Taha Abderrahmane: The Distinction Between Thinking and Contemplation

Notes:
1) An instance of an early scholar using the word “tafakkur” is Imām al-Ghazālī, in his Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm al-Dīn, where he dedicated the ninth book on the section of deliverance to the topic of tafakkur. In it, he discussed the definition of tafakkur, it’s forms, effects and methods, focusing particularly on contemplating creation.
2) An instance of a later scholar using the word “tafkīr” is Abbās Mahmoud al-ʿAqqād who wrote the work ‘Thinking: An Islamic Duty’.
3) In the seventeen verses where the verb ‘tafakkara’ (“to contemplate”) appears, they all vary in context but they all agree in the encourage of contemplation. The single verse where the verb ‘fakkara’ (“to think”) appears in 74:18-20, it was in the context of a Qurayshī leader, al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīra who heard the Qur’ān, admired it and praised it, but his people forced him to speak against the Holy Prophet ﷺ contrary to what he felt. That is why Taha infers that contemplation must always necessarily align with living Truth/Reality [ḥaqīqa], while thinking might not necessarily be so, as what al-Walīd heard from the Divine Verses could only be a matter of “tafakkur”, but he reduced it to mere “tafkīr”.
4) It is worth emphasizing what Taha’s trusteeshipal conception of “thought” [fikr] is: he posits that the original relationship between thought and action is one of essential connection [iṭṭiṣāl jawharī], not accidental. Thus, action is not an accident [ʿaraḍ] inhering within thought, but rather is something inseparable from its essence [dhāt]. Thus, action is a part [juz’] of the identity [hūwiyya] of thought, which is then characterized by a relationship of fundamental connection [iṭṭiṣāl aṣlī] as opposed to an external connection [iṭṭiṣāl khārijī].
5) The dual aspect of identity: its being [kiyān] and its constitution [qiwām] is an implicit critique of Hume’s is-ought problem that attempts to sever the two; Taha instead combines the two together so that “what is” is inseparable from “what ought”. Thus, thought can be possibly separated from action in two ways: either thought is separated from its being [kiyān], or thought is separated from its constitution [qiwām]. Therefore, the overarching argument of the lecture is to prove that the contemplator [mutafakkir] preserves the connection between thought and its being and between thought and its constitution (and consequently the thinker [mufakkir] does not preserve either of these two connections).
6) Taha defines Man as a ‘covenanting being’ as opposed to the traditional definition of ‘rational animal’. The argument for this is that in general, the goal for something precedes its means. Thus, Man primordially was created with the goal of making a Covenant with God, but this necessitated Man being endowed with the capacity for thought for the Covenant to be valid. Thus, the faculty of reason follows as a means for the Covenant to take place.
7) The outline of the first sub-argument is: Taha asserts that the contemplator preserves the ‘covenantal quiddity of Man’ [māhiyya mīthāqiyya], which in turn, leads to him preserving the practical being [kiyān] of thought. The foundation of this being [kiyān] rests on two elements: ‘existence’ and ‘time’, so Taha then argues that the Covenant of Witnessing [mīthāq al-ishhād] bequeathes the First Contemplation to Man, which provides the existential and temporal aspects of thought’s being [kiyān].
This last part happens because the First Contemplation is a thought characterized by ‘truthfulness’, ‘attentiveness’, ‘remembrance’ and ‘thankfulness’. Truthfulness defines the existence of thought, attentiveness defines its present, remembrance its past, gratitude its future.
8) The second sub-argument is: Taha asserts that the contemplator preserves the trusteeshipal relationship [ʿalāqa i’timāniyya], which in turn, leads to him preserving the practical constitution [qiwām] of thought. The foundation of this constitution [qiwām] rests on two elements: ‘standing’ [qiyām] (i.e., thought stands where values stand, meaning they are connected in terms of the function) and ‘stationing’ [muqām] (i.e., thought is stationed where values are stationed, meaning they are connected in terms of the position), so Taha then argues that the Covenant of Entrustment [mīthāq al-isti’mān] bequeaths the First Undertaking [taḥammul awwal] to Man, which provides the standing and stationing aspects of thought’s constitution [qiwām].
The last part happens because the First Undertaking transforms mere contemplation into trusteeshipal contemplation, which is characterized by obligation, unification, innate nature [fiṭra] and signs [āyāt]. Obligation and unification define the ‘standing’ of thought, while innate nature and signs define the ‘stationing’ of thought.
And God and His Emissary ﷺ knows best.
Lecture delivered by Prof. Dr. Taha Abderrahmane in Ankara, August 6 2024.
Full video originally uploaded by Islâm Düşünce Enstitüsü [IDE].

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