Operation Goodwood

After the Allies successfully stormed Normandy in June of 1944, the troops continued to fight the Germans occupying the area for weeks.
However, the British Army and the Canadian soldiers fighting along them were fixated on the strategically important city of Caen in the eastern end of the frontline in Northern France.
Unhappy with the slow results and advancement over a month after the landings, the British officials decided to launch an operation unlike any other.
It was called Operation Goodwood, and for three days, the British and Canadian forces besieged the area in what would become the largest tank battle the British Army ever fought…
- As images and footage of actual events are not always available, Dark Docs sometimes utilizes similar historical images and footage for dramatic effect. I do my best to keep it as visually accurate as possible. All content on Dark Docs is researched, produced, and presented in historical context for educational purposes. We are history enthusiasts and are not always experts in some areas, so please don't hesitate to reach out to us with corrections, additional information, or new ideas. -

[@drivenmad7676]

Bravo for breaking your programming by calling them Germans and not Nazis!! Great job

[@robplazzman6049]

I noticed in the recent movie “ Dunkirk” they are referred to only as ‘the enemy’.

[@alanmacification]

It depends on if you are fighting the Waffen SS or the Wehrmacht .

[@tonybarnes3858]

@@alanmacification They all fought to support the aims of the Nazi regime, so more loosely speaking, they were all Nazis. Too bad so many folks are in love with the image of the heroic warrior, the German soldier.

[@otacon5648]

They were Nazis though so….

[@oldredcoonhound2182]

I had a great uncle killed at the falaise gap shortly after the normandy landing. It was called operation Atlantic under an officer named Simmonds.( I think he had a big Ego also) He was with the royal scottish Essex. They didn't know they were facing an SS Division.

[@redmorphius]

Ooo tank battles pre drones and cool missiles

[@thebossman9176]

The actual tank battles, even pre A-10 Brrrrrt.

[@scootr65]

Well, at least the senseless deaths are the same.

[@thatdude1435]

@@thebossman9176 fun fact: 85% of armored kills by the A-10 was done using missiles :)

[@gabrielbertollini8144]

Right? When tanks actually shot each other lulzz. Now all you see is a t-90 shooting 5 rounds into a building then getting javelined lmao

[@waynehankinson8210]

The Bazooka, the panzerfaust your lack of knowledge is amazing.

[@ErichHiller44]

Imagine being a German soldier transferred from the eastern front for a vacation only to see 100s of British tanks.

[@SolracNexus]

German soldier: "meh, better than the eastern front"

[@seanzibonanzi64]

The vacation would continue if you surrendered early enough and got sent to UK or USA lol

[@MultiJesselee]

Don't forget a good thousand ships + a full scale invasion

[@captain0080]

Considering the soviets used masses of tanks it would have been another day at work had it not been for the allied control of the air.

[@bettyswollocks1670]

yep I would consider myself one lucky chap

[@truetoffee8684]

The Brits and Canadians were up against the cream of the German army,on the Eastern side of the bridge head the germans employed almost all their panzer and SS divisions so to block the route to Paris. Also although three armoured divisions were used they followed one after the other so all this power was only as strong as the units at the very front. The germans were worn down by this operation and couldn't make good the huge losses they incurred whilst the Allies could.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

Yup 8 Panzer divisions and 3 Tiger battalions.

[@truetoffee8684]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- the Tigers stationed in and around Cagny were especially deadly as were the 88s an Anti air Luftwaffe unit Von Luck found and ordered the 4 guns to be used in the anti tank role

[@Willzy800]

And the Americans love to criticise the Brits for being slow, despite facing 3 lines of anti tank guns and several crack panzer divisions just unbelievable

[@robertpatrick3350]

The Brits and Canadians dealt with more tigers in these actions than the US forces encountered in their whole Northern European campaign. Comparing the relative successes of the contributors is unfair they had to undertake different rolls

[@markpaul8178]

@@Willzy800 I know,brother.A statement well said.

[@paulmcewen7384]

The Canadian role was first and foremost about stopping the armoured counterattack that would have thrown the allies out of Europe. Read "Stopping the Panzers" by Mark Milner for a well researched history of this campaign.

[@ObltKG4]

Well cited!

[@Mike-tg7dj]

Montgomery saw the big picture. It hurt to send those men into battle knowing that they'd take a bloody beating. Though his ego was huge he understood chain of command, and knew what he had to do.

[@RSPYC]

Montgomery did only what he saw necessary to feed his ego. Operation Goodwood was a failure and killed too many men and destroyed too much equipment. He was like the Germans having a general on their side.

[@Swift-mr5zi]

@@RSPYC With the plan the laid out the objectives were set by Montgomery himself in a document dated 15 July 1944. The primary objective was “to engage the German armour in battle and ‘write it down’ to such an extent that it would be of no further value to the Germans as a basis of battle”. By ‘write it down’ Montgomery was using an accounting term that means to reduce in value. By keeping the German armour engaged or busy in front of the British and causing heavy casualties, he hoped to reduce its value to the German Army by holding it in the British sector so it could not be used as reinforcements in the American sector. The British plan was to attract the bulk of the German forces and write the German armour down to allow the American breakout. The British destroyed 90% of German armour in the west.Montgomery issued a personal memorandum to Dempsey and O’Connor making his limited intention clear.The British plan was to attract the bulk of the German forces and write the German armour down to allow the American breakout. The British destroyed 90% of German armour in the west. Montgomery ordered Dempsey to"go on hitting: drawing the German strength, especially the armour, onto yourself-so as to ease the way for Brad" - Montgomery issued a personal memorandum to Dempsey and O’Connor making his limited intention clear.Detailed planning began on Friday 14 July but the next day, Montgomery issued a written directive ordering Dempsey to change the plan from a "deep break-out" to a "limited attack". Anticipating that the Germans would be forced to commit their armoured reserves, rather than risk a massed British tank breakthrough, VIII Corps was instructed to "engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans". He was to take any opportunity to improve the Second Army's position-the orders stated that "a victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank"-but not to endanger its role as a "firm bastion" on which the success of the forthcoming American offensive would depend. From Hamilton’s biography: Monty’s alacrity in accepting the disappointing results of ‘Goodwood’ caused consternation at Eisenhower’s headquarters- and particularly among the Air Force commanders. ‘In order to get proper air support for the attack, de Guingard had to exaggerate the importance of the attack,’ Dempsey later explained in an effort to make clear the real,purpose of ‘Goodwood’ to the American Official Historian. ‘He kept telling the air people this attack is absolutely essential to the war and will be the turning point. Because of this statement, it has been difficult to convince people that we had not intended to do more than strengthen our line. Monty realised that this attack was open to exaggeration and for this reason gave me one of the first written orders I ever received, in which the limited nature of the attack was made clear.’ - Not only had Monty to deceive the reluctant barons of the Allied air forces; it was essential that the Germans be made to believe that ‘Goodwood’ was serious, and that unless all reserves were committed to the eastern flank, a British break-out towards Paris would result. ‘Both Bradley and I agreed we could not possibly tell the Press the true strategy which formed the basis of all our plans,’ Monty recalled; he therefore gave a press conference, in the midst of the ‘Goodwood’ battle, to give the impression that the decisive moment in the Normandy campaign had come. As Chester Wilmington, the BBC correspondent, noted in his diary after the true break- out in the west ‘the military offensive did not fail, but the propaganda offensive did’… -Monty Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton From Robin Neillands The Battle of Normandy 1944: The Goodwood battle took place at the crux of the entire Normandy campaign, caused a great deal of controversy, at the time and since, and requires some careful dissection if the various elements are to be fully understood. The first two points are that Operation Goodwood was linked with Operation Cobra, the US breakout at St-Lô, and was part of the strategic policy Montgomery had been following since shortly after D-Day-the British to hold the eastern flank and pull the German armour on to that front, while the Americans built up their forces and broke out in the west. - Since this strategy has frequently been misunderstood, misinterpreted or overlooked, it has to be pointed out-yet again-that this had always been the plan. Other than arguments about where the eventual ‘hinge’ for the swing east might be, no one at the time disputed it and in mid-July the bulk of the German armour were indeed facing the British around Caen. By the third week of July, as related in the previous chapter, there were eight German divisions facing the fifteen divisions of the US First Army between St-Lô and the west coast of the Cotentin; Panzer Lehr, 2 SS Panzer and six infantry divisions. Facing the British, on the shorter front from Caumont to Caen, were seven strong Panzer divisions; 1 SS Panzer, 2nd Panzer, 10 SS Panzer, 9 SS Panzer, 12 SS Panzer, 21 Panzer and 116 Panzer, plus five infantry divisions, a total of twelve divisions, over half of them armoured and most of the armour SS. More than 600 German tanks faced the British and Canadians; fewer than 200 tanks faced the Americans. This being so, it is rather surprising that it is still claimed that Montgomery intended to break out in the east, or is smeared by continuing odium for not breaking out, or for being ‘cautious’ and ‘too slow’. If the strategic plan was to work, the people being ‘too slow’ in July were the American units in the west who had fewer enemy to contend with. The German armour was in the east, the US forces had completed their build-up in the west where the breakout was to take place-and in the end did take place-so what was the reason for delay?

