GETTYSBURG: What our live action game found out about Hood moving to the right!

[@LittleWarsTV]

Loving this set up, guys! Brilliant stuff.

[@jeffreyblack9493]

Step it up, Littlewars.

[@decimated550]

Hey guys, why didn't you call me? I would have totally taken a day off of work and driven over and nerded out with you guys all day, walking that civil war ground

[@michaeldecarlo6945]

This was an incredible way to set the stage for the next video of the tabletop battle and potential outcome. Having a feel for the decisions, obstacles and “fog of war” precursors to the actual commitment of the troops that will be involved in the tabletop fight makes the mental and emotional involvement of the players and we spectators so much more meaningful. Well done and can’t wait for the next video. More like this please!

[@ssn711]

I was fortunate to have had Eric as a tour guide when visiting Gettysburg in 2022. His knowledge of the battle is unparalleled and his conveyance kept the tour entertained. Ty again Eric!

[@BlueSideUp77]

If you're marching 12+ miles, your cavalry from 30 minutes away will catch up and still be useful scouts long before it would be a problem. Send for them to follow and advance beyond you.

[@marknace1736]

the average civil war division marched 8-12 miles a day plus at least an hour to get into line of battle.

[@Hunterhr]

@@marknace1736 The historical attack didn't even reach their departure point until 4pm. Daylight is burning every mile you march.

[@ccreasman]

@@marknace1736agreed. There is no way Hood gets all the way around a 12-15 mile journey before nightfall. Now, maybe that opens up an attack the next morning, but Lee was insistent on the attack. And by now, Sickles already would have been in some contact with the rest of Longstreet’s troops. Certainly some firing would have already been happening which might have impacted Hood’s moves.

[@manfredconnor3194]

Buford, Gamble and Devin won this battle for the Union. Their work on the first day was instrumental.

[@johns3544]

​@@ccreasmanTakes abought 2 hours for me to walk abought 14 miles 7 up 7 back. I cant say any thing abought a army though.

[@matthintz9468]

I'm somewhat leery about counterfactual history, because there are so many alternatives to consider and assumptions to be made. They are also sometimes used by people who masquerade as genuinely interested in the subject, but who already have a preferred winner in mind and just want to sell people on it (e. g. "If Stonewall was there, there's no way the Confederacy loses!"). However, this is something I really enjoy and appreciate. The war game scenario presents a single, or very narrow set of circumstances and asks practical questions in order to analyze possible outcomes. It is both fun and intellectual. What I love about yours here is the incorporation of the battle staff ride element, which is what drew me to this video in the first place. Another scenario I think could be done like this, and one that would be very interesting and something of a fitting companion to this Gettysburg war game, is how the Battle of Fredericksburg would have played out had General Hancock were allowed to seize Marye's Heights in advance of the rest of the Union Army taking their positions.

[@Kevin15301]

Brilliant idea, what an inspired fusion of history on the ground and war simulation. This could be applied to any battle anywhere.

[@Nerve_Check]

Choice is 5 miles cross country or 12 miles on a 1860s road. Then fighting a battle. Having done the two i would prefer the 5 mile march. Great video, looking forward to the game!

[@nickmills8906]

Out of curiosity have you ever cross countried? It blows even if the road sucks it's still a road and armies then pick a speed everyone can follow to keep the column tight versus the pain in the ass CC which even in short distances sucks

[@terencefitch1604]

Command Control issues but in the Summer so 'easier' movement with fewer trees than then. Needed to be up and moving at 6am. Probably impossible after two days' fighting.

[@Midala87]

@@nickmills8906 Wouldn't shade, temperature and wind direction also play a small part on where and when a battalion marches?

[@nickmills8906]

@@Midala87 it would to minor degree

[@markhenderson6389]

One of the best historical wargaming "What if" scenarios I've ever seen! Really appreciate how you worked to apply real-world context to tactical planning and execution, with fog of war affecting decisions on both sides. Very informative and entertaining at the same time. Well done!

[@Skevic222]

There was correspondences between Mead & Halleck who was "General-in-Chief" in Washington DC about a possible flank movement by the Confederates on the 2nd, & it was decided if there was a massive movement that the Federals would of withdrawn closer to Washington. It should also be noted that there was no Confederate Calvary Brigades on the right flank, while the Union had multiple Calvary Brigades on that flank, mostly behind the Round Tops on the 2nd. Another point on that topic is that the Confederates had a very long & stretched out line with large gaps in it from the base of Culps Hill to Seminary Ridge facing Cemetery Ridge. Lee knew all this, so that's why in part Lee would not allow Longstreet to make a flank movement. So even if Longstreet let Hood do a limited flank movement with just his Division it would of been well past 6PM before Hood would of been ready, more likely about 8PM. Hood would of been completely cut off from McLaws, & Mclaws wasn't really very close to Anderson, Wilcox's Brigade had some communication with Mclaws but was ordered to stay put by Anderson. Also AP Hill & Anderson both were absent for much the events on the 2nd anyways. So if the "limited flank movement" that Hood wanted to do went forward it would of been disastrous for the Confederates. I think it could be argued if Lee let Longstreet do a flanking move with both McLaws & Hood it would of gone just as poorly. The Confederates were just in to long of line to make such maneuvers.

[@robertdigby4504]

Another genius who can’t spell Meade. At least you got Lee right but then again it’s three letters

[@LonesomeDove-dn8dk]

@@robertdigby4504 Shall we all assume that you have never once in your life made a typo error? Or are you just that person who has nothing better to do than pretend you're perfect and thus have some divine right to insult others for their mistakes.

[@firingallcylinders2949]

Longstreet it would seem was right about withdrawing from Gettysburg. At the start of the battle he believed that the battle should not have been fought there. Meade wanted Lee to attack him. One of the reasons Lee had been so successful previously like at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg is because they were below the Mason Dixon and on the defensive, on the ground of their choosing. Gettysburg was Lee on the attack on ground the Union had set up. It was a catch 22 for Lee in that the whole purpose for the move into Pennsylvania was to draw the Army of the Potomac out into the open, but once the engagement started he couldn't really pull out. He hadn't planned on fighting at Gettysburg but once Heth had engaged Buford the board was set.

[@karlheinzvonkroemann2217]

Lee's mistake was in not giving the 2nd corps to DH Hill as Longstreet suggested. He was a much more aggressive general and would have taken Cemetery Hill.

[@dalerobinson8051]

When you think about it, you realize Lee only won "home games."

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

@@dalerobinson8051 The typical general, both Union and Confederate, was poor on the offense. Lee was bang average in this respect -- poor. It is Grant, Sherman, Rosecrans who stand head and shoulders above all others.

