something is good, because G commands it. Now this statement, in itself, does leave a room for G to be bad; essentially an incosistent/hypocrite G, who let's say orders you to not kill, but he himself kills regardless of that. But that's *irrelevant* to our analysis: something is still good, because G commands it - regardless if he's good or bad; and, here comes the tricky part: we couldn't even tell if G is bad, even in a contradictionary scenario mentioned above, because our standard of goodness is only accessible through his commands - and that's no different to the modified Dcommand Theory. You can add a premise that G cannot be inconsistent or hypocritical (which is ad hoc, but okay for now), but that would just result basically making Dcommand and the modified Dcommand identical. Not to mention loopholes; f.e., since G is giving the commands, he can define the terms in them. Let's say he commands "not to kill", defining killing as "someone, who's not G, taking another person's life" (which is an actual theological stance). We are at square one. In a sense, whether G himself is good, or is he commanding/acting by his nature is irrelevant to the Euthypro Dilemma.

[@BornOnThursday]

"Dcommand states that something is good, because G commands it." > I know you kinda address this, but this also leaves open God determining the same action he previously deemed was bad (which would seemingly be absolute) is later good because _something_ changes, such as the arrival of Jesus. > I'd argue that it might be clearer for God to include in his commands that they are meant for humans/creatures now, as they serve a temporary purpose, but may change when he deems the time is right, and that all will be made aware when that time comes. ^ I say this because many treat God's commands as absolute and true no matter what, but this wouldn't be the case if they could be made no longer true for any reason as they would then not be absolute. "Now this statement, in itself, does leave a room for G to be bad; essentially incosistent/hypocrite G, who let's say orders you to not kill, but he himself kills regardless of that." > Or even then commands you to kill someone, as was done in OT. "But that's irrelevant to our analysis: something is still good, because G commands it - regardless if he's good or bad; and, here comes - the tricky part: we couldn't even tell if G is bad, - even in a contradictionary scenario mentioned - above, because our standard of goodness is only - accessible through his commands - and that's no - different to the modified Dcommand Theory." > If Dcommand Theory was true, I still feel humans might feel certain commands were good or bad based on our limited scope of reality, ie ignorance of what God knows, *unless* humans only felt good or bad as if God programmed us to feel that way as part of his Dcommand. > I think the issue we (humans) have is that we generally base our perception of a good or bad action on our level of awareness of the impact of said action as well as our personal reasons for liking/disliking an action or actions, which can be based on misperceptions or feelings, ie reasons we either can't explain or don't understand.

[@Euthyphro]

Craig's response to this paper was very.... Misinformed.

[@vepnytxpoaggaicjewto8870]

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