[@Swift-mr5zi]

@@RSPYC This is not chauvinism. The US Official History makes the same point. Writing on the advance to St-Lô1 it sums up the result as follows: Heroic exertion seemed, on the surface, to have accomplished little. With twelve divisions, the First Army in seventeen days had advanced only seven miles in the region west of the Vire and little more than half that distance east of the river. Not only was the distance gained disappointing, the newly established Lessay-Caumont line was less than satisfactory. The VIII Corps physically occupied neither Lessay nor Périers; the VII Corps did not actually possess the Périers-St-Lô highway, and the city of St-Lô remained under enemy artillery and mortar fire for more than a week after its capture by XIX Corps. To reach this position along the Lessay-Caumont line, the First Army had sustained approximately 40,000 casualties during July of which 90 per cent were infantrymen. - The US History goes on to comment: ‘The majority of casualties were caused by shell fragments while many men were now suffering from combat fatigue which, though not always reported in the casualty returns, nevertheless totalled an additional 25 to 35 per cent of the men physically wounded.’ The US History then compares the state of their forces with that of the enemy: ‘The German troops were good. Not invincible, the Wehrmacht units nevertheless had staying power while SS forces and paratroopers were a breed apart; elite troops, with an unshakeable morale, they asked no quarter and gave none.’Given the allegations of slowness and timidity made against the British and Canadian troops it is again worth pointing out that the bulk of these élite, ‘breed apart’ SS troops were facing the British Second Army although although most of the equally resolute German parachute units were facing the Americans. By now, halfway through the campaign-and rather more than halfway through this book-Montgomery’s strategy in Normandy should be abundantly clear. It was his mistake not to reiterate the details of this strategy at the time and foolish later to argue that it had worked out in every respect, but the actions of the Allied armies since D-Day make his overall purpose obvious-and unlike words, these actions are irrefutable. The British Second Army had mounted a constant series of strong attacks at or around Caen since D-Day and had thereby sucked in the German reserves while the US First Army had captured first Cherbourg and eventually St-Lô. Everything was now ready for the next phase, the breakout. - Cherbourg was coming on stream to provide a port for reinforcements and supplies and the road from St-Lô to Périers and Lessay in the west would provide Bradley with the start line for the Allied breakout-and provided there was an Allied breakout only a chauvinist would complain about who made it. These British and US attacks on the east and west of the Allied line had either been co-ordinated to stretch the German line to its utmost or where the shortages of fuel or artillery ammunition did not permit two offensives at the same time, had either followed each other in rapid succession, or overlapped. In the end this growing pressure caused the German line to snap.This had been the pattern of events since D-Day. It is hard to imagine that it was accidental or developed by the two army commanders, Bradley and Dempsey, without reference to the Allied Ground Force Commander, General Montgomery. Although some American accounts seem to ignore his existence-other than for the purposes of denigration-Montgomery was the field commander in Normandy and it was his plan that Bradley and Dempsey were implementing with considerable success and no particular objections at the time. Now at last, the British had Caen and the Americans had St-Lô. This put the Allied forces in line for the breakout, but before moving on to the next major Allied efforts-Goodwood and Cobra-it is necessary to take a look at some of the other events taking place at this time, notably those affecting the Germans - To trace the origins of Goodwood we have to go back to that meeting between Montgomery, Bradley and Dempsey on June 30, after the fall of Cherbourg. At that conference it was agreed that ‘the immediate task of the British Army was to hold the main enemy forces between Caen and Villers-Bocage ... and develop operations for the capture of Caen-and the sooner the better’. 4 US First Army were to begin an offensive on the right flank on July 3 -the drive on St-Lô-and then, as already described pivoting on its left at Caumont eastwards to a general line Caumont-Vire-Mortain-Fougères. When this move was complete the right-hand corps (VIII) should be turned westward into Brittany and directed on Rennes and St-Malo. Plans must now be prepared for the rest of General Bradley’s command to ‘direct a strong right wing on a wide sweep south of the bocage country to successive objects as follows: a. Laval-Mayenne, b. Le Mans-Alençon.’ The US Official History does not dispute this account but also claims, 6 that ‘By July 11 General Bradley had conceived the idea; two days later the idea became the First Armies plan. It was called Cobra.’ Bradley may indeed have developed the plan for Cobra; as the commanding general of the forces employed that was his duty, but it was certainly not Bradley who conceived the idea. This is a small point but it should not be allowed to go unremarked for it conceals a larger one; the connection between Cobra and Goodwood-and the aims of the latter offensive.

[@Swift-mr5zi]

@@RSPYC - Goodwood began on July 18, immediately after the First Army had advanced into St-Lô. The aims of Goodwood were similar to those of previous Second Army attacks-to tidy up the battlefield and finish any left-over business from the previous offensive; to keep the enemy armour occupied and ‘write it down’; and, if possible, to gain some ground. It should be noticed that the need to gain ground was the last objective. In his Operational Order for Goodwood, issued on July 15, Montgomery is very specific on this point: 1. Object of this operation; to engage the German armour in battle and write it down to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle. To gain a bridgehead over the Orne through Caen and thus to improve our positions on the western flank. Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel, as a preliminary to a possible wide exploitation of success. - Regarding the operations of the various units involved, Monty states that XII Corps and the Canadian Corps were (Point 4) ‘to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye.’ Then (Point 5), ‘The VIII Corps-the three armoured divisions, were to fight and destroy the enemy on the Bourguébus-Vimont-Bretteville area although, armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise (author’s italics) and cause alarm and despondency’. While this is going on (Point 6) ‘the Canadian II Corps must capture the Vaucelles suburb in Caen and get a very firm bridgehead over the Orne.’ Only when this has been done (Point 7) can VIII Corps ‘crack about’ as the situation demands. ‘But not before 6 is done.’ The orders stress that the capture of Vaucelles and that bridgehead over the Orne were vital-pressing on to Falaise was; if it had been it would have required a lot more than a thrust by armoured cars. - All this is laid out in the British Official History and there is nothing in any of this even hinting at the overrunning and holding of the Caen-Falaise plain-or a breakout. Indeed, the word ‘Falaise’ appears just once, in Point 5 of the order when Monty suggests that, if all goes well and the other objectives have been achieved, then armoured cars could push towards Falaise and ‘spread alarm and despondency’-in other words to exploit any success. In view of the outcry at SHAEF where-in spite of all the evidence-the impression seems to have arisen that Monty was planning a breakout in the east, this fact should be noted, and remembered. The US Official History, 8 compounds this error when it states ‘As a hush fell over the American front after the capture of St-Lô, intense activity began in the British sector. The Second Army launched a strong attack, (Goodwood) that promised the Allies an excellent chance of achieving a breakthrough. Had it succeeded Cobra would probably have been unnecessary.’ Apart from confirming that Goodwood-Cobra were linked, this statement hardly stands close inspection and flies in the face of every move in the strategy the Allied armies had followed in Normandy so far. Goodwood had three purposes; firstly, to follow-up the Charnwood attack of the previous week and take the suburb of Vaucelles, south of the Orne. Secondly, alarmed by the transfer of Panzer Lehr to the west, Second Army must at least threaten a breakthrough south of Caen, which would hold the other Panzer divisions in place and, perhaps, force the recall of Panzer Lehr. Thirdly, to write down the German armoured forces south of Caen, as a preliminary to exploitation-the later advance on Falaise. All of this would help the American break-out at St Lo. - As further evidence on this point there is the matter of timing. Goodwood began on July 18; Cobra was supposed to begin on July 20. The reason the two attacks were not scheduled for the same day was the availability of air power; both attacks were to be supported by a massive bombing programme and this could not be managed at two places at the same time. This proximity indicates that Montgomery, who had suggested the objectives for Cobra on June 30, intended the Goodwood-Cobra operations as part of a two-part plan which the US Official History accurately describes as follows: By launching Goodwood, the British would throw a left hook at the Germans; by following quickly with Cobra, the Americans would throw a right cross. Whether the primary intention of Goodwood was to aid Cobra by forcing the Germans to engage their mobile reserves and the secondary intention was to achieve a breakthrough, or whether the reverse was true ... later became a matter of doubt and controversy. - Indeed it did, and in view of the evidence given above one can only wonder why. Montgomery’s intentions for Goodwood are perfectly clear and it is hard to imagine that Martin Blumenson, the author of this volume in US Official History, published in 1961, had no access to the papers available for the British Official History, then in preparation and published in 1962. As we shall see, Montgomery himself managed to muddy the waters over the results of Goodwood, but his aims did not change. The problem with that ‘left hook followed by right cross’ tactic was that the US First Army could not start Cobra until 7 days after Goodwood, because they still did not possess the necessary start line along the St-Lô-Périers road.This American delay was also due to the weather, which remained poor, to a need to regroup, and to bring in replacements to cover losses caused in taking St-Lô. With the preliminary moves completed and three British armoured divisions shifted to the Orne bridgehead, Goodwood could not be delayed, not least because of that on-going fear that the Germans might shift more armoured divisions on to the American front and disrupt the hoped-for breakout. Although the US forces could not manage the necessary follow-up with Cobra, the Goodwood attack went ahead anyway - …It seems perfectly clear from this that Monty was planning a two-fisted attack and that Goodwood was designed to help the American attack at St-Lô on the following day. For some reason Eisenhower appears to have taken this the other way round, assuring Monty that the US troops would, ‘fight like the very devil, 24 hours a day, to provide the opportunity your armoured corps will need’, though exactly how they would do this is not stated and is not immediately apparent because the American attack would come after the British one. The aim of the American attack was to break out at St-Lô; the aim of the British attack was to keep the Panzers on the Caen front and/ or write them down while the Americans were doing this or-following the American delay-to help them do so, by engaging the enemy at Caen. Once again “-one wearies of repeating this-that had always been the aim

