Why did Lee order Pickett's Charge?

[@uh60ce1]

Basically "We are adrift in a sea of blood and Richmond has nothing else to send us".

[@nimitz1739]

Lol

[@Senor0Droolcup]

This presentation is fair, balanced, and very convincing. Thank you.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

I'm glad. Thank you.

[@robertzeitz3924]

Nicely and objectively summarized. In a way, I feel Lee strategized himself into a tactical corner.

[@Jbird1988]

Logistics logistics logistics, the factor many overlook. Great video! I love how you cover how difficult it was to extract an entire army, their wagons, and the wounded when so close to the enemy. Especially a numerically superior army.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

Exactly. People forget about logistics when they talk about disengaging.

[@jim2376]

"Logistics logistics logistics, the factor many overlook." Exactly. "Get there firstest with the mostest." Logistics summed up in six words. (This has been attributed to Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest although his actual statement, "Get there first with the most men", was changed by a war correspondent.)

[@kurtwicklund8901]

By this logic Lee would not be able to withdraw after Pickett was bled white.

[@PuckerFactor10]

The best explanation I have heard on the subject.

[@wmschooley1234]

Dr. Wilder: Without taking anything away from your excellent video on Lee’s thought processes, another consideration of why Lee and Meade clashed at Gettysburg could be because both commanders were both West Pointers and had been student cadets instructed in the military theories of Dennis Mahan. Mahan wrote and Lee and Meade studied "An Elementary Treatise on Advanced -Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in the Presence of an Enemy. Meade used Mahan’s tactic of using the Union 1st Corp as a reconnaissance in force to both gather information about the ANV and to force Lee to concentrate his forces. Lee likewise used Mahan’s tactic of using the mountains around Gettysburg to mask his movement from the Army of the Potomac. Respectfully, W.S.

[@DennisSullivan-om3oo]

@wmschooley1234 Too bad they couldn't have read Sun Tzu?

[@kenkaplan3654]

Cool

[@wmschooley1234]

@@DennisSullivan-om3oo Sun Tzu's “The Art of War” is rooted in the wider context of Chinese society. The focus of American war theorist before the outbreak of the War of the Rebellion drew heavily on the lessons learned from the Napoleonic Wars of the1800’s. Sun Tzu was not officially added to the U.S. Army, Military History and Professional Development, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College reading list until about 1985. But having said that, even without reading or studying The Art of War , there are numerous commanders both Union and Confederate who exemplified Sun Tzu principles of deception, speed, and striking one's enemy's weak points. Respectfully, W.S.

[@timhand3380]

Lee was Jominian. The copse of trees was the focal point just beyond the stone wall.

[@RRM13]

Hello from an ACW buff from Brazil 🇧🇷🇧🇷👍.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

I'm glad you enjoy my content.

[@RRM13]

@@HistoryGoneWilder Nicely done. Very good & well-put-together content.

[@timmylee41]

Are of confederate decendants?

[@RRM13]

@@timmylee41 No. Grandparents immigrants from Lebanon.

[@neilpk70]

Also important to consider is the personalities involved. Stuart and "Grumble" Jones had an ongoing feud that kept most of Lee's most able cavalry sidetracked doing picket duty.

[@livelife4471]

I have often wondered why Pickett's Charge occurred. The explanation provided by your video makes the most sense to me. Thank you for this.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

I'm glad I could help. Please check out my other videos.

[@garymurfee4290]

We often don’t hear the context. Very well done.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

Thank you so much!

[@Northman1963]

As I type it's late July in extreme northern Michigan. 85 hot humid degrees. Similar weather these poor guys were marching in, wearing heavy clothing and carrying heavy weapons going straight into murderous cannon, cannister and rifle fire. How they did it is beyond my understanding. Gotta respect the guts of the men on both sides.

[@richardroyster6631]

Guts is no excuse for unavoidable military mistakes and slaughter, ask Custer.

[@ms.sherlock]

They had no choice- they would be given a death sentence by the Army for desertion.

[@BirdDogey1]

Perhaps he had tired of fighting and was too anxious for a final decision whether it be successful or not. His impatience mixed with over confidence provided the psychological environment ripe for disaster.

[@Fat12219]

Lee army man took 2:02 a toll

[@JohnRawlins21]

I’m always amazed at supply logistics. Lee had to attack. Grant ran into the same challenges during the inland portion of the Vicksburg Campaign. Limited timelines and brilliant generals willing to gamble.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

Very true.

[@geraldcalderone5228-x2p]

I wonder why Lee didn’t take a defensive position at Seminary Ridge. Instead he attacked superior ground. And in turn, severely damaged his army.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

Lee was at the end of a non-existent supply line. The Union could pin him in place with 4-5 corps then cut him off from Virginia with the rest and cavalry. Lee had to use the initiative or withdraw entirely.

[@ponli7532]

@@kurtwicklund8901 he should have never invaded with enemy army behind him, of course he won't have supplies. It was doomed from the start.

[@manilajohn0182]

Lee was late getting into Pennsylvania. By the time that he got there, he no longer had any option to go over to the defensive. After 1 July, he had to either attack or abandon the campaign in failure.

[@geraldcalderone5228-x2p]

@@manilajohn0182 what if didn’t attack and established a strong defensive position?

[@manilajohn0182]

​@@geraldcalderone5228-x2p Lee ordered the 3 July attack because he had no other viable option. His original plan of campaign was to maneuver the AotP into attacking the AoNV and decisively defeat that attack (per Lee's after- action report and Longstreet's memoirs). This plan of campaign had been ruined by the meeting engagement of 1 July- an action in which the AoNV assumed the tactical offensive as well as the strategic offensive. Having attacked and inflicted a minor defeat on the AotP, it was now highly unlikely that the AotP would go over to the attack- particularly since it now had a new commanding officer at the helm. As one historian put it, Meade assumed command in the middle of a campaign, his army was in motion, and he was faced by a man widely regarded as the greatest general of the age. Since the strategic objective of the campaign was to achieve a great enough success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg (see John H. Reagan's memoirs)- and since Vicksburg had been placed under siege before Lee's campaign even got underway, time was vital. By 3 July, Lee was out of time- because of the length of siege at Vicksburg, and because Lee's army was foraging and couldn't remain in any one place for more than 3- 5 days- and the AoNV hadn't foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June. These factors made assuming a purely defensive posture- or carrying out Longstreet's proposed maneuver around the Union left- impractical options. Lee had to either attack or abandon the campaign in failure.