[@robertdigby4504]

@@dalerobinson8051Lee never won shit after Jackson died. Just proves to me the south had the wrong man commanding

[@JohnReedy07163]

​@@karlheinzvonkroemann2217 Ewell was staring at 10,000 Union men building entrenchments. He was asked to carry the hill if practicable but to still avoid a general engagement until Longstreet had come up. He asked for AP Hill's assistance but he was told no by Hill and by Lee and then he asked for fresh troops newly arrived under Edward Johnson and was again told no. He and Jubal Early both then decided it was not practicable and both agreed it was foolish to start an attack with no reinforcements especially with reports of Sickle's Corp coming in from behind Cemetery Hill and at night with no cavalry to scout positions beyond what they could see. You may not like Ewell but he likely made the correct decision. It's not like the confederates didn't breakthrough every position they attacked, the just didn't have enough men to be the aggressors and that was Lee's biggest mistake. Lee needed to play defense but all he cared about was Virginia and his own glory.

[@tabletop.will.phillips]

Really liked the concept of this video! Seeing the guys work around the battlefield itself is a cool conceit - and wow! That table and the 6mm figures look great!

[@miketaylorID1]

JULY TWENTY!!! Aarrrrrgghh 😖 This is really a great and creative way to address these long nagging questions from the battle and illustrate the complexities of commands’ decision making process. The constant need of current accurate information really stands out! Cannot wait to see how this all plays out! On July 2oth!!! 😠 😂

[@BernardK]

Great stuff. Hidden movement and fog of war are key variables that often get omitted in war gaming.

[@nicholasantonis3887]

Great video!! Loved the way y’all lead up to the table top, it really makes the players think when you actually see the terrain

[@gonatas1]

Fun and great effort. But in reality I doubt any period General is detaching a division from contact with its own army and fishing for a flank to attack across unscouted ground in the direction that the enemy army has approached from. How is Hood protecting his rear if there was another Union division or corps in play coming up from the south? And without scouting there is no reason to assume there is not; it’s in fact more probable that there would be.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Great comment. I think your points are exactly what Longstreet had in mind when he declined Hood's request to keep moving to the right.

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

This. 1000X this. Aggressive flanking attacks like this are interesting gambles in a war game where you have reliable maps and "meta knowledge" about enemy dispositions. And it is not at all crazy when you have the advantage of local knowledge of the roads, such as when defending Virginia for Lee and the ANV. Longstreet had quite enough difficulty getting his troops into position for a conventional attack, and he was criticized for taking too long with this much easier effort. Detaching a division and sending them into the unknown is a recipe for annihilation. And even if Hood is not destroyed, how does Longstreet coordinate the timing of the effort of the rest of his corps? What about coordination with the rest of the ANV? What does he tell Lee? "I sent them out an hour ago and I have not heard back nor have we heard cannon fire yet. What to do now, Bobby?" This is also why Lee rejected Longstreet's (possibly apocryphal) suggestion of moving the entire ANV southwards. That is an interesting idea, but it is not a plan without knowing which roads which corps will take while disengaging while the AoP breathes down their neck. And even then, what if they blunder into Union reinforcements hurrying up north along a road layout that favors the AoP? So many things that could easily go wrong.

[@chandlerwhite8302]

All true, but what the Confederates did had zero chance of success. At least with this strategy you would have the chance of catching the far flank unprepared and braking the line. Then you could charge from the center while the Union is busy trying to re-establish their lines and have a prayer of breaking them.

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

@@chandlerwhite8302 Bobby rated the chances of an attack center succeeding as far higher than zero, apparently. With the benefit of hindsight, I would argue the ANV is fortunate (not "lucky" but fortunate) that Pickett failed in his attack center. Successfully occupying that ground would entice Lee to throw all in for a grinding brawl that would tear up the ANV far worse. Meade might even concede the ground to give Lee a marginal tactical victory; but the ANV is still forced to retreat west soon enough due to supply issues, and Lincoln proclaims this bloody battle as a strategic win for the Union (much like Antietam).

[@heathenhawk853]

problem is everyone involved knows the History of the Battle so unless the Federal Players do not know what scenerio is playing out then this exercise is compromised.

[@thomaslance5428]

Ding ding ding ding. Ceerect. Union dude with the Lee hat, lol, knows that Hood hit the Little Round Top in reality.

[@Historybluff1986]

Yeah this making it much harder to ignore any reports that aren’t very clear because you know it’s not your own troops headed for the flank

[@xvsj-s2x]

Curiosity draws your focus in deeper. Epic understanding of this historical battle ❤✌️🇺🇸

[@johntillman6068]

Look forward to the fight between one tired, thirsty CSA division against Union V Corps.

[@marksellers4875]

Hummm... Ask Hancock about his experience against Robertson's BRIGADE at Wilderness. After the war, at a West Point reunion, Hancock said to Longstreet " That second day at Wilderness, you and those damned Texans rolled me up like a wet blanket!" That was one VERY understrength, tired, thirsty near starving BRIGADE against a ( comparatively) fat, dumb and happy Union CORPS...

[@M_Holien]

I love Evil Ben's twin stealing the limelight. Excellent work and looked like Sean knew how to stay out of camera shot.

[@gene2119]

Can't wait to see Antietam replayed to see if the war would have ended if McClellan had pursued Lee. What a lost opportunity.

[@marksellers4875]

Walter Taylor, Lee's aide, said it best. " General MC Clennan brought an overwhelming numerical superiority to Sharpsburg. But he also brought something in our favor. He brought himself."

[@johnbreitmeier3268]

Interesting exercise even if somewhat biased since Hood's proposed move requires tactical surprise and the guy playing Meade simply cannot "unknow" this. With that fact and you apparently granting Hood the opportunity to use two brigades of cavalry, I would go for speed and distraction. 1) These cavalry are dragoons, not lancers - effectively highly mobile light infantry. I send for all of them, but I do not wait on them. I get my infantry moving imediately. One small cavarlry detachment is sent with a battery of light field artillery to secure the top of Big Roundtop and lay down fire on Little Round top to be coordinated with the main artillery barrage. . A regiment of infantry is sent to relieve them when they can arrive, The rest of the cavalry are sent to make a dash around the right side to create havoc in the enemy rear. 2) I send all of my remaining artillery to fire on Sickles position and send in a light force of skirmishers to simulate the attack that actually took place on that day, to get the enemy looking in that direction. 3) With the rest of my infantry, I channel not Longstreet or Hood but rather Thomas Jacksson who wasn't there. and quick march my remaining infantry regiments around the Union left flank and Big Roundtop and exploit whatever weak spot the cavalry had found. I go overland by the quickest route without the impediment of artillery and baggage.

[@robertdigby4504]

So your a military genius but you don’t know there’s not two s’s in Jackson?

[@johnbreitmeier3268]

@@robertdigby4504 Nah, I am just lousy at typing. So glad you have no flaws and acknowledge my genius. Thanks. Tell your mother I said hi when you go up for cookies and milk.