[@Swift-mr5zi]

@@RSPYC …..There is a natural tendency for people-even generals-to hear what they want to hear and believe what they want to believe and Eisenhower was no exception to this rule. He had long wanted an all-out attack, all along the front, and in spite of the Field Commander’s orders-which he knew- and in spite of the importance of the overall strategy-which he also knew but apparently did not understand-Eisenhower came to believe that an all-out attack and a breakthrough on the eastern side was what Montgomery intended. Had he read Montgomery’s orders with the attention they deserved, or asked Brooke for clarification, he might have been better informed for Brooke had no doubts about Montgomery’s intentions-and approved of them. (edited) [06:31] - Perhaps anticipating some misunderstandings, or wary of further criticism at SHAEF, after delivering his plan of attack in writing, Montgomery took the somewhat unusual step of sending his Military Assistant, Lt Colonel Kit Dawnay, over to London to explain the plan verbally to the CIGS, Alan Brooke and answer any questions. In Dawnay’s words: The real object is to muck up and write-off enemy troops. On the eastern flank he is aiming to do the greatest damage to enemy armour. Caen-Falaise is the only place this can be done. If the proposed plan can be completed, the next British move will be westward, in order to ring round Évrecy, (Hill 122 again-author’s italics) ... having broken out in the country south-east of Caen, he (Monty) has no intention of rushing madly eastwards and getting Second Army so extended that that flank might cease to be secure. All the activities on the eastern flank are designed to help the (American) forces in the west, while ensuring that a firm bastion is kept on the east (author’s italics). At the same time, all is ready to take advantage of any situation which gives reason to think that the enemy is disintegrating. - This seems clear, logical and sensible. The presence of Fifteenth Army across the Seine to the east is all too often forgotten in accounts of the Normandy fighting. If Fifteenth Army came in from across the Seine-and it might do so at any time-then it would be the British Second Army’s task either to stave it off if directly attacked or advance to block it if it came in further south and headed for the Americans. American accounts stress how the US commanders were willing to take risks. Perhaps this is so; with the British taking on the bulk of the enemy forces and guarding their backs, they could afford to take risks; their British and Canadian colleagues guarding the eastern flank were not so fortunate. Since D-Day, one prime task of Second Army was to shore up the eastern end of the front against any thrust from north of the Seine. If Fifteenth Army came in the British would have Fifteenth Army on their left flank, Panzer Group West before them and Seventh Army on their right flank-and if the American breakout succeeded and the German front in the west collapsed, then the Fifteenth Army had to come in-surely even Hitler would see that it must. With all this to consider, ‘rushing madly eastwards’ and taking risks on that flank was not an option. Goodwood was the first part of a two-part plan-Goodwood and Cobra-but it had to appear to be an all-out attack-and if it succeeded or went further than planned, all well and good; as Dawney pointed out, the commanders must be ready ‘to take advantage of any situation which gives reason to think that the enemy might be disintegrating’. What is the problem with that? - Goodwood certainly employed a considerable force but the attacks around Caen had shown that considerable force was necessary. For Goodwood Montgomery employed three armoured divisions, Guards Armoured, Armoured, 7th Armoured and 11th Armoured, all under VIII Corps command. This force could muster some 750 tanks, Cromwells, Churchills and Shermans, with some specialised armour from the 79th Armoured Division. When the other elements were added in, Goodwood employed about half of Second Army and the movement of this large armoured force into the Orne bridgehead eliminated any possibility of surprise. The armoured divisions were to advance south out of the Orne bridgehead, but were not to go very far. Their orders stated that they were not to advance beyondVimont, Garcelles-Séqueville, Hubert-Folie and Vérriers-about four miles south of Caen at the most-without the express permission of General Dempsey. Dempsey wanted to be sure that the main aim-to take the Vaucelles suburbs-had been achieved and that the Canadians were firmly established south of the Orne before the VIII Corps armour made any further moves. This point again refutes the notion that Montgomery was aiming at a breakout.The US Official History15 states that ‘although neither Montgomery or Dempsey Dempsey mentioned Falaise specifically in their orders, they and other commanders were thinking of Falaise, and even of Argentan, as objectives perhaps quickly attainable if the battle developed favourably’. - Three points can be made about this comment. Firstly, given that none of the British commanders were mind readers, they would still need specific orders if they were to plan and mount attacks aimed at Falaise, (twenty-one miles south of Caen) or Argentan, (thirty-six miles south of Caen). Secondly, objectives twenty-one and thirty-five miles from the offensive’s start line were not ‘quickly attainable’ at any time in the Normandy battle.Thirdly-see Dawnay’s report to Brooke given above-Monty was indeed prepared to exploit any gain achieved in this offensive. Being ready and willing to exploit success is standard military procedure and is only to be expected of any competent commander. Even so, given the distances involved and two months’ bitter experience in the problems of gaining ground, it is inconceivable that Montgomery seriously intended to do more with this offensive than what he said he intended to do-and if possible exploit any result. A great many misconceptions on this point would never have arisen if historians had taken the trouble to read Monty’s orders fully-and look at the map. - ….. However, if the stated objectives given above could be achieved, Montgomery would be very satisfied-and, who knows, if all went well it might indeed be possible to press on to Falaise? Monty was well aware that battles seldom go as planned, but they sometimes, if rarely, go better than expected and he was quite willing to see how things went and take advantage of any opportunities to push on, or fall back if the cost of pushing on got too high. Not everyone seems to appreciate this fact-an omission which displays a woeful lack of understanding among military historians about the nature of military orders. As a result, those last directions-to send armoured cars ‘far to the south towards Falaise’ or to ‘crack about as the situation demands’-embodied as points 6 and 7 in the Goodwood orders-would be dissected to haunt Monty’s reputation in the years to come. The point is that all attack orders should include some mention of exploitation-on what to do if the enemy folds and where your forces should ‘crack on’ to if the opportunity arises; this is standard military procedure. Orders that do not contain an exploitation clause hang in the air. In various post-war critiques, the British are frequently accused of failing to exploit success or of sitting on the objective instead of pushing on (i.e. exploiting it). Now, when Monty puts a clear exploitation clause in his orders, his detractors state later that he promised more than he delivered - ….. As a result, much-perhaps too much-was expected. As the British Official History points out, 16 ‘Although he, (Montgomery), had made it clear to the CIGS (Alan Brooke) and the War Office that Goodwood was not an attempt to break out eastwards, he hoped it might appear so to the German command’. ‘It will be seen later,’ the account continues dryly, ‘that not only the Germans misread his intentions.’ It is certainly possible that Eisenhower never did understand the aims of Goodwood. In his report to the Combined Chiefs a year later, in July 1945, when the European war was over, Eisenhower states that the aim of Goodwood was ‘a drive across the Orne from Caen towards the south and south-east, exploiting in the direction of the Seine basin and Paris’ ... which is light years away from Montgomery’s oft-stated intentions …..Moreover, the Goodwood offensive had kept the German eyes fixed in the east while the Cobra operation geared up in the west. A greater advance would have been better, but the strategic aims of the battle had in fact been achieved. Besides (see above) this seven-mile advance by six British and Canadian divisions in two days is as far as twelve US divisions had recently advanced towards St-Lô in seventeen days …The emerging fact is that Eisenhower simply did not understand Montgomery’s strategy.- -The Battle of Normandy 1944: 1944 the Final Verdict (Cassell Military Paperbacks) by Robin Neillands