[@tim80110]

Having the great success of breaking up Union attackers at Fredericksburg with artillery, Lee seemed confident that his head of artillery, Colonel Alexander, could do it again. The terrain between Seminary and Cemetary Ridge is much different than having the high ground at Fredericksburg though, and the Union defenders and cannons were much more difficult to hit.

[@jojojojazz5830]

Alexander did a poor job of arranging his cannon for offensive maneuvers. Lining his guns up in a straight line directly facing his opponents might’ve worked at Fredericksburg, and it worked for the Federals at Gettysburg, but Confederate fire would have been far more devastating if the guns had been set up in positions to enfilade the length of the Union line. As it was, the bulk of the opening cannonade sailed harmlessly over the waiting Federals and did negligible damage. Enfilade fire could have garnered Lee the results he hoped for. As it was, neither the Federal artillery or infantry were broken up and were able to pour devastating fire at long and close range into the faces of Lee’s men. At Fredericksburg, young CSA artillery commander Pelham took a single two gun section into an enfilade in front of Jackson’s position and caused havoc among Meade’s division with just one battery.

[@ChordtoChord]

@@jojojojazz5830 Were there no spotters to tell Alexander's artillery that they were overshooting?

[@tim71pos]

I think the soldiers at Gettysburg would have agreed with Tim. That's why they started shouting FREDERICKSBURG FREDERICKSBURG after they had fought back the "high tide of the confederacy.". I don't fully understand JoJo's point. The union knew all about enfilade fire and that's why they captured little round top in a do-or-die struggle. And if the Greys were over shooting in a barrage where their ammunition supplies were short they would have figured that out with just one pair of binoculars or a portable scope.

[@richardstephens5570]

@@jojojojazz5830 At Gettysburg, the Confederate artillery was using fuses made at the Charleston and Selma arsenals, where in the past they had mainly used fuses made at the Richmond arsenals. A week after the battle it was discovered that the new fuses burned slower than the ones made in Richmond. The slower burning fuses had caused the Confederate shells to explode beyond their intended target.

[@JohnKemipa]

A battle became unavoidable, this statement agrees with Chinese Author book The Art of War: when surrounded by enemy, FIGHT!

[@hoegild1]

I dont think Lee is completely honest here. Lee was much too agressive to just play for time. He wanted to destroy the army of the Potomac, and he planned for it. But he failed to concentrate his army quick enough, and the North managed to get the good terrain. Once at Gettysburg he should have realised how vulnerable he was and have done something (anything) else.

[@bradentoncane8830]

Longstreet tried to tell him… He had the momentum from the last two years and he 100% thought the boys in blue would run.

[@garrettoliveto7483]

100%

[@model-man7802]

Awsome mapping as usual

[@robrussell5329]

Ironic that this, the greatest of battles, was commenced for basically no real reason. They were there... so he attacked.

[@sumnerrutledge8332]

If Stuart had been there things would have been different

[@brandonray8409]

By far my favorite civil war channel on youtube! The great detail of the Gettysburg battle in this video has explained to me the reason for fighting, i have always wander why he ordered the charge cus like in the movie Gettysburg i had to agree with Longstreet on the plan instead of Lee but this video had helped out a lot my friend and i appreciate it! On a scale of 1 to 10 , how accurate was the Gettysburg movie ? I have heard so many different opinions lol

[@ernestov1777]

God bless all the Union Soldiers who successfully repelled this charge 🇺🇲

[@Fat12219]

Gettysburg , so many young soldiers were killed 😮😮😢

[@nathanfisher1826]

Great job

[@hvymettle]

As grim as it may seem, Lee was not going to retreat with 15 unbloodied Virginia regiments when every other state had already bled on that field. If nothing else, Pickett's Charge bought Lee a ten month respite as Meade was willing to spar but was not willing to replicate Lee's tactics. Grant, however, when he took over in May 1864, was willing to apply the killer arithmetic that it would take to ultimately defeat Lee.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Grant's "killer arithmetic" is overstated, in my opinion. He intended a multi-pronged offensive and a war of maneuver. Benjamin Butler completely (if predictably) failed his assignment. Grant's corps commanders in the AoP repeatedly failed to move in a timely manner, as had been the custom of the AoP for a long time. When those things went wrong he was willing to "fight it out on this line all summer long", but that was not his plan.

[@groussac]

A good point that I had never considered. Thanks for commenting.

[@bradentoncane8830]

Grant had unlimited supply of resources.. he wasn’t that great of a general.. he was willing to sacrifice men to get what he wanted. He knew he could replace them and all of his resources.. despite being outnumbered in basically every category Lee did exceptionally well. I still think if Johnston would have hooked up with Lee they could have possibly laid siege to Washington. The war was almost over when Early invaded Washington. In the end it worked out the way it was always gonna work out and we are the powerhouse of the world because of it.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@bradentoncane8830 That's nonsense. What Grant did not have was an American public willing to give an unlimited number of fathers and sons and brothers to die in useless campaigns. By 1864 the clock was ticking for Lincoln's reelection, and progress absolutely had to be made. And by 1865 the country was facing serious concerns about bankruptcy, so even money wasn't unlimited. (I can't recommend more highly Roger Lowenstein's book "Ways and Means" about the financing of the Civil War on both sides...absolutely fascinating) Grant's campaign in the west were typically lightning fast and relatively low cost. For example, he lost 10k casualties in the Vicksburg campaign compared to 40k rebels. That's a staggeringly better ratio than Lee's lopsided victory at Fredericksburg. The war easily could have gone the other way. When Lee finally released part of his precious Army of Northern Virginia in September of 1863 to help Bragg, Bragg came within a whisker of destroying the Army of the Cumberland - if he had, that probably would have been a war-winning event. Imagine if September had come around and Lee hadn't wasted 40,000 casualties in silly battles at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg!

