Grim Reaper Paradoxes and Patchwork Principles | Ft.

[@jmike2039]

It's absolutely insane how much work you both put in. You are doing such a good service for all of us, especially those of us who might struggle to navigate through new concepts.

[@MajestyofReason]

@@jmike2039 thank you. This means a lot❤️

[@jmike2039]

@@MajestyofReason thank you. I hope to get more people who are interested in my platform to engage with the philosophical literature more and you are the first person I suggest along side kane b, friction, and carnaedes. Soooo, Keep it up brother, that is to say!

[@hodlwise2470]

​​​@@MajestyofReasonHey, bro, I bought your book recently (The Majesty of Reason). I dig, however, you have some grammatical and formatting errors scattered throughout (albeit few and far between). Presumably, you're unaware. Want me to e-mail you with what I've spotted thus far (haven't finished yet), or no?

[@rioluxx27x42]

wake up babe, Joe posted another objection to the Kalam

[@radscorpion8]

its time for a rub a dub dub in a tub a tub tub

[@ayushsinha1947]

I really love your content. These types of conversations make the internet better.

[@perorenchino2036]

Jai shree ram brother

[@uknown.]

Your content is amazing. Your videos helped me a lot to learn about philosophy of religion

[@brendanmckenna3851]

My glorious king joe producing another magnificent video. Good work man !

[@HumblyQuestioning]

detroyer is an absolute legend. Friction is such a great interview channel.

[@plasmaballin]

The patchwork principle, together with the assumptions about intrinsicality of powers and dispositions also leads to the immovable object - irresistible force paradox. An immovable object and an irresistible force are both individually possible, but they can't exist together (or at least, can't come into contact with each other) because that would lead to a contradiction. But the patchwork principle implies you could put both in the same spacetime and line them up such that the irresistible force is about to come into contact with the immovable object. Furthermore, the power of the irresistible force to move anything it comes into contact with and that of the immovable object to resist any force that contacts it are, under this view, intrinsic to them and therefore, they would still have these properties in the patched-together scenario. So proponents of the grim reaper argument for causal finitism must also believe that it's possible for an irresistible force to come into contact with an immovable object, or reject one of their premises.

[@EarnestApostate]

40:10 Holy crapp! I had been going for so long thinking this was the "Patrick Principle" assuming a guy by the name Patrick put it forth. Patchwork makes so much more sense!

[@truthteller3351]

Really good stuff. Back when I saw it on Friction's channel, I thought the Bulb-paradox objection was very convincing and I still think so. Though, with the caveat that at the time of writing this I've yet to fully read the paper; I struggle with the second objection at 34:50 which may well be a problem with my understanding rather than the objection itself. So, there's two regions, R1 and R2 each of which contain reapers that have the intrinsic disposition to create and place a particle at a location iff no particle was already placed there. In each individual region the reaper creates and places a particle, realizing it's disposition. Then with the assumption that there's a possible spacetime region big enough to house R1 & R2 we infer via the patchwork principle that there is a possible patched together spacetime region R* which jointly contains exact duplicates of R1 & R2 (R1* & R2*). So far so good. Now, the inconsistency is supposedly derived from the fact that, since R1* & R2* are exact duplicates, the reapers must be realizing their dispositions to create and place a particle at that region, yet the second reaper in the sequence can't realize their disposition in the patched together region because the particle is already created by the first reaper. My problem is this, it seems like there are 2 ways of understanding the contents of the regions R1 & R2, but on either understanding, I don't see how you can successfully derive a contradiction. The first understanding is where R1 & R2 each can be divided into a sub-region containing just the reaper and their intrinsic properties and dispositions (S1, S3), and a sub-region containing the particle each reaper creates (S2, S4). The duplicate regions will indeed have the exact same sub-regions and contents, leading us to the inference that in R* you have two reapers creating particles. But this doesn't contradict them having the disposition to create a particle iff no earlier reaper does. They are both able to create a particle in their subsequent sub-regions, S2 and S4, because no earlier reaper placed a particle there. All you can infer is that the reaper later in the sequence can't place a particle in the same subregion, say S2, as the reaper earlier in the sequence, because that reaper would have already created and placed the particle in S2. But that doesn't stop the later reaper from creating and placing a particle in their own sub-region, S4. So, there's no contradiction here, both reapers can realize their dispositions. That brings us to the second understanding, the regions R1 & R2 only contain the reapers not any sub-regions containing the particles, and they are both in a sequence to place a particle at precisely the same location L and will only place it iff no earlier reaper did. In this case, the reaper which is earlier in the sequence will place the particle at L but the later reaper won't due to their intrinsic disposition to place a particle iff none was yet placed. But we can see there's no contradiction here either. R1* & R2* are still duplicates since they contain the same reapers with the same dispositions and properties. There's no issue with one having a particle and the other not because, ex hypothesi, neither contained a particle in the first place. If I'm right, there's basically a dilemma here. Either we think of R1 & R2 as having a sub-region containing the particle created by each reaper, in which case the inference from them being duplicates to them both creating particles goes through, but we cannot infer that they can't create a particle from their intrinsic dispositions; they can both create a particle in their own sub-region. Or we don't think of R1 & R2 as having sub-regions containing the created particles, in which case we can infer from their intrinsic dispositions that if a reaper creates and places a particle at some location, the later reaper can't. But now we can't infer, from them being duplicates, that each region, R1 & R2 has the reaper creating a particle, in fact neither of them do. This is a long one but I would be curious to hear you guys' thoughts on this dilemma.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! We respond to your comment on Troy’s channel here, if you’re interested :) kzbin.infogiWMYW9-DqE?si=G3V7Eef_6V_TbUB_