[@StephanieElizabethMann]

It never pays to think that success is assured because of the amount of time, effort and material is spent. Too often reference is made to the amount of work done. It doesn't matter how precise something is. If it's in the wrong place it's still wrong. Effort, and time put into a project is only a predictor of a possible positive outcome not a guarantee

[@davep153]

That was an expensive 7 miles in cost of British and Canadian men. Thank you for their story.

[@andrewclayton4181]

The German defences were deeper than expected. The defenders closer to Caen were more or less obliterated by the bombing. Further south there was a line of 88' 's along a ridge, that weren't bombed, and could pick off any allied tank that attempted to cross the open ground.

[@bluetrue6062]

Thanks to the British and Canadian troops for their sacrifice.

[@nationalist464]

Thanks to German soldiers for their sacrifice

[@kubrick1969]

Sacrifice?? No. They were decimated for the negligence of Monty

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@kubrick1969 Goodwood cost the British around 5,000 casualties compared to at least 7,000 German casualties.

[@kubrick1969]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- a total victory for Monty (as Market-Garden) an absolutely overrated general

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@kubrick1969 Still not as bad as the disastrous Hurtgen Forest campaign. Market Garden gained 100 KM of German territory, Hurtgen Forest threw soldiers into a meat grinder and achieved very little.

[@omarmolina4036]

Thanks for your informative videos. I think I've watched all of your work. Thanks and keep it coming.

[@alanmacification]

The whole purpose of the Battle for Caen was to keep the German armour away from the American beachheads. Experience in Italy ( at Salerno and Anzio) had shown that the Americans could be easily defeated if you can stop them at the shore. Any large-scale German armoured counter-attack had to come through Caen.

[@jamesloring7186]

The reason goodwood didnt work was because the Brits didnt use their infantry in support of armor read hans von lucks' panzer commander

[@geoffburrill9850]

If Goodwood achieved its objectives, despite its losses then it was a success wasn't it???

[@crimsoncherry3525]

That's what we call a pyrrhic victory

[@oneshotme]

Enjoyed your video and I gave it a Thumbs Up as a support

[@theduck1972]

Confident the enemy had been softened up by bombardment only to be proven very wrong, in major operations, seemed to be a theme in both theaters of the war.

[@nedludd7622]

There are two explanations that I have read about this: one is that Montgomery was charged with occupying the German forces to aid the allied advance elsewhere, and the other is that he was incompetent. The first seems more likely, but not sure.

[@mistergreed824]

Or both?…..

[@boyd21]

Incompetent, yes.

[@togodamnus]

@@boyd21 You guys fail to consider the enemy's formidable response and reactions; even though outnumbered and clobbered with overwhelming supportive fire power including effective naval bombardment and total air superiority, (heavy bombers and attack aircraft) we smothered enemy logistics and transit and communications etc. The enemy (mechanized homicidal maniacs and lots of horse drawn conscripted fodder) was at fault and the courage of our vets is better recognized with that observation and perspective. Alot of civilians had difficult experiences as well; and so it goes. .. .

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@boyd21 Bradley was supposed to have launched COBRA 2 days after GOODWOOD started but he told Monty he could not get to his start-line in time. Monty let him put it off for a few days and started his attack without one half of the pincer. I think it was not Monty who was incompetent.

[@jarraandyftm]

Don’t think he’s incompetent mind 😁

[@Swift-mr5zi]

the tank losses for Goodwood are hugely exaggerated. About 130-150 tanks destroyed the rest recovered. ‘The British tank casualties for the Goodwood campaign is cited as 493, which is the sum of all tanks being repaired from 18 to 20 July for the above units plus an additional 24 tanks for the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade for 21 July. As is evident from the breakdown of the numbers, however, this is a summary of tanks that are not combat ready rather than write-offs. This includes those tanks that would have been repaired within 24 hours and therefore before the next strength status. All those tanks that were not repairable within 24 hours were of course not write-offs either; German status reports used a three week cut-off for short-term repairs rather than 24 hours, yet these tanks are not usually not counted as losses. The number of write-offs is more difficult to ascertain, but the numbers for 11th Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division gives some idea. Status of tanks not repairable by the field repair workshops for Operation Goodwood in 11th Armoured Division as of July and Guards Armoured Division as of September. - Even if it is assumed that the total number of tanks not yet recovered would be written off, the total number of lost tanks for 11th Armoured Division and Guards Armoured Division would be 103 tanks. Compared to the 350 tanks that are often considered casualties in post-war litterature for these two units, this is a considerable reduction. The definition of a lost tank is important in this regard, as German kill claims during Goodwood are often considered accurate because they match the British losses. If the actual British losses are in fact only about one third of the frequently accepted numbers the German claims must therefore necessarily be inflated. Among the claims of the German units is that the Panthers of I./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1/1. SS-Panzer-Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" destroyed 40 Shermans of the 23rd Hussars of 29th Armoured Brigade during their counter-attack on 18 July. On 18 July, however, 23rd Hussars only lost a total of 26 tanks, including those tanks that would since be brought back into action. While Operation Goodwood might not have created the breakthrough that was planned,* the total of about 150 British tanks written off compared to the 83 German tanks and assault guns written off is certainly not the disaster as which it is usually described.“ *Goodwood was of course only intended as limited attack not planned as a breakthrough. panzerworld.com/german-tank-kill-claims

[@rg20322]

Great reply!

[@rg20322]

Researching - good stuff!

[@frankvandergoes298]

So are you saying if everything went according to plan and a break through was achieved the British would not have taken advantage of it, would they have stopped and said oh wait we must let the Americans make the breakout, I think not.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@frankvandergoes298 A break out is not normally achieved on a strong front but a weakened one that's how a hammer and anvil works historically, you pin the stronger force in place and then hit them where they aren't strong.....thus the western flank with least resistance is where the Americans could punch through.

[@frankvandergoes298]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- So are you saying that if operations Charnwood, Goodwood, Tractable, Totalize etc had achieved their goal and broke through, the British would NOT have exploited the breakthrough and rolled up the front. They would all park up and say let's just wait here and let the Americans make the breakout, hardly.

[@carolecarr5210]

The happy face of that young German soldier speaks volumes

[@richardtucker8382]

Great back-up music to a great video. Thank you.

[@xthethingswecarryx]

what a coincidence, I get some Goodwood when I see the Dark Docs notification

[@lumenvitae4215]

💀💀

[@kaisermcnuggets]

ayo?

[@TheHighSpaceWizard]

Giggity

[@thebossman9176]

You need to shake off that thought 😂

[@JohnDoe-ft9kx]

@@TheHighSpaceWizard lmfao well said!

[@LU-nc6oy]

🔥🔥🔥🇨🇦🇨🇦🇨🇦🇨🇦never underestimate Canada !!

[@glennduke5853]

Yes indeed. The Canucks should be proud!

[@stephen8200]

He said 13000 British tanks used which seem a huge amount but the text shows 1300 tanks used which would be nearer to the truth.

[@moonmunster]

The British had 13,000 armoured vehicles - i.e. tanks. The Germans had 10 Tiger tanks. The Krauts kicked the Brit's behind.

