The Definition of Morality - Part 2 of 5

Stephen Stich takes us on a journey through recent moral philosophy, meta-ethics, numerous studies in moral psychology, a discussion of the moral/conventional task, and some interesting moral dilemmas, in an attempt to define morality.
Lots of interesting things to consider.
Stich is primarily known in philosophy for his work in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, epistemology, and moral psychology. In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Stich (1983) has argued for a form of eliminative materialism-the view that talk of the mental should be replaced with talk of its physical substrate. Since then, however, he has changed some of his views on the mind. See Deconstructing the Mind (1996) for his more recent views. In epistemology, he has explored (with several of his colleagues) the nature of intuitions using the techniques of experimental philosophy, especially epistemic intuitions that vary among cultures. This work reflects a general skepticism about conceptual analysis and the traditional methods of analytic philosophy. In The Fragmentation of Reason he briefly sketched a form of epistemic relativism "in the spirit of pragmatism."
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[@randyhelzerman]

That we judge the harm to be the same is irrelevant--if we thought it was good for somebody to be shot in the foot, we wouldn't judge that any harm had been done to them at all, just like bad parents don't think they are harming their kids when they beat them. And the difficulty of agreeing on the definition of morals is another red herring--no matter what your definition of morals are, you use them to determine whether harm has been done, and not vice versa.

[@randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer) therefore it is our morals which tell us that beating a child is harming them. By the same token, it is our morals which tell us that shooting somebody in the foot is harming them. It might be obvious to us that burning witches at the stake is harming them, but that used to be considered an act of mercey, because burning them at the stake gave them a shot at going to heaven instead of hell.

[@randyhelzerman]

Hi musekiteer, clinical practice can tell us whether, for example, children who are beaten are more likely to be physically violent. But clinical practice cannot tell us whether physical violence is moral or immoral--for example, in Sparta, children were beaten for the express purpose of making them move violent. In English, we use two different verb forms to represent these two different kinds of judgements: what IS the case, and what SHOULD BE the case. (cont)

[@musekiteer]

I think that we are employing terms in a slightly different manner. Harm is harm. We don't need to go back to Sparta. In modern armies, recruits are trained to kill the defined-for-them enemy despite social injunctions not to kill. In other words, relativism is in the eye of the person or agency that regards the action as advantageous -- there is your "should", I think. To the Spartans, their males were the army, aiui. Their intention was to do harm to their enemies.

[@randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer) clinical psychology can tell us what IS the consequences of beating children, but it cannot tell us what children SHOULD BE. For this we need morality. This point was first emphasized by Hume.

[@randyhelzerman]

Hi Muskateer, a recent survey of pediatricians showed that over half of them believe that occasional beating of kids was ok. Only one third of them said that kids should never be beat. Are you sure you are comming from a physicians point of view on injury? Physicians can describe how kids are brused by beating, and psychologists can describe how behaviors of children change when beat, but neither one can tell us whether those bruises or changes SHOULD be happening. (cont)

[@randyhelzerman]

Hi musekiteer, almost; I mean, you can have intentions which are moral and you can have intentions which are immoral, so its not your intentions which determine what is moral or not. Morality is therefore a different thing from intentions. Also, relativity is a bit of a red herring here; whether you think morals are relative or not, you are going to use your morals to decide whether they are moral or not, or whether a course of action is harmful or not.

[@riversonthemoon]

This isn't the only problem with Turiel's approach. Aside from the (perhaps forgivable) philosophical problems with his definitions, something that stands out to me is that his methodology w.r.t. classifying something as moral or conventional seems heavily influenced by his western sensibilities, & the classifications aren't very useful when trying to understand very different cultures. But his results may still be useful, even if his conclusions aren't. Stich goes on to make further criticism.

[@randyhelzerman]

Hi musekiteer, yes :-) I agree with you that beating children can do lasting harm, but that is only because we share moral sensiblities on this point. From the standpoint of, say, biblical injunctions, NOT beating your child can do lasting harm (e.g. Prov. 13:24, 'he who spareth the rod hateth is son" and Prov 23:13-14 "thou shalt beat him with a rod and deliver his soul from hell". Again, we both consider this pernicious nonsense but only because we share morals on this point. (cont)

[@randyhelzerman]

(cont) Seems like Turiel has got it exactly backwards.

[@musekiteer]

2 // cannot tell us what children SHOULD BE. For this we need morality // For *that* the Spartans and latter-day-child-beaters need rationalization and suspension of our instinct against doing serious harm. I am not saying that humans have not inherited the primate instinct towards violence (chimps murder, after all), but I am saying that for most of us, the instinct is mostly not to do harm (by my definition). I think that your point is that advantages can overrule natural instincts.

[@Ramatganski]

It's not a given that those who define morality consider themselves to be moral through and through. So the person defining morality CAN be objective simply by allowing themselves to turn out to be also immoral by standards of their own definition.

[@PtolemySoter]

Morality is local, temporal and it is always based on social acceptance criteria. morality has no global or timeless basis.

[@randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer) For example, suppose a man beats his wife. He then says "I'm the victim here, not her--she was harming me by complaining about my drinking. That constant nagging can really cause you psychological harm, and I beat her in self-defence". You think he's wrong? What if he then says to you "I think that handing over the assessment of harm to the perpetrator to their convenient definition of morals is bazckwards. i'm the victim, and I can asses and convey harm". (cont)

[@musekiteer]

We are obviously in disagreement over the starting point for assessment of what constitutes harm and an immoral act. I do understand what you are saying. I still disagree, but I am coming from a physician's point of view on injury. I am liberal, so I attend to harm and fairness. I think that handing over the assessment of harm to the perpetrator or bystander and to their possibly convenient definition of morals is backwards. The victim can assess and convey harm.

[@randyhelzerman]

I think this formulation by Turiel is... uh....less than, uh, satisfactory. Violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed??? That's true, but it isn't constitutive of morality: indeed, you need morals to determine WHETHER somebody has been harmed. For example, you see a mother beating their kid by way of punishment: depending upon whether you view beating as a moral way to punish your kid or not, you will judge whether the kid has been harmed or not. (cont)

[@musekiteer]

The original comment is there. I said *can* do ...

[@randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer). What tells what we should be doing is morality, not vice versa. We are actually not in disagreement at all about what constitutes a moral act---we both believe that beating kids is immoral. We are not in disagreement at all about what constitutes harm. We both agree that beating kids harms them. We are both liberal, and are deeply concerned with harm and fairness. But I don't think you really believe that the victim can assess and convey harm at all. (cont)

[@musekiteer]

// only because we share moral sensiblities on this point // Ah, I see your relativity. I am speaking from the perspective of clinical psychology, not "shared morals". Biblical injunction are nothing more than the petrification of ancient relativistic "moral" attitudes -- convenient to the parent, but not necessarily advisable with regard to the child's emotional health -- even in ancient times. Clinical practice indicates that those injunctions were bad judgment.

[@randyhelzerman]

Dude, the victim cannot identify themselves as a vitcim without morality. There are plenty of kids who think that their parents beating them is a sign of love, and there are plenty of battered women who think they deserve it. They are of course wrong, but they are wrong because they have an incorrect grasp on morality.

[@randyhelzerman]

(cont, to musekiteer) this is of course obvously bullshit. Whether somebody is the victim, or whether somebody has been harmed or not, is determined by morality, not vice versa.

[@randyhelzerman]

LOL yeah, this is uh...

[@kakudmi]

I agree. Very deceptive methodology. Nothing conclusive and approachable. Very disappointing.