[@EarlofChadwick]

​@@johnbreitmeier3268just finished those cookies. Mmmmmmm

[@ricashbringer9866]

You could try this tactic in Sid Myers Gettysburg. It may have been possible.

[@georgedeppner418]

Great stuff, love the what if's of games! Makes for some cliffhangers. Awesome idea and video !

[@aaronfleming9426]

I would just like to say how jealous I am of guys who have a group of friends to do this stuff with. I don't care what the results are or if this is even an "accurate" way of evaluating the military situation, it's just cool to see people having so much fun with this.

[@marinewillis1202]

I agree. I grew up having to play all of the old board games from Avalon Hill etc by myself because I didnt have anyone that was interested in playing with me.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@marinewillis1202 Yes! Like "Little Round Top: The South's Best Chance at Gettysburg", for example....

[@christopherweber9464]

Does Sickles still use his own initiative and move out to the wheatfield and peach orchard or is he maintaining the line? P.S. Will the attack at Culp's Hill still occur on the evening of the second day?

[@ken333howe]

Outstanding! Love how you have done this to set up the wargame to come.

[@sean250]

This is a truly awesome way to setup a wargame! I can't wait to see how this turns out. What rules did you use for this battle?

[@stewartmillen7708]

Wouldn't doing this in summer be more realistic? The trees being bare lengthen line-of-sights.

[@mikhailiagacesa3406]

Trees are in full foliage in Summer. Clearly, you're not from PA. ;-)

[@stewartmillen7708]

@@mikhailiagacesa3406 Well, I've been to PA on numerous occasions, including Gettysburg, and that sure doesn't look like summer! Looks like it's being conducted in the dead of winter. Gettysburg having more trees than 1863 isn't always the norm for Civil War Battlefields; at Antietam you'll see a sign announcing "The North Woods" out in the middle of a field!

[@robertdigby4504]

@@stewartmillen7708how does one see a sigh?

[@stewartmillen7708]

@@robertdigby4504 it was an autocorrect error, and it's fixed.

[@oldschoolfrp2326]

Really fun way to set up the tabletop battle, literally putting the players in the generals’ place

[@hamsteronthepaintingtable6465]

Great idea guys in setting the scene and walking the battlefield, gives a real insight and the decisions they had to make 👍🏻

[@davidharper4570]

Federal had plenty of troops in reserve to push back Hood’s flanking attack. They were massed in a way that they could quickly get reinforcements to trouble spots. Now if Lee could have done what Jackson did at Chancellorsville it could be possible for a Rebel win.

[@JohnReedy07163]

If this were based on after 4:00pm on 7/2/63 then this is a mute point. Sedgewick was in position to the left of the 20th Maine between the Round Tops at 4:30 having marched 32 miles from Maryland in a day and a half. Hood would have wandered straight into 17,000 men

[@briggsgreene5300]

Very Interesting and very cool to see an attempt to determine the answer to Hood's argument. I always believed he was right. One thing to remember that I haven't heard brought out is that when they are filming this it is quite cold. In July the trees would be full and therefore the Confederate right would have been more covered in the move to the right.

[@shawngillogly6873]

Fantastic amount of work, and well done. To my eyes, the issue of staying in contact with the main force on a 12 mile march, while not being counter-attacked in detail by Union reserves, given that there was no way to move a force that large while engaged without being seen, made circling the hills impractical. This is the cost of being the aggressor with a numerically inferior force on ground known to the enemy, but not yourself. Add to that, as others have noted, the Union VI Corps, 13000 men and outnumbering Hood 2 to 1, was coming into position to do exactly that. In my mind, Hood would've lost his entire division without even getting around the Union flank. Even Stonewall Jackson, outside of the grounds he knew well in the Valley, didn't make marches like this.

[@marknace1736]

The only possibility would be to move the entire army to the right to lessen the distance for the other corps to more easily support Hoods division. This could not happen on day two so maybe on day three attacking the right rear instead of Pickett's charge.

[@GhostofSicklesleg]

@@marknace1736or a double attack to keep reserves pinned in position to react to breakthroughs! The possibilities of what if’s 🤔🤔🤔

[@pagejackson1207]

The fault with this scenario is that it makes unrealistic decisions regarding the time element. Longstreet's attack force was not prepared to attack from the position designated by Lee until 4 PM. Yet in this scenario you have Hood's division halfway to the new attack position at 4 PM! You allow no time for Hood's objection to the planned attack to be "run up" the chain of command for a decision; his troops to redeploy into line of of column, and for Lee to move cavalry to his right flank to scout the line of march!. In the Civil War the typical infantry force averaged 2 to 3 miles an hour on the march. Jackson's flank march at Chancellorsville (which was approximately 12 miles) took over 6 hours to complete! His force began marching at approximately 8 AM and yet he didn't initiate his attack until 5:30 PM! Yet in your scenario you have Hood's division marching 12 miles and deploying into attack formation within 2 hours! It is utterly unrealistic! On July 1st it took Heth's division much longer than 30 minutes (used in your scenario) to deploy into attack formation. And his troops were relatively fresh having only marched from Cashtown to an location three miles west of Gettysburg. In this scenario Hood's troops (one brigade of which had already marched over 20 miles just to get into the the original attack position) marches an additional 12 miles and deploys into attack formation in just two hours. Straggling would have been inevitable in the march this scenario envisions! And movement along the narrow Ridge Rd would have inevitably resulted in the well-known accordion phenomenon of columns of troops having to stop and start again. A division of soldiers do not start marching instantaneously as it takes some time for the proceeding troops to clear the road for those who follow. It would be impossible for Hood's full division to arrive at the new attack location simultaneously!! Southern soldiers were much more mobile and in better physical shape than the average Union troop but they were not machines. The scenario you have provided us defies well documented phenomenon relating to the movement of troops during the Civil War and imagines that instantaneous command and control was possible in 1863.

[@aaronfleming9426]

You have many strong points, though I might dispute the notion that southern soldiers were in better shape. But you did say "average Union troops", which would leave out notable marchers like the Army of the Frontier.

[@pagejackson1207]

@@aaronfleming9426 Generally speaking the southern troops were from more rural areas and were use to working outside, etc. Many of the Union troops came from the large cities and worked in the more industrialized positions. This was less true with the Union armies from the mid-west. Of course, the above is a generalization and depended also on the level of conditioning which their commanding officers required of them.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@pagejackson1207 True, generally speaking, although it's not like factory workers sat around on their butts all day. And as I said, it's pretty hard to beat the marching of the western armies...the 9th Iowa marched 42 miles in 16 hours through snow and mud to get to Pea Ridge. 2nd Division of the AoF marched 117 miles in 3 days through the Boston Mountains to get to Prairie Grove. Etc. Those dudes could hoof it like nobody's business.