[@BlueandButternut]

​@@aaronfleming9426Firstly, the casualties at Vicksburg were mostly captured men, many of whom would be exchanged and paroled. Second, Lee could not split his army, especially as Hooker was about the begin his spring campaign, he needed everyone he could get to fend off Hooker. Third, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were far from "silly battles."

[@Dav1Gv]

Interesting video. I'm from the UK and have been interested in the ACW since I was in school in the 1950s and have visited many of the battlefields including Gettysburg. My view, expressed in a paper I wrote at the end of a course on the war, is that Lee lost the campaign when he let Stuart leave the army which made him blind to the enemy's movements especially as he failed to use the cavaler he did have with him effectively. Once the encounter battle at Gettysburg started he was, as his report says. tral[[ed amd cpi;d pm;u attacl a larger force in a gppd defensive position, never a good idea. I've always thought that Longstreeet's idea of moving round the Union left and waiting to be attacked was totally impractivable, nut would welcome comments.

[@mikechampion1614]

Lee had recently suffered a heart attack. And was not at his best that did not help matters.

[@manilajohn0182]

The claim that Lee had a heart attack is nothing but Lost Cause mythology. There is no evidence whatsoever to support that claim.

[@Fat12219]

And those days 😢😮

[@kirkmorrison6131]

I have stood at the Virginia Monument and looked at the copes of trees and wondered why he ordered The Puckett, Pettigrew, Trimble Charge. I think he refused to maneuver for the reason you gave and one other. I think the other reason was he wasn't in great health after his injury, along with his belief his men were unbeatable after Fredericksburg and The Wilderness...by this I mean, the Union Army had been bloodied so much that they would break easily. He was still effected by his injury and didn't remember enemy soldiers fight harder on their own soil. What made his Army (ANV) great in Virginia was now working against him.

[@kenkaplan3654]

Really good insight.

[@kirkmorrison6131]

@@kenkaplan3654 Thank, you

[@2gpowell]

Hi, thanks for providing insight into General Lees strategy. Gen. Lee certainly had gotten his army into a heck of a fix. I was always under the assumption that even though Pickett's men were fresh and ready for the fight. They still could have been supported by men that fought on days 1 and 2 from other brigades etc. Even if they were slightly wounded an extra several thousand may have made the difference on the push forward and created a panic. Also, made up for what he lost before his men even got to Emmitsburg rd. and slightly beyond. Thanks👍

[@jojojojazz5830]

Picket’s division was in fact supported by troops that had fought on July 1st, but these brigades were so depleted and shot up due to the fierce fighting on the first that most of their support for Pickett crumbled rather quickly under artillery and rifle fire. Some NC units actually advanced farther than Armistead’s Virginians who were at the angle, but they were shot to pieces. I’ve seen some vids that talk about how the first day’s toll affected the performance of these units on the third.

[@tomhenry897]

Should have flanked like Longstreet wanted

[@2gpowell]

@@tomhenry897 That is what I proposed on past videos but was met with some resistance. One viewer brought race into the picture when I proposed the same as you.I told him my thoughts were Military Strategy not political. Seemed he was glad Pickett's charge destroyed Lees army. I replied that by him agreeing to Longstreet's plan may have pulled the Union from High ground giving Lees army more of an equal fighting field. Another viewer questioned me about what road would the south have taken if Longstreet had his way. Can't even enjoy talking about history anymore with internet trolls.

[@purplefood1]

​@@2gpowell tbf that is a valid question, if you think they should have flanked how would they have been able to do so? Iirc the roads in the area don't allow for a simple march around the flank.

[@2gpowell]

@@purplefood1 He could have retreated like he did eventually. After 150 cannon tried to uproot union troops at the wall for 1.5 hrs. with no success. He should have known better. Besides Lee should have known when the union gunners were firing back inflicting heavy casualties leading up to the charge. He had the option of calling it off and pulling back slowly into VA.

[@tims6970]

Lee had one option after the attack by Longstreet. Retreat on the night of the 3rd or retreat on the night of the 4th. Pickett was the reserve division arriving after the plan was finalized the night of the 1st. VI Corps of Sedgwick was held in reserve behind V Corps of Sykes. I, XI & III Corps were effectively destroyed. II, XII & V Corps were damaged. Retreating on the 3rd with Pickett undamaged may have provoked Meade to attack Ewell & Hill on the road to Maryland & Virginia in obedience to Lincoln and Halleck.

[@Helm-w1q]

I've always said, that by the time of the civil war Lee was out dated. Without his younger field commanders he had nothing and after he lost them,,it was only a matter of time.

[@Fat12219]

Sad 😭

[@prun8893]

That's a good video right there from someone who knows a thing or two because he put in the work. Some of us appreciate properly researched history channels on youtube. Now, back to the black tape project. It's art.

[@stewartmillen7708]

Good discussion of the logistical situation, though you can add to that the limited ammo supply Lee had.

[@cathode6252]

Hey Wilder, I heard a long while back that Longstreet opposed fighting in Gettysburg altogether because he had studied 'Sun Tzu: Treatise of War' where as General Lee never read the work. Is there historical credence to this claim?

[@aaronfleming9426]

The Art of War had been translated into French by that time, but was not translated into English until the 1900's. Of course West Point students studied French specifically so they could read French military texts, so it's theoretically possible that Longstreet had come across a copy somehow, but I'd categorize it as "highly unlikely".

[@christopherdeen5275]

Unless I missed it, there was no mention of the Pincer movement that Stuart's cavalry was supposed to provide at the same time of Pickett's charge. Stuart was to attack from the rear at the same time of the charge, in a pincer type attack. His force was intercepted by Union cavalry ,led by a brash young commander named George Custer. This was where Custer's fame began.

[@robertortiz-wilson1588]

I didn't know that

[@christopherdeen5275]

Be that as it is, however it does not change Lees battle plan of the day. At that stage in the war , they were still using a lot of Napoleonic era tactics. @@arisnotheles

[@christopherdeen5275]

I don't disagree. However many assume Lee just ordered a frontal attack into the center of the union line a without the coordinated attack coming from the rear.@@arisnotheles

[@christopherdeen5275]

@@arisnotheles Sir, I don't know how we got into this discussion. I was just pointing out Lee's battle plan that did not occur because Stuarts cavalry was intercepted by Union forces. The end.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

Custer led a single brigade not the Union cavalry corps.

