How could these pilots make such a rookie mistake? - CO1943

[@jamesgraham6122]

During my flying career, I did spend several years as an instructor pilot, ground school and simulator. You'd be amazed at what highly experienced, highly motivated pilots are capable of on occasion. Sometimes, introducing even a minor distraction such as a frequency change at a critical moment can lead to a major failure.. not often, but it can, and does, happen.

[@PInk77W1]

AF447

[@user-sf9pq5ox7w]

I don't want to fly as a passenger anymore.

[@ursodermatt8809]

@@user-sf9pq5ox7w good on you

[@makantahi3731]

@@user-sf9pq5ox7w pack your self into box and travel as package

[@gerardmoran9560]

As you gain experience, performing flight duties reliably and safely becomes easier, but it never gets harder to screw things up.

[@moriver3857]

Sorry, but not a rookie mistake. Total disregard and complacency from the captain. Makes no difference if an item is first or fifth on a checklist. It still has to be read line by line. 17,000 hrs to forget a checklist item, and disregard the gear horn, red unsafe gear, and no three greens? 206 tks approach speed? How many ways do you want the airplane to tell you that something is amiss? By the way, the horn does not sound in flight when the throttles are at idle, but the red unsafe gear light does illuminates. Awesome animation presentation.

[@sblack48]

Certainly the airspeed should have been a huge clue that something was wrong and time to go around and re-evaluate. Forgetting a checklist item is bad, but it can happen. But ignoring the airplane talking to you in such a glaring manner is unforgivable

[@paulcrumley9756]

I'm not sure about the DC-9, but I would be surprised if all the low throttle warning consists of is the red light. Most of the transport category airplanes I worked on had audible warning, but it could be canceled with a pushbutton, and wouldn't sound again until rearmed by advancing the throttles.

[@sblack48]

@@paulcrumley9756 the 9 is a 1960s airplane so I wouldn’t be surprised if it didn’t have an aural

[@paulcrumley9756]

@@sblack48 Well, earlier regulations (CAR 4b) required an aural warning if more than one throttle was closed without the gear being down and locked, and FAR 25 has the same requirement, so whether the -9 was certificated as a 4b aircraft or a part 25 aircraft it's likely to have the throttle warnimg

[@sblack48]

@@paulcrumley9756 ok you are calling it a throttle warning but isn’t it really a gear warning based on throttle position (and other stuff)? It would certainly have that.

[@Stetsonhatman]

I took a Continental flight back in the 80s. DC 9 hop from Orlando to Atlanta then to Chicago. The plane was almost empty departing Orlando. The pilot pulled excessive climb on take off and I had to bend forward to keep the blood in my head and fight off dizziness. There were several young guys around me and they laughed and cheered like it was a rollercoaster ride. At Atlanta I got a look at the pilot who greets passengers. He had quite a beer gut, dirty shirt with the tie halfway down and an 18 hour shadow. I never took another Continental flight again.

[@deepthinker999]

Wise Words - Thank You !

[@greggstrasser5791]

Take a shot, sweetheart. Any landing you can walk away from is a good landing. You’re alive to bitch about it. Carpe diem.

[@juliemanarin4127]

That is reckless for sure

[@billdivine9501]

When did Homer Simpson become a pilot?

[@michaelosgood9876]

I like a pilot who greets passengers in person. Had that experience on a TAP flight. Can't have been the same pilot as this one was fit & lean,clean shirt & clean shaven. I'll definitely be flying TAP again!

[@norbert.kiszka]

Miss a item on checklist can happen. But not going around in that situation? Completely insane.

[@royhsieh4307]

That would make the captain late for tennis

[@Quillons1]

This was my EXACT thought. You HAVE to believe the horn and lights.

[@Dwightstjohn-fo8ki]

I imagine that checklist is in a certain order for a REASON, but moving "hydraulics" to the list top would seem to be a no-brainer.

[@rickn8or]

Sometimes, the Gear Warning Horn is NOT lying to you...

[@komrad1983]

The key thing that crew did not know they missed an item. Your statement is absurd. If you know you missed an item, you just check and redo that very item and not like "Oh we missed an item, going around"

[@GlutenEruption]

Here’s more info on the first officers earlier suspension from the NTSB report: “In September 1994, while a second officer on the A-300, the first officer was removed from the line for 60 days and sent for a fit-for-duty evaluation following an incident at an IAH security checkpoint and an A-300 captain’s complaint about his cockpit behavior. While proceeding to the gate for the first leg of a trip with the A-300 captain, the first officer failed to respond to a request by security personnel that he pass through a second magnetometer. After flying with him for six legs, the A-300 captain complained to the Houston chief pilot’s office, and later to the FAA principal operations inspector (POI) for COA, that the first officer had questioned his authority, demonstrated nonstandard behavior in the cockpit, and ignored security personnel. The first officer was removed from duty, and the Houston chief pilot started an investigation and evaluation. No concerns about the first officer’s professional competence were identified during the investigation. He underwent a fit-for-duty examination consisting of a clinical interview by a psychiatrist lasting several hours, and a comprehensive psychological evaluation consisting of a battery of personality and aptitude tests. The psychiatrist found nothing wrong with the first officer and recommended to the assistant chief pilot that he be returned to flight status without delay. After a proficiency check, the first officer was returned to duty. The first officer told Safety Board investigators that the A-300 captain’s complaint resulted from what he said was a “personality clash” precipitated by the security checkpoint incident. He said a contributing factor was his status as a non-union reserve pilot who had obtained a line [monthly trip schedule] to fly for the entire month. At the time, COA’s pilot union was at an impasse in its contract negotiations with the company, and it recommended that pilots not fill open time so that the company would have to call in extra pilots. The first officer did not support the union and did not heed their recommendation. The A-300 captain was a union member. The first officer said this incident was “terribly damaging” to him personally and professionally. After the incident he adopted what he described as a mode of “captain management” to preclude a recurrence of another similar event. In this mode he would constantly interpret what the captains he flew with really meant or really wanted. He indicated that it was necessary for him to play along and “not stir the hornet’s nest.” Even though he had been cleared of the accusations, and the record of the incident had been removed from his personnel file, the first officer felt like he was being watched.”