[@michaelsnyder3871]

Longstreet had aligned his divisions to attack up Cemetary Ridge. For Hood to move to the right, he would have to rearrange his division, (2+ hours) before he could move around to the right, which by the time he got there, the Signal station on Big Round Top having seen his movement, he would run out of light and get into a meeting engagement with V Corps.

[@DocLampLighter]

Maybe I'm asking this question prematurely (27:25) If Hood went to the Left Flank, and the Union diverted troops to the south while also concentrating to the north, Picket's charge to center may have been successful.

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

Without support or a significant win on either near flank, Pickett is just sitting in a cannon kill zone waiting to be swept away by Union reserves. What is accomplished by that? If the AoP is spreading itself thin to counter the ANV spreading itself thin, then the ANV is spread thin, and Lee cannot find reserves to support a successful attack center within the required timeframe. Meade had at least twice the reserves of Lee, and the advantage of interior lines -- the AoP wins this game easily.

[@davidnemoseck9007]

Like how you did this. Can't wait for the actual game now!

[@mikebelcher7244]

The difficulty of wargaming this or any historical scenario is the knowledge of the players. Even if the "fog of war" is wargamed as a factor, the actual history of the event colors the players decision making. There's no true way to come at this like the actual commanders would other than to get players completely ignorant of the events of the battle to play it out. Allow them to act/react organically and without pre-disposition.

[@jfiery]

That was my thought when "Meade" receives a message of troops moving to his right and his move is to go look left.

[@stephenphenow6050]

Oh Mike. The only way to get around that is not to restage historical battles. If you want to add fog of war, you need a game master, and dice or cards controlling events. What if Sickles stays at the base of the ridge? What if Vincent does not run into Sickles courier, and moves to help out Caldwell's Div, instead? What if Hill's attack starts on time, rather than an hour later? Small things, true, but still critical to the battle flow. And could change the result.

[@JDub-en6ix]

Very cool episode! I really enjoyed this!

[@MarksGameRoom]

Thanks! We had a blast making it!

[@haroldmorgan7381]

As always we Old Wargamer dogs are INSPIRED by watching your videos - we see how you do it and think "we could do that" ! We also pick up "ideas" how to do things the same way or differently than the way we see you all do it !! The SHARING of ideas is a GOOD THING ( quote Martha Stewart ) !! :-)

[@TheHilltopPillbox]

I was wondering about the dust you'd kick up...glad to see it was noticed! Well done video, guys!

[@edstewartjr4530]

Great to see the decision-making done at real ground eye views, and not the usual "God's eye" view.

[@totenkray]

Or Patrick Gorman.... Known him my whole life... Excellent and overlooked actor.

[@haroldmorgan7381]

Our group played Gettysburg a couple years ago on July 4th weekend - 1st day - Hills Corp cleared the Union off Semenary Ridge and pushed the Union back into Gettysburg -Ewell's Corp arrived and captiured Oak Hill (1 VP) then helped Hill;s Corp attack Gettysburg (1 VP) and push the Union back onto Culp's Hill and Cemetary Hill where the Union entrenched in the night - Hill's Corp left Gettysburg to Ewell's Corp and moved south along Semenary Ridge to attack the Union entrenched in the Peach Orchard - 2nd day morning Longstreet's Corp had been marching south at night along the road behind Semenary Ridge and came out just in front of Devil's Den in the morning (in our game we gave a "bonus" to troops that stayed on a road their whole move) - Longstreet's troops took Devil's Den (1 VP) and pushed the Union back up the Round Tops then with heavy losses in the afternoon pushed the Union back off the two Round Tops (2 VP) ( in our game the South did not try to outflank here) - Hill's Corp attacked the Union entrenched in the Peach Orchard both morning & afternoon but failed to take it due to heavy losses on the 1st day - 3rd day both sides moved troops to try to gain advantage and the Union came off Culp's Hill & Cemetary Hill to capture back Gettysburg afternoon 3rd day = Union WON with Wolf's Hill, Gettysburg, Culp's Hill, Cemetary Hill and the Peach Orchard (5 VP) vs/ South's Oak Hill, Devils Den, & 2 Round Tops (4 VP) - Great Fun !

[@robertwalsh4397]

Great idea ! A lot of fun ! Thank you

[@lewisbreland]

This is such a unique and fun way to experience wargamming and the battlefield!

[@martanpan]

My favorite hypothetical is moving 2 divisions of Ewells Corps (Early and Johnson) to the right of Longstreet, and 1 division (Anderson's) to Longstreet's Corps, so there would be 4 divisions moving to the right. Rhodes division would be anchoring the Confederate left encircling Gettysburg.( temporarily attached to A.P. Hill)

[@Legendary_UA]

It would have been nice to see how fast the soldiers could proceed on a more direct route and at the same time stay close to their support column on the roads.

[@bigsarge2085]

Intriguing what-if scenario!

[@Anvilarm07]

What a brilliant video and exploration. I am looking forward to part 2.

[@hagamapama]

One thing to bear in mind is that by the time Sam Hood said that to Old Pete, Gouvernor Warren was already frantically assembling forces to advance to Little Round Top. Going around the hill would have been suicidal without clearing the men that were rapidly claiming the high ground, so they'd have had to go up that hill regardless and try to dislodge the stubborn Mainers determined to hold it. The Alabamans got to Little Round Top about the same time a general assault would have done, and the forces that attacked the hill would have been sufficient to take it if the Mainers and Pennsylvanians next to them (The Pennsylvanians never get half the credit they deserve) had been less dogged. Furthermore any attempt to wrap further around the hill would have exposed Rebel forces to attacks from 3 sides thanks to the fish-hook nature of Meade's defensive line. Furthermore if Hood had not attacked as ordered, Sickles' position would have been a thorn in his side for the entire battle. Sickles' foolishness proved a valuable distraction to any project to take Little Round Top by the Confederates, as he was in a position to flank any rebel who tried. To the point thhat I wonder if maybe Dan Sickles saw the danger and moved forward to bring fire onto himself and his division and coopt any adventurous flanking by Hood's men. Also Warren was not done, if I recall right a brigade of New Yorkers was already on its way to stand to the left of Chamberlain. They got there after the battle but were in time to reinforce and spell the exhausted Mainers and push the last of the Confederates off Big Round Top.

