The Plausibility of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy | Timothy Williamson & Paul Horwich

UCD School of Philosophy presents: Philosophies of Philosophy - Celebrating 20 years of IJPS. June 17-21 2013
Timothy Williamson (Wykeham Professor of Logic, New College, Oxford University) & Paul Horwich, Professor of Philosophy, NYU - "The Plausibility of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy"
UCD School of Philosophy: www.ucd.ie/philosophy
UCD School of Philosophy Facebook: / ucdphilosophy
Timothy Williamson: philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/...
Paul Horwich: www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/member...
Timothy Williamson has been the Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford since 2000. His main research interests are in philosophical logic, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language. He is the author of Identity and Discrimination (Blackwell 1990, updated edition 2013), Vagueness (Routledge 1994), Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford 2000), The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell 2007), Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Oxford 2013), and over 180 articles. Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford 2009) contains fifteen critical essays on his work and his replies.
Paul Horwich, Professor of Philosophy (BA Oxford 1966, MA Yale 1969, PhD Cornell 1974). His principal contributions to the subject have been a probabilistic account of scientific methodology, a unified explanation of temporally asymmetric phenomena, a deflationary conception of truth, and a naturalistic use-theory of meaning. He has received fellowship support for his work from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation, and (currently) the Guggenheim Foundation. He has been on the faculties of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (73-95), University College London (95-00), and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (00-05). He has also given courses at UCLA, the CNRS Institut d'Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences et Technique, the University of Sydney, the École Normale Supérieure, and the University of Tokyo. His main present project is a monograph on Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy.

[@HueyTheDoctor]

He's done these things!

[@bezonshroff]

'The obvious' is elusive, we learn....for this gem alone, the discussion is praiseworthy

[@avellopublishing5851]

'Modal Logic as Metaphysics' by T. Williamson is reviewed in the Avello Publishing Journal.

[@ianhruday9584]

Williamson did a good job! There are a lot of comments about his speaking style, but I take it if you're already interested in the issues its not important... Turning up the speed also helps. I think Horwich can effectively criticize some areas and projects in T-philosophy, but in order to make a general critique he has to do T-philosophy and he does it badly. Any general critique requires Horwich to demarcate T-philosophy and diagnose whats going wrong in a way that doesent threaten other areas of inquiry. Its hard to see how he can do this without employing the same kinds of idealizations, cherry picking of data, over generalizations and other methods he claims to find problematic. In this critique, he can be seen as presented with the same dilemma he gives T-philosophers. If he is too loose with his data he doesn't connect with his target. If he is more faithful to the phenomena of T-philosophy, his critique looses force, and the T-philosopher will have plausible responses to his criticism. I think Horwich errs on the side of overgeneralizing about T-philosophy. Although his critique doesn't work, it can be reformulated as a skeptical challenge to T-philosophers.

[@vincentzevecke4578]

I'm wittensteinian.

[@thehairblairbunchjones6209]

I don’t see why he has to be doing T-philosophy. Williamson doesn’t adequately explain why the approximate equivalence between use and meaning need be a theory rather than a definition, which is responsive to our actual use of the term. To my mind, it is a good definition that captures our use of the term well, even if we can’t immediately see it. Seeing it seeing doesn’t involve theoretical speculation but a careful overview of our use of the term.

[@geraldbalzano431]

Please add closed captions to this! Thank you!

[@metafiscoparapensante8550]

1:43:33

[@metafiscoparapensante8550]

+Pheelosophee OMG puoi giurarci. He has done those things!

[@timothywilliamson4492]

+Metafisco Parapensante I did!

[@shanewagoner6504]

Absolute legend

[@HueyTheDoctor]

Bless you, sir.

[@arts_ambassador]

Thank you for sharing this discussion. I'm looking forward to reading Professor Williamson's book "Modal Logic as Metaphysics", especially after hearing the points that he raised here. I understand that he is a most respected academic in his field. I find Paul Horwich very interesting too. (I'm a bit surprised that some of the comments here are of the kind that one associates with pop music videos and entertainment; but if philosophy can expand its audience, we are all better off).