[@zoanth4]

He lived for another 10+ years after the war. Funny how not a single person seemed to ask him this basic question. Especially in a time where pist war memoirs and books were all the rage

[@ronniewatkins]

He only lived for 5 years after the war, dying in 1870

[@zoanth4]

​@@ronniewatkinsif so thanks for the correction!

[@ArmenianBishop]

@@zoanth4 Ronnie Watkins is right: R. E. Lee (1807 -- 1870), died 5 years after the war. Lee surrendered at Appomattox, on April 9th, 1865; he died from a heart condition and stroke, on September 28th, 1870.

[@beachcomber1able]

Probably exacerbated by the stress of the war and having all that blood on his hands.

[@tim71pos]

I think plenty of people were asking that question (why Pickett's charge). Lee just didn't have a good answer.

[@Robert-g3l1v]

Lee was absolutely brilliant in his deduction of the assessment of not only his army and positions but the insights of the total strategic evaluation. Not having JEB Stuart's reports on the enemies numbers and whereabouts. Removing Hooker was a huge boost in the Army of the Potomac. I do understand your explanation of Lee attacking the center. Love Newt Gingrich's following Longstreet's advice to go around the roundtops. But in my own opinion it would have been to go around Culp's Hill and strike at the soft underbelly of the snake.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

If Lee were as aware and brilliant as you assert, he would have issued clear orders to Ewell on day 1. The CSA stumbled into this battle with only a vague idea that somehow an opening would appear somewhere they could exploit. That is barely a plan much less brilliant. Not that Lee had much choice. The CSA had to hope the USA just quit.

[@malcolmtaylor518]

Longstreet's artillery had been firing high over the frontline federals because the trails were digging into the soft ground. Had Jackson been there he might have advised more flanking work. He thought his moment had come and the federals were ready to break. By this time frontal charges were suicidal, Lee knew this from Fredericksburg.

[@tim71pos]

This is an interesting presentation. One part is Lee's army outran its supply lines. The other part is that even had it been closer with shorter lines to get to them, supplies were still inadequate because the South was being out produced. That's how I interpret the part about needing to conserve cannon shot. To me the conditions described seem similar Germany's situation in operation Barbarossa. Germany outran its supplies. And they thought the Russians had roughly the same amount of aircraft and tanks as they did when in fact Russia had already stocked roughly three to four times as many of each, and lend lease would come not long after. I think Lee was losing the initiative and didn't even need a battle in Pennsylvania for that to happen. Vicksburg was toast. The Southern economy would be strangled. The offensive in Pennsylvania had to happen because he would never get a chance to do it again.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

Pretty much. The CSA had to try a long-shot and hope the USA just decided to quit. Almost all the what-ifs end up with CSA defeat regardless of Lee's choices in early July 1863.

[@martynpope8218]

Lee did not have the benefit of hindsight like we do. As far as he was concerned there was nothing to be gained by simply remaining on the defensive in front of Richmond with Hooker bloodied, cowering at Falmouth. As with Antietam "We must assume the aggressive" had so far served him well (as he'd said to Pres.Davis back in '62) just before leaping with the A.N.V headfirst into Maryland. He'd just smashed the numerically superior Army of the Potomac, "His blood was up" said a Confederate observer. He had every reason to carry out the war into Union country with or without Stonewall. However in this instance Lee was to learn a humiliating lesson about the danger of frontal charges into massed infantry w/Good interior lines.

[@kenkaplan3654]

This is very instructive. The Kiiler Angels and the movie Gettsyburg which was based on it put the blame on Lee for nt following Longstreet's advice but here we see te general of the army's rationale for not doing so. The larger question is how much of Stuart's actions forced Lee to a battle on ground not of his choosing? Are we unfair to Stuart and did lee have other cavalry that failed him? In any event, i don't think the ground was where he wanted to fight.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

The movie blamed Lee for his failed choices because Lee deserved that blame. They were Lee's decisions and he was advised otherwise. The battle was a chance meeting which drew in both armies. Les could have fought elsewhere true. Bottom line Lee was going to be worn down in the end. He had to gamble, did a poor job of it, and lost.

[@kenkaplan3654]

@@kurtwicklund8901 I tend to agree with you, especioally day 3, but I do think there were circumstances that affected Lee in the midst of it all.

[@andrewc2491]

Folks...I've read all the comments here and WOW there are some great insights throughout. I would only add that it is FUNDAMENTALLY important when "Monday Morning Quarterbacking" Lee's actions at Gettysburg to ONLY ONLY ONLY use the facts AS HE COULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THEM TO BE as they existed UP TO the moment to which he was in...before we start to opine about what "could have" been done differently. I'm talking about faulty maps, unfamiliar terrain, no Stuart (to a point), unpredictability of the enemy, etc. In the moment to moment heat of battle, who could POSSIBLY know every exacting detail of the enemies' freshly formed earthworks that were accomplished overnight after Day 1 (as an example). Things like this. I simply and intellectually remind fellow prostelitilitizers to be mindful of this as we (myself included) draw conclusions, opine, assume, and...ahem...Generalize... Because the one unspoken BIG BIG truth about this battle (battles in general) I believe to be true is that NOT EVERY action taken on that field was perfomed COURAGEOUSLY and with bravery and honor at the fore...remember they were HUMAN BEINGS, just as flawed and weak and oftentimes frightened and sometimes cowardly as....ANY ONE OF US TODAY may be. The fog of war, i.e. the MISTAKES, COWARDICE, and human stupidity (except for Sickles' and perhaps Barlow's) have long since been erased out of the Battle of Gettysburg in lieu of our romantic desire and love for the ideas and reasons and virtue of the Larger Thing involved. We love HISTORY. The idea of it. the romantic qualities. And so we like to glorify and accentuate by natural course of human bias... I believe the TRUTH of this battle is a HELL of a lot more dark, and considerably less virtuous. That's just my objectivity slipping out, sorry.

