BBC Battlefields of WWII 4 Arnhem

[@user-gi5nh6ng7g]

Richard Holmes had a great gift of telling the facts concisely in a way which held the viewers attention. I was very sad to hear he’d passed away.

[@leeroyle9017]

Heroes all of them , I still find it so touching that the children of Holland still tend to the graves of these great and brave men

[@goodwood-rc4nx]

wish someone could find and post the War Walks series Richard did for the BBC

[@johnny5805]

I didn't realize that Professor Richard Holmes died in 2011. His voice is THE voice of war documentaries. RIP.

[@metalbent9078]

+Malau He is greatly missed!

[@alittlebitofhistory]

It really is a shame he passed and pretty young too, I always still expect to see him when a new War Documentary comes on the TV.

[@hey_joe7069]

Yeah Brigadier General Holmes will be missed.

[@terrybiddle2969]

One of those voices that made him a great teacher

[@rossmac3084]

@@metalbent9078 I served with him in the Queens regiment - he was my company commander and a truly inspirational leader of men. We would have followed him to the moon if needs be..top man..!

[@michaeleverest7631]

Very sad Richard Holmes passed away for obvious reasons.. but sad to think of the documentaries he never got to make as every programme he made was excellent!!

[@bridesblade5307]

Yep, what could've been. He is truly missed.

[@72Bigray]

I couldn't agree more...Dan Snow- a pretender to the throne... is poor, not a proper historian for me.. see his programmes- instant turn off for me.

[@BounceBackBelfast]

​@@72Bigray his dad was a better narrator I think. Some of Dan's older stuff is alright

[@ColinFreeman-kh9us]

Holmes and Professor Groves are the most knowledgeable, passionate presenters on any WW2 documentary anywhere. Holmes excelled in this series

[@danjohnston3422]

Frost's defense of the north end of the bridge is yet another of England's favourite things - a bravely fought military disaster.

[@SGTRIP-dh7fz]

I really miss Prof. Holmes A true historian (RIP).

[@bigwoody4704]

yes one of the better historians and good to see major Tony Hibbert - he pointed squarley at Monty throwing the Poles under the bus.It's in a video not long before he died.I've always said Britain had good soldiers Monty wasn't one of them

[@SGTRIP-dh7fz]

@@bigwoody4704 Have you seen the doc series "Last heroes of ww2" Major Hibbert was in that along with several other notable vets.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@SGTRIP-dh7fz Thanx I'll have look when I get the time. Which docu is it they are numbered,do you remember?This is a good honest Docu here,that today's revisionists need to watch

[@JuergenGDB]

What a beautiful generation and time, for all of the hardships and horrors. Also, for those that did not know Richard Holmes volunteered for the TA Territorial Army/Reserves of sorts) and was promoted all the way to Lt. Col by 1986 and later Brigadier. He also had a Phd by 1975 being born in 1945. Very colorful career.

[@Dg-zj6jo]

Richard was the best tells a story like no other

[@ericrichards6252]

These are the men that should be leading or running this country. Never to be seen again.

[@roywall5231]

At least we're not speaking Gernan! A must read book on Market Garden is "it never snows in September". You never understand a battle until you deeply study the enemy, something every book and documentary fails to do.

[@davemac1197]

It Never Snows In September does contain some errors, but it is 'the' pioneering work on the German side of the campaign and an important reference to be recommended. The only problem with it is that Robert Kershaw is a former British Parachute Regiment officer and speaks fluent German (he was a liaison officer with the West German army during the Cold War), but he sometimes counted the same unit twice because German units were often referred to by their official designation, by the name of its commander, or the home base it was located. So his German order of battle for Market Garden should be treated with caution, but it was a fantastic effort treasure trove when first published. I don't think he's an expert on WW2 German vehicles, so he also misidentified the four "assault guns" reinforcing the Nijmegen garrison as being a detachment from Roestel's SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 10. They were indeed Stug IIIG assault guns, but from 7./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10, and not Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers from Roestel's unit, which was attached to 7.Armee in Limburg with all 21 vehicles. If you're aware that 9., and 10.SS-Panzer-Divisions were first raised as Panzergrenadier-Divisions in 1943 and then converted to Panzer-Divisions on Hitler's order, the StuG Abteilung had their assault guns formed into two companies for the new Panzer-Regiment's II.Abteilung, it all makes sense. To be fair to Rob Kershaw, Wilhelm Tieke makes the same mistake in his history of the II.SS-Panzerkorps (In The Firestorm Of The Last Years Of The War, 1975), and he was a veteren of the 9.SS-Panzer-Division himself! The Stugs encountered by XXX Corps south of Eindhoven were from an army Panzerjäger-Abteilung, 559, and not from Roestel's unit as well. This confusion probably stems from the fact that Valkenswaard south of Eindhoven is a similar name to Valkenberg, near Maastricht in Limburg, where Roestel was operating.

