3 David Hume on Causation - Reid's Critique of Hume (Dan Robinson)

Professor Dan Robinson gives the third in a series of 8 lectures on Thomas Reid's critique of David Hume at Oxford in 2014. Causality arises from a habit of the mind formed by repeated experiences. “There is nothing in any objects to persuade us, that they are either always remote or always contiguous; and when from experience and observation we discover, that their relation in this particular is invariable, we, always conclude there is some secret cause, which separates or unites them…”
Under “David Hume”, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins with, “The most important philosopher ever to write in English”. His most formidable contemporary critic was the fellow Scot, Thomas Reid, the major architect of so-called Scottish Common Sense Philosophy. The most significant features of Hume’s work, as understood by Reid, are the representive theory of perception, the nature of causation and causal concepts, the nature of personal identity and the foundations of morality. Each of these topics is presented in a pair of lectures, the first summarizing Hume’s position and the second Reid’s critique of that position.
All Lectures: • Reid's Critique of Hum...
#Philosophy #Hume #Causation

[@Ignirium]

I love this guy, i find it a joy to listen to him.

[@die_schlechtere_Milch]

I agree, I haven't learned much about Hume in this lecture, which was probably the supposed topic, I don't know if I gathered any new information from all his talk, but the way how he talks, he seems to be just some really cool and chill dude, who has a lot of interesting associations.

[@ErnestRamaj]

Where did those lectures on David Hume himself go?

[@die_schlechtere_Milch]

The power, by which one object produces another is never discoverable from their idea; and even two objects, tho' perfectly resembling each other may be numerically distinct.

[@helpconflict9851]

thanks

[@jamestagge3429]

ANY THOUGHTS?....................1. Hume surrenders to the understanding that entities are distinct in what they are and by that, that which they are not. A square is distinctively that which it is for its characteristics (squareness) and that which it is not, possessing no characteristics of a circle (circleness). 2. That an entity can be that which it is distinctively and not other things is due to its “distinctive” physical characteristics or physicality. E.g., the billiard ball in his analogous refutation of the deterministic nature of cause and effect is distinctively just that, a billiard ball and not an apple or beach ball or the like. 3. He thus, by definition, accepted that entities are that which they are by the assertion of their form and function (characteristics) into materiality (quantum mechanics validates this unequivocally). Were this not so, he could not have appealed to them that they would be employed in his propositions. 4. He also, by definition, accepted that entities are material, i.e., physical, defined by their physical characteristics (a ball is round and not square, etc.) or they could not be considered at all and could not be participants in his propositions. That he specifically chose billiard balls for the players in his analogy demonstrates his acceptance of this (above) as a recognition. 5. By this he submitted to the understanding that motion for being intangible, could NOT be a characteristic of the billiard ball which is moving but a phenomenon in the context of consideration, it moving toward a stationary billiard ball that it might cause it to move when struck. Motion of the billiard ball in this context is only a phenomenon of concern with the billiard balls physicality or characteristics. 6. Given the above, we know analytically that the motion of the billiard ball had to have been imparted to it by the force of another entity of which it was concerned when it struck the billiard ball. 7. Thus, by that same means by which the motion of the billiard ball was imparted to it by a prior entity also effected by motion, it would be imparted to the stationary billiard ball by the moving billiard ball. 8. We are able then to induce that the stationary billiard ball would in fact move if struck by the first because of the nature of motion as opposed to that of the physicality of the billiard balls for we know analytically that motion cannot be a part or characteristic of the physicality of the billiard balls but only an imparted phenomenon. So if it was imparted to the first billiard ball by it being struck, so too would it be imparted to the second when being struck.