[@brianmoore1164]

Logistics wins wars. Generals, strategy, and brave soldiers win battles, but logistics wins wars. Lee knew it and was in a logistical nightmare. People see the movie and woulda, shoulda, coulda Gettysburg to death without ever considering logistics.

[@0giwan]

This.

[@davidtuttle7556]

I wonder, would it be fair to say that Buford’s decision to engage Harry Heath with Reynolds and Howard marching to the guns hell bent for leather, that particular decision but Lee typographically and geographically between a rock and a hard spot.?

[@Eyes-of-Horus]

If you haven't seen the film, "Gettysburg" it's well worth the time. Can't forget, "Gods and Generals" either --- which is kind of a prequel.

[@philplante6524]

Lee's decision to move north of the Potomac was affected by events happening at Vicksburg, Mississippi, at the same time. Powerful political voices urged Jefferson Davis to detach at least one corps from Lee's army to be sent to the relief of Vicksburg. Lee countered by proposing an invasion of Pennsylvania, arguing that it would force the union to detach units from Grant's army at Vicksburg, thus achieving Vicksburg's relief. So, when Lee speaks of the drawing enemy forces from other locales, he is not referring to other federal troops in Virginia, he is referring to Grant's army at Vicksburg.

[@manilajohn0182]

He told Confederate Secretary of War Seddon this in early April of 1863. Moreover, the retention of those divisions in Lee's army- and his raid north was authorized by the Confederate government on the assumption that the AoNV would achieve a great enough success to remove pressure from Vicksburg. Unfortunately, most people just believe what they wish to believe rather than what the historical record shows.

[@philplante6524]

Though he didn't say it, I have always thought that Lee's insistence on Pickett's charge was influenced by the need to achieve a success in order to relieve Vicksburg. Lee offered his resignation after the Gettysburg campaign, probably thinking that some would blame him for Vicksburg's fall.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@philplante6524 Well, IMHO, that is absolutely correct. The signal problem on the minds of senior Confederate political leaders for months prior to Gettysburg was what to do to 'prevent the fall' of Vicksburg- and there's no evidence whatsoever that they changed tack and authorized Lee's raid northward on the premise that any success that Lee might gain would offset the 'loss of Vicksburg'. It's clear enough that Lee offered his resignation because his campaign failed and Vicksburg was lost. In retrospect, it can be seen that his campaign failed because Lee attempted to: 1) achieve the strategic objective of reducing pressure on Vicksburg; 2) do this by maneuvering the AotP into attacking the AoNV; 3) forage off of enemy territory, and; 4) do all of this within a very tight time constraint.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

In short, the CSA had two remaining chances, slim and none. So Lee ditched Traveller, saddled up Slim, and rolled the dice; him men on the felt and Lee needing boxcars to win.

[@flatearthisahoax4030]

It wasn't exactly a charge, it was a slow walk through artillery fire

[@robertortiz-wilson1588]

Thank you!

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

You are very welcome!

[@Jim-sb6wz]

Great video. I see what Lee was up against. Still wonder if he couldn't have redeployed to a defensive position.

[@christopherstephenson7199]

What was longstreets division supposed to do if the broke through at the crops of trees? Just keep going on to washington? They would have been surrounded on all sides? Im actually asking. What were they supposed to do after they acheived their objective? Or at least what was the next move after they did it?

[@JohnKemipa]

Southern Army was already cornered according to General Lee’s writings. Suicidal attack or shameful surrender appeared to be his only options. Movie GETTYSBURGH by Turner Film company does not accurately present the hard truth behind General Lee’s order Pickett to charge. To the contrary, it makes Lee’s look like a stubborn dummy which he wasn’t. Pickett’s words “VIRGINIANS, who will go with me” immortalized the Spirit of the Southern peoples if not of the entire USA. May God bless you guys.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

War isn't romantic adventure as you seem to feel.

[@MikeSavage-i9r]

"get first with the most and don't; let them see you coming"...

[@OxfordPatriot]

Robert E. Lee was an excellent strategist contrary to modern revisionist "history." What he understood that most others did not, was that the South lacked the industrial compacity, manpower, and economic security for a long-term defensive war. He knew that for every passing year, the Federal army would get larger and better equipped, and the navy would strengthen its hold. His defensive-offensive strategy, though with obvious flaws, was actually the best strategy given the almost unwinnable circumstances. It revolved around weakening the Federal army in a string of defensive battles, then attacking and decisively defeating it before it could fully recuperate on its own soil. Lee was well aware that on paper, the Union could have replaced their losses even if he managed to ever destroy the Army of the Potomac. But he also knew that the South's best chances of winning were to crush Northern morale and make the war unpopular to further pursue. I personally believe Antietam was the high-water mark for the overall Southern war efforts. There's a good chance that the foreign powers would have recognized the Confederacy, and that alone, on top of a victory on Northern soil, would have made it feasible for concessions to be made.

[@RebHawkins54]

Another great article. The south was being worn down. The longer the war went the worse it was for the South. The south could not win a long war. I think Lee hoped a big victory would affect the November elections. Early in the war Lee had great success giving Union generals a bloody nose and inducing them to retreat. While Lee was losing irreplaceable commanders he was indirectly training Northern commanders. Hancock and Meade were not going to easily retreat. I think in the latter stages of the war the North had developed a cadre of good generals and field commanders. While Lee was losing irreplaceable men.

[@stonesinmyblood27]

I always thought that Lee knew the North would win a protracted war because of the North’s industrial complex and the availability of fighting men. I think one of the main reasons of his advance northwards was either to win a deciding battle and make the North weaker until he could somehow resupply his army and drive the war out of Virginia and out west

[@tim71pos]

In that sense the grand strategy was similar to Japan in world war II. South wanted to hang in there and make victory for the north too costly and too difficult so that the north would pick up its marbles and go home. In world war II Japan was basically hoping for the United States to do the same thing. In both cases the lesson is don't pick a fight you can't win. The other lesson is that leadership will often choose war to the death rather than concede the situation is hopeless.