[@calengr1]

the terms of the 1940 German armistice did not require the Brit Empire to switch to German from English. See Charley''s book on Churchill

[@bigwoody4704]

Dave Mack you have lied once and that has been continuously.The Gerries point right at the single road and pathetically slow advance and XXX Corp going no further after crossing it. Almost TWO DAYS late *Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.* Monty demanded this operation then with all the backbone of a gummy bear doesn't show up for it when the reality of it coming apart immediately is evident. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation

[@beachcomber1able]

What's wrong with German language anyway. 🤔

[@bigwoody4704]

Dave Mack you have lied once and that has been continuously.The Gerries point right at the single road and pathetically slow advance and XXX Corp going no further after crossing it. Almost TWO DAYS late Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that. Monty demanded this operation then with all the backbone of a gummy bear doesn't show up for it when the reality of it coming apart immediately is evident. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation

[@johncostello3174]

A lot of mistakes were made nd they also ran into some bad luck but overall I think the primary reason for failure was too much emphasis was placed on the Grosbeak Heights (82nd airborne division should have taken Nijmegen bridge on day one. It was not in allied hands until the late afternoon of day four) so when 30 corp arrived in Nijmegen just as Frost's men at Arnhem bridge were nearing the point of capitulation, 30 corps could not advance on Arnhem. This was one of the main reason Urquart gave for the failure. By the time they were in a position to advance, Frost's men had been overun at the north end of Arnhem road bridge and the germans had established a blocking line between Arnhem and Nijmegen. It might have still been possible to put a bailey or pontoon bridge over the lower Rhine to near the old church at Oosterbeek to link up with what was left of 1st Airborne div and I think it should have been tried. They had the artillery and air support to do it. but sometime between 21st Sept (day 5) and Sept 25th (day 9) Allied command gave up on the offensive.

[@davemac1197]

Gavin instructed 508th CO Colonel Roy Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the Nijmegen highway bridge as soon as possible after landing as part of his divisional plan, but Lindquist was not a good field commander and failed to interpret this instruction correctly. The initial objectives at De Ploeg, De Hut, and Berg-en-Dal (taken by 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions respectively) were secured against zero opposition, and Lindquist was met at De Ploeg by Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees, who told him the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men guarding the highway bridge. I believe these guards were half of the BdO Musikkorps-Zug (headquarters of the German Ordnungspolizei for the Netherlands band platoon) that was left behind to guard the two bridges over the Waal when they evacuated Nijmegen in the afternoon. The opportunity to send the 1st Battalion directly to the bridge to seize it was at that moment as Gavin had envisioned, but instead Lindquist and 1st Battalion CO Lt Col Shields Warren organised a recon patrol based on Lt Bob Weaver's 3rd Platoon of 'C' Company, Lt Lee Frigo's battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, two squads from the LMG Platoon, and an SCR-300 radio on the battalion net with operator, to recon the bridge and report its condition. Only the three-man point team from the S-2 Section under PFC Joe Atkins reached the bridge and surprised seven guards at the southern end, taking them POW without firing a shot, while Weaver and the rest of the patrol took a wrong turn and got lost in the back streets of Nijmegen. Atkins waited an hour until it got dark and no one else had shown up, so he decided to withdraw and release their prisoners. As they left, they could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end of the bridge. When Gavin found out that Lindquist was not sending a battalion to the bridge until the drop zone was cleared ('D' Company of 2nd Battalion was performing this task), he was as "mad" as the 508th liaison officer, Captain Chet Graham, had ever seen him and they went to the 508th CP by Jeep to get Lindquist moving. Leaving 'C' Company behind at De Ploeg as a backstop, 1st Battalion was ordered out of their defensive positions dug-in along the ridge and eventually assembled on the road to move into the city at around 2200 hours, and were met at the large Keiser Karelplein traffic circle near the railway station by SS-Panzer troops in half-tracks, unable to get to the bridge a kilometer away. The operation failed at Nijmegen, not becaue the plan had failed, but because a unit failed to follow the plan. Three Scouts from an S-2 Section had actually proved the plan would have worked, if it had been followed with the required force. Montgomery only gave up on the offensive and formally ended operation GARDEN on 7 October, when he ordered the Arnhem bridge bombed to prevent further German counter-attacks, and prepared for a new attack through the Reichswald called GATWICK towards the Rhine bridges at Emmerich and Wesel. This was cancelled because the Germans still occupied a Maas bridghead around Overloon based on Venlo, threatening the flank of GATWICK, and turned his attention to widening the MARKET GARDEN salient on the west with operation ALAN towards 's-Hertogenbosch and operations by 1st Canadian Army to clear the Scheldt estuary. I'm not a trained Army officer, so I'm not going to argue from my armchair with a XXX Corps assessment that 1st Airborne Division's perimeter at Oosterbeek was not viable for a bridging operation of the Rijn. The location of the perimeter was not ideal as it was based on the western sector of the planned divisional perimeter around Arnhem that was established by 1st (Airlanding) Battalion The Border Regiment's planned Phase 2 positions. General Sosabowski suggested a crossing further west at the Renkum ferry site, and XXX Corps commander General Horrocks asked Montgomery for permission to go for the Rhenen (rail) bridge even further west, but these were both denied.

