Heidegger vs. Kant

[@dogou8956]

I am a Philosophy Freshman that struggles upon grasping definition. Thankyou for this.

[@propos05]

I am glad you offered the distinction of Kant's preference for space/time against Heidegger's necessity of time/temporality. However, I still need to further explore why H argues that time would necessarily be superior.

[@vomCzumHzumRIS]

Later in his life, heidegger refutes this prioritisation of time and corrects himself :)

[@joshuaim3263]

@propos05 Early Heidegger argues for the prioritization of time based off of Dasein as Being-Towards-Death. His idea was that because we derive purpose in relation to our limited time to be alive, that time itself would be more important for us. In other words, every day is a day closer to death, and we feel an existential anxiety to get the most out of the limited time that we have. So time is more important based off its relationship to our death.

[@threeblindchickens]

@@vomCzumHzumRIS in which works does Heidegger correct himself?

[@Impaled_Onion-thatsmine]

​​@threeblindchickens the economy, his philosophy on technology and man is critical marxist, his book on technology..kant would probably argue that's not what time is for, all this stuff you get anyway, however temporality is precisely a determination regardless

[@robford3211]

I think it would have been much better if Heidegger embodied a very well Buddhist sutra: Form is emptiness and Emptiness is form until then it’s just a theoretical construct how does out of emptiness form takes and what is relationship of form to emptiness.

[@bokramubokramu8834]

Good shit. Long form videos would be even better in my opinion.

[@numbersix8919]

On hearing this HvK difference regarding time again, my previous question about puppies, bunnies, and kitties I now extend to fluttery butterflies for emphasis. Is this notion of Death linked to Time a mental concept? Or like Freud's Thanatos is it a natural force arising from the physical principles of existence? In the first case, the butterfly, and even the bunny rabbit may be left out of Time and Care. By contrast Kant's a priori time and space faculties might allow being in time for puppies, kitties, bunnies, fluttery butterflies, and any other living thing. (Although Kant excludes them for other reasons I believe.) And so would Freud's entropic Thanatos, if that is how Heidegger envisions Death/Time. I'm trying not to psychologize Heidegger but need help on this point.

[@addammadd]

Thank you for your work! So it’s interesting that you claimed to be a (was it “dirty?”) Kantian in other videos. I see that you raise one of the more robust critiques H made of Kant’s ontology. My question to you, if a QnA were possible, would be: what do you make of that critique?

[@gavinyoung-philosophy]

I was thinking the same thing.

[@kazz970]

Have u read Heideggers Kant book? That would be good to look at after you're down with sein und zeit.

[@61541186154118]

Your videos are great, but I'm a bit overwhelmed by intros. It feels good to just jump right into the explanation. Also can you make videos on OOO & Nick Land?..

[@fredwelf8650]

I felt that your discussion was not relevant to Heidegger's critique of Kant in B&T. So, here is an excerpt which makes the issue self-evident. "Phenomenon", the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. 1 "Appearance", on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is in an entity itself, 2 and which is such that what does the referring (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a 'phenomenon'. Both appearance and semblance are founded upon the phenomenon, though in different ways. The bewildering multiplicity of 'phenomena' designated by the words "phenomenon", "semblance", "appearance'', "mere appearance", cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the phenomenon is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself. If in taking the concept of "phenomenon" this way, we leave indefinite which entities we consider as "phenomena", and leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being, then we have merely arrived at the formal conception of "phenomenon". If by . "that which shows itself" we understand those entities which are accessible through the empirical "intuition" in, let us say, Kant's sense, then the formal conception of "phenomenon" will indeed be legitimately employed. In this usage "phenomenon" has the signification of the ordinary conception of phenomenon. But this ordinary conception is not the phenomenological conception􀉡 If we keep within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can give an illustration of what is conceived phenomenologically as a "phenomenon", with reservations as to other differences; for we may then say that that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the "phenomenon" as understood and as accompanying it in every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the 'forms of the intuition') will be the "phenomena" of phenomenoiogy. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way-they must be able to become phenomena-if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when he says that space is the a priori "inside-which" of an ordering.1. Macquarrie p31 Being and Time

[@CancelledPhilosopher]

Heidegger is right. I'm biased because I like his philosophy a lot more than that of Kant though.

[@87Julius]

Probably side-stepping Hegel here. The critique of the kantian subject as an abstract moment of "the world" (as totality for Hegel) already is found in hegelian dialectics. The difficulty is how Heidegger has to escape totality while asserting immediacy in a non-dialectical sense. I have no taste for Heidegger, I think he's a huge trap (and not only for ethical reasons). I suppose you're already deep in it ; good luck getting out.

[@gavinyoung-philosophy]

I mean he does call himself a “dirty Kantian” in I think part 2 of his Being and Time series, so I don’t think he’s “caught up” in Heidegger as much as he is just being an academic and representing Heidegger’s critiques fairly.

[@kehana2908]

I mean, he is an academic who is trying to teach other people about Heidegger without evaluating it.