[@wilsjane]

While a staunch union supporter can be a pain in the ass, the phrase "Works hard to avoid work" springs to mind, someone who is anti union can be every bit as toxic and crewing them together is never a good idea. What happened in this video was a good example of the outcome. The airline must take some responsibility for creating this situation in the first place.

[@edwardmylnychuk5774]

worked with too many a holes like this in various jobs, tooooooo many union guys are trash lazy clowns that dont like it when someone not a union member does their job while they slack off or disagree with their opinion, also putting a union and non member together is stupid and i am glad that things got cleared up, the a hole captain should have been called in to answer why he filed the complaint because others have the right to question captains decisions whether they like it or not.

[@mikedeal3466]

Fortunately, I was trained very thoroughly at United in CRM, cockpit resource management. As a F/E on the B 727, DC-8 and B 747, if I yelled "go around", my Captains assured me, we were going around. We could argue later on the ground why what I had said. Only once is 4 years as a F/E did I ever have to say that. It was at HNL, with a truck crossing our landing runway. The Captain IMMEDIATELY went TOGO. As he accelerated, he saw the truck. Years later, as a Captain myself, I always told my crew, if you see something, speak up now. Don't wait. We can talk about it later, safely at the hotel.

[@rickn8or]

RE: Go-Around. It's like the unofficial motto is "It is far, far better to die than to go around and look bad", like there was some kind of disgrace about making sure you made a routine landing out of two or more approaches.

[@polarvortex3294]

I imagine that by treating your crew with respect for their supporting role and showing confidence in their judgement you boosted their morale and professionalism before you ever left the ground, making your flights safer in other ways besides improving the quality of the land/go-around decision.

[@wilsjane]

@@polarvortex3294 A friendly while professional attitude is the most important thing on any flight deck. When things are not going quite to plan, two heads working together are always better than one. While checklists are needed, common sense should always take priority. If the pilots on this flight had been working together correctly, the failure to set the hydraulic pressure correctly would have been obvious right from the start. Needless to say, two nitwits are not better than one. LOL

[@gabrielle-AVFloyd]

Did you by any chance know my father UAL Captain James M. Hykes? He flew 1960-1994 and he was SFO based. He lived on Oahu from 1986 until his passing a few years ago. Thank you!🙏🛫

[@daveinmilwaukee]

The cabin was filling with smoke, and the flight attendants deployed the slide and evacuated all 82 passengers within one minute. Their quick action and courage prevented what could have been a major tragedy. Anyone who mistreats flight attendants, or considers them nothing more than airborne waitresses/waiters, needs to know about this story and the many similar ones.

[@IlIlIlIlIlIlIlIl-v9h]

Imagine the realization after you touch the runway with the belly that your career is completely over. That one fuck up cost you everything.

[@deepthinker999]

As it should be.

[@TheBudkingfan]

I think he was more worried about dying than losing his job!

[@AADFWspotters2]

Just discovered the channel, clean informative content, with good detail, no dramatic over acting and simple sim reenactment. I hope you continue to produce content like this.

[@Vladimirthetiny]

Good except for the robotic voice

[@cremebrulee4759]

@@Vladimirthetiny I agree. I really don't like robotic narrations. It takes away from the information, especially when inflections are wrong, or words are mispronounced. It's just very awkward sounding.

[@malcolmwhite6588]

Agreed but it would be better if you voice that yourself instead of those annoying Chat bots that don’t get the annunciations or pronunciation correct and sound dead pan!

[@scdawn8658]

Good start, this accident is one I was unaware of. Looking forward to future clips. Thx for not having background music during the clip.

[@jimmbbo]

Good report. Have over 2000 hours in DC9s and consider this to be directly on the shoulders of the pilot in command... multiple clues that something was wrong and he failed to pay attention. Additionally, the crew apparently forgot to do the landing check, which calls for "LANDING GEAR - THREE GREEN" I can only hope he was demoted or fired after this incident. Subscribed

[@davidsine4390]

Seems like the gear and flaps would still operate even at the lower Hyd. pressure reguardless? Why have a design where pilots have the option to select a reduced hyd. pressure in the first place? Can you opine? If you're inclined to say because a 3000 PSI pressure is not needed nor desirable when the gear or flaps aren't in transit, then why not simply design the gear handle like the 73. Up, down or OFF. Seems like 1500 PSI in the landing gear and flap system would be just as undesirable as 3000 PSI would be during operations when no pressure in those systems is needed.

[@terrigreen8813]

I’m not even a pilot, and I know about ‘three green’. I was wondering about that during the video, since I never heard it called out.

