The Unity of Value - Ronald Dworkin (2012)

[@christopherwood9032]

This is very significant in Plato & the cardinal values

[@sahebchoudhury]

Thank you for sharing this interview.

[@hinteregions]

The part early on about Isiah Berlin, and pluralism, seems reminiscent of Locke's correction of Hobbes.

[@resiliencewithin]

Legal scholars from the 20th century have their intellectual charm whether left or right.

[@prataprajat4231]

He begins with the position that value is unitary, that there is no exclusivity in terms of choice. But then, in claiming that there exist 'the' right definitions for political concepts like justice, does he himself not submit to the exclusivist discourse?

[@xxcrysad3000xx]

So the fact of value pluralism in the world doesn't necessarily mean that there are no objective moral values, no "right answers", but then neither does the apparent unanimity of values in the abstract (prohibitions against murder, lying, rape, cruelty, ect.), that all, or nearly all, reasonable people agree on. Even if we had total unanimity on the injustice of murder, why assume that tells us something about some objective world of moral reality that we all ought to conform our behavior to, and not something about ourselves, the sorts of creatures we are, and the sorts of socialization processes we've experienced from the moment we are born? I don't think it's a logical contradiction to speak about these moral ideals and then go on to express doubt about their existence. It seems to be putting the cart before the horse to say that objective moral truths must be real if you want to make any claims whatsoever about the existence or non-existence of these very claims.

[@Khuno2]

Rather, one would be contradicting oneself in claiming that the right answer to moral queries is that there are no right answers. It is in this that the moral nihilist is claiming that they're not issuing a moral answer, no? But let's assume that there aren't moral properties. How then would we make sense of moral language? Perhaps in denying the first sentence in some way...

[@xxcrysad3000xx]

@@Khuno2 You could say that moral language is a type of personal approval or disapproval of this or that, which has no relation to some objective moral fact of the matter. Or you could say that moral statements are imperative statements, that they're commands of a sort. Or you could say they're a sort of wish. But the basis for all of these isn't some objective fact about the universe, the basis is the personal preferences of the individual or group. That's just a few of the possibilities.

[@Khuno2]

Those options attempt to answer how one could account for moral language without moral truth. But let's say that morality's a matter of personal approval and disapproval. Those who believe this also believe that it's a true accounting (the right answer). But its truth can't itself be matter of personal approval or disapproval. And what kind of truth would it be if not a moral truth?

[@christopherwood9032]

his dismissal of existentialism was rather shallow- in particular to sartre’s students moral dilemma. He did not dodge the question but I didn’t really come to his conclusion that it starts with a postulate of knowing the right answer. Sartre point is there none. Seems kind of circular to me. I don’t think existentialism gets a fair viewing when people reduce it to radical relativism. It just to say that there’s an element of subjectivity in some choices and we can’t always know a priori what the right answer is.

[@divertissementmonas]

Mr Dworkin is a slippery one but I have no doubt he would be unable to slip through the tight grip of Isaiah Berlin.

[@letdaseinlive]

An interesting discussion between them. If they met! Unfortunately, Zizek cowers and won't talk with Dugin!

[@susannemeyer7023]

What do you mean with „slippery“? You cannot mean unclear as Dworkin is one of clearest thinkers in the 20th century. It is absolutely necessary to define terms in a way that positive consensus can at least be expected.

[@divertissementmonas]

@@susannemeyer7023 I mean he's a smooth operator; disarming even. I agree that it is necessary to define terms that yeld a positive(majority?) consensus if it involves political philosophy. Politicians appeal to majority consensus by evoking the publics emotions. Dworkin certainly helped them to do that with his 'luck- egalitarianism'.

[@susannemeyer7023]

@@divertissementmonas "luck-egalitarianism"? I think you could profit from carefully studying Dworkin. Especially interesting kzbin.info/www/bejne/Zl7GeWamhdqpr7ssi=PiDbMMvVApAaAHoZ - around 40:00 to gay marriage marvelous, absolutely marvelous.

[@adamsimon8220]

His methodological comments re: definitions and theories seems to run afoul of the so-called Socratic fallacy. But set that aside: you can develop theories that explain why things falling under one concept have a certain property-necessarily-without thinking that the upshot of that theory gets “read back into” the relevant concept, and so the word expressing that concept. Take, for instance, the definitions of “male” and “female”-which seem to be something of a political obsession for some nowadays. To be sure, you’d want the definition to “decide” between contested contested cases-at least, that’s what those arguing over whatever accounts for the contestation want out of a definition. But take something else-say, the physiologist or biologist wants to understand why the distribution of physical strength in adult male populations tends to be statistically significantly higher than the adult female population. And suppose experiment and theorizing yield various factors which explain that observed distribution (e.g., relative differences of exposure to testosterone during certain periods of development, etc.). Now no one would say, whatever the appropriate theory or theories provide the desired explanation, are somehow part of the definition of the words “male” and “female.” Rather, those are further contingent features or properties the kinds those terms pick out. At least, to claim otherwise is a substantive claim requiring some defense. Similarly for “equality” and “liberty.” The reason this matters is because we could all mean the same thing by the terms-our expressions are subject to the same definitions-and yet we our disagreements involve what further normative attributes or connections these concepts have. Though I was exposed to Dworkin by someone who doesn’t much care for his work in jurisprudence, I’m surprised at the glibness with which he makes the move alluded to above.