Phenomenal Conservatism

[@noah5291]

I had a dream last night where you talked to Jack Angstriech about moderate realism and relativism and you ended up getting pissed off at him.

[@KaneB]

I have actually spoken to him about relativism before, but neither of us got pissed off.

[@saimbhat6243]

That is a great philosophical content right there. I liked it very much. P.S: "Intellectual seemings" is an oxymoron. It cannot be just SEEMING and INTELLECTUAL at same time. It is similar to saying something like RATIONAL SEEMING, seeming is phenomenological, how can something be phenomenological and intellectual simultaneously. While as sensational seemings can standardized and cross-correlated between different observers, intellectual seemings remain truly subjective if they even exist.

[@ElodieHiras]

37:00 of all possible places, Pornography brings up similar considerations, and a possible answer to it. There is a fetish called "Altered Common Sense", which is a subfetish of mind-control/hypnosis/Brainwashing fetish. The ACS sub-fetish centers around controlling someone's actions by controlling their perception of reality, AKA controlling someone's actions by controlling their seemings. And I guess that's why of all possible MC/hypno/brainwash fetishes, this one is the one that scares me most. ACS is explicitly about pulling Verity-type stunts. But the suppression and/or falsification of evidence in general is a realistic scenario, and brings up a very difficult question. When the evidence has been deliberately made unavailable, is the person whom did not have access to it responsible for their own seemings/beliefs?

[@rodolfo9916]

How to prove that phenomenological experience exist without making a circular argument in which we presuppose that we do have phenomenological experience? Besides, if all our beliefs are based on phenomenological experience, then how to know what is a phenomenological experience?

[@Wherrimy]

This is phenomenal

[@KaneB]

Thanks!

[@TylerMillhouse]

At least it seems to be! ;)

[@projectionofthemind]

Thanks for the video. It seems… that PC is a form of pragmatism in the sense that it doesnt ground itself in an ontology but rather just says: here is an appearance/seeming and i have to make a choice with the condition at hand. In doesn’t go further because it would be unproductive/unreasonable to reach the point where you are “forced” to take no action because of the redundant nature of skepticism (asking why ad infinitum). Is is fair to say that the main difference between PC and pragmatism is that PC just says let’s assume the appearance is enough justification, and pragmatism says it doesnt matter if something is justified as long as there is “net benefit” in a situation?

[@KaneB]

I'm no expert on pragmatism, but I think a key difference between PC and pragmatist is that PC is foundationalist and internalist. Pragmatists tend to reject the view that there are states that can serve as the foundational "building blocks" of the rest of knowledge, and they tend to think of knowledge as a social phenomenon. Also, I've never really thought of pragmatism as claiming that justification doesn't matter. It's either that they give an account of justification where this is understood with reference to utility and norms of inquiry, or that they say that it's sometimes rational to hold beliefs beyond what can be justified.

[@benayakoren5045]

It seem to me that pragmatism also very silently assume PC, as you can not deduce what is effective without having some idea what is the case, at least in some shallow sense. Assuming away the problem of induction is indeed very useful, but only if induction actually works - which sure seem to be the case...

[@jojomojojones]

When you use a ruler to measure the two lines, don’t you just get more “seeming” ? Using a ruler, the two lines seem to be the same length, but are they really? Why aren’t the little arrows at the end of the lines considered defeaters to the seeming of equalness?

[@mmiv37]

Good question. I think you right; it's "seemings all the way down." If there are conflicting defeaters, I think we go with the one that seems more likely. In this case, we might know that the lines are a popular optical illusion and we might trust that we're reading the ruler correctly. Given that, it SEEMS we should go with what the ruler shows us. But the door is still open for the ruler to be defeated. I mean, the printer doesn't print lines of the exact same length, and... do we need glasses?... ...and we can keep falling down this pit until we stop ourselves with pragmatism.

[@jocr1971]

because the arrows on the ends are not a part of the question "are the lines( implicit exclusion of arrows) equal in length"

[@StatelessLiberty]

As far as I can see phenomenal conservatism doesn’t solve these skeptical puzzles. The anti-skeptic says “it seems like I have hands, so I’m justified in believing I have hands.” But what would “seeming like I’m a brain in a vat” be like? It would be exactly the same. So the skeptic can say “it seems like I’m a brain in a vat, so I’m justified in believing I’m a brain in a vat.”

[@TruSoleSeven]

Is it any trouble for the view delimited here that "seems" can be ambiguous? I might say, in the case of the Muyer illusion, that the top line "seems" longer than the bottom one. That "seeming," once defeating knowledge has been acquired, is implied to be a mere seeming. Although I know that the lines are of equal length, the seeming remains intact qua mere appearance. However, there are also cases where my expressing that it "seems" that P is actually just a way of expressing that I believe P, and the belief has been formed on the basis of a seeming.