[@davidpeteriarussi7956]

On Tuesday, the 30th of June, in 1863, thirty-seven year old John Buford, a career cavalry officer (Brigadier General, United States Army) was commander of two cavalry brigades. They were the eyes and ears of the Federal army shadowing General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, then marching northeast, somewhere between the mountains of south-central Pennsylvania. Buford took unequivocal and brilliant leadership, recognizing that Lee was planning to gather his disjointed forces and concentrate them at the strategic hub of the town of Gettysburg. Lee planned to destroy the Federal forces piecemeal as each corps arrived separately. Once victorious, he would march unopposed to Washington. Buford quickly forged a sound battle plan to slow down Lee’s concentration of his forces, until Federal reinforcements could arrive. His plan worked better than expected and worked against overwhelming odds. What was at stake was the culminating battle of the war, that should it produce yet another northern defeat and southern victory, the United States could not be expected to support the Union effort. Resistance to the war was rising and about to boil over in violent anti-Union riots in large cities in the north. Papers for an armistice had already been drawn up and were waiting to be placed on President’s Lincoln’s desk for his signature should news of a Federal debacle in Pennsylvania be proven true. Speaking to his men (and half aloud to himself), John Buford rhetorically scolded the Army leaders and the politicians urging them to strike - strike; regardless of the tactical realities in the field. Buford told his junior officers that they must hold Lee’s infantry until (and if) reinforcements arrived. That was the only way to prevent Lee from gaining the high ground. Conferring with his junior officers was also sound leadership. It ensured buy-in of his chain of command. Explaining that the high ground just might be held if ...they can hold their defensive line and if ...reinforcements arrive in time, and if ...ammunition holds out - three 'IFS' on which they gambled their sacred duty. Buford's men adored him, tolerating his musings out loud. He had gotten them to throw away their sabers that he said were useless and their revolvers as well. Carry extra carbine ammunition for the same weight he preached, and his men enthusiastically agreed. From time to time there has been speculation that Buford may have issued repeating carbines to his men. There is no evidence or mention of this anywhere to date. Most likely standard issue Sharps carbines or similar breech loaders were in the hands of his troopers. These had three times the firepower of the muskets of Lee's infantry, Besides greater firepower, breechloaders had the advantage of being able to be loaded while lying down. Buford’s men were deployed behind low stone walls topped with whatever rails, rocks and logs they could find. Most of Buford’s casualties sustained head, neck and shoulder wounds that testify to semi-protected positions. Lee’s infantry by comparison, had three disadvantages: attacking upright in a tight line formation, using slow loading muskets that could only be reloaded while standing up, and having little or no cover while firing. The two lines were at times only one hundred to one hundred fifty yards apart. But more importantly Buford expedited correct intelligence to the closest infantry corps (1st and 11th) with requests for all possible speed and reinforcement. He simultaneously did the same through the night to four other corps; to come to Gettysburg where he was "...in possession of good ground." He slept little, perhaps an hour, and less than two, off-and-on before waking his men well before first light on Wednesday, July 1st. Despite the Federal 11th corps' rout on that 1st day, and because of the stalwart toughness of the 1st corps, despite this fragmented situation, the coveted high ground was secured and reinforced over the next two days. Possessing the high ground was the principal deciding factor of the tactical situation at Gettysburg. Although Lee could have, (should have?) abandoned his position at Gettysburg and forced the Federals to relinquish their advantage of the high ground and pursue Lee elsewhere, Lee did not; though he was advised by his highly respected 2nd in command, General James Longstreet, to do exactly that. Lee's hesitation at the end of the 1st day was failing to pursue the fleeing Federals to the high ground they retreated to and failing to take it. The 2nd day, Lee was slow to move his forces and failed to coordinate them. He also failed to outflank the Federals when the Federal left flank was open, (despite repeated calls by Generals Longstreet and John Hood to do so). Lee also failed to use the cover of night to maneuver into position by daybreak of July 3, as he had done several times before. This hesitancy and failure to act, permitted the Federals to hold the high ground. Lee's indecisiveness and poor judgment were uncharacteristic of him, and cannot be fully explained by Jeb Stuart's absence (Lee's cavalry was absent the first two days of the engagement). General Lee's ineptitude was seemingly inexplicable, and has been debated from the hour the final attack failed, throughout the following century and even down to today. On July 3rd, General Lee ordered General Longstreet, (over Longstreet’s strenuous but respectful objections), to make a frontal assault on an estimated 45,000 - 55,000 Federal troops with superior artillery perched on top of Cemetery Ridge. Longstreet was given only 17,000 infantry to make the attack. They had to start by marching in plain view across a mile of open fields subject to raking artillery and grape shot before reaching musket range less than a quarter mile from the top. By the time Lee’s men reached their objective, estimates ranging from only 3,000 to 2,000 were left. By then Federal forces on Cemetery Ridge had been reduced by an estimated 1,500 to 1,800 casualties but even as Lee’s men breached the line, Federal infantry and artillery were being rushed in to replenish any losses. The one or two thousand infantry that made it into the Federal lines were quickly surrounded and most were captured rather than shot. Also, a sizable number of Longstreet’s men had turned back on the way to the top, and straggled back, in relatively good order, to their own lines. It was reported that in the aftermath, as General Lee rode past General Longstreet, Lee was recorded as saying, “It is all my fault, it is all my fault.” His owning up to his responsibility was immediate and unequivocal. On Saturday morning, the fourth of July, in a drenching downpour, Lee's shattered army mournfully retreated, heading back to Virginia. The ambulance train was described by reliable contemporary accounts as being ‘nose-to-tail’ unbroken for twelve miles and leaving a trail of blood. The casualty lists that were being calculated and drawn up - then published in the papers both north and south - stunned civilians and military alike in both halves of the country. The tide of the Great Rebellion, with her string of victories up to and including July 1, that ebbed on July 2, was reversed on July 3rd. Lee never again held the initiative as he had throughout the rebellion up until that third day at Gettysburg. The turning of the grim fortunes of war were terribly and mercilessly decided man to man, company to company, brigade to brigade and division to division on the fields, woods and ridges of the fruitful Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. On that same fourth of July, the Confederate fortress at Vicksburg on the Mississippi, surrendered to General Ulyses S. Grant and the fledgling nation was cut in half. The desperately needed horses and mules, hogs, sulfur (for gunpowder) and leather from west of the Mississippi, was now in fact, beyond reach of the Confederate forces that needed them. The strategic soundness of the Great Rebellion was no more and it could only linger and flounder, amid growing hopelessness. The final collapse which would bring peace, was still twenty-two long, bloody and bitter months away.

[@robertdigby4504]

Thank you for typing out the script for Gettysburg on here. We saw the movie and you wasted your time trying to prove how knowledgeable you are

[@ronniecoleman2342]

Having been to Gettysburg twice now I can say the union in and around big and little round top had a huge defensive advantage. That terrain is rocky and steep and awful for any maneuvering.

[@robertdigby4504]

Yes visiting twice as a tourist makes you a expert

[@ronniecoleman2342]

@@robertdigby4504 Yeah that and the fact I'm a doctor of American and European history. 😊 Plus I've taught Civil War tactical strategy at the war college.

[@scottl9660]

Stunning!

[@charlierichardson613]

Well this is pretty cool idea!