[@billdonohue2389]

Rookie mistake??? Flagrant disregard for proper procedure on so many levels.

[@u171098atgmail]

CAL

[@bellboy4074]

What levels.

[@PInk77W1]

@@bellboy4074 No sterile cockpit No turn on hi pressure hydraulics No following checklist No go around

[@fuffoon]

I have filled my car for 40 years without incident. Then on the 41st year of driving, I departed with the nozzle. One momentary distraction was all that it took. I did return and offer to pay but it happens often enough that they just fix it. Plus, its a breakaway just for that.

[@greggstrasser5791]

I did that once because we were filling up & it was freezing. We got high AF off this one-hit Sativa & I just drove off! Lucky it was a breakaway & I knew how to reattach it before a cop pulled up! Good times!

[@kg-Whatthehelliseventhat]

​@Gregg Strasser why are you driving high af? Go get high but don't drive. It is not worth killing a family or dwi.

[@joeyjamison5772]

I nearly did that with a rent-a-car a number of years ago that fueled on the right. This is why, when I bought my last car, that I insisted the vehicle be able to be fueled on the left side. I ALWAYS glance in that mirror before pulling away from anywhere.

[@phillarnach9484]

Sure, but if your car told you the nozzle was still in the filler hole when you got back in the drivers seat, would you still proceed

[@SergioNayar]

Another example of an incident post CRM standard procedures. Great video.

[@arturo468]

Obviously not a rookie mistake, more like a Captain with a career ending death wish.

[@jbenthere627]

Did either of them check to see if they had "3 Greens" when the gear was extended? I guess not. I'm glad I found your channel. Subscribed!

[@blackvulcan100]

Exactly my thoughts I thought it was part of the pre landing check list call out ?

[@blackvulcan100]

@@aviationinvestigationchannel 👍Thanks, should they have gone around to achieve a stabilised approach ?

[@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549]

@@blackvulcan100 there was no stabilised approach requirements at this time

[@andresteeg]

A non-reacting Flap gauge literally shouts for an hydraulic failure right from the beginning. Very strange all this.

[@jonslg240]

Wow I just found your channel with the PA learjet crash. Now watching this one. *VERY glad I found your channel!* You got another subscriber. I love the format/way it was done!

[@Driver-retired]

Just found your channel - good reporting!! - it would be even more interesting if, after these types of incidents, you also let viewers know if flight crews are terminated by their respective carriers.

[@scottmoseley5122]

ya that was my question too.

[@texasbella576]

Captain was fired. (Just read on another comment)

[@rebuild4992]

@@texasbella576 Well now he has more time for his tennis.

[@juliemanarin4127]

Sometimes we don't know

[@tadwiltman4875]

Normally, the final reports submitted to the public don't contain that information. Airlines also state in most cases that they don't discuss internal personnel decisions

[@danandkimpage958]

This was not a rookie mistake but a screwup by an idiot pilot. The captain never ask for a checklist and the first officer kept prompting him to use the checklist. After starting the descent and doing the approach the captain ask for flaps and they did not deploy because the hydraulic system was not brought to the high pump position. He still continued the approach and still did not ask for the checklist. They made a gear up landing because of a stupid idiot in the left seat. He was fired.

[@Sean_Coyne]

Glad to hear he was fired, what a pair of muppets.

[@marcospark2803]

Are you sure?

[@chaspfrank]

Major mistake by the captain. At the same time, given the importance of hydraulics when landing, moving the turning on of the pumps to the top of the checklist is a half fix. The last item on the in-range checklist should be checking hydraulic pressures to ensure they are sufficient. Just because you turned the pumps on doesn't mean they produced the required pressure.

[@Dwightstjohn-fo8ki]

EXCELLENT point. We have re-sets on our new digital boilers, but during a power outage that DOESN'T mean they reset automatically. And I have to check just before leaving every day that the water temps. on the pools and boilers are normal and running. Just hitting a button proves nothing. Thankfully, I'm ON THE GROUND!!!

[@RedArrow73]

9:29 - Incorrect. What I want to know was how many minutes it took Continental to escort the captain to HR.

[@deepthinker999]

In other countries they sentence the offending crew to jail time, particularly when the loss of life is involved.

[@kensmith8152]

I picked a fine time to give up glue sniffing 😂

[@winchesterwings8795]

What happened to the Captain & 1st Officer?

[@OttoMatieque]

I think the earlier issue the first officer had deserves some coverage. Why did the other captain put in a formal complaint? What was the situation?

[@1978garfield]

I would like to hear more about that. I wonder what airline and when it happened. Seems crazy to me that questioning the captain would get you sent to a shrink. I know in the old days the captain was considered a god and not to be questioned. Then KLM's poster boy captain caused the deadliest plane crash in history at Tenerife.