[@yippeeyo]

Whatever begins to exist has a cause Joe began to exist Joe has a cause And that's to rip the Kalam to shreds at any given oppurtunity

[@0OmerErgun0]

Do you even know what Kalam cosmological argument is? It seems like you dont accor. to your comment

[@logicalliberty132]

top 10 anime crossovers

[@darth_mb]

Fr

[@mjdillaha]

Since your companion argument doesn’t contain an infinite, linearly ordered set, it doesn’t seem to be sufficiently Benardete-like, and so I don’t think it is analogous to the GRA.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! We respond to your comment on Troy’s channel here, if you’re interested :) kzbin.infogiWMYW9-DqE?si=G3V7Eef_6V_TbUB_

[@philosophicaljay3449]

I still have to think about it more, but my first instinct upon watching, which gives me pause about the argument, in regards to your finite Bulbs example is that each member is its own defeater (as each Bulb is "to the left of itself" in the sequence). If a Bulb was lit/turned on, then it, itself, serves to prove that it cannot be lit/turned on, independent of the status of any other Bulb in the sequence.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! We respond to your comment on Troy’s channel here, if you’re interested :) kzbin.infogiWMYW9-DqE?si=G3V7Eef_6V_TbUB_

[@truthovertea]

The question is when are going to write another paper objecting to this one?😊

[@JohnnyHofmann]

Great video!

[@FredHarvey779]

I'm still alive out here guys, ain't no Grim Reaper reaped me yet!

[@andrewmoy5855]

I wonder if either of you think that your diagnosis of the problem with the GRA presents a problem for patchwork principles in general. Once two formerly separate regions of space-time are connected, it seems implausible that those regions can remain causally isolated from each other.

[@darth_mb]

MY BOI DETROYER!

[@ILoveLuhaidan]

literally your entire channel is antagonizing theists

[@darth_mb]

@@ILoveLuhaidan it's not antagonizing them, it's destroying them in debate. And no that's not all my channel, philosophy of religion is just most popular on my channel.

[@ILoveLuhaidan]

@@darth_mb”destroying them in debate” 🤓🤓

[@darth_mb]

@@ILoveLuhaidan why are you being this cringe in an academic philosophy yt comments. Like honestly stfu and stop being weird.