[@TheLookingOne]

Did "Frontal Attack" Lee consider a flanking attack? By how many years did Lee's actions shorten the war?

[@Perponcher]

July 20th, can't wait!

[@alvinpaul7460]

Brilliant fellas, this was truly amazing 👏👏👏👏

[@ericsanger4408]

They make Hood look like grampa. He was in his early 30's during this event and was considered 'dashing'.

[@douglasiles2024]

Yes, Hood had just turned 32 right before this battle. That was one of the things I took umbrage with in Gettysburg, and later Gods & Generals. Patrick Gorman is a phenomenal actor, so I don't fault him, as he portrayed Hood well. But the choice to cast someone over 20 years older than the actual individual was a poor choice, in my opinion.

[@heathclark318]

Great video with guides and full explanation from the GROUND. Cant wait for episode 2 and you gotta new sub! Keep up the great work

[@WargamingHistory]

Loving it guys, such a great build up😊

[@frankpesco7723]

Do one on what would have happened if Sickles had not moved to the peach orchard?

[@WARdROBEPlaysWWII]

Very cool - goodness, that table

[@Skevic222]

If you really want to speculate about the would of, could of & should of.... What if Davis transferred Breckinridge's Division from the Army of Tennessee & Ransom's Division from DH Hill's Department in the Carolina's to Lee for the Gettysburg Campaign. With those two elite divisions bolstering the Army of Northern Virginia little over twenty-thousand additional men & placed under Longstreet or reporting directly to Lee who knows what could of been!

[@peabody2884]

This is the way to do 6mm. The terrain is everything.

[@michaelmccartin2054]

If Lincoln had equiped the union Army with Sharps, Spencer and Henry rifles the war would have been a lot shorter.

[@kw19193]

Something that many of the 'what ifers' always fail to recognize, or acknowledge is that even if Little Round Top had been captured the South would not have prevailed for long. Reserve Union forces were close enough to the Round Tops and in significant enough numbers that any breakthrough would have been next to meaningless. Cheers!

[@timhand3380]

Scout while you advance, this is what Longstreet did. It also it led to the counter march (fiasco?). Also, Longstreet received orders from Lee about noon? He ordered scouts, which failed him (he noticed himself) that his troops could be sighted just past the Emmitsburg turnpike. Hahaha, yes, Lee said, "yeah, oh well, you know" after Pickett's Charge.

[@stevenwynn819]

Absolutely fascinating! Well done!

[@mikhailiagacesa3406]

Wasn't Kilpatrick's Cavalry picketing the area south of Big Round Top? Is this in conjunction with the attack on Culp's? I do look forward to the conclusion.

[@christophersmith8316]

I think they were off east chasing Stuart. They were posted there on Day 3.

[@stephenphenow6050]

OK. I'm Stephen Phenow. Designer of Mr Lincoln's War Miniature ACW Rules, and the Battle Manual of the ACW Rules. I have studied Gettysburg and put on the battle in miniature a lot of times. So I was interested in several things. One was the knowledge of the battle, and two how you were restaging it. So, why did you pick a bunch of people who never studied battle in the ACW? 6mm does have advantages, and the board looks great. I prefer 15mm since I like painting figures. In miniatures one worries about frontage not depth. But, the debate about moving to the right? Even if we assume that Lee was correct in believing that the opportunity to turn II Corps was there, by moving up the Emmitsburg Road, he was basing it on a recon report at 3-4 AM. Union 3rd Corps was down in the hollow in front of Cemetery Ridge guarding 2 Corps Flank and the scouting party missed them. 3rd Corps only came up to the Peach Orchard because of a bad experience Corps CO Sickles had at Chancellorsville. His Corps took casualties from Stuart's (Jackson's old Corps) artillery which had occupied Hazel Grove ridge. Now his pickets informed him that the Confederates were approaching the high ground around the Rose Farm and the Sherfy's Peach Orchard. He became afraid that he was about to re experience the Hazel Grove event. To forestall the Confederate occupation of that high ground Sickles ordered his two Divisions forward 3/4 of a mile to occupy this area instead. This stopped any unopposed flanking move of Hancock's 2nd Corps dead Longstreet's second divisional commander, Hood didn't like the ground of Devil's Den that was occupied by Ward's Brigade his target. He also felt that the little Rocky Hill had Federal troops occupying it. His foot scouts told him there was none, but remember, he, Hood had no cavalry. Stuart was just arriving with his three brigades. There were other cavalry but none within the Longstreet front. Hood had to depend on his foot scouts. Meanwhile Col. Vincent of 1st Div 5th Corps came across a courier from Sickles who directed Vincent to take his brigade and occupy it. Hood instincts were correct. Against a strong position would be better to move around it and take the position from the flank. But by Noon, 5th Corps was behind the Round Tops and Hood never had the opportunity. In our refights we assume Hood leaves his line of departure at the historical time (4 PM) and moves around the base of Big Round top. This takes an estimated 40 mins. The scouts a head spot Barnes 1st Division, 5th Corps behind the Big Round Top in Column of Divisions, artillery limbered along the Taneytown Road. However 25 minutes away coming up in march columns from Power's Hill is Ayres 2nd Division. The Third Division (Crawford) is in reserve behind Power's Hill. Hood deploys, while Barnes does the same. Barnes out numbered is eventually driven back. But its 5:20 PM, and remember McLaws division is engaged at the Orchard and Wheatfield. There is nothing pinning Ward, nor Vincent's Brigades. The both join fight at the base of the Big hill. By this point, 6th Corps' lead division Wright's is crossing Rock Creek even though they are 3/4 miles away, they are on Hood's flank and could block his retreat. With Aryes up, and deployed Hood must take stock. Even if he breaks Ayres (unlikely) it will take time and allow Wright's division to block Hood from rejoining Longstreet. He retreats back around the base of the hill. The move to right fails due to a lack of scouting with no cavalry. Those interested in looking at our fields will find them on Facebook at facebook.com/groups/410753052431546

[@JohnDoe-wt9ek]