[@GlutenEruption]

According to the NTSB report: “In September 1994, while a second officer on the A-300, the first officer was removed from the line for 60 days and sent for a fit-for-duty evaluation following an incident at an IAH security checkpoint and an A-300 captain’s complaint about his cockpit behavior. While proceeding to the gate for the first leg of a trip with the A-300 captain, the first officer failed to respond to a request by security personnel that he pass through a second magnetometer. After flying with him for six legs, the A-300 captain complained to the Houston chief pilot’s office, and later to the FAA principal operations inspector (POI) for COA, that the first officer had questioned his authority, demonstrated nonstandard behavior in the cockpit, and ignored security personnel. The first officer was removed from duty, and the Houston chief pilot started an investigation and evaluation. No concerns about the first officer’s professional competence were identified during the investigation. He underwent a fit-for-duty examination consisting of a clinical interview by a psychiatrist lasting several hours, and a comprehensive psychological evaluation consisting of a battery of personality and aptitude tests. The psychiatrist found nothing wrong with the first officer and recommended to the assistant chief pilot that he be returned to flight status without delay. After a proficiency check, the first officer was returned to duty. The first officer told Safety Board investigators that the A-300 captain’s complaint resulted from what he said was a “personality clash” precipitated by the security checkpoint incident. He said a contributing factor was his status as a non-union reserve pilot who had obtained a line [monthly trip schedule] to fly for the entire month. At the time, COA’s pilot union was at an impasse in its contract negotiations with the company, and it recommended that pilots not fill open time so that the company would have to call in extra pilots. The first officer did not support the union and did not heed their recommendation. The A-300 captain was a union member. The first officer said this incident was “terribly damaging” to him personally and professionally. After the incident he adopted what he described as a mode of “captain management” to preclude a recurrence of another similar event. In this mode he would constantly interpret what the captains he flew with really meant or really wanted. He indicated that it was necessary for him to play along and “not stir the hornet’s nest.” Even though he had been cleared of the accusations, and the record of the incident had been removed from his personnel file, the first officer felt like he was being watched.” Sounds like it was political more than anything to me.

[@DrHarryT]

The first problem is violating the sterile cockpit policy, second is omitting the checklist item and third is to not perform a go-around to troubleshoot the problem.

[@MrSuzuki1187]

I know exactly why they failed to lower the landing gear, and it was because they were saving money for continental airlines by not lowering the landing gear until the last second. They then got distracted and forgot to put the gear down. In 1996, continental airlines, not capitalized out of disrespect, was paying its pilots a bonus for saving fuel. This caused their pilots to make flights with minimum fuel reserves because an airplane burns more fuel when it carries extra fuel due to the increased weight of the airplane. Their pilots would routinely declare a minimum fuel advisory, or an emergency due to low fuel and cut in front of the rest of us responsible pilots who carried sufficient fuel for contingencies. One day in 1996, I was the captain of a United Airlines 737 awaiting takeoff from O'Hare's Runway 32R at the intersection of Taxiway Tango. I was delayed because a continental 727 was landing on Runway 27L that intersected Runway 32L (O'Hare runways have all changed since then). As I watched the continental 727 flare for landing, I noticed that the landing gear was not down. Just prior to disaster, the O'Hare tower controller screamed "continental (flight number) GO AROUND NO GEAR!!. Those idiots added power and rotated but the tail of their 727 drug the runway for about 2,000 feet leaving a rooster tail of concrete dust in their wake before they got established in a climb. The investigation found that these unprofessional clowns had disabled all of the warning devices that would have sounded to tell them the gear was not down. PROFESSIONAL pilots lower the landing gear upon intercepting the glide slope some 5 or 6 miles from the runway. These idiots, like the ones who landed the DC-9 gear up, were going to wait until 200 feet and 1/2 mile from the runway to lower the gear in order to save fuel and collect their bonus. But they got distracted and forgot to put the gear down. And THAT is why the DC-9 in your video landed gear up.

[@timelwell7002]

Clearly these guys didn't have a stabilised approach. Given that they must have realised this, the question is - why didn't they opt for a go around?

[@kennethjohnson4280]

Would it be a landing gear warning horn or a configuration alarm?

[@peac2916]

Do we know if the Captain was able to play tennis that day?

[@brucejenner4800]

Nuisance alarm!??? WTF??? Why was this allowed to prevail? Would it be a good idea to have master caution lights dotted all around the cockpit so no matter where the pilots gaze is focused they would see it??

[@65gtotrips]

Even a civy like me understands that you’re supposed to have a ‘sterile’ cockpit at takeoff and landing in order to FOCUS on the tasks at hand at the proper time.

[@johnvickers5932]

Fatigue????? He wasn't so fatigued that he was going to pass up his tennis game later. NTSB looking for a reason to give this guy every benefit of the doubt. The task at hand is the most important and pilots should be held accountable when they clearly don't follow established procedures.

[@verifiedgentlemanbug]

Narration is so funny with those expletive remarks from both pilots😂 It's like I'm watching a comedy show 😂

[@deepthinker999]

The problem is that its not a comedy show. It potentially is life and death.

[@wallywally8282]

Hard to fathom how these amateurs got that far up the pilot ladder!

[@marks6663]

If the approach speed was so high why did the captain yell the FO to keep his speed up?

[@deepthinker999]

I wondered about that too. The Captain's brain was preoccupied with issues outside of the cockpit.

[@noshsreqd]

I'm guessing the captain didn't get to play tennis that afternoon.

[@luv2fly745]

No, but he'll have plenty of time for tennis in the future since he killed his career..but fortunately no people on this, his last flight. Maybe this clown 🤡 can get a job at the circus 🎪.

[@jonyjoe8464]

the pilot was in a hurry to land to go to his tennis game before the weather got worst. Also as a passenger someone should have told the stewardess the landing gear wasn't down. The flaps and landing gears make alot of noise when they are deployed, the passengers can hear it alot better in the back of the plane. As a passenger its your duty to point out when something isnt right, since you will go down with the ship also.