[@ILoveLuhaidan]

@@darth_mb I was there too. You will grow up someday XD

[@seanpierce9386]

When considering Turing-Completeness, the Grim Reaper setup becomes obvious. You’re setting up a universe in which the only logical possibility is that no particle is placed. The problem arises not from the logical impossibility of a particle being placed, but because the system is not Turing-Complete. It’s possible to set up a configuration of reapers that simulate a cellular automata, which is Turing-Complete. That such a universe may extend infinitely in space and time is not a paradox, as we can always logically determine the state that must occur before and after any given configuration.

[@AndreAy1975]

The Reaper who kills Fred is the first one he meets after his birth. Unless you assume, that Fred has always existed, in which case he is God and not killable but the Master of all Reapers.

[@gffhvfhjvf4959]

The circular lightbulbs is a killer, I love it 😂

[@smdb5874]

I was waiting for hey peeps.

[@EarnestApostate]

34:48 supporting you on Patreon certainly seems a better deal than buying a shirt from you for aleph-null dollars!

[@debunkingdonkey6098]

My head hurts @.@

[@radscorpion8]

its time for a rub a dub dub in a tub a tub tub

[@drmayne2071]

First video I ever watched and not gonna lie first 10 seconds I was thinking "man here's gonna be some pseudoscience" good thing I didn't click away right away lol

[@crayzscientist6824]

Very cool

[@bindaathvisene8754]

An event can't affect an other if light dont have enough time to travel between them. I don't know if you account for that

[@juanausensi499]

It's logic, don't expect the described objects functioning logically.

[@bindaathvisene8754]

​@@juanausensi499yes but that undermine some part where he takes our universe as existence proof.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! We respond to your comment on Troy’s channel here, if you’re interested :) kzbin.infogiWMYW9-DqE?si=G3V7Eef_6V_TbUB_

[@zsoltnagy5654]

I was already sceptical about P3, when you introduced it. I was like, that doesn't make any sense stating like that regarding and considering the Bernadette rule regarding the GRA.

[@TheOtherCaleb]

Bill Craig has been real quiet since this dropped ‼️🗣️ (But fr, he seems to be completely ignorant of cutting edge objections 💀)

[@davidandersson1961]

Hey Joe, I'm a 17 year old trying to deepen my understanding of philosophy and I have been thinking about which philosophy books to get. I would very much appreciate a response explaining if the books I'm thinking of are a good start or if I'm totally off. Some backround knowledge: I have been watching Alex O'Connor for a couple of years, but my interest in philosophy wasn't nearly as great a couple of years ago as it has been for the last year or so. I have also recently started watching Unsolicited Advice as well as your channel. I think that I'm somewhat drawn to analytic philosophy but I want to learn from different traditions. I recently finished Meditations by Marcus Aurelius. I have some philosophy books at home that I haven't read yet like The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, The History of Philosophy by A.C. Grayling, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenancey by Robert M. Pirsig, Alternativa Fakta by Åsa Wikfors, I don't know how much information there is about that book in English but in short it's about epistemology and critical thinking, I did read it like seven years ago and I don't remember much of it but as far as I know it is considered to be quite good. The books I have been thinking if either buying or asking family members to buy as a Christmas Present: Tao De Jing, by Laozi On the Shortness of Life, by Cicero Summa Theologiae by Thomas Aquinas Thus spoke Zarathustra, by Friedrich Nietzsche Language, Truth and Logic by A.J Ayer. Do you think these books are okay to start with? Or should I change one or more of them? If I should which book should I get instead? What do you think about the books I already have? I would very much appreciate a response! Thanks in advance.

[@slashmonkey8545]

You made this same post on r/askphilosophy didn't you?

[@davidandersson1961]

@@slashmonkey8545 Yes, I did.

[@jmike2039]

I highly suggest Michael Huemers 'Knowledge, Reality, and Value'. He's extremely accessible and even if you don't agree with some of his views he's good at being impartial. My only criticism of him is his critique, or lack there of, regarding error theory. I haven't finished it but it's really good so far. I keep getting distracted 😭

[@sillythewanderer4221]

Those all seem great. More to add to my reading list I suppose. I would also recommend “the coherence of theism” by Swinburne, but it is quite dense.