[@jamestagge3429]

YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT, BUT SIMPLER...............Hume defined an analogy employing two billiard balls and claimed our inability to know unequivocally via induction that a second stationary ball, ball 2 would be made to move if struck by a moving ball, ball 1. Both balls were on a level billiard table. Hume chose the billiard balls for his analogy to the exclusion of all other possible objects, e.g., crochet balls, bricks, rocks, apples, etc. How was he able to do this? Because all of those objects are distinct in their physicality/characteristics and in that, different from each other in some measure. If then he made that choice it was by his recognition of his ability to distinguish between them, the characteristics consequent of their form and function. So, there can be no claim by anyone that he did not or could not know of or respect their physicality, i.e., their physical characteristics. Hume also defined one of the balls, ball 1 as moving and ball 2 as stationary (initially). By definition then, he knew of the phenomenon of motion and that it effected an object’s physical status in a given context of consideration. He then claimed that we could not know via induction that should ball 1 strike ball 2 that it would cause the latter to move, that we could only expect that it would but due only to our experience in witness to such. So, again, Hume knew of the characteristics of the billiard balls which he would have had to, to have chosen them as opposed to all other objects. He also acknowledged his understanding of the phenomenon of motion (of ball 1) for it is structural to the analogy and since he knew of the physical characteristics of the balls (by which he chose them), he would have had to have known that motion was NOT part of those characteristics for it is intangible and only “of concern for” or “about” the physicality of the ball. He knew that ball 1 was moving and though exactly the same in all physical respects to ball 2, ball 2 was NOT moving but stationary. Why? because motion had been imparted to ball 1. In other words, motion was connected in some way to the ball which was moving (there cannot be motion without its object (without the object moving)) and motion was an effect of the progressive change of the physical status of the ball in a particular context. If then the motion was NOT a physical characteristic of ball 1 and was a phenomenon which was not present in a ball being itself (as with ball 2 which was stationary before being struck by ball 1), in and of itself. Absent some imposition upon ball 1 which was otherwise in its natural state, or stationary, BY DEFINITION, motion has to have been imparted to ball 1 (motion was not there otherwise). By our understanding of this in all that stated above, we know that the motion of ball 1 would have had to have been imparted by another object which struck it (so that object was moving before it struck ball 1), imparting that motion. Remember that ball 1 could not have merely started moving by itself with no interaction of other objects because motion is a phenomenon not part of the physicality of the ball but rather “about it”. The motion had to have come from somewhere and something. After being struck, the motion was there. The only source of the motion was the object which struck it which possessed the phenomenon of motion prior to the strike. Thus we know unequivocally that ball 1 striking ball 2 would cause it to move as with the striking of ball 1 by the unnamed object (a pool cue perhaps). Any comments would be very welcome.

[@soleil2947]

Lots of your language here implies the (necessary) existence of 'causal powers'. For example: "motion had been imparted to ball 1" (para 3), "...the motion of ball 1 would have had to have been impacted by another object..." (para 4), "The motion had to have come from somewhere and something" (para 4). Hume is highly suspicious that we have ideas of causal powers of the manner you imply, since the closest thing presented to us in experience is resemblance/contiguity/etc. Side note (but maybe helpful): would you, by the same token, argue that the Universe as a whole must have had something *prior to it* which started its motion? If not, then the universe is an entity whose motion did not have to "have come from somewhere and something [else]". Presumably we can't rule out the possibility that the universe's motion was self-caused simply by making an observation about two billiard balls. This isn't to say your approach is hopeless here. Only that Hume would have some very firmly held and deep objections to your starting point, which you'd need to resolve before evaluating whether your argument works. Hope this helps! [Edit: misspelled "imparted" as "impacted" in 1st sentence. Fixed.]