[@bigwoody4704]

Congratulations on all you have forgotten LMAO the troll Monty never showed up how can he give up? SMDH 1st Para had been over run by then and as you know Carrington stopped going no further. But in Britain they'll award you the titles of Field Marshall and LORD for this piss poor performance.The Tommies deserved much better ♦the 82nd had nothing to do with BERNARD ignoring to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to! Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead you revisionist rube and try to blame bernard's buffoonery on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦ *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning. This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. But in Britain that will get you the title of Field Marshall* ♦ *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* ♦ *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* ♦Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved - great job. ♦ And why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.

[@johncostello3174]

@obimk1-ms1jw Isn't the river river at Arnhem called the Lek ?

[@bridesblade5307]

Thanks for uploading!

[@metalbent9078]

Gee I miss this guy!

[@robertjones-eb4xo]

Excellent ,Docu. Some say it was all a waste of life, waited for RAF to flatten area then parachute in months later. Think a lot of top Brass wanted glory ?

[@mikekelly6023]

Thousands of CANADAS 🇨🇦 brave men Lay buried there in Belgium and Holland the estruaries were the HARDEST fighting in Europe after D-Day

[@thevillaaston7811]

And also Mike, Thousands of Britain's and Poland's 'brave men Lay buried there in Belgium and Holland'

[@bigwoody4704]

Exactly Mike and that yellow coward monty who insisted on this debacle got scarce as it came apart immediately. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there in person and directing operations

[@phillydelphia8760]

​@@bigwoody4704that's a heavily biased and opinionated reply to make. Especially as it's lacking any real informative substance.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@phillydelphia8760 he demanded and got it then doesn't have the backbone to show up like the guys he got killed - he would have drummed out in any other army perhaps shot in Russia after this debacle . Bernrd is only studied as a bad example - britain had much better officers - MUCH

[@Dg-zj6jo]

great footage sir

[@stuarturquhart9363]

Is there a page dedicated to Richard Holmes history documentaries?

[@RavenswoodProductions]

Someone might want to read "A Bridge Too Far" for an analysis of this battle. Far too many things had to go right for it to work. Anyone with any level of tactical and logistical sense would look at the plan, before it was carried out, and say "Are you kidding me?"

[@davehann8178]

Good old Richard!

[@bridesblade5307]

One of the best!

[@alexroselle]

Market Garden is what happens when brilliant generals and planners get high on their own supply

[@rockavukcash6675]

The only thing hatred is worth is getting rid of.

[@zoso73]

Is the St Elizabeth's Hospital still standing in Arnhem?

[@giuseppe196424]

I don't think it's a hospital anymore, but it was still standing in 2019

[@zoso73]

@@giuseppe196424 Thank you. Such an historic building.

[@giuseppe196424]

@@zoso73 there are appartments now, but the building is still standing.

[@zoso73]

@@giuseppe196424 So the building was converted to apartments?

[@zoso73]

@@davemac1197 thank you.

[@georginagedroge4405]

RIP Lord Carrington

[@wullieg7269]

Rot in hell. Immaculate 2nd died for a spineless bastard, English of course.