An extreme right maneuver could work, if it could maintain the most of its secrecy, or at least make the presumption that the unit was moving off to a distant position for rest and refit rather than a tactical maneuver. If you're also sending dispatches back to Lee informing him of your decision making and reasoning behind it. And with the potential that only one singular unit is holding the point of contestation, it would behoove Hood to inform Lee that the objective can be overtaken with minimal casualties, if Lee also commits to a feigned offensive elsewhere (possibly that of an equivalent Pickett's Charge but where the casualties will not be so devastating, and avoiding the open ground of that 1 mile field they did charge across that fateful 3 July day in 1863). Insodoing, Meade would have the presumption that a main offensive is occurring right then with Lee's other committed forces, which would mean he would have his reserves ready to be committed at the moment the line breaks. While Hood and his Division would have complete and total numerical superiority in 4 to 1 advantage against the Round Top defenses. Of course, this would necessitate much time as dispatches of intel and movements would be slow going between Lee's camp and Hood's camp. But the moment Hood heard ferocious combat well away from his objective, I guarantee that he would have waited until Meade had no doubt that it was the main attack, rather than a distraction to another attack, elsewhere. Above all, this all hinges on Meade not knowing that there's an entire Confederate force behind his defensive Fish Hook disposition ready to take the high ground of Little Round Top, and thus the ability to roll up his Left Flank with reinforcements AND the high ground. And doubly that of the element on Little Round Top getting wise to the fact that the attacks on their position have, suddenly, gone quiet and no opposition has been met. Essentially, Chamberlain getting a sixth sense of the situation and presuming something off about the sudden stop of attacks. If the Confederates succeed in taking that position, Meade would be in a tough position. Does he stay and attempt what the Confederates had attempted prior, losing excessive casualties in the process, unable to repeat what the Southerners performed due to their being wise to potential flanking? Does he hope that it remains contained to Little Round Top? What if Lee ALSO breaks through with his offensive? Will Hood capitalize on the victory and begin a full sweep, or stand fast and recuperate, thus allowing Meade time to set up defensive measures to prevent a complete route? Does Meade even have the reserves to commit to such a defensive position? Or does Meade recognize that his position is untenable with the loss of that immediate high ground, and now has enemy within his battle lines, thus, having to withdraw to fight another day? Can he even withdraw without excessive casualties or Lee taking advantage of said withdrawal?

[@douglasiles2024]

By getting Hood's division on line by around 6pm, that would still leave roughly 3 hours of daylight for any action to unfold. Considering there would initially be only one brigade to oppose them, even that brigade is somewhat out of position and would have to form a battle line in order to try and delay Hood's advance up the Taneytown Rd. Meade would then have to try and redeploy additional reinforcements to meet the threat coming up his left flank. If Lee executes this correctly, Ewell's division should be going in against the right flank, tying up those Union units. At this point Meade is caught in a dual flank attack, similar to Hooker at Chancellorsville.

[@robertdigby4504]

Ignoring the accounts where the reports from generals said it was almost dark around 7:00 pm. No daylight savings time back then and a lot of other things about timekeeping was different back then. Nice try though

[@douglasiles2024]

@@robertdigby4504 even with daylight savings time taken out of the equation, there's still around 2 hours of effective daylight to work with. As evidenced in other battles during the war, troop movements and assaults would begin in pre-dawn hours, so it's not a stretch at all to say that Hood could have pushed on. Also in this video it doesn't say if they were using 6pm as the time was back then, or 6pm as it was today, meaning it would have been only 5pm back then. But hey, at least you tried harder.

[@th.goertz7839]

Brilliant concept.

[@davidbarshjr9854]

Just started watching and am interested by the premise, but I do think that the exercise should have been done in the summer to make sure the foliage was full in order to take advantage of the cover.

[@stewartmillen7708]

Where is McLaws's division positioned? Anderson's? They would have had to deploy further south as well (with McLaws being in essence in Hood's historical location and Anderson in McLaws's) for the flank attack to be conducted with maximum effect, so the defenders of Little Round Top are being forced to fight off both attacks front and rear.

[@user-zk8bu2wt5j]

The ground to the right of little round top is worse than devil's den, deep stone ravines. Forces may have crossed it but would not be in any type of formation. Looks good on a map, looks like hell on the ground.

[@irockuroll60]

Seems like this Union general knows the ending…”move your brigade to the round tops and refuse your left flank”. I feel like we all know this song and dance from Gettysburg

[@Historybluff1986]

Probably made harder today due to private property. In 1863 you could probably just match and ride as you please around the Gettysburg area.

[@fredsmith8498]

Poor maps were a scourge for the South. There was a Gettysburg native in the Confederate Army. If he had been consulted, Hood would have arrived on the flank 2 hours earlier than your scenario. Then, both hood and McLaws would have attacked and turned the flank

[@kevlarburrito6693]

26:14 should've sent a full regiment to recon in force and moved the remained of the division into line with the brigade at little round top, at the very least.

[@user-ck1rw3yr4u]

i have all the respect in the world for Eric and had the pleasure of one of his guided tours. But this scenario deviates from historic accuracy: Meade has already ordered V Corp to move left to occupy where Sickles is supposed to be shortly after 3pm, not to mention Warren to assess the situation. Hood would have certainly faced a lot more than one brigade in his assault. Also, he's way far away from any supporting troops (McClaws is back by the Peach Orchard. farther than Sickles is from II Corp) and would have been extremely vulnerable on both flanks. It's just another lovely 'Lost Cause' myth that isn't realist.

[@Farlomous]

this was a good exercise in how the maneuver might have went, but had Hood's Division made it that far with minimal detection, knowing what we know today, he would have run right into the VI Corps which was marching up the road on Hood's flank at that time with roughly 13,000 men with reinforcements nearby, while Hood only has around 7,500 men and no reinforcements remotely near him. If Sickles was to have done what he did, you now have him facing off against just McClaws and Anderson who like you said were by themselves, in a straight up fight with no body coming in on his flank at the Wheatfield. He would be able to swing around Mclaw's flank and roll him up. Hood would then be further left out on an island and I would wager lose his entire division. also, not mentioned, but Berdan's Sharpshooters are scattered about on the left flank and would probably have heard or seen Hood's men which would have left Hood even more exposed.

[@jamesellis4664]

July 20th, talk about a cliffhanger. If I were Lee when he hears Hood launch his attack, Lee should launch an attack at the same time because Hood is going to need support. With attacks coming from both directions at the same time the Union army could be sent into a panic. I can see the dispatch to Union headquarters in Washington now. "Left flank of the army has caved in, Meade's army in full retreat".

[@pagejackson1207]

The fault with this scenario is that it makes unrealistic decisions regarding the time element. Longstreet's attack force was not prepared to attack from the position designated by Lee until 4 PM. In this scenario you have Hood's division halfway to the new attack position at 4 PM! You allow no time for Hood's objection to the planned attack to be "run up" the chain of command for a decision; his troops to redeploy into line of of column, and for Lee to move cavalry to his right flank to scout the line of march!. In the Civil War the typical infantry force averaged 2 to 3 miles an hour on the march. Jackson's flank march at Chancellorsville (which was approximately 12 miles) took over 6 hours to complete! His force began marching at approximately 8 AM and yet he didn't initiate his attack until 5:30 PM! Yet in your scenario you have Hood's division marching 12 miles and deploying into attack formation within 2 hours! It is utterly unrealistic! On July 1st it took Heth's division much longer than 30 minutes (used in your scenario) to deploy into attack formation. And his troops were relatively fresh having only marched from Cashtown to an location three miles west of Gettysburg. In this scenario Hood's troops (one brigade of which had already marched over 20 miles just to get into the the original attack position) marches an additional 12 miles and deploys into attack formation in just two hours. Straggling would have been inevitable in the march this scenario envisions! And movement along the narrow Ridge Rd would have inevitably resulted in the well-known accordion phenomenon of columns of troops having to stop and start again. A division of soldiers do not start marching instantaneously as it takes some time for the proceeding troops to clear the road for those who follow. It would be impossible for Hood's full division to arrive at the new attack location simultaneously!! Southern soldiers were much more mobile and in better physical shape than the average Union troop but they were not machines. The scenario you have provided us defies well documented phenomenon relating to the movement of troops during the Civil War and imagines instantaneous command and control was possible in 1863.