[@iberiksoderblom]

The objective was met, and Caen was liberated from the Germans ! Loss of lives are always a problem when talking about western/allied forces and must be minimized. The casualties here was borderline high, but the reduction in German manpower, dead and captured was higher and much more difficult/impossible to replace, where the Allies could easily replace every man they lost. Loss of material was a lot less of a problem for the Allies, as replacements was produced at a higher rate than the losses. As oposed to the Germans, that could not afford to loose a single tank.

[@constitution_8939]

Did that defeat of Germany then make You Happy? If so then your another FOOL brainwashed by the 80 years of Zio-Com indoctrination. Enjoy the coming "Bolshevik Revolution" that the Defeat of Germany's Third Reich has Guaranteed for Western Civilization unless You'll be happy being a "Noahide" and if you Don't know what that is then Look up "Noahide Law's" or Presidential Proclamation 4921 if you are the kind who really desires actual History especially the subversive "Law's" hidden from American's, but this goes FAR beyond Treason as you'll notice if you actually do some research on it and have children and Grandchildren. But, here was my response to this video if You Care: These IDIOT'S following the Orders of Traitors as Churchill & FDR were, were Not supposed to remove Germany and it's reason for being what it was which was to ensure the survival of Western Civilization by Destroying the "Synagogue of Satan" that was behind the Traitors who were Mason's that Germany wanted to Save Humanity from. Why do people remain Stupid of this? Because of the Many Traitors who Sold Out Our Freedom & Liberty for their "30 pieces of silver" in England, America, France and ALL the rest. I hope they Never enjoyed One day of serenity after Murdering the Only people of the Only Country that Gave their All to Save Western Society and Culture from the Doom of the Luciferian NWO of Zio-Coms, their "Coreligionists" and Mason's which Only the Blind, Stupid & Marxist Indoctrinated sheeple are ignorant to. I wish there was a A.H. and Nation with 10 times the German Soldiers with their Bravery, intelligence and fanaticism as that Blessed German generation and the American, British, French etc, who fought the Wrong Side amd the World is paying for it now with the Worst yet to come. FTJ which has Nothing to do with that Traitor POS Biden, just think of who A.H., Martin Luther, Henry Ford, Gen. Patton, William Pierce and So Many others knew the World's Enemies were if you can't figure it out, and when you do, form a Militia to go out and Exterminate "'Them"' ALL especially the Zio-Coms in Congress and the other Traitors in there and D.C. who continue to do their bidding, the ones who Rise & Clap numerous times for Benjamin YetanotherJew when he Desecrated the House Podium that especially LOWEST Time in U.S. History. WAKE UP AMERICA, THE HOUR OF OUR DESTRUCTION IS NOW NEAREST!!!

[@Swift-mr5zi]

the tank losses for Goodwood are hugely exaggerated. About 130-150 tanks destroyed the rest recovered. ‘The British tank casualties for the Goodwood campaign is cited as 493, which is the sum of all tanks being repaired from 18 to 20 July for the above units plus an additional 24 tanks for the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade for 21 July. As is evident from the breakdown of the numbers, however, this is a summary of tanks that are not combat ready rather than write-offs. This includes those tanks that would have been repaired within 24 hours and therefore before the next strength status. All those tanks that were not repairable within 24 hours were of course not write-offs either; German status reports used a three week cut-off for short-term repairs rather than 24 hours, yet these tanks are not usually not counted as losses. The number of write-offs is more difficult to ascertain, but the numbers for 11th Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division gives some idea. Status of tanks not repairable by the field repair workshops for Operation Goodwood in 11th Armoured Division as of July and Guards Armoured Division as of September. - Even if it is assumed that the total number of tanks not yet recovered would be written off, the total number of lost tanks for 11th Armoured Division and Guards Armoured Division would be 103 tanks. Compared to the 350 tanks that are often considered casualties in post-war litterature for these two units, this is a considerable reduction. The definition of a lost tank is important in this regard, as German kill claims during Goodwood are often considered accurate because they match the British losses. If the actual British losses are in fact only about one third of the frequently accepted numbers the German claims must therefore necessarily be inflated. Among the claims of the German units is that the Panthers of I./SS-Panzer-Regiment 1/1. SS-Panzer-Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" destroyed 40 Shermans of the 23rd Hussars of 29th Armoured Brigade during their counter-attack on 18 July. On 18 July, however, 23rd Hussars only lost a total of 26 tanks, including those tanks that would since be brought back into action. While Operation Goodwood might not have created the breakthrough that was planned,* the total of about 150 British tanks written off compared to the 83 German tanks and assault guns written off is certainly not the disaster as which it is usually described.“ *Goodwood was of course only intended as limited attack not planned as a breakthrough. panzerworld.com/german-tank-kill-claims

[@masonharkness6437]

@@constitution_8939 crack is one hell of a drug

[@markpaul8178]

@@constitution_8939 89,all I will say about your comment is,if the German leadership were such good people,why would they MURDER millions of innocent civilians who were only trying to scratch a living out of the land.They tortured,beat,starved,shot,raped,mutilated,and used people who could less about their war.You my friend are the brainwashed.My uncle was an American P.O.W outside Dresden .Don't Tell me anything of your nonsense,because I have heard the truth from the horses mouth!

[@frankvandergoes298]

The Allies could easily replace every man they lost??. Where did you get that idea. By August 1944 the British were already disbanding units simply because there were no replacements. 4th County of London Yeomanry were disbanded to provide replacements for 3rd County of London Yeomanry, as were other units. After Arnhem 1st airborne was NEVER rebuilt, why simply there was NO manpower available to do it. By late 1944 the RAF lacked trained pilots because there was NO one left. My own father in law ( RIP ) was 17 in March 1945 when he entered combat for the first time with the British Army.

[@ploptart4649]

Operation Goodwood is the sort of name I'd give a saucy morning hello.

[@richardmassoth8237]

The United States Army Air Forces were the air arm of the US Army during the Second World War. The narrator keeps calling the US air arm the "US Armed Air Forces", like at 4:02+ in the video.

[@Sickofsociety1]

Yeah, the narrator has constant gaffs. I like the channel as I like documentaries but the inaccuracies are what keeps it from being great.

[@karlheinzvonkroemann2217]

This site makes numerous mistakes,

[@markpaul8178]

Thanks DARK DOCS for a well researched video.Operation good wood was to keep the Germans right where they were thinking stubborn Montgomery would try another attack.Meanwhile,the Americans would swing around their flanks to create a bottle neck.By the time the Germans got the big picture,it was to late .They were surrounded and trying to head their columns east were destroyed.British typhoons and thunderbolts made for easy pickings .

[@robmckrill3134]

Mate love your channel, honestly I wasn't at first until I watched a few episodes..thankyou cheers 👍

[@markmccummins8049]

It amazes me that the Germans, not known for good intelligence, let alone discounting it, managed to figure out Operation Goodwood. Can one really blame Montgomery when he had lost the element of surprise? Few generals have the talent, let alone materiel, to overcome such a setback. What could Montgomery have done, with pressure from above demanding that he take Caen?

[@alanmacification]

Montgomery was under no pressure to take Caen. That was allied propaganda. The objective was to draw in the German armoured counter-attack and keep it away from the American beaches.

[@frankbuckley477]

In the many duels between Rommell and Montgomery, this final one was a victory for the former!

[@johnhehir508]

Montgomery in an interview well after ww2 stated that the fighting men of WW1 and the fighting men of ww2 had to be inspired and commanded differently, Montgomery would never say we are going to take an objective and some of you will die or be injured, He created a persona for his men to be inspired with.

[@johnhansen8272]

“Heavy American casualties in the D-Day landings.” That is a fascinating line at the beginning of the video. I guess at the most base level, we could ask heavy in compared to what? Personally, my viewpoint in the back of my head is that the casualties from the Normandy landings were relatively light, considering the task at hand and the overall casualty rate for large operations in the war. I find it an interesting and somewhat odd comment given casualties in major landings in the pacific and obviously Attlee on the eastern front. Sorry for the rant, the comment just sparked these thoughts in my head. Curious what others might think.