[@daman7387]

It seems (hah) to me that as long as we clarify that we mean the first sense and not the second, there's no problem here

[@mohammadsultan935]

What's the difference between this and foundationalism?

[@KaneB]

Phenomenal conservatism is a form of foundationalism.

[@darcyone6291]

1) this a related question to the self-defeating argument. Consider people's beliefs 3000 years ago, when they had no defeaters against the seeming that the sun revolves around the earth, what would the PC theorist say about that, and more importantly what does this example says about us? Maybe this has to do with the PC being a theory of what is justified, not necessarily with what is true, but I wonder if this is satisfactory, at least from the PC point of view! This point is one reason why I'm lately considering some kind of antirealism about knowledge because, it seems to me that all we can talk about is how we perceive and think of different propositions, without access to whether or not these propositions are actually true, and this is seems to be just like saying we can only talk about justification, not knowledge! 2) also I have some questions related to the first Verity's case that have been puzzling me lately! So, consider a person who is considering a moral question, such as whether slavery is morally wrong or not. Suppose they carefully considered both the arguments for and against each position, and they came to believe one of them. Now suppose that the one they believed is the false one! (I know you're a moral antirealist but I think you won't mind the question.) We can say that this person made some sort of epistemic error, but making false conclusions isn't supposed to be morally wrong, right? So if that person weighted the arguments both and against slavery and they ended up endorsing that slavery is good (and let's assume it's actually bad or at least in some sense inferior), how can we deal with this case?

[@KaneB]

(1) Most phenomenal conservatives will accept that those people were justified in believing that the Earth is the fixed center of the universe. I don't see this result as particularly counterintuitive, to be honest -- I take it that most epistemologists will want to allow that there can be false beliefs that are nevertheless justified, and belief in the stationary Earth, prior to the Copernican Revolution, looks like a plausible candidate for a false but justified belief. Truth as it's usually conceived depends on the way the world is, independently of us, but of course we have no independent access to reality: the most we can do is provide justification for our beliefs; we can't step outside our own minds and demonstrate that the beliefs we take to be justified do in fact correspond to a mind-independent world. (2) Yes, I suspect that the phenomenal conservative will say that Verity has probably made an epistemic error. Whether this is morally wrong will depend on whether our favoured moral theory says that there are moral constraints on belief-formation. I think a lot of philosophers would say that drawing false conclusions can be morally wrong, especially if a person is epistemically irresponsible (I suppose we can just stipulate that in this case, Verity has done her best to be diligent, and to consider all the evidence and arguments in a fair way). However, this is tangential to phenomenal conservatism -- the phenomenal conservative will just say that whatever the right moral theory is, its justification can rest on seemings (moral intuitions). Of course, this does mean that if Verity has the right initial seemings -- say, she begins with the strong intuition that slavery is acceptable -- then by the lights of phenomenal conservatism, it might be reasonable for her to conclude that slavery is acceptable. But in most realistic scenarios, Verity will have plenty of defeaters for such intuitions.

[@darcyone6291]

How about the antirealist proposition "we can talk only about how we think about things, not about things themselves"? I know this sounds just like Kant is talking, but I wonder what other epistemological approaches you know about that endorse this approach!

[@darcyone6291]

And by "things" I don't mean only the external world, but also concepts, rationality, etc!

[@Doctor.T.46]

Phenomenal conservatism as a philosophical approach can be supported/defended by the use of thought experiment...or am I wrong in that thinking?

[@KaneB]

In principle, you could thought experiments to defend or criticize anything. I think most philosophers will appeal to thought experiments when assessing epistemological theories. The case of Verity the religious extremist is a thought experiment.

[@Doctor.T.46]

@@KaneB Thanks Doc. When I think of thought experiments I think of Wittgenstein's beetle. Even John Rawls' Theory of Justice is effectively a thought experiment. A very underestimated method of philosophical investigation. I think many philosophers resist it because it sounds too much like scientific method. I'm hoping to use it in connection with the mind-body debate...from an eliminative materialism perspective.

[@legendary3952]

What is the difference between Phenomenal Conservatism and Principle of all Principles? Never understood the latter. This vid improves my understanding of PC so 😎

[@KaneB]

I don't think I've ever heard of the Principle of All Principles.

[@maxmax9050]

It seems to me that PC is false. PC seeming false is prima facie justification for the belief that PC is false. In order that PC seem false, PC must be true. PC is both true and false, which is a contradiction. Rote seeming cannot be the basis of justification. That... seems... to me the course of the self-defeat objection, and it is compelling to me at this moment. I do sympathize with the "empircist" response you briefly spoke of. Yes, all of our beliefs will be beliefs on the involving seemings, but not all seemings are justifiers. Therefore, seeming is not the sufficient basis of justified belief.