[@aosidh]

Just had a thought! You can construct this as a retrospective analysis of Zeno's arrow by subdividing the arrow's flight backwards from the target. Perhaps a bit more classical and a little less distracting than the grim reapers 😹

[@Twork4Jesus]

Hi Joe, I am born Catholic, what do you think of the Eucharistic miracles that allegedly even scientists have no explanations? Thank you for your efforts!

[@NathanBozeman-sn6zq]

It seems nonsensical to say that a light bulb is to the left of itself though... Let me know if I'm misunderstanding the light bulb example by saying that. Also, if it's not nonsensical to say that a light bulb is to the left of itself, then it doesn't seem you could ever say ANY lightbulb is on, because then a lightbulb to the left of it would always be on, making it impossible to ever turn that lightbulb on. So it seems like you're either relying on a nonsensical idea of a bulb being to the left of itself or you've created a situation where no bulb could ever turn on. Not sure how this contends with the GRA given this.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! We'll respond to this in our video on Troy's channel, but very briefly: we *stipulated* the sense of 'to the left of' at issue, and the stipulated sense allows something to be to the left of itself. There is nothing nonsensical in our stipulated sense; the sense is as stated in the video: Bulb A is to the left of a Bulb B just in case either (i) the glass of Bulb A is touching the electrical contact of Bulb B, or (ii) there is a sequence of Bulbs from Bulb A to Bulb B that touch each other in this way." Notice that there can be a sequence of Bulbs from a Bulb to itself which touch each other in this way -- simply arrange Bulbs into a circle as depicted in the video, and that condition is satisfied. So our stipulated sense of 'to the left of' is perfectly sensible and also allows Bulbs to be to the left of themselves. If we don't like calling the relevant relation 'to the left of', we can call the relation t'o the schm-eft of'. So a Bulb is able and disposed to be on iff no Bulb to its schm-eft is on. And Bulbs can be to the schm-eft of themselves, given the stipulated sense of 'schm-eft'.

[@NathanBozeman-sn6zq]

@@MajestyofReason Alright, thanks for getting back to me so quickly! I'll definitely check out that video when it comes out - I'm still not all the way through the video, and I'm listening while I'm working, so maybe I missed the part you mentioned. But I still do think that if we say that it's not nonsensical for a bulb to be to the left of itself, then we have a situation where no bulb could ever turn on, because then there would be a situation where that bulb itself would require itself to be off, which seems to avoid the contradiction, making premise 2 of your argument false. I'm also curious - what if someone responded by saying, "Time isn't cyclical, so the analogy with the lightbulbs is disanalogous" ?? On the GRA, it involves intervals of time, which are linear, but on your model, it's bulbs arranged in a circle. This would be an attempt to reject premise 1 - because if the light bulb illustration is disanalogous, then someone could say that If P1+P2+P3 is true, then it doesn't follow that P1*+P2*+P3* is true. If my contentions are not based on misunderstandings of your argument, then it seems we could have reasons to reject both premises of your argument.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! We respond to your comment on Troy’s channel here, if you’re interested :) kzbin.infogiWMYW9-DqE?si=G3V7Eef_6V_TbUB_

[@JohnDBlue]

Algorithm says hi (I am far too dumb to comment something smart about this topic, even though I found it interesting lmao)

[@frogandspanner]

I reject the claim that reapers are possible.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! We respond to your comment on Troy’s channel here, if you’re interested :) kzbin.infogiWMYW9-DqE?si=G3V7Eef_6V_TbUB_

[@JamesRichardWiley]

An eternal Cosmos with no beginning or end and no creator cancels out the Kalam. But good try.