[@mikebaker2436]

I agree. It's clear that some people wandered here because of Wittgenstein's celebrity and not because they read Horwich's book, Williamson's written critique, then wanted a deep academic discussion. I am sympathetic to Horwich's point of view here... but credit to Williamson for a valiant defense of what is regrettably a bit of a stawman in the book. I wish Horwich would mount a follow up book where he gets past case study examples and challenges specific families of thought or specific philosphers rather than this abstract "T-Philosphy" bogeyman. I don't agree with Williamson... Horwich's reading seems to treat late Wittgenstein rather faithfully. I kind of chuckled at the irony if Williamson criticizing Horwich's thought in many ways that Russell did Wittgenstein's later work... and then predicted that the reading would be seen as not faithful. lol.

[@arts_ambassador]

Thanks for the input. I'll add Horwich to my reading list, because I'm not myself too familiar with the points raised here. You may well be right. (I've read parts of Williamson's 'Knowledge and its Limits' and 'The Philosophy of Philosophy', which seem somewhat relevant, but that's about it). After having read some of the more 'continental' writers, I've found Merleau-Ponty to be quite 'therapeutic' too, perhaps in the sense in which that term is applied to Wittgenstein, but that's been more concerned with the nature of the subject than with the nature of philosophy as such (I don't know where phenomenologists like him fall with respect to the theoretical versus the therapeutic as these are understood here).

[@Karollenart]

what matters is thought not fluid language, it can be only nice addition

[@hardhittingman]

Dude you're in trouble.

[@Karollenart]

U just shouldnt make equal aestetics and intelligence (thought). Thats two different things.

[@helenlauer9465]

I was there -- it was a fabulous riposte, really the gem of the conference, the most inspiring of several very good presentations. There was a great conversation afterwards as well, inspired by nothing but Williamson's implacable refusal to be cowed. This was wry, adroit, and very valiant conservative analytic standards applied at their best. A landmark critique of a very popular and fashionable trend. Funny as hell and courageous as the dawn. If there were more Williamsons in the business it would be a very different industry. He's one in a million.

[@edwardwebb1246]

I gotta go on this, 20:34-20:56. I suppose as inconclusive as the results of the 1WW.

[@theoldpond0]

1:43:30

[@McRingil]

1:44:40, Horwich`s response pins down exactly what is wrong with his conception of philosophy, he insists on it being a priori, but it is a relatively recent development to think that

[@KripkeSaul]

Why?

[@welshriver]

2:00:35 Wonderful.

[@daniellanglois8807]

I note, if it's relevant, that Wittgentsein never discussed, in so many words, his 'metaphilosophy', such as if he had said 'my metaphilosophy'.

[@pamelafrancis4476]

I suspected as much.

[@freeri87]

What is t-philosopher / t-philosophy?

[@Lia_L.]

traditional and theoretical philosopher/philosophy

[@ackbooh9032]

@@Lia_L. What would be its characteristics? I.e "traditional" from where and where?

[@Lia_L.]

@@ackbooh9032 I would guess that a t-philosopher takes those questions seriously while Wittgenstein tries to show that you can step away from them, because they are just theoretical

[@ChrisSmith-yh9bq]

The first speaker may know his stuff but he cannot impart it.