[@buj1387]

And how did the German Blitzkrieg overran France thru Belgium without having to thru these bridges? This plan is too ambitious in my mind. A bridge too far indeed.

[@gamestation9437]

They did they dropped paratroopers into Holland to hold the bridges then sent another bigger force with tanks across the Belgium German ardenne wood which nobody thought could be done with tanks then they caught the French and British in Belgium and cut em off plus the Germans did capture bridges with Paratroopers they used the same plan to fool the French and British into crossing into Belgium once we did Rommel sang through the woods and cut us off

[@giuseppe196424]

well they captured the bridges on the meuse and the albert canal.

[@johnburns4017]

The Nijmegen bridge was blown by the Dutch army in 1940. The Germans raised the bridge.

[@davemac1197]

@@johnburns4017 - I think the Dutch rebuilt their own bridges, including the Arnhem bridge, which was also dropped in 1940 by the Dutch Army. The rebuilt Arnhem bridge had only been reopened a month before the 1944 battle, and then bombed by the USAAF on 7 October. The 'John Frost Bridge' standing today is the third iteration of the same design on the site! Between 1940 and 1944, the Dutch resurrected the old Arnhem ship-bridge at the western end of town, and it was this structure which was still present in 1944, but with the centre section removed to allow river traffic. It was not a German military pontoon bridge as often assumed, and the southern section was set on fire by German troops to put it beyond use by the British.

[@Kalaswalia]

These bridges are in Holland.

[@hey_joe7069]

You Bastards will never give the Full Monty. The Respect he Deserves as one of the Great WW2 Commanders. Alamein was Brilliance!

[@SGTRIP-dh7fz]

Alamein was brilliant I don't think anyone disputes that.

[@TheLittlered1961]

Monty was an egotistical sob. He made so many mistakes because of his ego. Because of the "success" he obtain in the desert war he was allowed to make more mistakes. I do not limit that honor to just Monty, MacArthur shares the same ego and mistakes.

[@Petal4822]

@@TheLittlered1961 Well said 👍

[@huwd2292]

He was indeed a great general. Although this wasn’t entirely his plan. It was undoubtedly worth it given what it might have achieved.

[@bigwoody4704]

Monty was ass as bad as he was even he couldn't lose in the desert with the massive wholesale advantages ULTRA,new Shermans and Artillary arrived from the states,The RN & RAF were the real heroes they not only strangled the German supply lines but brought in massive supplies. Torch Landings between 107,000 -115,000 troops. Even Rommel said Auchinleck would have closed and captured them Monty never did it in 1,500 miles and with complete air superiority and ULTRA

[@sm70911]

Monobrow madness ! 🤨

[@tonypino2858]

Leuke Video

[@pickititllneverheal9016]

Radios were not working because the Gremans were jamming them.

[@1959KM]

I believe they didn’t work because they used the wrong crystals in the radio’s. They used the crystals they used in Africa that has no obstructions thinking they could reach a further distance but instead with European theater there are hills and tree that can block your signals and I’m sure the Germans were trying and blocking also.

[@phillydelphia8760]

That's just not true.

[@pickititllneverheal9016]

@@phillydelphia8760 Dirka Dirka

[@robv135]

I believe that our own anti tank guns were ineffective or too heavy for use by paratroops.

[@davemac1197]

We had the 17 pdr at Arnhem, which came as a shock to the Germans because it had not been air transported before. Not seen in A Bridge Too Far, of course!

[@bwarre2884]

@@davemac1197 There is still a 17-pdr outside Hotel Hartenstein Airborne Museum in Oosterbeek (former HQ for the 1st Airborne Division during the battle). It is pretty big.

[@davemac1197]

@@bwarre2884 - I think it's called 'Pathfinder', if I'm not mistaken. Each gun had a name starting with the Troop letter, so 'Pathfinder' was from 'P' Troop, attached to 1st Parachute Brigade.

[@bwarre2884]

@@davemac1197 I can't remember seeing a name on it, but that could very well be possible. In the weekend around 17th of september there is a remembrance with a parachute drop on the Ginkelse Heath with a memorial colonne with old vehicles. Also with re-enacters in full uniform.

[@davemac1197]

@@bwarre2884 - I have seen those on video. The thing that really impresses me are the 'flower children' of Arnhem. I don't think anyone in the UK expected anything like it.