[@felixsanchez4805]

+100000 aura

[@ScottRachelson777]

Isn't the strength of a philosophical argument determined by whether its premises are more likely or reasonable than those of competing arguments? For instance, the question of whether physical objects existed timelessly before the beginning of metric time seems more reasonably answered with "no," even if it's not absolutely certain. This conclusion is supported by all available physical evidence, which appears more convincing than any premise assuming the infinite and timeless existence of physical objects. Similarly, Einstein's theory of relativity is considered robust not because we know that no counterexample exists, but because it works-allowing us to make testable predictions and yielding consistent results. However, it only takes one counterexample to discredit the theory. We don't need to know all possible counterexamples to regard the theory as more valid than any alternative theory with less empirical support. This is how I see the strength of the Kalm Cosmological Argument compared to its alternative and competing arguments against it. To illustrate my point in more detail and complexity, I am pasting an argument by Ron Miamon from Philosophy StackExchange addressing the question: Is Mathematics Invented or Discovered? His argument illustrates that although we don't know for sure that we can conclusively say that all mathematics is invented or discovered, their are idealizations in mathematical thinking that don't seem to correspond to physical reality and whose fundamental nature yields questions that are not decidable or computable in finite time, or on a computer. Computation is fundamental, not mathematical idealizations of different kinds of infinity. For example, the Banach Tarski problem is a Paradox because it defies geometric intuition and it's proof requires assuming that the Axiom of Infnite Choice holds true. Ron's full argument: (I'm posting it in two parts because KZbin won't let me post as it's too long.) There are things that are discovered, and things that are invented. The boundary is put at different places by different people. I put myself on the list and I believe that my position is objectively justifiable, and others are not. Definitely discovered: finite stuff By probabilistic considerations, I am sure that nobody in the history of the Earth has ever done the following multiplication: 9306781264114085423 x 39204667242145673 = ? Then if I compute it, am I inventing its value, or discovering the value? The meaning of the word "invent" and "discover" are a little unclear, but usually one says discover when there are certain properties: does the value have independent unique qualities that we know ahead of time (like being odd)? Is it possible to get two different answers and consider both correct? etc. In this case, everyone would agree the value is discovered, since we actually can do the computation--- and not a single (sane) person thinks that the answer is made up nonsense, or that it wouldn't be the number of boxes in the rectangle with appropriate sides, etc. There are many unsolved problems in this finite category, so it isn't trivial: Is chess won for white, won for black, or a draw, in perfect play? What are the longest possible Piraha sentences with no proper names? What is the length of the shortest proof in ZF of the Prime Number Theorem? Approximately? What is the list of 50 crossing knots? You can go on forever, as most interesting mathematical problems are interesting in the finite domain too. Discovered: asymptotic computation Consider now an arbitrary computer program, and whether it halts or does not halt. This is the problem of what are called "Pi-0-1 arithmetic sentences" in first order logic, but I prefer the entirely equivalent formulation in terms of halting computer programs, as logic jargon is less accessible than programming jargon. Given a definite computer program P written in C (or some other Turing complete language) suitably modified to allow arbitrarily large memory. Does this program return an answer in finite time, or run forever? This includes a hefty chunk of the most famous mathematical conjectures, I list a few: The Riemann hypothesis (in suitable formulation) The Goldbach conjecture. The Odd perfect number conjecture Diophantine equations (like Fermat's last theorem) consistency of ZF (or any other first order set of axioms) Kneser-Poulsen conjecture on sphere-rearrangement You can believe one of the two "Does P halt" is absolutely meaningful, so that one can know that it is true or false without knowing which. "Does P halt" only becomes meaningful upon the halting of P, or a proof that it doesn't halt in a suitable formal system, so that it is useful to introduce a category of "unknown" for this question, and the "unknown" category might not eventually become empty, as it does in the finite problem case. Here is where the intuitionists stop. The famous name here is L.E.J. Brouwer Intuitionistic logic is developed to deal with cases where there are questions whose answer is not determined as true or false, so that one cannot decide the law of excluded middle. This position leaves open the possibility that some computer programs that don't halt are just too hard to prove halt, and there is no mechanism for doing so. While intuitionism is useful for situations of imperfect knowledge (like us, always), this is not the place where most mathematicians stop. There is a firm belief that the questions at this level are either true or false, we just don't know which. I agree with this position, but I don't think it is trivial to argue against the intuitionist perspective. Most believe discovered: Arithmetic hierarchy There are questions in mathematics which cannot be phrased as the non-halting of a computer program, at least not without modification of the concept of "program". These include The twin prime conjecture The transcendence of e+pi. To check these questions, you need to run through cases, where at each point you have to check where a computer program halts. This means you need to know infinitely many programs halt. For example, to know there are infinitely many twin primes, you need to show that the program that looks for twin primes starting at each found pair will halt on the next found pair. For the transcendence question, you have to run through all polynomials, calculate the roots, and show that eventually they are different from e+pi. These questions are at the next level of the arithmetic hierarchy. Their computational formulation is again more intuitive--- they correspond to the halting problem for a computer which has access to the solution of the ordinary halting problem. You can go up the arithmetic hierarchy, and the sentences which express the conjectures on the arithmetic hierarchy at any finite level are those of Peano Arithmetic. There are those who believe that Peano Arithmetic is the proper foundation, and these arithmetically minded people will stop at the end of the arithmetic hierarchy. I suppose one could place Kronecker here: Leopold Kronecker: "God created the natural numbers, all else is the work of man." To assume that the sentences on the arithmetic hierarchy are absolute, but no others, is a possible position. If you include axioms of induction on these statements, you get the theory of Peano Arithmetic, which has an ordinal complexity which is completely understood since Gentzen, and it is described by the ordinal epsilon-naught. Epsilon-naught is very concrete, but I have seen recent arguments that it might not be well founded! This is completely ridiculous to anyone who knows epsilon-naught, and the idea might strike future generations as equally silly as the idea that the number of sand grains in a sphere the size of Earth's orbit is infinite--- an idea explicitly refuted in "The Sand Reckoner" by Archimedes. Most believe discovered: Hyperarithmetic hierarchy