[@bellboy4074]

I'm guessing the captain didn't make his tennis match.

[@PInk77W1]

Missed it by a wee bit

[@ManuelGarcia-ww7gj]

Shouldn’t all checklists be programmed and read aloud by the airplain itself? It could pause and wait for the crew to act and repeat the item if necessary.

[@toupac3195]

Pre-landing sterile cockpit is a serious rule. Your tennis match worries can wait. 🤷‍♂️

[@usmale49]

My first time viewing your channel...I just subscribed. I like the detail and graphics! Your narration is great! Thank you for uploading and sharing! 😊

[@AndreA-ke2id]

I have always maintained that a highly experienced pilot, let's say 15,000 hrs +, is not necessarily the best to be in charge of a plane. It leaves so much room for complacency, and the arrogance of authority. And with that comes the reluctance on the part of the less senior pilot to question that authority. And these are ingredients for trouble. I wonder what the optimum experience (hours etc) would be to ensure maximum safety ??

[@billwelter4101]

When in doubt, go around

[@germb747]

I guess this was before airlines trained pilots to go-around if the approach isn't stable?

[@briancarno8837]

I guess the captain would have to pospone his tennis game and spend the time looking for a new job

[@GeneralGayJay]

What is the difference between an international and intercontinental airport?

[@johnmoyle4195]

The story the 1st officer told about his reluctance to challenge a captain was just what his lawyer told him to say.

[@edwardmylnychuk5774]

he was smart in doing so, the captain was obviously at fault and not thinking or he would have listened and acted appropriatel

[@joeyjamison5772]

I think the captain takes final responsibility-and blame. And 10 seconds before landing is no time to be dealing with a misconfigured aircraft. All he had to do was just radio the tower for a go-around and the incident would have not happened.

[@edwardmylnychuk5774]

@@joeyjamison5772 i agree, probably ego got in the way or to distracted with his tennis bullshit and he was in lol la land

[@marcospark2803]

They can hear everything , they have the voice recordings.

[@rallyden]

Despite this and that, the fact that the plane was over 200 kts and would feel very odd om final (descent rate, power used, handling...etc) shows that both pilots really have little feel and knowledge of aerodynamics. And definitely no attention to detail even at a superficial level.

[@lhw.iAviation]

As much as this accident is baffling, sometimes you have to wonder how close the accident could be avoided if one of the pilots decided to do something different

[@rickn8or]

Such as the FO saying "I'm the Pilot Flying and this ain't right. We're going around and figure out what's wrong with this airplane" for instance.

[@btbd2785]

Wow what blatant disregard for safety and utter stupidity!!! you decide to put a plane down 70 knots over what you would normally land at And expect that you're not going to cause major injury to your crew, passengers , possible death!! Unbelievable!!!! He should taken the advice of the other pilot when he said to go around! What made it worse that he tried to blame the other pilot! Complete Malignant Narcissit; VERY DANGEROUS!!

[@TheSateef]

both ex airforce pilots, i'm sure the 1st officer was intimidated by his superior. was the captain retired after this?

[@niranjanraju3459]

17500 hours and you miss the critical check

[@scottmoseley5122]

nice work! So did the captain lose his job?

[@texasbella576]

Yes (read on another comment) now plenty of time for tennis!

[@danmartens8855]

1) Non sterile cockpit 2) Military ego never goes around like a pansy. 3) First officer intimidated by previous corporate bullying

[@JLange642]

I thought that the PIC had the ultimate authority, whether he is the FO or Capt. He is the one responsible at that moment. If the FO wanted to go around, even if the Captain said no, the FO as PIC should have done so. But to ignore all the bells and warnings and continue the approach- absolutely the worst decision either of them could have made.

[@carlwilliams6977]

Did you hear the part the part about the psychiatrist?

[@tct84]

Just curious, because I do enjoy aviation videos, however I have always wondered why we can’t ever hear the ACTUAL FLIGHT RECORDINGS. Granted I am not a pilot, nor have I ever even flown (I understand man’s fallibility, I mean bloody hell their Hydraulic switch was off, the captain was fixating on tennis whilst ignoring a frickin cringe alarm for said lack of Hydraulic pressure🙄 ) but this has always struck me odd that we have to hear through voice actors reading a transcript I assume.

[@deepthinker999]

The Flight Channel does use Cockpit Recordings when they are available.

[@xeldinn86]

I think they used to release them but the families of the crew put a stop to that

[@jonchowe]

There was a crash in the 80s I think (EDIT: Delta 1141) where the pilots joke around with flight attendants before take off, joke around during the checklist, then crash on takeoff because they missed a step and never set the flaps. The recordings came out, it was super embarrassing, and a law was passed banning the release of the audio after crashes. ATC is public, but nothing from inside the plane.

[@jacekatalakis8316]

@@jonchowe Depends on the country as well, Brazilian CVR recordings have surfaced, the GOL/XL one is nightmare fuel being in a doomed plane, with the crew realizing it and all the warnings. The GermanWings one somehow, I forget how, got out or was reenacted at least when that was all over the news. Different countries have differing laws, good luck finding any from recent UK/US accidents but you will find Brazilian ones no problem. On that note I'm wondering now how shows like Mayday get around that given Canada has similar laws to the US, does re-enacting it somehow skirt the law. I'm genuinely curious. I've also heard that there are actually situations where the transcript is released, but not the recording itself though and the law isn't retroactive either way, but I'm pretty sure I wasn't told that by a lawyer

[@Michael-ve6ce]

Wilber said it a long time ago “we’re making better and better equipment but the pilots are not getting better”.