[@greggmacpherson1946]

If inteligence suggested that panzer tanks would provide critical resitance to the operation, why not provide usefull weapons against them?

[@lampofexperience6296]

They did. It somehow gets missed that there were in fact anti tank guns.

[@gamestation9437]

Most thee weapons were light anti tank weapons that were shit check out The Victoria Cross for heros the story is explained by Clarkson its great

[@giuseppe196424]

they did have anti tanks, I think 6 and maybe some 17 pounders, they had some AA guns in the form of polsten guns.

[@davemac1197]

Joseph is correct, but there were far more anti-tank guns taken to Arnhem: 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery had a Troop (A thru C) of 4 x 6-pounder guns for each Parachute Battalion in 1st Parachute Brigade (5 made it to the bridge to support Frost there), two Troops (D and P) of 4 x 17-pounder guns for the Division and 1st Parachute Brigade support, and another Troop (Z) of 4 x 6-pounders for Division. 2nd Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery had a Troop (E, G, and H) of 4 x 6-pounder guns each supporting the three Battalions of 4th Parachute Brigade, a Troop (F) of 4 x 17-pounders for Division, and another Troop (X) of 4 x 17-pounders for 4th Parachute Brigade. In addition, each of the three Battalions in 1st Airlanding Brigade had two Platoons of 4 x 6-pounder guns in their Support Companies, usually assigning two guns out to each Rifle Company, and two 3-in mortar platoons split up on the same basis. That makes a total of 68 x 6-pounders, and 16 x 17-pounders (although some failed to arrive or were written off by glider crashes). The only two Polsten cannon (Polish/British design based on the Swedish Oerlikon 20mm AA Cannon) used were in the Support Troop of the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron along with two 3-in mortars. Each Airlanding Battalion also had a Polsten Section, but they were not taken to Arnhem. There was, I think, at some point in the planning that US 82nd Airborne would land at Arnhem and British 1st Airborne Division would go to Nijmegen, but they were switched I believe specifically because the British Airborne Divisions were heavier on Anti-tank weaponry and the American Divisions on field artillery. That doesn't quite square with the latest intel summary from SHAEF (#26, dated 16 September) that assessed II.SS-Panzerkorps as refitting in the eastern Netherlands and presumed to be drawing new tanks from a depot in the Cleve area. This would make the 82nd at Nijmegen more vulnerable to an armoured counter-attack, but perhaps the unconfirmed Dutch reports of 9.SS 'Hohenstaufen' units billited in the area Apeldoorn-Zutphen-Arnhem were taken seriously enough to switch the Airborne Divisions. In reality, 9.SS had just three Panther tanks at Arnhem and two Jadgpanzer IV tank destroyers at Apeldoorn. The whereabouts of the 10.SS 'Frundsberg' was completely unknown and in fact had most of the Korps' heavy equipment, 16 x Panzer IV and 4 x StuG IIIG assault guns at Vorden (between Zutphen and Ruurlo). The 10.SS was billeted on the other side of the Ijssel River in the area Ruurlo-Arnhem-Zutphen. The location of these divisions was not specifically to meet a threat to Arnhem, but to support a defence line being constructed along the Ijssel River. The 9.SS was in any case in the process of being withdrawn to Germany for refit, had handed over most heavy equipment and combat ready battalions to the 10.SS, and only had a few 'alarm' companies of tank and artillery crews acting as infantry left in Holland at the time of the Airborne landings.

[@davemac1197]

@@lampofexperience6296 - no anti-tank guns at all in A Bridge Too Far, except for the German ones placed incorrectly hidden in the woods and surviving the artillery barrage at the XXX Corps breakout. The AT guns had no prime movers available to get them into off-road positions, so they were all wiped out by the artillery preparation. The 9 Sherman tanks taken out by the Germans during the breakout were by handheld Panzerfaust weapons by the parachute troops (Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon 'Kerutt', or I./FJR-18) from the roadside ditches. Conversely, at Arnhem, the director has our paratroops equipped with the just their PIATs, when in fact most of the damage done to the German SS attack was by two of the five 6-pounder anti-tank guns that were deployed at the bridge.

[@jimburow706]

Yet another example of Montgomery’s ego in overdrive. He was so convinced of his own brilliance he didn’t care how many men he got killed. Completely overrated

[@thevillaaston7811]

'Yet another example of Montgomery’s ego in overdrive.' How so?

[@pilgrimageintothepast6086]

I think you misspelled "Patton" there.