[@maxmax9050]

Nvm this argument doesn't work. I still think PC is false though, for other reasons.

[@Lojak-exe]

THIS IS THE ONE I BEEN WAITING FOR, LETS GOOOOOOO!!!!!!

[@Doctor.T.46]

I've just checked your channel and subscribed. Interestingly I subscribe to the same channels as you.

[@Lojak-exe]

@@Doctor.T.46 That actually means a lot and you have great taste in KZbin philosophy channels! I'm nowhere near kane's level but im gonna try to get there lol

[@Doctor.T.46]

@@Lojak-exe That's exactly the right attitude to have. Thank you for sharing your experience and expertise with the rest of us. That means a lot. I have spent a lifetime in science and now I'm studying for an MA I philosophy, to get a more rounded approach to life. People like you are helping me on that journey...so sincere thanks.

[@Lojak-exe]

@@Doctor.T.46 Hey! that made my day! :) Hope your studies go well, and it was nice meeting you!!

[@dummyaccount.k]

you should go on the Emerson Green Podcast

[@razi_kr]

Which theory of justification you find most plausible?

[@KaneB]

None. My view is that no beliefs have justification, but that there is nothing irrational about holding beliefs without justification.

[@otavioraposo6163]

@@KaneB so you can believe some propositions without any justification and still be rational? Not even the appearances are required? Wouldn't that be still more permissive than PC?

[@KaneB]

​@@otavioraposo6163 Yes, that's my view, and yes, it's presumably more permissive than PC. The central motivation for it is that I think skepticism wins the argument, but I'm not willing to just suspend judgment on everything. I enjoy holding beliefs. So I say it's fine to just take a shot in the dark and accept beliefs for whatever reason takes your fancy, or no reason at all.

[@otavioraposo6163]

@@KaneB wouldn't your view amount to saying that all beliefs have equal justification? So it doesn't matter if you prove a mathematical theorem with rigorous logic or just consult a seer about it? How can we talk about rationality in this case?

[@thomistica597]

@@KaneB lmao

[@maze2512]

can you do a video on axiology?

[@KaneB]

Don't I already have a bunch of videos on axiology? I take it that ethics and metaethics are part of axiology.

[@deepfritz225]

Based + redpilled

[@telosbound]

I agree!

[@JumperDorian]

Based and sodapoppilled

[@blyysm]

baesd means high on crack.. 🤮🤮🤮🤮

[@randomMERRYgirl3po]

did you change the color of the thumbnail as a visual metaphor lmao are you gaslighting us or am i legitimately crazy and making things up, i did smoke hella weed

[@squatch545]

I love how Michael Huemer always seems to believe in dubious philosophy theories.

[@jmike2039]

Yeah like souls

[@chrismathew2295]

I wonder if you're aware of any responses to the cognitive penetration argument?

[@KaneB]

See e.g. Matthew McGrath, "Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The "Bad Basis" Counterexamples". It's freely available on PhilPapers.

[@snippletrap]

The Verity example doesn't bother me. Yes, her beliefs seem justified to her. They seem unjustified to others. So what?

[@dummyaccount.k]

yeah, about that belief justifying itself: seems accurate as thats how brains brain

[@eyesofnihility]

Find the end of this hilarious for some reason

[@yourfutureself3392]

Very interesting video

[@H4KK3-jq2il]

What's the principle of all this ? Everyone here makes "propositions" about whether such "propositions" can be reliable and justified or not; like there's nothing nonsensical here. It seems to me that everyone here already knows, rely and are justified in certain previous set of principles and(or) propositons.

[@justus4684]

How would a PC justify the proposition "PC is true"? If with PC, then they beg the question If not with PC, then PC is false At least that seems to be true to me 🙃

[@felixsanchez4805]

Well it depends on what view you take in epistemology. Someone like Michael huemer would say that Perceptual beliefs on his view are foundational meaning that they do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. They do however depend on perceptual experiences for justification. And because perceptual beliefs are foundational by his lights they are going to be justified which would justify his seemings about PC seeming to be true.

[@KaneB]

It seems like if this is a problem, it's a problem for any epistemological theory whatsoever? So I'm not sure this tells against PC specifically.

[@Aranchia92]

It all comes down to Munchausens trilemma, no?

[@justus4684]

@@KaneB Hm Yeah sure 😄

[@justus4684]

@@felixsanchez4805 Yeah that makes sense

[@justus4684]

Finally

[@DaKoopaKing]

More like phenomenal dogmatism

[@IdoDarklyCute]

"Slavery seems to me morally wrong" - instant dislike. 🙄

[@Sui_Generis0]

?

[@jonathacirilo5745]

​​@@Sui_Generis0 maybe they wanted some more objective? or maybe they racist or something like that? idk.