[@jeffreytaylor9682]

philosophy could use a new champion

[@dj098]

I am really not sure what Horwich means by "theoretical philosophy", once we start peeling off all the conceptual layers of the five basic preconditions that figure in his 'definition' of it. Of course, intuitively it is clear that the target of his Wittgensteinian attack is the idea that there are these kinds of deeply mysterious properties of the underlying reality of things, identifiable by the archetypically philosophical concepts such as truth, knowledge, consciousness, etc. But, as indicated by Williamson himself (as well as one other member of the audience in the Q&A section of the discussion) most of what he says about these traditionally philosophical problems is highly 'theoretical' in nature, not very different from the kind of inquiry one can find in contemporary science, for example in fundamental theoretical physics. Most physicists today would probably subscribe to this or that version of realism when trying to elaborate on their understanding of how theoretical models in their own respective areas of research relate to what is philosophically termed the 'objective world', or reality. The oft-quoted (and largely misinterpreted) dictum 'shut up and calculate' - which in the meantime became the metaphorical divine law of the gospel called instrumentalism - is not only problematic for the philosophically inclined in the physics community, but has for quite some time now been negatively contributing to a halt in the process of making the next major breakthrough in foundational physics (here of course I have quantum mechanics in mind). And the objection that Horwich is actually implicitly endorsing the kind of theoretical philosophy that he is arguing against is actually stronger than it seems at first. For example, his minimalist account of truth is all but a highly sophisticated piece of philosophical theorizing (or theoretical philosophy?), even if it is designed to be critically at odds with any kind of substantial philosophical theory of truth. But then again, how much theory is enough theory when we are talking about philosophy? And what exactly is 'theory' in the philosophical application of the term? It is interesting to wonder how many 'theoretical philosophers' today - assuming they don't have any qualms when it comes to accepting the label in question - would actually be willing to stick to the kind of substantialist view of philosophy that Horwich finds deeply irritating. Hell, one can even make the argument that Plato's conviction that there was this underlying reality hidden behind illusory perceptual experiences of things should be read as a primitive exposition of a theoretical conception of philosophy. Even Aristotle inherited the term 'theory' more or less intact from Plato, despite his harsh disagreements with his theory of Ideas. It is not clear what exactly they understood by it, but they certainly believed philosophical reflection is able to capture - at least to a certain degree - some vital aspects of the general functioning of nature and the human mind that are otherwise unattainable by other means. Of course, one can say that their assessment of the role and value of philosophy was appropriate for the historical context in which they lived, but a lot has changed in the meantime, we have made a lot of progress in philosophy. This is true, but still the questions they raised and the concerns they had about some of the basic solutions are still as perplexing today as they were when they were originally formulated. It seems that philosophy is always under attack, this is nothing new (I guess 'beating the dead horse' phrase assumes new meaning when used in this context 😂 In any case, Williamson's fight for the autonomy of philosophy may be misguided, but it certainly has solid roots in the past history of the discipline.

[@austinsmith117]

Wow, well said. Didn't understand any of it but you sound smart

[@hectorramage1308]

This comment section is quite depressing. It is filled with people who seem to have studied very little philosophy but have been (rather embarrassingly) seduced by the mystique and cult of personality surrounding Wittgenstein, and have thus taken it upon themselves to declare Horwich victorious. None of these cultists seem familiar with Wittgenstein beyond the usual one-liners, which, presented without context, are reduced to pseudoprofound deepities. If you have a modicum of intellectual good faith, read Williamson's review of Horwich's book, which he's largely repeating in this talk.

[@edwardjones2202]

Well Russell and Keynes were seduced by W's mysticism so they're in good company!!

[@hectorramage1308]

@@edwardjones2202 They're in appropriate company insofar as Wittgenstein considered Russell and Keynes to be mostly or fully uncomprehending of his ideas.

[@syureyn4230]

Ruan Fernandes

[@JonSebastianF]

I guess this is what it looks like when analytical philosophers really disagree :P

[@boxbanger]

I didn't realize he was debating! "I therefore predict that most Wittgenstein scholars will find Horwich's interpretation unfaithful. Thanks very much." That was the most clear thing he said the whole time (39 minutes in)--it was like a linguistic bomb dropping...

[@AustinStarr191]

the umms are nuts making, no matter how brilliant this guy is. he's unlistenable.

[@marcmars2381]

"Caseez"? "Exerciseez"? Gimme a break, Tim.

[@alibilgeozturk2227]

İyi ki Timoth Williamson görüşlerini kitaplaştırmış. Yoksa konuşmaları hiç çekilecek gibi değil.