[@havan56]

Came here to make a similar comment. Allied Casualties on D-Day were actually lighter than estimated. Operation Overlord was divided among sections of beachfront along the Normandy coast codenamed, from West to East: “Utah,” “Omaha,” “Gold,” “Juno” and “Sword.” Except for Omaha Beach, and possibly Sword first day casualties were considerably light than expected. What followed was problematic and the "fixation" on Caen wouldn't have been so great if the allies had been better able to make progress in "the bocage," the hedgerow country that bottled up allied troops in the westernmost landing areas.

[@sillyone52062]

The Commonwealth troops met most of the German armor in Normandy, with the bocages being mostly an infantry battle.

[@partygoersonlevelfun4485]

Quick note: Caen is pronounced as "caw"

[@robertphillips6296]

Cann is that the same one that now has a Film Festival?

[@marcioreis2648]

Awesome video. Thank you.

[@Alexander24871]

Hello

[@somethingelse4878]

The British took on Tigers so took the main German punch freeing up the US Even though the us claimed every tank was a Tiger, they weren't, they were mk4s

[@buknekkit3084]

Helping feed your algorithm beast, good story

[@simonvirus6417]

Imagine being in a Sherman for the Yanks , Poms or Canadians and coming up against German armour seeing your shells bounce off, not only Tigers but Stug 3's ! Panther's , Panzer 4's , even Hetzer's. What a feeling knowing in the next few seconds you were about to be cooked alive. Absolute disgrace by the brass

[@michaelkenny8540]

Rubbish. Normandy was littered with knocked-out Tigers, Panthers, Stugs and Pz IVs. Normandy was the graveyard of the panzers and they were totally destroyed .A British survey in Normandy found that 75% of the hits on a Panther tank penetrated. Bounce that about and see if you can explain it away.

[@markbolton7431]

...and yet the Sherman was a STRATEGICALLY far superior option for the Allies. Checkout the survivability %age for various armoured FORCES -not tank models bt actual people.

[@allangibson2408]

You were far safer in a Sherman than any German tank. Both Panthers and Tigers could be taken out by a shot to the side by a 75mm armed Sherman but Germans were more likely to be taken out of the fight by catastrophic gearbox failures in either. Just under one crewman was killed for each Sherman destroyed in combat. German tanks more typically lost the entire crew when destroyed.

[@justobserving7045]

I own a so called "goodwood" , a Gibson guitar made between '96 and 06 with the best woods , mine is from '97 .

[@ricardobarbosa1838]

What is the point of artificially aging the footage used? Strange

[@Mrgunsngear]

Thanks

[@johnkidd1226]

A friends father was wounded shortly after D Day on the outskirts of Caen. He was taken to Britian for a month to recuperate. When he returned, his group were still in the same position where he had been wounded a month before. Once they finally took Caen, the Allied advance was never held up for any length of time again.

[@benwilburn6147]

Battle of the Bulge comes to mind.

[@johnkidd1226]

@@benwilburn6147 That was trying to contain a German counterattack. All other Allied sectors were still advancing.

[@andrewhaley8992]

Awesome thanks

[@bobraible]

@3:11 "... and amounted to nearly thirteen thousand." but closed caption says "... amounted to nearly 1,300." I suspect that the CC is correct, as opposed to the narration.

[@rnedlo9909]

Was air cover/assault used fully in operation Goodwood? It seems that much more coordination between the air forces and armies could have helped.

[@BigSkyCurmudgeon]

i believe the Brits and Yanks were hesitant bringing the heavy bombers into a ground support role, and preferred a strategic attack plan. this i mean on a large scale of course, 1000-2000 plane raids.

[@jasonMMorris]

Good work

[@phillipcouch2608]

thats 1300 tanks , please factcheck.

[@johnlansing2902]

Thank you .

[@nkristianschmidt]

Montgomery was overall commander in Normandy and also controlled the US participation in his overall strategy. It was Montgomery that failed but also Montgomery that succeeded.

[@michaelmccotter4293]

Damn high price to pay for Monty's prestige. He was just warming up for his grand blunder in Holland. Over 4800 good men lost in the battle for Caen. Over 17000 lost in Operation Market Garden. Ike was a damn fool to support Monty's plan instead of trusting Patton to get the job done right.

[@orwellboy1958]

Urban myth. Market Garden was not Montys plan it was Boy Browning's, Monty was only involved in the early stages of planning. As for Patton, he was a reckless fool and his men hated him for sending them in to battles they could not win just to massage his ego.

[@michaelkenny8540]

So if 5,000 casualties for Monty is bad how much worse was Bradley who lost 10,000 men at Brest?

[@michaelkenny8540]

If 17,000 casualties for Monty at Arnhem is bad then how much worse was Bradley losing 33,000 at Hurtgen?

[@JamesRDavenport]

@@orwellboy1958 Convenient. The head that wears the Crown bears the responsibility. Without Monty's approval, it never would have gone. 'Course if he was as brilliant a general as hailed by his latter day countrymen he could have seen it for the catastrophic blunder it turned out to be and stopped it going forward. Hell, I can see it even excluding 20/20 hindsight. (How many armies throughout history have bogged down in the Netherlands/low countries? Duh. ) Face it, Monty was a cowboy...err...sorry, I suppose you'd all prefer cavalier eah? ;)

[@alawesy]

@@JamesRDavenport People love to criticise Market Garden but the alternatives were not any better. How many tens of thousands of American casualties were suffered in Aachen and at the Hürtgen forest? There was no easy route into Germany and Market Garden offered the most promising reward for the high casualties.

[@staffancallert]

Germans didnt know about the offensive. Some high commanders where on leave. They wouldnt been allowed to if they knew about Goodwood.

[@BHam336]

Yeah buddy! More WW2 docs cuZ history channel stopped doing them a long long time ago. All hail the golden generation!

[@michaelkenny8540]

The History Channel stopped doing them because there were garbage but have no fear KZbin is stuffed full of that old rubbish because it all went to VHS and then DVD and nearly every WW2 film on KZbin uses pirated footage from the History Channel.

[@AtheAetheling]

Lots of ignorant comments here criticising Monty for baseless reasons. And I don’t think your video helped in that regard. The man has had internet idiots calling him a bad general for years now, and he really needs internet historians to actually be accurate about him, not just repeat the same tired myths of his failures. The nonsense of Biddle and Hastings strikes again I suppose. As to the Canadian capture of Caen, you made that sound like a success; when Operation Atlantic has been debated equally as much as what the Brits were doing at Goodwood. Personally, I think both were succesful at what they set out to do, but you shouldn't take a negative view of one and gloss over the other.

[@thomasfoley8316]

What about New Zealand and Australia

[@andymoody8363]

The script is confusing and sloppy. What are 'armoured soldier formations' (5.25)? And what does 'the british anti-aircraft guns turned against panzer tanks' (6.00) mean? This never happened, I think you're getting confused with von Luck's story about getting a German AA battery of 88's to turn on British tanks at Bourgebus ridge, a crucial battle that isn't mentioned. Neither does the weather have anyhting to do with closing down the operation and no mention of the significant losses suffered by the Germans and the fact that they had zero ability to replace them. Finally, with all the footage of Shermans availible why use clips of M3 tanks which had been replaced in the ETO a year earlier?

[@michaelkenny8540]

von Luck placed his (elusive and not seen by anyone but him) guns at Cagny.

[@jimmyyu2184]

But wait, I've got a better idea, "Operation Market Garden"!! Gimme paratroopers; this time. It will work!!

[@philodonoghue3062]

Don’t think Monty would appreciate his name being BernARD as in French not the correct BERNard. Montgomery was never ‘quick’ as an overall battle operational commander. As in Al Alamein, he never moved until he had overwhelming odds in armour and artillery. And after, the groundwork had already been done by previous commanders like Wavell who didn’t yet have adequate let alone massive logistical and ‘sharp end’ preponderance. The latter was the victim of Churchill’s frustration and caprice.

[@kenthigginbotham2754]

WELL SAID!!

[@johnkidd1226]

Tank losses are deceptive. Many with a track knocked off would be counted as a loss in battle by both sides but could be quickly repaired and back in action the next day. Here the Allies had an advantage. They had parts and mechanics for the easily repairable Shermans very close to the front lines while the Germans had to haul their heavier tanks further to the rear by train to make serious repairs, often being out of action for longer periods.

[@Paul-md8de]

Why didn't the Allies just divert around Caen ?

[@Paul-talk]

"struggling to creat a breakthrough,"... exactly. Cobra had nothing to do with it.

[@lilmanbazooka7944]

Can?