[@tims6970]

Recorded historical statements by Longstreet and Lee verify their consideration of the dangers of protracted struggle. Lee had to first put pressure on Hooker/Meade to make them react to him. Taking the initiative offered the only advantage available regardless of potential outcome. The hope was to orchestrate a political disaster for General Halleck by following through with the Lincoln contingency plan to move the capital to New York. Becoming mayor of Philadelphia would put Lee in a position to dictate peace terms. Not using the fresh Virginia reserve division prior to giving up on forcing Meade to move was not a practical consideration. A complete Pennsylvania regiment threw down their arms and surrendered when Pettigrew/Pickett breached the center of the federal line.

[@barbiedahl]

Because Lee was enamored of the frontal assault and never learned his lesson, something Grant did after Cold Harbor.

[@garrettoliveto7483]

No doubt General Lee believed what he said. But, he convinced himself of this reality. Withdrawing may have been difficult. It may have been easy. Meade just took command, and Lee had reunited with Stuart. The army of Northern Virginia was largest it would ever be. Even with a sharp rear guard action, they could have drawn Meade to better ground. Or, Meade may have let them slip away. Day 2 and 3 were mistakes. especially 3

[@manilajohn0182]

Lee was forced to attack on both 2 and 3 July because his plan of campaign had been ruined and he was out of time (and the local road net didn't support anything other than a tactical shifting of forces around the Union left anyway). The AoNV was foraging and couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days, and the army hadn't foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June. Moreover, the Confederate government had authorized Lee's invasion (instead of sending some of his forces west) with the understanding that the strategic objective of the campaign was to at least achieve a great enough success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg- and Vicksburg had been placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began. That said, the campaign failed because of operational errors made by Lee himself before the battle even began. He tasked his infantry formations (known for their tendency to straggle) with foraging and marching northward in good time, with the AoNV taking an excessive amount of time getting into Pennsylvania as a result. Worse still, he gave his cavalry commander two contradictory objectives for one force which coincided in time, and without designating either as a priority. Stuart lacked the strength to accomplish both simultaneously or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. He attempted to accomplish both and predictably failed. The resulting lack of intelligence on the AotP directly resulted in the unexpected meeting engagement of 1 July, which ruined Lee's plan of campaign- by casting the tactical initiative (which he had not wanted) onto the AoNV.

[@johncotton5561]

I always think that Pickett's Charge should have commenced just before day break, just before the light. The Confederates could have moved across the battlefield under cover of semi darkness and got into the Union positions, without too many casualties. To march across open ground in line in full day light as they did was hopeless.

[@aaronfleming9426]

There's a reason there was very little night fighting in the war...it was almost impossible to keep ranks dressed in the dark.

[@jim2376]

Lee's logistical concerns were understandable. As WWII Gen. Omar Bradley remarked, "Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics." Soldiers win battles, logistics wins wars. The South had the better generals, but the North had the logistics.

[@dbjkatz]

The North had over twice the number of troops as the Confederacy.

[@johnjacobs1625]

Once Stonewall was killed by his own troops Lee wasn't the SAME! Just saying. JJ

[@allanbrogdon3078]

Lee was used to his men doing without shoes uniforms marching for days and winning. It couldn't last.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

Missing here is mention of Confederaboo "genius" JEB Stuart failing his biggest assignment in life, leaving Lee to blindly stumble into this battle. On Day 3 Lee ordered Pickett to charge because he knew the CSA had to gamble on a win that day, even if the chance was 5%.

[@RichardWayburnsr]

Lee had more cavalry with him than Stuart made his ride with, and failed to use them properly, instead using them for train protection instead of scouting, due to personal issues amongst his cavalry commanders. That failure falls directly on Lee.

[@manilajohn0182]

Stuart's errors in the campaign were minor. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee's before the battle of Gettysburg even began. While Lee's decision to attack at Gettysburg was correct, his own errors placed the AoNV into the position where that was the only option that he had available after 1 July.

[@juliollontop4812]

Logistics.... win or lose a war

[@thunderccr5056]

If the Confederates had launched Pickets charge as a pre dawn/dawn assault with a delayed and limited artillery barrage when the Confederates were nearing the Union lines. Do you think Pickets men would have succeeded? Thanks for any responses. All the best!

[@tim71pos]

I think the union would have heard them and opened up. There would have been no preliminary damage to Federal artillery so the damage would have been even worse than during the day when at least some of the federal units had been damaged. There would have been the risk of friendly fire hitting the Confederates from the rear. As I recall the Union had already prioritize breakfast over combat in Tennessee. They probably weren't in the mood to do that again.

[@garrettoliveto7483]

it could not have been worse than what happened.

[@purplefood1]

I think it's a terrible idea to launch frontal assaults against dug in opponents at any time of day.

[@Paul-lm5gv]

On July 3, 1863, against some of his generals’ advice, Lee ordered Pickett's Charge over almost a mile of open ground with Union artillery raining down and waiting Union soldiers behind the ‘stone wall.’ Thousands of good men were sent to slaughter! Nine infantry brigades - approx. 12,500 soldiers - suffered 50% casualties! After Pickett's Charge the war was essentially over - for this is often referred to as 'the highwater mark of the Confederacy!'

[@mshelfer1]

Lee should have listend to Longsteet!

[@gggaryjon67]

And why is it not called "Lee's charge"? He ordered it and forced a reluctant Longstreet to carry out his orders. Pickett's division was really the "victim" of Lee's orders. Outflanking the union army was really the only possibility, charging uphill into a well defended crossfire was crazy.

[@JohnKemipa]

Lee did the same Union Army did in Manasas II

[@777Outrigger]

Did'ja not listen to the video? Please, no Monday morning quarterbacking. I don't know what I would've done on the 3rd day. There were no good options.

[@primafacie9721]

Lee found out that it was significantly harder to fight after advancing many miles into enemy territory than it was to defend against an enemy that had been doing so for the last 2 years.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Exactly. He gave up all his usual advantages and assumed all the challenges the Union generals usually had to overcome. I think he found out he wasn't quite as good as he thought, and maybe the Union generals weren't quite as bad as he thought.

