Episode 2: Strategy, Performance, and Practice - Col. Celestino Perez - Army War College

[@vincealcazar2870]

COL Perez: When you arrive at Episode 3, would you address what I feel is likely the make or break stage of the 4 steps in the larger process you lay out in your theory of strategy as performance (different than strategic performance)? Specifically, Coalition-Building could (can we test this proposition?) to be thought of at least an External + Internal endeavor. What I am thinking of here is NOT the Engagement Plan, that is later in the whole work process of the Planner. Instead, what I am thinking of here is the process of encounter; that is, how we talk to senior leaders and tactical audiences, asking each to in one case, reach down to the tactical, and in the case of the other, ask the tactician to reach up to the strategic to form the interlocking infrastructure of the campaign. as executable plan...as a performance coherenlty executed throughout the force. Thanks. COL Vince Alcazar, USAF

[@ArguingTheOE]

Hello, Vincent Alcazar. Before I continue, I do want to ask you about the difference you see between "strategy as performance" and "strategic performance"? I do not distinguish between these two, or between these two and my "strategy as performance." My intent with the latter formulation is to call attention to my broader argument that strategy is more than an academic or professional discipline to be discussed; instead, it is an activity or practice that can be done well or poorly...and we need to have a discussion about how to do it well...and we need to practice it often (daily?) to do it well. Now, with respect to building a coalition, I think that those persons who come up with the strategy must give--as part of their discernment whether their strategy is feasible--some thought to what would be necessary to win support from key persons...anywhere. The way I see things, we can alter a person's behavior in two ways, or with some combination of these two. First, we can alter a person's incentives. Second, we can alter their ideas (i.e., their values/priorities or their interpretation of the world). Hence, when we engage with leaders of all pay grades, the coherence of what we are doing must be rendered clear to each. Tactical capacity bears upon strategic feasibility. Moreover, tactical coherence depends upon strategic direction. My idea, following a political theorist whom I have some students read, is to be neither a holist (who seeks only patterns at the "top level") or a reductionist (who seeks only an understanding of x-y causal relations at the "ground level"), but to be a "connectionist; i.e., to be able to scope one's analysis and synthesis in ways that prompt you to look up and down, see necessary connections, and build your arguments and interventions accordingly. I think many of us do this, but we should do it more mindfully and with greater devotion to quick-turn research and consultation to move us away from merely intuitive decisions (although well-honed intuition too is valuable and necessary). As an application of the foregoing, military leaders are looking at the world's strategic environment to identify potential military threats. Their strategic solutions in many cases include DOTMLPF-P decisions, e.g., acquiring weapons and vehicular platforms that enable tactical leaders to intervene at highly specific geographic locations. If these tactical leaders do in some potential future employ these weapons and platforms, they will do so with an eye toward achieving some end that is nested in a chain of ends to the top. Now, to change gears a bit, you seem also to be talking about narratives; i.e., how do we craft our arguments to render our strategy compelling to our audience? That is a big question we can discuss elsewhere. If I've missed something or you want to speak further, feel free to write at: [e-mail]

[@vincealcazar2870]

Tino: thanks for the rapid reply. I will connect at your .mil email, but wanted to engage here in the event others had related questions. When I write "strategy as performance" I perceive the ideas bound up within the theory of strategy as performance writ large. When I wrote the term, "strategic performance," the distinciton I am attempting to make was between the proposal (your theoretical 4-part frameowrk) and that (any) framework at work, producing results. Second, I found your explanation connected to your deployment above of "connecitonist" useful. Specifically, I see strategists armed with a foundation of inter-related, explanatory, enabling, and supporting theories in concert with vocational tools & methods to process mission+environment. But, what I do not perceive is analytic recognition of, or work that fosters "connectionism" in order to get after being effective connectionists. I realize any body of work is not so much strategizing so much as it is communicating. It seems to me that connectionsim and connectionist is/are composed of at least several key ideas, but I will digress into that discussion. However, what I was thinking of in my quesiton was the problem of the tactical flag officer and/or the senior leader audience that unhelpfully tacticizes strategy. Here, what I am recalling in my experience are leaders who still look upward from their bodies of tactical expertise but who cannot yet connect to the stratgy proposal/campaign plan in consideration. Third, narratives; most certainly. Perhaps my concern is apparent in my questions in different but related areas. Thanks, Vince

[@zerosix3606]

the professional military education complex is a self-licking ice cream cone