[@Broodjemetbeleg]

​@@pilgrimageintothepast6086all of them, just big egos clashing with each other.

[@tonypino2858]

ik woon 10 Kilometer van Arnhem groetjes van Tony pino

[@johnburns4017]

This documentary is seriously lacking. On 17 Sept, the jump day, the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was totally clear. There were no ditches or barbed wire around the bridges and *no* armour in the Arnhem area. The only concentrated German forces were on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British lines - naturally. XXX Corps did not know the Germans reinforced the area, but when advancing made _remarkable_ progress, as the US official history states, from the start point to Eindhoven. The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans. The other two airborne units, both US, *failed* to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them. The *12 hour delay* caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical *_time window_* to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem from Germany. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance. Obvious. The US 101st took four hour to move a few km to the Zon bridge. They *failed* to seize the Zon bridge north of Eindhoven On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional *36 hour delay.* This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the *two day time window in total* given to the Germans was far too long. The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units *failed* in theirs. XXX Corps. who were not slow, hardly put a foot wrong. *1)* 101st *failed* to seize the Zon bridge putting the operation back 12 hours; *2)* General Gavin's 82nd *failed* to seize the Nijmegen bridge putting the operation back a further 36 hours; *3)* The First Airborne at Arnhem never delayed XXX Corps' advance. *i)* If *1)* failed and *2)* succeeded, the operation would have been a 100% success. *ii)* If *1)* and *2)* *failed|*, as was the case, then not a 100% success. Quite simple.

[@bigwoody4704]

Like you Monty never showed up for the operation. Everyone in SHAEF pointed right at the ankle biter bernard. The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.​ Monty demanded this operation then with all the backbone of a gummy bear doesn't show up for it when the early results start tumbling in. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.

[@GregWampler-xm8hv]

And let's get real Monty saw a chance to have heaps of accolades piled on him personally. Shortening the war was a mere by product He was so vainglorious he was well know for trying to steal others credit. Look every General (General Doolittle being the only modest and self deprecating General I've ever seen) has a massive ego. Monty's was just much worse.

[@bigwoody4704]

Greg wrote: What is with the Brits and this love affair with Monty? ------------------------------------------- Exactly Churchill had to stick with him after messing up O'Connor and Auchileck's operations. For Winston to admit he was wrong - again would have been to much. So HE created the Monty Myth and stuck with a mistake rather than dare admit he made one.This is well documented. Britain had some good officers the bufoon bernard wasn't amongst them

[@geomac650]

Ploppy Chimpstone

[@jasonward6723]

the british fantastic soldiers, but with terrible commanders in both wars it seems to me

[@liverpoolscottish6430]

What? Terrible commanders like Montgomery who defeated Rommel, conceived the five beach head D-Day plan, created the allied strategy in Normandy, and commanded all the allied ground forces until late 44?

[@bigwoody4704]

Lions led by jack asses - correct

[@johnburns4017]

@@liverpoolscottish6430 Monty had to take command of two shambolic US armies when the Germans pounded into the US armies in the Bulge attack. Monty went through nine countries not ever having a reverse.

[@bigwoody4704]

Johnny Burnhole the GIs never got driven into the channel - or wait 4 yrs to cross it. That is of course after coming 3,500 miles to finish the scrum for you - AGAIN. As Stalin pointed out to Churchill at Tehran More Monty victims Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013

[@johnburns4017]

@@nicholasjkane It started from Belgium then finished on the Rhine in Holland *60 miles* from the start line, a few days later. A reverse is ending up further back from when you started.

[@bcriderful]

This was Montgomery's diaster plan.

[@thevillaaston7811]

Not really.

[@RPMZ11]

Read a book.

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@RPMZ11 You mean like this?.. For example, in regard to having no final say on the MARKET airborne: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 588 The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave. THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P 265 ‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’ UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P132 ‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’

[@RPMZ11]

@@thevillaaston7811 That should do it, and then some. The Kingdom for a Horsa.

[@nickdanger3802]

@@thevillaaston7811 Six hours after landing 1st AB managed to get to the rail bridge, four miles from DZ Z, just in time to see it blown up. XXX Corps was supposed to be in Eindhoven by sunset on day one and arrived about noon the next day. Because it was hundreds of miles to the south Operation Dragoon had at least four more hours of daylight than MG.