[@kenkaplan3654]

@@aaronfleming9426 The union generals were outstanding at Gettysburg. Lee was weakened by the loss ofJackson.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@kenkaplan3654 Indeed. I also think the AoP was well served by having more corps and thus more corps commanders, and a more democratic style of decision making...that meant that the loss of a single corps commander wasn't as devastating and there was more development. Jackson was brilliant, but also notoriously secretive, which means his subordinates rarely benefited from mulling over ideas with him, seeing how his thought process worked, etc. So when he died there was a huge gap left. I'd love to hear other people's thoughts on that idea.

[@BlueandButternut]

You don't think he knew that? He was with Scott in Mexico, he knew the challenges of operating in enemy country.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@BlueandButternut His experience as a staff officer in Mexico, fighting against the Mexican army, does not seem to have adequately prepared him to be an army commander on the offensive against the U.S. Army.

[@tomhenry897]

Hammered the left Hammered the right Thought the center was thin Didn’t think Mead would reinforce his center Should have listened to Longstreet

[@marksandor2830]

Blind without his cavalry, the first days battling started without his knowledge. The first two days were fought on the left and right flanks so Lee felt that they were the weakest at the center.

[@jwb1783]

Thanks.

[@KomarBrolan]

Lee pretty much had to order the charge. He knew the strategic situation that the Union armies were getting stronger and stronger while he was doomed in the long run. He had to try forcing a result favorable to the South as soon as he could.

[@emilioalcazar4170]

Rebel courage..true as hell!!

[@stephenwatson8981]

Rebel treachery, false as shit.

[@RRM13]

@@stephenwatson8981woke aggressive rhetoric detected.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

You use of the word rebel is unneeded. Both sides demonstrated courage few can comprehend.

[@terryl7874]

I believe that sums it up. Logically the attack makes sense but the ground was not favorable.

[@michaelpatterson7519]

Pickett never recovered after this

[@mokoarlyana1481]

Pickett made another charge outside Petersburg is '65.

[@fuzzyoldyak5313]

@@mokoarlyana1481 Five Forks?

[@ArmenianBishop]

Pickett's grudge against Lee was about getting fired and relieved of command, after the Confederate defeat at Five Forks (April 1, 1865), as well as from the charge at Gettysburg. He wasn't present for duty, when Sheridan attacked.

[@williampaz2092]

After the Civil War but before Robert E. Lee passed away Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest visited Robert E. Lee. George Pickett accompanied him. The visit was cordial but cold. After they left Lee’s house Pickett said to Forrest: “That old man massacred my division.” Forrest was quiet for a while then replied: “Well, it made you immortal.” About 5 years after that some young fool asked George Pickett why he didn’t win at Cemetery Ridge. Pickett replied: “I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it…”

[@danielkitchens4512]

​@williampaz2092 i believe it was Mosby not Forrest

[@williamchamberlain2263]

0:30 _technically_ why he _said_ he'd done those things

[@jameshaxby5434]

He gave in to boredom and frustration. Something a great Commander should never do.

[@Psmerling]

So if he has no choice but to attack at Gettysburg, he over extended himself to begin with and never should have begun the campaign in the first place.

[@robertbertagna1672]

Thanks!

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

Thank you so much!

[@Geep615]

Probably because he’d seen/ heard of it working before. Unfortunately the artillery wasn’t effective and we paid for it. He had to take risks to beat an opponent of such material and numerical superiority.

[@marshalkrieg2664]

This does explain why he fought Gettysburg but does not fully explain Pickets charge.

[@rebcotton3679]

What is a good unbiased Robert e lee bio book?

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

I love the book, Reading the Man: A Portrait of Robert E. Lee.

[@nofeerz]

Lee had major supply chain mess no horses no food no ammo well it’s time to be bold

[@mrweisu]

Longstreet certainly won’t agree. He is experienced enough to know about supplying the army.

[@alexius23]

Hubris

[@Charon58]

Lee was a great tactician. But he couldn’t see that strategically the war was lost.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

I suggest the opposite. Pickett had almost no chance but that was the oy chance the CSA had.

[@DM-iw2qt]

Simple your out numbered. The enemy is in a defensive position you should not be the one attacking. Charging. The charge was stupid.

[@TheLookingOne]

By how many years did Lee shorten the war?

[@kentnilsson465]

Lee´s reasons for fighting at Gettysburg sounds reasonable, however, was his perception correct? Im not so sure. He found the second day promising, but the results were negative for the most part, so I cant agree. As for Pickets charge, pure lunacy

[@aaronfleming9426]

Lee was probably unaware of how much Sickles' blunder had contributed to his success on the second day. Without another such blunder there was no way Lee was going to win.

[@jeffthornton6998]

This is why I think Buford should have just let the Confederates have the high ground on Day 1. What would they have done with it. The Union had the men to surround all the hills. The Confederates could stay up there; and if they came down, they would have faced a numerically superior entrenched Army.

[@lazysob2328]

Lee was reluctant to fight in the same manner the north had been forced into fighting for the last two years. Charging into well dug in troops over open ground in foreign territory is never a good idea. I’m kind of surprised the charge did as well as it did , and if Longstreet had succeeded in his mission, Lee might very well have won that battle.

[@williampalchak7574]

Anyone remember the electric map?

[@alphalunamare]

Not bad Binkov!, from a Soviet Producer, one does wonder why though.

[@johnmarcustaylor]

Two things I fail to comprehend. First, why not hunker down in semi permanent camps from chambersburg down to winchester? and defend the chambersberg pike and the southern passes through South Mountain while feeding off every farm in the surrounding area, thereby impoverishing the yanks farmlands as they had done to the Virginians? Second, like the savage night raids of the Cosaacks, why not use small numbers of archery companies to keep the union sleepless atop cemetery ridge and culps hill during the two nights? With a home base and plenty of food, leave them trapped and sleep deprived through the july 4th weekend. That would have brought Unioners from the western theatre to bail them out or exposed DC.