[@jamestagge3429]

@@soleil2947 I really appreciate your responding. I very much enjoy these discussions. But I think you missed my points. Let me try to explain with greater precision. That by which Hume was able to formulate his proposition and the context in which it functioned and was considered, defines certain necessities that he could not deny OR HE COULD NOT HAVE FORMULATED IT TO BEGIN WITH. Either it is, or it ain’t. 1. He chose to employ in his proposition the concepts of billiard balls specifically to the exclusion of all other things. This cannot be questioned. This means by definition that he had to have recognized and acknowledged the physical characteristics of all of those entities from which he chose the billiard balls or how could he have decided on the billiard balls as opposed to something else such as crochet balls? So the assertion of the form and function of all of those entities in material reality that he had to have perceived (or again, he could not have made the distinct choice he did) was that by which he was able to choose. There is no escaping this. 2. In that he had to have recognized the physicality or physical characteristics of the billiard balls, again, the only means by which he have chosen them to the exclusion of all else, he had to have known that motion was not one of those characteristics (motion is a phenomenon of concern with the physicality of the ball). First, motion is not tangible as is all of that by which the billiard balls were defined in their physicality. Secondly, were motion a characteristic of the billiard balls, both, not just one would have been moving. That the one ball is moving has to have been the effect of a cause of that motion having been imparted. There is no escaping this. 3. Then, that he had to have known that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, he had to have understood that that which imparted that motion was itself a moving entity for which motion was also not a characteristic. I am sorry but this is cause and effect, like it or not. Analogous Hume does I the formulation of is theories is “appeals to truths to formulate a position which denies truth. He doesn’t get to do that anymore than the rest of us. That entities are distinct they are by their characteristics. That they are distinct they are chosen for the “effect” of those distinctions. This is true in impressions. Hume chose balls because they are configured to roll. That is why he did not use bricks are pineapples, etc. That recognition in part defeats his theory of no cause and effect. A final point…..the proposition that ball 1 hitting ball 2 would cause it to move, is inductive only in the most general context of consideration. However, in a sub-context where we consider that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, that is deductive. His theory makes no sense. What do you think?

[@jamestagge3429]

@@soleil2947 As for the source of the universe, I can answer that easily but that would take effort which would have to be separate from this. I would enjoy getting into that with you if you like. Just let me know.

[@soleil2947]

@@jamestagge3429 Regarding this elaboration of your point, I think Hume would interrogate your idea that we have any deep/significant "concept of billiard balls" as "physical" entities. What's in (sensory) experience, for Hume, is Impressions and Ideas. The division between them is that Impressions typically/always have greater subjective 'force' or 'vivacity' (he isn't 100% clear about what he means by this). Ideas, such as what you see in the mind's eye when imagining a unicorn or what's in your experience when you remember seeing a sparrow, are fainter/less-vivacious copies of (combinations of) Impressions. Beyond that division, all there really is to Impressions and Ideas are the kinds of associative or habitual laws/patterns we observe in their succession. How do these Impressions and Ideas relate to physical things? Hume thinks it's a 'vulgar' view (i.e., not acceptable if you're doing proper philosophy) that the senses put us into contact with Physical Substances, or Real Things, or whatever else you'd like to call them, which are separable to and independent from Impressions and Ideas. Our very *notion* of a physical thing, if you trace it back to its psychological source, is just a series of connections between sensory Impressions.Here's a maybe helpful metaphor: the senses give us an array of ever-changing "pixels", and these pixels exhibit patterns that seem to animate "objects". But there aren't really any objects behind the screen, standing apart from the pixels (or, if there are, our senses certainly don't give us access to those objects). All we really have are the pixels arranged in patterns that give us firm expectations about what's coming next, and it's a fiction to think there's some further "Real Thing" behind those patterned appearances which the senses put us in contact with. (N.B., since Hume is an Empiricist, he also doesn't believe any kind of 'pure intellect' or 'reason' could put us in contact with those Real Things in the way someone like Descartes might claim.) On this sort of view, "motion" is just a kind of convenient label for the fact that sometimes similar Impressions appear in one position in visual space, then a nearby one, then a little further, and so on and so forth. The succession of Impressions generates an illusion of *a thing moving* whereas really all there is (or rather, all our senses put us in contact with) is the ever-shifting, instanteneous Impressions. So I think Hume's conceptual scheme is from the ground up very different than what you're working with here. He would probably accuse you of helping yourself to an idea of "Physical Object", "Motion", "Cause", etc., which you haven't properly sourced in the original Impressions (hence, you might be speaking utter nonsense). This isn't to say I agree with Hume: just trying to represent what he'd be likely to say in response to your comment.