[@ahmetsakrak]

Vallaha izlerken acı çektim.

[@internetenjoyer1044]

"If this was Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy, and if this meta-philosophy was Wittgenstein's main contribution to philosophy, then it seems that Wittgenstein wasn't a philosopher of much consistency or depth" boom

[@Feedinggoldfishhouseflie-wp8jx]

I think Tim's saying that he can easily imagine a scenario when he is 'not sure he feels pain' is specious. I mean - his quale is about as normative as a quail with three feet and 2 heads. Everyone knows whether they are in pain or not. He is being facetious Perhaps Paul should whack him over the head with his new book and see whether he feels that or whether he is 'not sure'. It is so ridiculous what Tim says. He sets the facile tone for his arguments from the outset when he denigrates Paul's perfectly serious ideas to things like 'calling T philosophy is all rubbish'. I frankly think people like Tim are like those who like to write hurtful poetry like 'The Tree in the Quad'. I know I am hurt by such nonsense poetry that claims a nonsense (imo the God-created reality of the tree for the observer is existent in the mind of the God-created observer - but it is still existent) - just like Tim would know that he was hurt if he was whacked over the head by Paul's book.

[@rarebreed1984]

Erm

[@marcmars2381]

"Accuseez"? What the fuck is going on, Tim?

[@mindkickstart8488]

Agreed. I endured 2 minutes. What a shame.

[@modvs1]

Andrew Dietrich says Philosophy thrives on antinomy, unlike science where you get convergence and consilience. I’ve often wondered if philosophers get together and agree to use antinomy as a way of manufacturing ‘debate’ or ‘controversy’ about what (perhaps) is essentially horseshit no matter which side of the fence (extended and bounded versions of cognition come to mind: Chalmers, Clark vs. Adams, Aizawa, Rupert, etc), so as to guarantee spectacle value and hence income?

[@modvs1]

Having said that, I'll put my two bob on Horwich.

[@oysteindg]

I believe Dietrich is essentially right, whoever he is (he seems to be unknown to google). Horseshit... well, working on an antinomy is not pointless, at least not in all cases. It is, though, if you do not understand that there i s an antinomy.

[@modvs1]

oysteindg Sorry "Eric Dietrich" Go to Philpapaers and look for said author "There is no progress in philosophy"

[@internetenjoyer1044]

There's no need for them to. Reproducing someone else experiment/finding is extremely useful in science. In philosophy, reproducing someone's argument and conclusion is worthless. So you only publish if you have something "antimonous" to say. That slows progress, but what's the alternative? Just put Jones (2010) paper on "such and such", into your own words, and expect to be published? How would that lead to progress?

[@blobblob3830]

Williamson's "argument" is terrible, painfully unconvincing.

[@modvs1]

Peter Unger would agree with Horwich.

[@KripkeSaul]

Peter Unger is a nobody with chip on his shoulder.

[@lesliecunliffe4450]

Before attempting to give insights into Wittgenstein's philosophy. it would be a good idea if Williamson grasped the significance of research into pedagogical styles. His own style of pacing around like a caged tiger distracts the listener and thus prevents him from being effective. The best communicators stay still when they are speaking.

[@mysticseer19]

This is the most boring presentation l've ever heard...💤

[@sinisamajetic]

41:20 Tim done a good job? It was a clumsy lie that had to hurt Tim more than if he openly said to him "you screwed"

[@timothywilliamson4492]

+sinisa majetic how dare you!

[@denisosu]

I would have liked to watch this, but I didn't have the patience to sit through that never-ending introduction - what was the point - let the guy who wrote the book speak and explain it for himself - he's actually a decent speaker and doesn't hmmm and haww at ever second word ...

[@kazisiddiqui6435]

This is a debate, not a sermon.