[@chriskule4663]

Lee supposed his government could not survive for very long unless lt could find an ally to break the sea blockade. The best way he could do that was to cut a supply line from the west and northeast. He identified the two Susquehanna bridges above and below Harrisburg as being the most accessible. . He had Ewell establish a bridgehold between York and Columbia and moved to invest the bridge at Marysville.

[@chriskule4663]

When he saw that the AOP was across the Potomac already, his only alternative was to concentrate someplace east of South Mountain so that at least part of his army could get back the way it had come.

[@chriskule4663]

He reckoned he, once engaged, would probably have to win or fight his way back and planned accordingly.

[@manilajohn0182]

This had nothing whatsoever to do with the strategic objective of the campaign. Contemporary evidence makes clear that the Confederate Government authorized Lee's movement northward on the premise that Lee would achieve a great enough success (which was never defined) to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. Suggestions to send divisions from the AoNV westward to either directly or indirectly assist in the relief of Vicksburg were retained by Lee for his offensive in the east on this basis.

[@chriskule4663]

@@manilajohn0182Au contraire. Davis assumed Grant would be defeated. www.google.com/books/edition/North_with_Lee_and_Jackson/5_3SwAEACAAJ?hl=en

[@manilajohn0182]

@@chriskule4663 The book which you referenced is part fantasy- and Jackson played no role in the Gettysburg campaign. Davis made no such assumption. Reagan's memoirs and Lee's own April, 1863 statements to Confederate Secretary of War Seddon show that Lee's movement north was authorized by Davis on the assumption that Lee would achieve a great enough success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg.

[@richardcuccia]

Longstreet was completely correct after the 2nd day at Gettysburg. After the South's non-success on the 2nd day & realizing that the AoP's defensive position at the end of the 2nd day was impregnable to frontal attack, the ANV's only reasonable course would have been to slip around the Yank's left, to gain some sort of advantageous position, & to hopefully incite the AoP to attack the ANV.

[@lukebertrichardson7799]

No grain, or cereal for his horses (no fuel for his supply trucks, or artillery tractors,) so Lee can not maneuver around the flank of the federals. The ANV could not just sit and wait for an attack, because Meade just needed to wait until Lee's logistics forced the ANV to withdrawal, and in the following pursuit Meade would have supplies, Lee not. Recipe for withdrawing troops to get caught piecemeal. The road had suffered enough rain, that the passage of 20-30 wagons, left the roads practically impassible. Imboden got the wounded out. He has honor of an Arkansas town named after him, because of it. Meade finally caught up to Lee at the river, where he was entrenched, and had been resupplied. Meade was lucky, the ANV crossed the river the night before the Army of the Potomac's attack was to begin. The coordination of the ANV's attacks left much to be desired. Lee started writing out very specific orders after Gettysburg.

[@outdoorlife5396]

I can make it simpler than that. Lee broke major rules of engagement at GB. First, he attacked without being up and concentrated. Second, he attacked an unknown object. I realize he had limited supplies and could not support his self for long in PA. He attacked both ends on the second day unsuccessfully. But on the third day, with a daylight charge, more than a mile between armies, two fences. It would be unforgiving. It was the same mistake that Napoleon made at Waterloo.

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

Yes but it worked for Napoleon at Austerlitz en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Austerlitz1 - which is something all those Civil War Generals only half a century or so later had studied. In the movie ... Lee says that the Union had committed it's reserves to the flanks - so - it would be weak in the center (like the Austrians at Austerlitz) the thing was - all that happened in a few hours at Austerlitz but took place over days at Gettysburg - so the Union had plenty of time to shift their line. The thing about Waterloo though - was that Grouchy _"followed"_ the Prussians as he had been ordered to instead of riding strait to the sound of the guns at Waterloo. Because he was "following" the Prussians - they got to Waterloo before he did and the battle was lost. THAT is the reason Napoleon lost at Waterloo. kzbin.info/www/bejne/oJCah3WOlMisgJY That ... and his hemorrhoids ... .

[@outdoorlife5396]

@@BobSmith-dk8nw I think the British using the wall and really fighting smarter than harder had something to do with it. The Duke of Wellington deployed his men better, can't remember but I think he was outnumbered. Which goes to the winner, the person who uses the terrain better is the victor.

[@pinesparrow]

...laying the country under contribution, and making Pennsylvania support the war, instead of poor, used-up, and worn-out Virginia. - Col. Fremantle

[@JohnKemipa]

Not a dummy as historians usually present General Lee.

[@kurtwicklund8901]

Yeah. All my life I have heard nothing but "Lee was a dummy". Emoji Eyeroll

[@stephenwatson8981]

Lee was a worse traitor than Benedict Arnold.

[@RRM13]

Wokeness aggressive rhetoric. Get lost, radical woke.😊

[@williamisraelgomararias5737]

​@@RRM13fuck that traitor long live the union🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸🇺🇸

[@danielkitchens4512]

Benedict Arnold was still in the service of U.S. military and in commanded of west point as he was talking to the British about handing over west point. Lee resigned from the U.S military and went home to Virginia which was still in the union it was after his state secede that he joined the confederacy to fight with his home state that he was a citizen of. So you are wrong.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@RRM13 It is silly to say Lee was a worse traitor than Benedict Arnold for the reasons danielkitchens outlines above, but Lee was fully aware that secession was treason. Nothing woke about it, here's his words: "The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so much labour, wisdom & forbearance in its formation & surrounded it with so many guards & securities, if it was intended to be broken by every member of the confederacy at will. It was intended for pepetual [sic] union, so expressed in the preamble, & for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolution or the consent of all the people in convention assembled. It is idle to talk of secession. Anarchy would have been established & not a government, by Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison & the other patriots of the Revolution. In 1808 when the New England States resisted Mr Jeffersons Imbargo law & the Hartford Convention assembled secession was termed treason by Virga statesmen. What can it be now?"

[@stephenwatson8981]

@@danielkitchens4512 Lee received his training and experience from the US Army. Regardless, what what his traitorous state was doing, Lee was a US citizen who took up arms against his country. He was more responsible than anyone else for the war being so long and bloody. You need to get it through you thick, cracker head that even back then people were citizens of the United States and merely residents of any particular state. So you are wrong.