[@boeingdriver29]

Incompetence at the highest level.

[@pastorjerrykliner3162]

Did they not look at the Gear Indicator and not see that the "Three Green" indicator lights were not lit on the panel? That should have been part of the "Final Approach" checklist. Even when the gear handle was "down" the pilots should have confirmed the "Down and Safe (locked)" indications on the panel. Multiple aircraft have crashed because a light on the "Gear Indicator" panel wasn't lit because of a burned out bulb and the crews became obsessed with the "non light" that they quit flying the aircraft altogether (EAL 401/UAL 173). This crew seems to have done almost the opposite; flying the aircraft without looking at their indicators at all.

[@treylem3]

Wow ! Unique vid. Is this an older plane? I would think this hi-low hydraulics would be automatic in modern aircraft, but consider it could be there for low pressure or leaking incidents

[@JBofBrisbane]

DC-9s are not new.

[@JoeZamecki]

It seems like a lot of the miscommunication that happens in these incidents could be prevented by the airplane simply speaking like it sometimes does, to indicate the problem. Just a beeping sound is vague. If it had said, "The hydrolic system is not ready, the landing gear is not down and the flaps are not properly set," they would have figured out the problem quickly. With just a noise, the info simply didn't get conveyed to them.

[@MrJONES925]

Although not responsible for the accident , the TWR controller could have said something , one of their jobs is to watch the traffic

[@flyingdentist]

Captain was anxious of playing tennis.OMG!

[@georgittesingbiel219]

The plane is totaled. Does that come out of the crew's pay?

[@errorsofmodernism7331]

it comes out of the catering budget

[@bwalker4194]

I’m guessing the captain had a lot more time to work on his tennis skills after this.

[@makantahi3731]

what about 3 green

[@ocsplc]

As mentioned by those in the know here, the problem was the crew not following checklists and the FO not just going TOGO

[@sydyidanton5873]

Other than OTP, which is NO excuse, that PIC had ZERO reasons to continue the unstable non-normal approach. A ‘ no flaps' landing which is naturally conducted at much higher than normal speeds is categorised as an emergency landing. By executing a go-around not only does it improve safety conditions for all on board, it gives the tech crew the opportunity to try and sort out the issues they are faced with, while also advising ATC they will be conducting an emergency landing and to roll ARFF crews as a responsible precaution. Because it qualifies as an emergency landing, the PIC's responsibility for passenger safety necessitates the onboard manager/lead F/A being advised of a so called NITS briefing (possibly not used at all airlines) and then instructed to conduct their prepared emergency drill, which includes Because of the high speed landing this an increased risk of injury, or worst case loss of control or gear collapse on landing, subsequent potential for fire hence the required preparation of the cabin which includes passengers being instructed on the brace position and warned they will be commanded to do so immediately prior to landing. So the 'get-there-itis' infected commander absolutely failed his passengers and crew with his arrogance and ignoring all trained and expected emergency procedures. By carrying out their required 'Non Normal' procedures they may have identified their error and then been able to cancel the emergency preparation and subsequent emergency landing, returning to normal operations subsequently conducting a safe normal landing. If anyone is wondering what a NITS briefing is: N - Nature of the emergency I - Intentions of the tech crew e.g. holding to conduct troubleshooting with engineering, landing, ditching, dips and rolls and perhaps touch and go’s for a stuck gear, etc. T - Time left available before landing S - Specific Instructions e.g: - Will bracing be required, if so how advised - the PIC will either make a 'Brace' PA or use secondary warning, typically the double recycling of a FSB or NoSmkg sign with its associated high chimes. - Will an evacuation be likely/expected, what side of the aircraft or which doors to be used as some may be blocked due to a threat such as engine fire etc. - May even include extreme weather conditions if necessary. - Along with many other unique applicable instructions as required. This information is then ALL repeated back to the PIC to confirm the OBM has understood, the PIC and OBM will then synchronise their watches. The OBM will conduct the same briefing with ALL cabin crew. On a small 2 - 6 cabin crewed aircraft there will be a designated location like the forward galley, on a large wide body it will be conducted as an 'All Call' over the interphone with all crew listening in, then each F/A confirming it is understood. This all stations call is conducted in the same sequence and system used every flight for arming/disarming their doors, and cabin prep check before every takeoff/landing. The F/As then go to their demo positions, the OBM advises the PIC they are ready for the emergency PA. A specifically designed and worded instructional PA is first given by the PIC advising the situation, reassuring them and to follow all cabin crew instructions, then the OBM, delivers their specifically designed and worded PA, there are two, one for land the other for ditching (the latter being longer and more involved). The instructions include a number of facts like how to brace, what to do, (ditching - the fitting of life vests), removing sharp objects from pockets, dentures, glasses (place them in the sick bag, then place that in the seat pocket) that reduces injuries, along with a bit more info which is broken into 'bite-sized' chunks so anxious passengers can absorb and acknowledge what they’re being told. Both The PIC's and OBM's PAs along with all further information and interaction from the crew becomes very assertive/instructional vs the typical friendly/informational. That’s not to say they are not caring and supportive but all the 'service language' is dispensed with, people are no longer asked - they are told. It is important that the crew assert their authority and leadership to achieve the necessary compliance, which is no different to any emergency services personal. Caring but direct! In a more serious expected scenario, the cabin will select ABPs which is an able bodied passenger, identified by any positioning/paxing crew, or any fit, strong individual who appears to be fully compliant with instructions and coping well, military/police are ideal choices and can be be identified, often travelling in uniform if travelling on business. They are asked if they’re willing to participate, one/two is selected for each exit and briefed by the F/A responsible for that door/exit, they’re then shown how to operate the exit and slide if the F/A briefing them is unable for whatever reason, otherwise the F/A will operate the door and slide, they’ll be there to help block the exit until the slide deploys and inflates (less than 6 seconds). They are then first down the slide to remain at the bottom and help pick people off and redirect them to safety (either the grass on the side of the runway, or up-wind ahead of the aircraft's nose). They’re then reseated in the immediately-closest seat/s to the exit they’ve just been briefed on. If it’s an aircraft with over wing exits; the passengers seated on the exit row although they were given a specific pre-departure briefing, they are advised they will now be likely operating this exit and confirm if they are still willing to be responsible for the exit? They are briefed again with firm, clear and additional instructions; exactly how the exit operates, what dangers to first check for before opening, when to open it, if applicable where to put the exit hatch once it’s removed. Then advised exactly the technique for climbing through, but first before exiting exactly where the slide will deploy from and exactly how to know if it’s safe to use, it not how to block and redirect, or with some airlines, how to replace the hatch. (Lots of 'exactlys' because the information must be understood). In the case of the B737 (if required how to pull it back closed) including smaller aircraft, which direction to go once outside on the wing and how to slide off the back of the wing (flaps automatically fully deploy when the exit is opened, if not already) Then where to lead passengers once outside. If it’s a ditching what to do specifically for that. Most importantly to reinforce when absolutely not to open it, or if in the scenario of expected threats/danger that side they will be told absolutely not to open it, but block to it and redirect other people away to useable exits and then get to the available exit/s themselves. There are a few other items the crew must do time permitting, every action is prioritised and eliminated/edited according to time available until ‘landing' how ever much time that may be! That’s a very rough brief outline, naturally in an unprepared sudden emergency, that’s an entirely different process for both tech and cabin crew.