[@ScottRachelson777]

Part 2: The hyperarithmetic hierarchy is often phrased in terms of second order arithmetic, but I prefer to state it computationally. Suppose I give you all the solution to the halting problem at all levels of the arithmetic hierarchy, and you concatenate them into one infinite CD-ROM which contains the solution to all of these simultaneously. Then the halting problem with this CD-ROM (the complete arithmetic-hierarchy halting oracle) defines a new halting problem--- the omega-th jump of 0 in recursion theory jargon, or just the omega-oracle. You can iterate the oracles up the ordinal list, and produce ever more complex halting problems. You might believe this is meaningful for any ordinals which produce a tape. There are various stopping points along the hyperarithmetic hierarchy, which are usually labelled by their second-order arithmetic version (which I don't know how to translate). These positions are not natural stopping points for anybody. Church Kleene ordinal I am here. Everything less than this, I accept, everything beyond this, I consider objectively invented. The reason is that the Church-Kleene ordinal is the limit of all countable computable ordinals. This is the position of the computational foundations, and it was essentially the position of the Soviet school. People I would put here include Yuri Manin Paul Cohen In the case of Paul Cohen, I am not sure. The ordinals below Church Kleene are all those that we can definitely represent on a computer, and work with, and any higher conception is suspect. First uncountable ordinal If you make an axiomatic set theory with power set, you can define the union of all countable ordinals, and this is the first uncountable ordinal. Some people stop here, rejecting uncountable sets, like the set of real numbers, as inventions. This is a very similar position to mine, held by people at the turn of the 20th century, who accepted countable infinity, but not uncountable infinity. Those who were here include many famous mathematicians Thorvald Skolem Skolem's theorem was an attempt to convince mathematicians that mathematics was countable. I should point out that the Church Kleene ordinal was not defined until the 1940s, so this was the closest position to the computational one available in the early half of the 20th century. Continuum Most practically minded mathematicians stop here. They become wary of constructions like the set of all functions on the real line, since these spaces are too large for intuition to comfortably handle. There is no formal foundation school that stops at the continuum, it is just a place where people stop being comfortable in the absoluteness of mathematical truth. The continuum has questions which are known to be undecidable by methods which are persuasive that it is a vagueness in the set concept at this point, not in the axiom system. First Inaccessible Cardinal This place is where most Platonists stop. Everything below this is described by ZFC. I think the most famous person here is: Saharon Shelah I assume this is his platonic universe, since he says so explicitly in an intro to one of his more famous early papers. He might have changed his mind since. Infinitely many Woodin Cardinals This is the place where people who like projective determinacy stop. It is likely that determinacy advocates believe in the consistency of determinacy, and this gives them evidence for the consistency of Woodin Cardinals (although their argument is somewhat theological sounding without the proper computational justification in terms of an impossibly sophisticated countable computable ordinal which serves as the proof theory for this) This includes Hugh Woodin Possibly invented: Rank-into-Rank axioms I copied this from the Wikipedia page, these are the largest large cardinals mathematicians have considered to date. This is probably where most logicians stop, but they are wary of possible contradiction. These axioms are reflection axioms, they make the set-theoretic model self-similar in complicated ways at large places. The structure of the models is enormously rich, and I have no intuition at all, as I barely know the definition (I just read it on Wiki). Invented: Reinhard Cardinal This is the limit of nearly all practicing mathematicians, since these have been shown to be inconsistent, at least using the axiom of choice. Since most of the structure of set theory is made very elegant with choice, and the anti-choice arguments are not usually related to the Godel-style large-cardinal assumptions, people assume Reinhardt Cardinals are inconsistent. I assume that nearly all working mathematicians consider Reinhardt Cardinals as imaginary entities, that they are inventions, and inconsistent at that. Definitely invented: Set of all sets This level is the highest of all, in the traditional ordering, and this is where people started at the end of the 19th century. The intuitive set The set of all sets The ordinal limit of all ordinals These ideas were shown to be inconsistent by Cantor, using a simple argument (consider the ordinal limit plus one, or the power set of the set of all sets). The paradoxes were popularized and sharpened by Russell, then resolved by Whitehead and Russell, Hilbert, Godel, and Zermelo, using axiomatic approaches that denied this object. Everyone agrees this stuff is invented.