[@klappspatenkamikaze]

one of the best wargaming videos ever!

[@JimmySailor]

Lee’s 1863 campaign was flawed from inception. His decision to invade Pennsylvania after Chancellorsville was motivated not out of strategic good sense but a desire to fight offensively and outside of Virginia. Meanwhile the troops he used could have very realistically been sent West to relieve Vicksburg. The fall of Vicksburg did in fact end the chances of the South. This was the exact same strategy that Lee had used in 1862 to great effect, and yet in 1863 he blundered. Had the battle gone his way the war still would have been lost when Grant took Vicksburg. The Army of the Potomac was used to being beaten by Lee in the field and yet all Lee would have earned was temporary possession of some Pennsylvania farm land. He couldn’t maintain his army in the North for long, even living off the land they were famously shoeless after only a month of campaigning. Even if he had broken the Union line he would have had to turn and head South. The idea Lee could have gotten “between” the Army of the Potomac and Washington is absurd. He didn’t have the force to threaten Washington. If he had he would have been crushed outside the gates as his supply lines were cut off. The whole campaign has been romanticized from the beginning, there was no way they could have won. The only possible way the South wins the war was if Lincoln loses reelection, for that to happen they had to keep their army intact. Risking the Army in Pennsylvania gained them nothing.

[@manilajohn0182]

If Hood had moved around Little Round Top, Longstreet would have created a division- sized gap in his line between Hood and McLaws. If he had shifted McLaws along with Hood, Longstreet would have created a division- sized gap between his corps and Hill's. Having a gap in one's line as a result of an enemy attack is bad enough; creating one in your own line as a result of your own movements is an invitation to disaster. Chickamauga is a great example of this. Some will say that the AotP was in no position to attack Longstreet's corps- but that being wise after the event. At the time, the Confederates had no idea exactly what Union forces were in the rear of the enemy line in front of them.

[@Jonascord]

Little Round Top had been lumbered off on 7/2/1863, and was bare of any cover. It was only visibly occupied by a Union signal station. No other troops were seen to be up there. There are trees on the hill, now, (160 years gives a lot of time for a forest. The movie missed that completely.) Hood could move through woods during his approach, hiding his intent. Not until he came out and could see the top of the hill would he have known that parts of the Union V corps had reached the top of the hill and were piling up rocks for protection.

[@zeeboo2012]

Yall should play Sid Myers Gettysburg/Anteatum...i used Hoods tactic and won the battle of Gettysburg as the Southern army

[@dibackdraft]

Pretty neat, is some struggle it seems with utilizing meta information. Wasn't much reason to switch head quarters so soon with reports all being on the union right flank. This is a fun way to prep to play the game.

[@christophersmith8316]

Sickles advanced to Peach Orchard partly because of miscommunication with Meade. This keeps him from doing that

[@stevenahlberg1542]

Before I even watch this. I like long streets plan. To get out of Gettysburg and set up a another field of Battle.

[@michaelgent3316]

Gnl. Longstreet argued for a general movement of the ENTIRE Confederate army to the right to take advantage of the higher ground. Starting at Big round top. If a movement was to be made I believe it would be a Occupation of Big Round Top, to secure the movements of the rest of the Army. This would force Gnl. Meade to leave the comfort of his hills and his strong defensive position. With the Confederate Army now poised to be able to strike at Washington, Meade would have no other option than to attack a stronger Confederate position. I have played this scenario over and over again on the game "Gettysburg". I took the actual reports from "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" Century Press 1888. According to reports Lee did not want to "give those people" the option to retreat to defend Washington. That would have made the entire campaign useless and Lee would have to withdraw back into Virginia rather than trying to assault the city and the fortifications. Ps: I do not believe that Gettysburg was the "beginning of the end of the war" I believe that the loss of Vicksburg as well as the Blockade was actually the beginning of the end. Vicksburg was the major loss suffered, but all three events were the end of the Confederacy. Just my opinion.

[@Ijustpooted]

My only problem with this is it wasn’t done around the same time and season the battle happened. The foliage is much denser during the summer

[@KYPopskull]

Bravo, I’m a subscriber now

[@libertycowboy2495]

Should have made the federal "generals" move at speed of horses, and southern "generals" move at pace of marching columns.

[@geneseeboy5138]

I can't wait. Not far. 😅

[@glennmartin6492]

But the real tactical advantage of the move south was the friends they made along the way.

[@andychisarick6879]

Did anyone notice that it's not summertime in this video? Saying the Rebs need to make sure they're unobserved...it's not just the lack of leaves on trees (though thats a HUGE issue.) All kinds of brush is missing, bushes & crops & almost everything else in the world that actually grows is gone, died back & won't fill in for another 6 months at least. Plus it's obviously cold- the Rebs that are role playing (not the ones on the board, but in the field) won't move nearly as fast as they would in July. Unless they cal all drive around in those nice comfy cars! Anyway great idea but to go to all this effort but not stage it in July seems to throw the whole thing off kilter before you even start. Pointing to Round Top through the trees- even though they say, those trees werent all there back in the 1800s- well SOME of them were. Every sight line is suspect beyond just the different eras. I just can't get my mind around staging this any time but July. Sun sets earlier, rises later- they talk about running out of daylight! July could have 4 hours or more of daylight than winter does in Pennsylvania. Ok I could go on but I'm sorry to try to rain on your parade. But it's like filming a movie about the Lillehammer Olympic Games in Floida in July.

[@Carl-MGR]

I mean, we didn’t eat hard tack or load muskets either. The compromise has to do with how crowded the park is in summer, and how the foliage actually is *too* concealing at that point. We are doing another scenario there next year so stay tuned

[@davefranklin4136]

As an historical wargaming purest, I am appalled! Make the players ride around the battlefield on horseback! Ok, ok, so that's not practical. Then the next best thing: have them ride Mustangs. That's the only car being produced that comes immediately to my mind named for a horse... :)

[@ComradeOgilvy1984]

Ford Pinto?

[@LegioXIVGemina]

Those electric Mustangs. They have to stop and recharge frequently.

[@joedufek2810]

This is AWESOME!!!’