[@RedArrow73]

Now, in fairness to this Captain, him being a former F-4 jock in the 'Nam, pilots of F-4's were overwhelmed with warning noises of different sorts, so blocking them out became commonplace during combat missions. This does not excuse, but adds background insight.

[@boeingdriver29]

You’re correct about one thing, this does not excuse the Captain. He’s not in a f-4 anymore, he’s flying an RPT jet and is legally required to follow SOP’s which requires correctly responding to all warning systems aural and visual. He failed on all counts.

[@robinrichards6275]

The 206kt landing speed should have been the elephant in the room.

[@deepthinker999]

@@boeingdriver29 Now passengers lives hang in the balance, unlike his military career. The (former) Captain seems arrogant.

[@markmonse5285]

A well-done video!

[@dgriffin6074]

Complacency is more of a risk to passengers than incompetence.

[@tomjones4093]

Now if they just had a good Flight Engineer on those planes... just saying. 🙂

[@natehill8069]

A red light or a buzzer should NEVER sound with regularity, it becomes part of the furniture and useless as a warning. I used to work in a military communications facility. It had something like 29 alarms, all the same tone (go lowest bidder!). It was very difficult to tell which one was sounding, and they sounded for no meaningful reason sometimes so we wound up disabling all but a couple that might actually be noteworthy. Whether we disabled them or not, the printer printed out the event and the time/date. The printer pretty much ran continuously listing these things, and the paper was unique and very expensive. We would go through a box every 2-3 days, just printing meaningless alarms and as far as I know, no one ever looked at the printouts. The one that WOULD have been noteworthy (input power failure - switching to battery - 3 minutes to facility shutdown; this happened about 1-2 times a year) did NOT trigger an alert because I guess they didnt want to bother us with trivia. Usually you only noticed this failure because it got comfortably warm (normally it was wear-a-field-jacket-in-the-summer cold inside), which took about 2-2.5 minutes. That made you go "oh crap!" and look at the little tiny voltage fail indicator way over in the corner to see if the power had failed; at this point you had < 1 minute left to get a different generator going or shut down "gracefully".

[@XY_Dude]

I don't know... pilots Sum Ting Wong and Wi Tu Lo made a rookie mistake at SFO!!

[@oldschoolman1444]

Any landing you can walk away from is a good one! 😂

[@verifiedgentlemanbug]

Hahahahaha its like when you can lift the weights, it's Lightweight!

[@GH-oi2jf]

It seems to me that when the first officer is the pilot flying, he should be able to initiate a go-around without asking permission from the captain. Am I wrong?

[@juliemanarin4127]

Forgot the LANDING GEAR???