[@BaronVonHobgoblin]

I don't care what anyone claims you do not, DO NOT, conduct a Contested Wet Gap Crossing, let alone several (eight!!!!!!!!) simultaneously, as an airborne operation! This is, plain and simple, not how you employ airborne forces! The fact the very operational concept of "Airborne Wet Gap Crossing" never cohered either in Monty's head or on in the Plans Tank is sinister in its implications. The fact historians and soldiers alike continue to belittle and browbeat the main effort, the legs, speaks to why the operation failed in the first place. Too many historians and soldiers alike focus on the airborne component of this operation and completely and utterly ignore the ground and engineering considerations. As a former infantryman I am disgusted by with those who claim that this operation had any genuine commander's planning, or any chance, of success whatsoever. Those unfortunately assigned to Monty's planning staff surely must have suffered great reservation, surely some of those staff planners voiced their reservations and it's a shame history has not learned the story of the senior mission planners for this ill-fated operation. I imagine Monty gave them all poor OERs while he got away scot free still the hero of Alamein. I would have resigned from his staff and forfeited my rank before such a disaster as Market Garden. The airborne operation itself was the easier part of the operation, the ground and engineering components were completely strung up and out by Monty, and he surely should have known better. There is something deeply disingenuous in an airborne captain publically pinning the failure of the entire operation on a single lowly tank commander. The ground forces were tasked with opening and holding the entire contested length of an MSR, anyone with any recent army experience will tell you this isn't a simple task either in planning or execution. What's General Bradly's modern cliche, "amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics"? When it comes to Market Garden all anyone wants to talk about is the strategy and the fighting no one wants to have the tough talk about the desired logistical end state! Maybe the legs could have pressed further but clearly the leg officers felt that their orders from Monty prevented them from doing so - without the MSR there would have been no point to the operation in the first place. All of these Leg and logistical considerations should have been comprehensively thought through by Monty prior to his recommendation for the operation to Eisenhower. And then you have documentaries that come along and still bluster on Monty's part and do nothing but screed doubt and shame and shade on the real part of the operation! I will have nothing of this unhinged revisionism. Contested Wet Gap Crossings are some of the most complicated and difficult ground military operations even under the best of circumstances. Rivers are natural obstacles to progress and only fools think an airborne operation is properly task organized for a Wet Gap Crossing! To me Monty's Operation Market Garden is on the level with Patton's "Slapping Incident" as both incidents appear to be an abuse of authority. The "Slapping Incident" was one maybe two soldiers - Market Garden was thousands. Really both generals should have known better, and I'm as much horrified as I am fascinated by why these otherwise great leaders broke character so spectacularly both at the height of their own success.

[@davemac1197]

I would have thought a former infantryman would at least know there's a heirarchy of planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels - if not, there's a useful KZbin video on the topic. Montgomery was responsible for strategic planning and ordered the airborne operation at Arnhem to get his British 2nd Army across the Rhine. The operational planning for COMET was carried out by Browning's British I Airborne Corps and the ground element by Dempsey's 2nd Army. When Montgomery cancelled COMET because of the intelligence situation in the Netherlands and proposed an upgrade to use the American airborne as well, this became MARKET and the operational planning was done by Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army. Divisional commanders were responsible for ther own divisional planning at the tactical level. Despite compromises made in the airborne planning by Brereton, MARKET GARDEN failed on the ground because Gavin's divisional plan for the 82nd Airborne was not folowed by Colonel Lindquist of the 508th PIR. This was equivalent not to a slapping incident but to scoring an own goal. That the plan would have worked if followed was actually proven by a three-man point team of scouts from the 1st Battalion 508th S-2 (Intel) Section who managed to secure the southern end of the Nijmegen highway bridge on the first evening without firing a shot and had to give it up when the rest of the battalion failed to arrive as Gavin had instructed. The Germans were able to reinforce and delay the operation long enough to retake the Arnhem bridge and destroy the 1st Airborne Division. PFC Joe Atkins has completely undone your armchair diatribe, despite your "infantryman" experience. Perhaps read some more books before being so sure you know better? Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen (2011) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge

[@bigwoody4704]