[@kazisiddiqui6435]

1. The essential thing about a good sermon is its performative dimension, hence the importance of rhetoric. When attending a sermon, one should expect to be lectured at by a performer. 2. The essential thing about a good debate is the actual set of issues being explored. When attending a debate, one must exert oneself to a greater extent in order to understand the positions being put forward if one's interest is in the issues rather than the rhetorical form in which they are being presented, as would be the case if you were attending a sermon rather than a debate. This is why: 1. Your statement is false. 2. Persons finding my comment ridiculous are likely to be members of the class "foolish".

[@kazisiddiqui6435]

You are mistaken. Pretty much all your assertions are factually inaccurate.

[@edwardjones2202]

@@kazisiddiqui6435 "members of the class of foolish" 😂😂 you mean "foolish"? Pretentious twat

[@pectenmaximus231]

People really need to get over Wittgenstein. I don’t understand why people make careers out of debating interpretations of his ideas. Wittgenstein was cryptic. He makes interesting suggestions but doesn’t carry them through into completion. Of course this engendered a century of furious debate, but I think we should recognise how fruitless this is. Why bother cleaning up Wittgenstein’s mess? Answer the questions to one’s own satisfaction, instead of trying to perform philosophical seances for Wittgenstein’s ghost.

[@thehairblairbunchjones6209]

Would you say this about other great philosophers like Hume and Kant? There are also fundamental disputes about what their ideas meant, and it’s not obvious that the disagreement about Wittgenstein is that much more severe or irresolvable. And despite his sometimes cryptic remarks, there is a lot of agreement about his basic ideas and their implications for philosophy of mind, metaphysics, etc. this is unsurprising since he elaborates the same ideas in different texts and in different places in the same text, and so those with the patience can build up a picture of what is going on despite the initial unclarity. as for this idea that we should solve the problems ourselves instead of trying to tidy up his ideas, the latter is certainly no substitute for the former, but it may help us to do it, for example, by forcing us to make certain distinctions that arise in connection with an exegesis that might not otherwise occur to us. Not to mention that it has intrinsic interest.

[@pectenmaximus231]

@@thehairblairbunchjones6209 Kant and Hume left legacies with less ambiguity, less debate, and frankly less fanatical interest. They loom large but are also fixed. Maybe this is because the active debates about their work were relevant to men long gone like Schopenhauer. I don’t disagree that Wittgenstein’s basic ideas are agreed on - the issue is that that is just about all that is firm. I think by later life he enjoyed the ambiguity, but I think it was really not so impressive to say “language is a game” or “language is use” or whatever and to walk away. Inspiring even today, and at the time, wave-making, but he didn’t *really* resolve anything to satisfaction. He provided stimulus. He pointed in a direction and everyone started walking that way. By the way, I do take Wittgenstein very seriously and certain arguments of his (eg Private Language) are really wonderful stuff. I just have the impression after enough time now, that “enough is enough!” with Wittgenstein, specifically, and the utter preoccupation people have with him. No other philosopher gets this kind of treatment. Maybe I’d be having the same reaction in the nascent Renaissance to Aristotle.

[@thehairblairbunchjones6209]

@@pectenmaximus231 Well, I’m not sure. People disagree about whether Hume was a naturalist or a skeptic, about what Kant meant by the noumena, etc. the debate about whether Wittgenstein held that rules must be actually shared or only potentially shareable, or whether he held that meaningful words can be meaninglessly combined don’t seem to me to cut much deeper than those debates. And indeed, I think there are good answers to these exegetical questions. The cult of personality is fairly cringe, especially since in many ways he wasn’t a model person, to say the least. However, I think that the extent to which it exists among academic philosophers who self-consciously follow his views and methodology, as opposed to non-academics who ingest a pop version of his work, is overstated. Most do depart from him in at least some significant ways and are aware of the shortcomings of his presentation of his arguments in the Investigations, which Wittgenstein himself was aware of, and, contrary to your claim that he enjoyed the ambiguity, was, to my knowledge frustrated by his difficulties in presenting his piecemeal observations in a linear argumentative form. Perhaps I am biased by my own sympathies for his views, though.