[@erwinschmidt7265]

Sht can happen! '90s G.R. Mich exp Capt approached. In MDOT PU I had just broke out of windshear on I-96 2C plane stationary. No traffic so swerved violent fingering Capt. He said to FO, "Ya outta see what this crazy Highway truck..ah..just, Holy SHT!! Full gas/flaps, gear up, nose slight down, then disappeared in flat plummet into woods w/big smoke. Then liner broke out of treeline as smoke had been exhaust. His plane raped, Capt flew E. towards Lansing, then turned around W. to see if PU existed. FO whimpering as knew he was dead, no COM w/cabin, and no radio, he waggled wings on way by in thanks. Can't say this guy wasn't polite! He gave self clearances to approach GRR, land, taxi, & park at Gate. Airport deserted so Capt started shutdown as FO no longer operational. He heard Company & Medical taking care of injured, deplaning passengers, and collected 1st Ofcr w/o word to Capt. On shutdown he slid down small stairway for late luggage, looked back at nice MD-82 Vee wings, but they were gone. They hung with their tips near the ground. No groundcrew, so began pulling the oak tree limbs out of the belly when heard double click of GRPD giving him new bracelets sayin' he was charged w/Tampering with Evidence, Leavin' Scene of Accident, & Joyriding Plane. Cop dragged 'em across tarmac, up into Terminal, past his deplaned passengers terrifying 'em, & before NWA Exec, FAA Ofcl, NTSB Controller, & GRPD Ofcr who wanted Attaboy for apprehending him. Capt didn't know what to say other than on approach, had full load, had insane MDOT Driver alert him to danger as stationary, took emergency actions, flat plummet into woods w/wings catching at very last second, verified MDOT existed on I-96, then approached, landed, & taxied to gate w/o clearances. After shutting down plane arrested while pulling oak limbs back outta the belly and dragged in here in front of you Gentlemen....what did you do today? FAA Ofcl & NTSB Controller said impossible, FAA said tickets canceled, NWA said he was suspended, & Cop said, "Here's your tickets"! In their "investigation", NTSB said, "Pilot Error", NWA said continue suspension until re-trained w/new Certs, and GRPD said, "Where's my money"! All survived, but w/entire Cabin Crew injured, one Senior Stewardess had broke spine so confined to chair, but still told Capt she still loved him obvious knowing much more that NTSB! This Capt like followin' me around, so chance met him again in '96 at TPA Pilots' Lounge tellin his sad tail. He couldn't remember emergency actions or their order....so me being unafraid added those details. Capt attacked demanded how I knew that, but when told I was ahole in MDOT PU w/I.D. he froze. When sht somewhat back together he said, "I've been looking for you...would you like to sit with us at our table?" Upon refusal as had already ordered burger, he grabbed me, sat me down at their table sayin', "You look like a T-Bone Man to me", and so it was. Told ya this guy was polite!! I printed out entire conversations that night, 4 Pilots witnessed signature, & NTSB dead-in-water. This especially true when new investigation ordered & Investigator found original crew had wrote out statement for MDOT saying no equipment near incident, & NWS determined no windshear or downdraft possible near incident location - Here, sign it! This wasn't their Finest Hour!! This time it was the NTSB with "Rookie Mistakes"!!

[@merlesmith6794]

Was the captain a scab? Just curious.

[@ChildofGod3712]

This is one of many reasons why people are afraid to fly… incompetent pilots smh

[@slowpoke96Z28]

2.56 million write off value?? Man, they'd be mad if that was a Bugatti Chiron.

[@CC-te5zf]

This was the old days. Nowadays, the pilot would be brought before the public and praised for saving lives (*even though he caused the problem). That's the new trend: Pilot screws up big time, manages to get the plane on the ground somehow and is hailed as a hero when it was the pilot that caused the problem in the first place.

[@jimsteinway695]

Back in the 80’s and early 90’s there were a ton of bad dc-9 and md 80 pilots . They were crashing left and right

[@louispd6828]

The second I heard "Continental Airlines", it all made sense...

[@chrispetty8587]

Sounds like they should hired navy pilots.

[@dantea6]

two military pilots inside the cockpit, it makes another hole on the swiss cheese. What matters is if they pack plenty of gameboy.

[@rangerider51]

Just leave the plane in the grass so other pilots won’t make any mistakes.😆

[@letsgobrandon7112]

Hopefully this was the end of this Captains career and retraining for the FO.

[@richardcline1337]

Captain FAILED to keep a sterile cockpit and didn't listen to his First Officer. He destroyed a perfectly good aircraft! I hope they pulled his license!

[@tommynikon2283]

That will buff out.

[@genehunsinger3981]

AWWWW,the captain wanted to do "The Curley Shuffle" and then pull a Jim Carry-IN,,,Like a glove.

[@oatlord]

Colorblind maybe?

[@spvillano]

So, discussing tennis games is a part of a sterile cockpit now? Perhaps we need AI in the cockpit to control a robotic arm to slap someone upside their head when they're being an idiot. Once perfected, I'll take one for my car...

[@AirForceChmtrails]

The captain should have been fired and the first officer temporarily suspended.

[@cremebrulee4759]

Two fundamental issues, sterile cockpit and Cockpit Resource Management.

[@slowpoke96Z28]

13:54, well heres a thought, LOOK AT THE FUCKING PRESSURE GAUGES!!! They are there for a reason. Thats the first thing i would've looked at if the flaps were acting up.

[@PatFarra-t5z]

Hydraulic boost pumps were not turned on. IMO

[@PHAROAHJK]

This was a total Captain error, definitely an issue with no checking and rechecking you have to make sure it's conducive to land terrible job by the Captain who should know better

[@B1900pilot]

Very poor CRM, Captain was more focused on his tennis lesson than being pilot-in-command. Multiple pilot groups operating the DC-9 due to mergers, and convoluted procedures.