[@jamestagge3429]

@@soleil2947 Much thanks for responding again. These exchanges are not just fun but very instructive. Hume formulated an analogy of his theory on cause and effect by formal logic. He appealed to his own and all of our understandings of concepts in that effort, i.e., that there are such things as billiard balls which are distinct from all other things. Also that one ball, ball 1, moving toward a second ball, ball 2 which was stationary, would not necessarily cause the latter to move if struck by the former. It was he who chose billiard balls specifically as opposed to all other things he might have chosen. This demonstrates unequivocally that he recognized billiard balls for their characteristics as such as opposed to the characteristics of all of those other things which were possible choices. If he did not recognize them by their characteristics, how else and why else would he have employed billiard balls in his analogy? That he did, makes the point. That he spoke of impressions rather than the physical things themselves, he had to have agreed that those physical things existed in prerequisite were there to be any impressions which had to have been born of them. I believe that his inferior understanding of the nature of perception, i.e., that it is wholly subjective, is the reason for this. To remedy this, see the very last paragraphs. He defined the context of consideration of his analogy, the issue of the moving ball, ball 1 contacting the stationary ball, ball 2 and making it move, the structure of the entire point of the analogy. That motion was a phenomenon affecting ball 1 and not ball 2 demonstrates unequivocally that motion was not a characteristic of the billiard balls either as physical entities or impressions or both would have been moving AND the discussion as to what would happen to ball 2 if struck by ball 1 would have been impossible for the lack of structure in the analogy. The entire issue or question by which the analogy was defined was whether the force of ball 1 would impart that motion to ball 2 were it struck by ball 1. That is by Hume himself, not some notion of mine. That motion was then understood as not being a characteristic of the billiard balls, there was no other means by which the moving ball could have been moving, if the very logic by which the analogy was formulated were to be respected, but that it was imparted to ball 1 by the force of some other entity. That the force of some other moving entity might have imparted that motion to ball 1 is the same scenario as what Hume himself considered in whether ball 1 would have caused ball 2 to move by having struck it. I think it clear that nested within the inductive implications of this analogy, there were those deductive with regard to the presence of motion. There is no escaping my point. Hume outlined a scheme in which he employed formal logic then in the structure of his analogy, violated or simply ignored its strictures that his analogy would hold together, which if he were true to that logic throughout, it would not. It is easy to formulate a complex, intricate and even subtle scheme which is logical and understood as objective, but when founded on a false premise is useless and wrong. Such is Hume’s philosophy on cause and effect. As I have said twice I think, so I know it’s becoming tedious, he appealed to truths to define a position which denied the existence of truth. Its piffle. So, what do you think? His error in this business of impressions is in his inferior understanding of the nature of perception. Perception is NOT simply subjective, but rather “quantitatively objective” and only “qualitatively subjective”. For example, that we can perceive a square and a circle is because they are distinct/delineable. A square is perceived as such for its “squarness” (physical characteristics) but also for those characteristics which it does not possess, i.e., “circleness”. This is quantitative. That Hume might have claimed that we could not know truly the nature of its squareness is unimportant to my fundamental point. That he and we could and have always along with all others perceived a square as distinct from a circle by virtue of distinct characteristics (squareness) exposes his claim as false. Were this not true, we could not perceive them at all, yet we do. That we perceive the mouse as distinct from the tree is also quantitative. That one might find the tree pretty and another ugly, is qualitative and the only subjective aspect.

[@owlnyc666]

You can't "see" cause like you can't "see" god. "Cause" is necessary " but god is not "necessary" ? You can't "experience" cause, or god?😉😇😎

[@owlnyc666]

Aside from the big inflation the most significant singular event in history is the birth of a person who did not have a human-natural father-concption but had a supernatural father-conception!😇😎💒

[@owlnyc666]

I would agree 124% that Aristotle was a very, very poor Christian. He was a good pagan! 🤔😉😇