[@pectenmaximus231]

@@thehairblairbunchjones6209 i didn’t comment on the depth of contemporary debate about LW’s ideas, just that the debates concerning his work remain more active and obsessive than those concerning Kant or Hume. You are right that this effect is only more pronounced when including the popular dimension, but I think even in academic philosophy it is LW who has the top spot? I’d love to find out I’m wrong here. Of course the Greats are phasing in and out of academic popular interest so maybe LW is out and someone else is more in. I’m surprised to hear he was frustrated by his lack of success in presenting a linear argument, especially since he was essentially disposing of linguistic or conceptual linearity with his Investigations, and seemed to be assured of the futility of the kind of questing-for-certainty that defined his earlier work. I think a mind as sharp and deep as his would have seen that he was painting very vividly, but with a broad brush. Others have taken it upon themselves to pencil in the details, which is fine, but I think the world is ready for a new rockstar instead of paying overpriced tickets to see the second (and third) farewell tours of the aging ones playing their greatest hits. PS: I definitely go to all the old rockstar tours to see the hits... but we always wish there was someone taking the mantle than just creating watered-down derivatives. If you know of some plausible contenders under 40 years of age to “Heir of Wittgenstein”, please share. I make the age clause because I am adequately familiar with many of the significant philosophers who are now older than this (most of them by a factor of 1.5-2)

[@thehairblairbunchjones6209]

@@pectenmaximus231 I would say that Wittgenstein scholarship has been relatively niche for several decades. Since the decline of linguistic philosophy, whose influence had already greatly waned by the 80s. Having said that, some of the interpretive debates are actually fairly recent and involve attributing positions to Witt that none of his contemporaries did, as far as I know. So there has remained a sort of academic cottage industry of Wittgenstein interpretation, even if it pervades the general philosophical culture far less now, and I would say less than debates about Kant or Hume, both of whom I see as being currently more influential than Wittgenstein.

[@edwardjones2202]

13:46 and finally a concrete example of this momentous intellectual conflict descends from the cloud of words: Wittgenstein thinks "I think I am in Pain" sounds a bit wrong, Williamson doesn't. This is why Freeman Dyson dismissed Philosophy as, like theology, being about words not things. The "evidence" on which the point turns boils down to our feeling that a word is right here, wrong there, and I'm not sure about over there.

[@pierredutilleux9550]

It doesn't have to do with feelings. The "think" there functions as a signal of doubt, but how can one doubt one's own pain? You have pain or you don't. You can doubt epistemic claims, but you can't doubt a sensation you have. Wittgenstein was right.

[@michaelcollins7192]

Loggorea

[@nickpeim]

Fumbling around, Williamson. Learn to speak fluently …

[@TradingNirvana]

I've endured 15 minutes, but let's face it: this is unbearable.

[@Summalogicae]

There’s no accounting for taste, I suppose.

[@TradingNirvana]

@@SummalogicaeI was probably too harsh there 😅. Have a good day!

[@steyndewet1191]

I have to agree, it is insufferable. The stop start delivery, the muttering to himself with zero engagement with the audience, the weird breathing... If it is your job to lecture, you might as well do it right; if you're going to record it, get the mic away from the breathing...

[@michaelcollins7192]

He's not able to speak, I pity the audience who had to endure this, he should have passed over the two painful hours in silence.

[@juangbc1542]

why would he not be able to speak?

[@dannysze8183]

a lunatic find a new way to torture his attendance. why does he erm... and walk around?

[@Oners82]

Erm, erm, erm ,erm ah erm,...

[@celestialteapot309]

May I suggest speech therapy, if not, perhaps a job as a refuse collector?

[@MarkCarbajal]

Yawn. This is exactly what Wittgenstein railed against....

[@TheNeverposts]

do tell

[@angeloperalta5442]

@@TheNeverposts they havnt thrown away the ladder

[@Genghis_Sean_]

The first speaker is really difficult to listen to. He has a very jagged and broken speaking fluency.