Monty Garden quit trying to rewrite history you bent bernard Fanboi There was a very good reason the British Planners of Linnet & Comet dismissed this bad idea whole sale. Monty getting 2 US Airborne Divisions doesn't eliminate any of those problems. As the results later proved and admitted by Monty. Brereton or Browning were not aware of ULTRA and the information of not only the mobile flak units but the 9/10 th SS refitting in Arnhem. Brian Urquhart 21st army intel officer was relieved for persistently pointing it out. IKE owns some of the blame for letting Monty have his way with his single thrust and ignoring opening the port of Antwerp that was absolutely needed for any Operation this size. The Red Ball Express couldn't keep lugging supplies/provisions from Cherbour 483 miles away.Specially after 1400 British Austin Lorries provided broke down - as did their replacement engines *OVERLORD 3 months earlier was 30 miles across the channel,maybe another 20-30 miles inland these flights were almost 300 miles ONE WAY from air fields 50 miles west of London up into NE Netherlands around Arnhem.* The Dutch Army who wasn't really consulted stated going right up highway 69 was one long choke point surrounded flood plains,polder marshes and drainage ditches - it had been war gamed before the war started. Also thousands of experienced, well-fortified enemy soldiers still had to be dislodged from key positions they inhabited since Fallschirmjäger General Kurt Student had dropped into that exact area in 1940 he was very familiar with the area and perhaps the best tactical commander on any front. Monty simply hid as an excuse - he knew he was toast in the eyes of every one in allied HQ

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@davemac1197 Its hard to see any sense in this BaronVonHobgoblin comment. MARKET GARDEN an abuse of authority?.. Eisenhower aproved Market Garden, and later, confirmed that he had given that approval: 'CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P333 At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' Answering an urgent request from London to try to put a stop to V2 attacks on London, an abuse of authority? VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke, to Montgomery, 09.99.1944: 'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.' A post-war observation from a soldier who was, like Hobgoblin and the rest of us, was not there: ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK VIKING 1994 P441 ‘Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.’

[@thevillaaston7811]

The head of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA), US General Lewis Brereton had the final say on FAAA operations, as evidenced here: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 588 The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave. THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. This paperback edition published in 2013. P 265 ‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’ UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P132 ‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’ In the same period, Bereton vetoed a propsal to use FAAA forces on Walcheren Island. The evidence is clear, the last word on MARKET planning belonged to Brereton.

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@davemac1197 'Brian Urquhart 21st army intel officer was relieved for persistently pointing it out.' Para Dave (aka Big Woody) Brian Urquhart was a FAAA intelligence officer. Why don't people check first?

[@jamespasquali7693]

Germans schooled the Brits!!!!

[@thevillaaston7811]

What, two SS Panzer Divisions, with a copy of the allied battle plan, surround a single airborne division that cannot be re-supplied?.. What sort of schooling is that?

[@bigwoody4704]

Logistic,tactics,strategy Monty didn't show up for his own debacle and later got raked by senior allied officers for the whole thing folding in on itself. Like Dieppe,Dunkirk - RUNAWAY must be a Monty thing.Going straight up an elevated lane for 55 miles with no room to maneuver is the idea of an idiot who had no business leading a boy scout assembly *Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,* Doubleday & Co., copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219"...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.* Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."

[@markmullin4246]

First problem with market garden; Montgomery!!

[@thevillaaston7811]

No.

[@markmullin4246]

@@thevillaaston7811 YES!!

[@davemac1197]

Why? Or are we just trolling?

[@bigwoody4704]

Correct Mark the troubled tart Bernard just like these slappies were no where around playing with his bunnies,birdies,puppies and himself back at the Field Caravan HQ. while 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN Congratulations on all you 2 have forgotten ♦the 82nd had nothing to do with BERNARD ignoring to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead you revisionist rube and try to blame bernard's buffoonery on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦ *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning. This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. But in Britain that will get you the title of Field Marshall* ♦ *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* ♦ *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* ♦Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved - great job. ♦ And why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November

[@bigwoody4704]

you and villa always troll perhaps you should set the scotch down

[@jamespasquali7693]

The old cowardly British General hiding in the attic instead of commanding his men: SHAMEFUL!!!!!!!

[@thevillaaston7811]

So what was he supposed to do. Run out in front of German troops?

[@jamespasquali7693]

@@thevillaaston7811 yes. Yea he was. Get some Krupp steel in his keister.

[@thevillaaston7811]

@@jamespasquali7693 How was that going to help anyone?

[@jamespasquali7693]

@@thevillaaston7811 it would’ve been funny!!!!

[@calengr1]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Blumenson

[@calengr1]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Holmes_(military_historian)

[@calengr1]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Urquhart

[@calengr1]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Horrocks

[@calengr1]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Horrocks