[@bobmiller5009]

Can you get Robert Koons on and discuss this PLEASE!!!!!

[@Biblig]

Hes already discussed this with koons

[@MajestyofReason]

@@Biblig Actually I haven't discussed the objections in this video with Koons! That discussion was before any of my 5 papers on this topic were written or published; it was in the earliest stages of my thinking on the topic when my ideas were just beginning to form. Since then I have published further criticisms and have polished and published some of the ones mentioned in that discussion while responding (in the articles) to Koons' responses from the discussion. With that being said, Koons is welcome to publish responses to my papers. I would *love* that, in fact -- it's how we make philosophical progress -- and if he does, I'll always offer my own thoughts and/or responses in turn either on my blog or in further published work. It's also very likely (but cannot be known for sure) that he was an anonymous reviewer for at least several of these papers, and if so, his criticisms in the reviewing stage were brought up and considered in the relevant papers. Finally, while I might still be open to it, I'm currently not inclined to host a discussion on my channel mainly because (i) I've become more interested in polished and heavily-thought-out lecture-style content and so have been scheduling fewer discussions (this can be seen in the trajectory of my channel over the last year or so), and (ii) Koons has posted some things on twitter that I am hesitant to be associated with. Though I could be convinced otherwise, of course!

[@bobmiller5009]

@@MajestyofReason why the change in interest?

[@Karankashyap45]

You deserve millions of subscribers bro love you religious peoples afraid of you 😂😂

[@MajestyofReason]

@@Karankashyap45 nah, I’m on their team if they’re pursuing truth ❤️

[@Karankashyap45]

@@MajestyofReason bro pls debunked inspiring philosophy again 😁😁

[@bman5257]

I’m a religious person and I love my boy Joe. You’re right that I am afraid of him though (I’m easily frightened by the philosophy of time)

[@navienslavement]

​@@Karankashyap45 why are you speaking like you're having a stroke?

[@anteodedi8937]

Sadly, superficial and fraudulent channels get millions of subscribers, demonstrating as such the ignorance, superficiality, and fallibility of the masses. It's a profound issue and I don't see it getting fixed anytime soon, lol.

[@onlyonetoserve9586]

Panting ned panter. Planit erth ned creatored. Edukate!!