[@michaelkenny8540]

5:40 start with 3 Armoured Divisions and then reduced to 2 Armoured Regiments? 3 Armoured Divisions is 12 Tank Regiments and if only 2 were left that meant 10 Tank Regiments were lost which is nonsense.

[@alawesy]

I think he meant that because of poor coordination/communication the spearhead was being led by just two regiments not 12 as the forward units had put some distance between them and the other 10?

[@WgCdrLuddite]

Each Armoured Division had 1 Armoured Brigade (Regiment has a different meaning in the British Army). So the tip of the advance was by 2 Armoured Brigades.

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@WgCdrLuddite 11 AD at the front, Guards AD following with 7th AD at the back. Each AD had 3 Tank Rgts in the Armoured Brigade but also a 4th Tank Rgt as the Divisional Recce Rgt. So 4 tank Rgts x 3 = 12 Tank Rgts.

[@WgCdrLuddite]

@@michaelkenny8540 Using the word Regiment like that will confuse non-Brits. The actual size of those Regiments is a battalion. So the tip of the advance was 6 battalions, as 7th Armoured Division never really got engaged. He isn't saying the other battalions were lost, just that they weren't engaged.

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@WgCdrLuddite When writing about any Army you use the term the way that Army uses them.

[@DUBEE43]

How do troops survive bombardment so well????

[@II_Hylander]

In modern times with computer/laser guided munitions a bombardment of that scale would obliterate, but back in WW2 you were only using radio communication, maps and your eyes to direct fire. With the bombs from planes most of them after the first wave would of fell off target the artillery may of fallen short or far many variables.

[@DUBEE43]

@@II_Hylander Makes sense, thanks

[@iberiksoderblom]

We dig down and/or stay away from the obvieous targets that will be hit.

[@henryturnerjr3857]

Every single battle in WW2, Korea and Vietnam someone is always quoted as saying "We bombarded them so much that noone could possibly survive!" Oops! Wrong again!

[@SteveDorrans]

It very much depends how close the shells land to you plus how well you have been able to dig in. Not many survive an artillery shell to the noggin.

[@johnhehir508]

Operation Goodwood name after Goodwood race track perhaps?

[@michaelkenny8540]

There was a book of random code-words that could be used. They learned a lesson from the Germans who used to give code-words to their secret weapons that gave away details of how they worked. A randon code word means that mistake was never made by the Allies

[@scottfryar4294]

USAAF = United States Army Air Forces. You said 'United States Armed Air Forces' twice. Details are important in historical accounts. I do watch continuously your various channels, I hope you take this as constructive.

[@0Zolrender0]

Stop showing Lee Grants if you are talking about DDay ops.

[@marvwatkins7029]

Monte was at his best in N. Africa. After that, to put it nicely, not so much.

[@anthonyadverse4449]

Must be after the festival of speed :)

[@waynegoddard4065]

How far we have come?

[@simonrooney7942]

Well a story about Normandy but shows t-34 and m3 grant tanks with panzer 3 - why??

[@covercalls88]

In many of their videos they mix films from other battles. Sometimes it is not that easy to find footage from the actual battles.

[@ilfarmboy]

Monty also blew it with Market Garden

[@spaolozzi53]

13.000 tanks!?! Divide that by 10.

[@Paul-talk]

Not correct. Cobra was planned separatly, and occured a week later, and the tanks allegedly held at Caen all went to Mortain.

[@benderbendingrofriguez3300]

can you make avideo about Project GAMMA? Also known as the Green baret affair.

[@richardcurry4912]

Did France request "liberation" from the Allies? Thought not. The Allies totally destroyed one of neutral France's most ancient cities murdering tens of thousands of French civilians.

[@maggotman9100]

Caen is pronounced the same as “khan” in English and has a silent “n” in French, not “can.”

[@mikeyerke3920]

Thank goodness he wasn’t taking about Ypres!

[@manowa3395]

I pronounced it like Caine lol, whoops

[@Sickofsociety1]

"Only" losing 25 bombers? 🤨 That's pretty severe.

[@robertwaid3579]

Great explanation, of a very Crucial piece of the puzzle, on Engagements of the Western Front! I agree 👍 with others that Montgomery, was Pompous, maybe Eccentric and a lot of BS. But now looking back? Over those Campaigns, and the Men who fought them? We are now told so many things, n informed so much better of the situations, logistics it took, the Terrain involved? What units, & capabilities, the Opposing Forces had, and could bring in? My contention and point here is that along with many other Great n Talented Officer's? Montgomery was No Better?, nor was He any Worse? Than the Rest! On the same notion they were all "Following Orders", from the Higher Command Structure. All Wars have taught Us (meaning mankind) that they are? Gigantic One's and small one's, games of Chess! Pitting opponents against Each Other, to determine an Outcome to Thier Difference's n ideals, or whatever they tell Us it was About. I do not agree with War, or Fighting anymore! Of course I'm saying this from the perspective of being a Sixty Three year old Adult. My generation was the Post WWII, Korea, Baby Boomers! I grew up through the Sixties n Seventies, when the World was Fighting, too stem Communist Aggression, all over the Planet!! To be very Candid? What did any of the Last say major Conflicts? Achieve, Resolve, or in the past do except for stall another eventual Conflict. Excuse Me please? I don't have the answers just Like so many of our Other's. IF Mankind would Truly, Try too Get Along, Always, without the Crap? I think we could do it. Well I've preached my Piece. Thank you. Wyo. Robert.🇨🇦🇺🇸🇨🇦🇺🇸👀👀🙏🙏🤔🤔

[@aldosigmann419]

no no no 13,000 tanks ? - uh uh ..

[@ethanwaynehunt4413]

You don't hear about this from Patton 360 from the history channel at all More forgotten history from the Brits and Canadians of operation goodwood Shalom peace

[@jarraandyftm]

Hold on! So you’re telling me that the British and Canadians fought in ww2 with America!?

[@somethingelse4878]

They also paid for DDay, but not much is said about that

[@csjrogerson2377]

Yeah, I'm with you. From what I'd heard, I thought the Yanks won the entire war (Western Front, Eastern Front, North Africa, Far East, Pacific Theatre, North Atlantic and all the air wars) all on their own. In fact with just 2 troopers, Sgt A Murphy with an empty Thompson SMG and 2 hand grenades, by tea-time.

[@boyd21]

@@csjrogerson2377 yep, we did we are awesome !!!

[@wolfganggugelweith8760]

Brave German Soldiers!

[@ret7army]

A Nit: USAAF was the United States Army Air Force, which later after WWII became the US Air Force.

[@stevep5408]

I thought Caen was a first day objective of the British on D-Day? Monty seems to have a penchant to underestimate his opponents in any kind of maneuver battle? Even air supremecy didn't seem to assist him in his attempt to push back his adversary?

[@michaelkenny8540]

How wrong can you be? Monty was the ground commander in Normandy June-July-August. In that time he exceeded all the pre-D-Day 'Phase Lines' and got to Paris ahead of schedule. Please tell me how that is 'underestimating' the Germans and is just an 'attempt' to push them back. The usual way the ill-informed make this kind of argument is to seek out all the bits that did not go as well as planned and then relentlessly concentrate on these examples to the total exclusion of all the 90% of things that did go as planned. In short they look for fault because that is all they are interested in. Envy drives such people.

[@AndyJarman]

Caen is pronounced con, not can. Cannes is at the opposite end of France and is pronounced can.

[@danor6812]

The French people still aren't too happy with the bombing of Caen. Even though the Allies dropped leaflets telling the people (civilians) to leave before the bombing. Most didn't and around 70% of the population died in the bombings. It's still a sore spot with them.

[@johndawes9337]

bs..roughly 700 died due to the bombing

[@davidwolf2562]

Montgomery was susposed to take Caen from day one but hesitated as he always did as he insisted he needed more troops although all other commanders accomplished their objectives ... Ike has to take over and make him attack ... Monty kept making excuses for over a week while the troops in the West were held down because good ole Monty wasn't attacking Caen in the east ... Monty cost allie"s lives more than once

[@michaelkenny8540]

What a load of ill-informed tosh. You make up facts to support your crazy claims. For instance you seem unaware that Montgomery was in charge of all troops in Normandy until September 1st 1944. GIGO.

[@RobertEWaters]

That's the United States ARMY Air Force. The U.S. Air Force wasn't a separate branch of the service until after the war.