[@chrisjohn4361]

+Sean Parrish This should serve to educate you: www.asha.org/public/speech/disorders/stuttering/

[@heyassmanx]

+Chris John Thanks for the edifying link. Still...seems like people who stutter shouldn't give public speeches. Just like people with narcolepsy shouldn't be air traffic controllers and pedophiles shouldn't teach school children.

[@chrisjohn4361]

i'm not sure that these are equal analogies.

[@heyassmanx]

oh. well I'm sure they are. They emphasize the point quite nicely.

[@rodrigosilveira3903]

Actually, not quite a good analogy. The first speaker, Williamson, is professionally a philosophy professor, a philosopher (a researcher in philosophy lol) and he exerts these activities mostly writing articles, chapters and books and delivering lectures and talks. His "speaking style" may be an issue 'n his lectures, classes and talks, but a greater part of his work does not depend on his speaking skills. That's not the case of air traffic controllers, who rely necessarily on their motor ability, or teachers of children, who cannot have ANY kind or level of sexual attraction to the kids. In the two last cases being a pedophile or having narcolepsy make someone unable to perform a job. I would agree with you that stutter makes a talk very difficult to follow, but (1) he's also a researcher and exposes his ideas and arguments written, so his stuttering is not an issue here, and (2) a researcher must sometimes expose his ideas by talking. I agree that he is not the best speaker, but he is prominent in his area, and hear him stuttering is a price to pay.

[@YeseDenuton]

Guy mumbling like hell; is he a teacher? dude YOU ARE A PAIN TO LISTEN AND I KNOW IT

[@neoepicurean3772]

I am a philosopher - I don't think this conversation fits this format...

[@zhaepTV]

if this is a debate (and Tim's showing barely qualifies as debate), clear victor: Paul Horwich

[@kihondosa4]

If Wittgenstein could comment, he would probably mess Tim up:). Where is no proposition there is no point. Philosophers are needed but those who practice what they preach, I believe, and in the past they were scientists and vice-verse. Just listen what Hawkins proposes about understanding of quantum physics. The bottom line, Tim hardly reflects Wittgenstein's view.

[@kazisiddiqui6435]

Um, Paul is the one who's trying to be Wittgensteinian...

[@kihondosa4]

Kazi Siddiqui Yes, indeed. He's trying. If he spoke less and therefore more constructive rather than critique, then there would be more of a progress resulted here. Nevertheless, Paul sounds awesome:)

[@kazisiddiqui6435]

Alex Kostko I disagree with Paul. I think he is suffering from Voltaire syndrome. Voltaire once dismissed calculus as "useless". I think ideal agents like Hutter's AIXI and Orseau and Ring's formalism for space-time embedded intelligence can give us some idea of the kinds of thing that are possible in principle through the use of approaches that we know about today. I see no reason why Wittgenstein would not change his mind after seeing what we've accomplished. He had changed his mind before.

[@kihondosa4]

Kazi Siddiqui I would just stick to atomic facts within a body of information and dismiss the rest of tautology. Nevertheless, as for Timothy and Paul, Paul's sanity is more intact, I guess.

[@kazisiddiqui6435]

You would, but should you? Perhaps our goals would be best served by trying something else in this case.

[@hrryhslm]

THIS IS SO BORING

[@hardhittingman]

Just think about it, " what we cannot speak thereof one must be silent " he can't even get across his own ideas of what he knows about. What a painful lecture.

[@lesmizzle]

This is insufferable. Endless word salad.

[@heyassmanx]

The first speaker is painful. Content and delivery equally feeble. Calling him a sophist would be a compliment, at least sophists can be superficially interesting...

[@MontyCantsin5]

'Calling him a sophist would be a compliment...' No, it would simply be factually incorrect.

[@robdevilliers666]

Williamson is a past master at waffling. Appaling (non-)argument. I by no means go along with all of Horwich but Williamson is woeful.