[@beachboy0505]

Missing notes 📝 😕: Montgomery was the overall commander in Normandy, directly under Eisenhower. He could defeat any German or Italian commander with the least casualties. Even his missed deadlines were still victories.

[@spudtaterson6281]

I don't know market garden didn't work out so well.

[@Lidds1973]

@@spudtaterson6281 MG wasn’t planned by Monty. Please read a book

[@spudtaterson6281]

@@Lidds1973 I checked a book and the internet and they both say I'm right. If it wasn't Montgomery who was it?

[@Swift-mr5zi]

@@spudtaterson6281 Monty did not plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery’s relations with the commander of Second TAF, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, were poor, and he was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF. It was Bereton and Williams who: - decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. - rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. - chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. - Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. - Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Robin Neilland’s The Battle for the Rhine 1944: “In early September Montgomery had a plan ready for employing airborne forces-Operation Comet-and some details of Comet should be noted here. Comet called for the 1st Airborne Division and Sosabowski’s 1st Polish Parachute Brigade to seize the Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges, using gliders for coup de main attacks, landing close to the bridges, rather as Pegasus Bridge at Benouville had been taken by the 6th Airborne Division on D-Day. Once the bridges had been taken the parachute brigades would land on nearby DZs (drop-zones) and join up with the glider parties to hold the bridges until the ground forces arrived. In the Comet plan, Brigadier ‘Shan’ Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was tasked to take the road bridge over the Maas at Grave, landing on a DZ just 1,000 yards from the north end of the bridge-which, hopefully, had just been taken by a force from the 1st Air Landing Brigade in four gliders landing at the south end of the bridge. Operation Comet was planned for 10 September; then it was called off and replaced one week later by Market Garden. The Comet plan stuck to the basic airborne rule-land as close to the objective as possible-and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge-take both ends at once. In view of the subsequent arguments over the deployment of 1st Airborne at Arnhem, one cannot but wonder why the Comet plans for taking the bridges with one reinforced British division, using glider coup de main tactics, were regarded as far too risky for an airborne assault by three Allied airborne divisions just one week later? It has to be clearly understood that taking the bridges on the road to Arnhem was only a means to an end. The final aim was to establish Second Army just west of the Rhine, north of Arnhem, and just south of the Ijsselmeer (or Zuider Zee). Once there, having outflanked the West Wall, which petered out some distance to the south, Second Army could either turn south-east to outflank the Ruhr, or head due east towards Berlin. Any decision on its final destination would rest with General Eisenhower. Having elected to use the Airborne Army, Montgomery had first to decide where to cross the Rhine. His own preference was for a crossing east of Arnhem, close to the town of Wesel, and Wesel was also the choice of Dempsey in Second Army. Wesel lay just south “of the Ruhr and was the better option for Garden, with fewer canals and an easier approach to the river. However, Wesel lay within the Ruhr anti-aircraft gun flak belt and the airborne planners stated that low-flying and slow-moving glider-tugs and parachute aircraft would suffer severe losses if Wesel were chosen (readers should note that Wesel was chosen for the last airborne operation of the war, the Rhine crossing in March 1945, when the US 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions were dropped around the town). Therefore, since the air planners-specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command-had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp, a route that would require the crossing of some wide rivers or canals: the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, the Willems canal at Veghel, the River Maas at Grave, the Maas-Waal canal, the River Waal at Nijmegen and the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) at Arnhem (the Waal is the southern arm of the Rhine, which divides in two to form the Waal and Neder Rijn, some distance upstream of Arnhem). There were, in addition, any number of minor streams and canals restricting movement off the main north-south axis. “The point to note here is the destruction of the first Arnhem myth. The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders-and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges. Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges. This decision had some dire effects. The obvious one is that it gave some airborne units-most notably 1st Airborne-a long way to go through enemy territory before they even got to their prime objective. If that were all it would have been bad enough, but there was more. It also deprived the airborne soldiers of that other airborne asset, surprise. Once on the ground, airborne units lack mobility: instead of swooping from the sky onto their objectives in a matter of minutes, the men of 1st Airborne had to march there from distant DZs, and this took hours. Long before they reached the bridges over the Neder Rijn the enemy were fully alert. In addition, one of the other prime assets of an airborne division is that it can leap over obstacles that would hinder a ground force by landing on both sides of “a river bridge at once, which the 82nd Airborne did at the Grave bridge, but not at the Nijmegen bridge. At Arnhem both these assets were lost by the Air Force commanders choice of DZs, but the choice of the Arnhem drop and landing zones was not made by Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division. Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops. This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units. Among other tasks, these ground-attack aircraft could have taken on the flak positions around the bridges, those anti-aircraft guns the air planners were so wary of. But the truly dire effect was, as Julian Thompson relates: ‘that the 1st Airborne Division was denied the use of a weapon the Germans, after their Normandy experience, dreaded. The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’ ... “Ideally, an airborne force, be it battalion, brigade, division or corps, should be landed in one lift. For Market it was judged impossible to fly in all the Allied airborne units in one lift as there were not enough aircraft available. In fact, it was judged impossible to land any of the Allied Airborne divisions intact on the first day. This difficulty was put down to a shortage of transport aircraft and glider tugs, but the problem actually went further than that. The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews-and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two-to three-day deployment-an attack by instalments-was throwing this vital asset away. This decision would have some profound effects on the ground, most notably on Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.” - The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson. “General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”

[@Swift-mr5zi]

@@spudtaterson6281 On the failure of the US 101st Airborne to capture the Som bridge intact: “Montgomery’s proposal was for the US 101st Airborne to be strung out like a kite string over a 30 mile stretch. Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of US 101st Airborne, protested against such an extreme dispersion of his division. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery,who agreed to let the matter be settled by direct discussion Taylor and General Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on September 12th.” -Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, not Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning. They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stooped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked. Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea. Eisenhower: “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions. Of course it was not 100% guaranteed to succeed but it had a good chance to succeed, if only certain things were executed a bit better, such as the 82nd capturing the Nijmegen bridge early when only around 20 German troops were guarding it. Beyond the initial broad outline, Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders. Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are the ones who should be vilified, not Montgomery. It was their decisions that screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success. Also, if the 101st had seized the Son bridge as planned, XXX Corps would have been in Nijmegen 12 hours earlier. Being at Nijmegen 12 hours earlier, XXX Corps still would have seen the Germans had poured south into Nijmegen and manned the Nijmegen bridge. So, if XXX Corps immediately started to seize Nijmegen bridge, they would have reached Arnhem 12 hours earlier, meaning the would have relived the 1st Airborne. Contay to many popular myths XXX Core was not late to Nijmegen, they were exactly on time. They had early setbacks but they made up for their time quickly, If the 101st and 82nd had done their jobs properly, seizing both bridges, XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem at the end of the 2nd day. Then a bridgehead over the Rhine established.

[@dkramerstein]

And now it’s game over

[@terry_willis]

Good show Monty, good show. 😕

[@markpaul8178]

At the end of this operation the allies found out a lot about the different soldiers fighting for the Germans.From every country occupied by the Germans were soldiers who were given a choice.Fight for us,or go to a concentration camp to starve.Koreans were also amongst the p.o.w.s.And once these soldiers could get away,or shoot their German commanders,they surrendered.Normally,the Germans would put two leaders per platoon.

[@paulleckner9148]

This is mentioned in passing in the movie Saving Private Ryan. The actors in German uniforms said they were from Czechoslovakia.

[@paulbarthol8372]

I think it has been said that Montgomery was either the best WW1 general the British had in WW2 or the best general the Germans had. The American version was McArthur.

[@boyd21]

He helped the Germans

[@togodamnus]

As if Mark Clark or any of the others could have done any better? No plans survives contact with the enemy. ...

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@boyd21 GIGO

[@minbannister3625]

Lonnie Donegan was a prisoner of war?

[@mazack00]

No subtitles means thumbs down.

[@CaseyTheBrash]

You said, "goodwood."

[@whotknots]

Bad to disastrous planning and outcomes seemed to comprise a disturbing proportion of Montgomery's campaigns yet someone or something else was always to blame for his 'misfortunes'. Although Montgomery was lauded as a great and popular commander by politicians of the time, history indicates otherwise and universal popularity claimed for him seems to have been anything but the case with a considerable proportion of troops unfortunate enough to be subject to his command.

[@michaelkenny8540]

Another man who gets all his facts from the film 'Patton'.