Vietnam War: How the U.S. Fought the Wrong Conflict

The primary North Vietnamese defeat mechanism to subdue the South Vietnamese was its invasion down Lao's Ho Chi Minh Trail from 1959 to 1975. The U.S. knew this invasion down the trail was the primary military problem confronting its effort, but failed to place combat troops in Laos to stop the invasion. This video explains why the U.S. failed in its effort to confront the problem, details the primary proponents of the strategy, and shows why the U.S. would have been at a distinct advantage by placing troops into Laos to confront this invasion.
Another set of pilots, the clandestine U.S. Air Force Ravens, flew in Laos with one of the highest casualty rates of the entire Indochina War. You can see videos on them Ravens I: Mission and Men • The Ravens Part I: Mis... and Ravens II: Their Stories • Ravens Part II: Their ... . You can also learn more on the Secret War in Laos from Dr. Carter's video "What was the Secret War in Laos?" • What was the Secret Wa... .
John Horan, gracious financial benefactor and supporter to memorializing Lao War veterans, sponsor of the The Lao-Hmong Memorial in Colorado, says: "I've seen and read a lot on the U.S. Secret War and your video is the most complete and concise review of all." The United States Air Force Museum at Dayton Ohio says this video is the most accurate and complete account of the Laos Secret War.
A special video on this channel is Laos Secret War Pilot: Lee Gossett. • Laos Secret War Pilot:... Lee flew for Air America, a contract airline for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Continental Air (CASI)
‪@CarterOnConflict‬

[@WilliamSWhorton]

Absolutely superb! I was amazed by the scope, lucidity, and clarity of this video. This video will cause me many sleepless nights because it will force me to meditate on the breadth of information presented. I am an infantry combat MARINE with 21-months of infantry combat in Vietnam as USMC Infantry platoon commander and senior battalion advisor to a South Vietnamese Army infantry battalion. Thank you Paul (even for my future sleepless nights!).

[@CarterOnConflict]

You walked the walk sir and we are humbled and honored by your dedication, experience, and selfless service in your Vietnam tours. I look forward to you sharing your wisdom with us very soon. Thank you so much for watching and commenting.

[@rwjr1944]

Once again, thank you for the clear yet succinct presentation.

[@CarterOnConflict]

And I appreciate you watching, truly, and your comments.

[@johnmoreno9636]

I think one of the best strategic analysis of the Vietnam War I have ever seen. It pretty much follows what Col. Summers said in his book On Strategy - cut a DMZ line across South Vietnam, Laos to Thailand like in Korea. Let the ARVN handle the insurgency in the South. And it has the advantage that you do not invade North Vietnam, which would have caused the Chinese to intervene directly. I cry when I think what might have happened in Vietnam had your strategy been followed instead of Westmorland's and Pres. Johnson's. Excellent job. I hope the War College makes it required viewing. Another very good book on strategy about Vietnam is Vietnam: The Necessary War by Michael Lind.

[@CarterOnConflict]

John, I really appreciate your words. You are correct that others laid this out quite well, particularly Summers. I concur in the heartfelt sadness in thinking what a totally opposite outcome could have been achieved had Laos been the battlefront. Sir, I hope you share my video with others, you write and articulate well and I am sure you are an influencer. This video is the only one of mine that felt like a mission, a duty to do. I felt a calling towards it, and I know you get that. Thank you again for watching and commenting.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Oh, thanks for the book recommendation- I will check out the Lind book.

[@CarterOnConflict]

And I just ordered the Lind book.

[@sugarpuddin]

To win a war you have to invade and dispatch the opposition. If you don't have the fortitude for this necessity, then you have no business warring. Sun Tzu, et al, made this clear.

[@johnmoreno9636]

@@CarterOnConflict So what did you think about the Michael Lind book Vietnam: The Necessary War? Part of what impressed me was his comparison on what people predicted at the time versus what actually happened by 50 years later. I did tell a retired US major friend of mine to view your video. But I have read several conclusions that the basic fault lied with the General Staff, and not with political interference by the White House. It is the job of the Chief of Staff to come up with a winning strategy. But like with MacArthur in Korea, it is up to the White House to make sure the military strategy does not cause bigger problems. The Lind book makes this clear.

[@lessd7564]

Very thorough presentation. Thank you. We need to deside when we enter a war we use military means with a goal to win not play around.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Well thank you for your comment, and of course for watching. Yes, playing around in war, continuing to use the same methods when they are not working, are recipes for disaster. I remember war correspondent Martin Stuart-Fox telling me of talking to a Marine in Vietnam, and interested in what kind of prep they had done, asked if they had studied the French fight against the Viet Minh? The Marine replied the French had lost, why would we study their war? So pride and hubris played a role too. ‘We can win half cocked, we are mighty America.’

[@falcon5215]

Dr, Carter....your presentations are absolutely critical and should be a must view for everyone, particularly future leaders. Thank you

[@CarterOnConflict]

I appreciate you saying this. The video you viewed here is, for me, the most important of the 34 or so videos I put together. As much as possible, I’d certainly appreciate you sharing the video. Thank you very much for watching and commenting.

[@Chilly_Billy]

I believe that regular mining of Haiphong harbor would've had enormous impact on North Vietnam's ability to import heavy weapons and POL supplies so critical to their final victory.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@Chilly_Billy I agree. Good point. Thank you for watching and commenting.

[@fugguhber4699]

Yes. I am going to watch this later today. From Bangkok !

[@CarterOnConflict]

Ha ha- thank you

[@lllordllloyd]

Thank you for your other short video drawing attention to this one, which I had missed. The scholarship and sourcing, and arguments put forward here are first class, and compelling. Your arguments reflect those of Harry Summers in his book "On Strategy" which in the late 1980s used a Clausewitzian framework to consider how the US could have 'won' in Vietnam. His conclusion was that US forces should have 'isolated the battlefield' from the NVA whilst allowing the ARVN to secure South Vietnam. Your thesis here takes the arguments further and into more detail I think (I read the book at the time of publication, when I was in high school, and it's one I loaned out and never got back). However, I suspect the superior communist political organisation would have extended its efforts to infiltrate and control the South Vietnamese government apparatus. Such a strategy would have reflected that used against the French in the 1940s, and various middle eastern 'allies' of the US in recent times: the communists showed they could control small villages directly, while placing fifth columnists into the 'South Vietnamese' government. They had a compelling narrative or ideology the South lacked, and as Captain Whorton described in his 'insane asylum' video. Then, it would be a matter of waiting for the US to leave the theatre. This immediately leads to the question of whether the Thieu regime could have secured legitimacy and consolidated his power against such a threat, and built up a strong and growing government. It's a counter-factual, but it is hard to see him surviving long term without becoming like the southern regimes the French supported (ie, only controlling part of Saigon), or an authoritarian strong man, either of which would have given the communists fertile ground. We are also led into some questions regarding timing: if the Ho Chi Minh trail was cut before Tet '68, would the communist southern forces have been so sacrificed in that February? The folly of the Tet Offensive could be allowed (the Northern leaders were divided on it) because the Trail allowed PAVN forces to replace losses. Isolated, the Viet Cong would have had to be more circumspect, cautious. The South Vietnamese regime was certainly stronger and more legitimate in, say, 1972, than it was in 1968. Cutting the trail after 68 might have worked, but so much damage was already done, the war was at such a pitch of violence, and global and domestic sympathy for superpower intervention was rapidly disappearing (but much of that because of the events as they played out). There are moving parts to our scenario, but the timing of the intervention brings rather different military and political problems, depending on the year. Just a couple more notes for your consideration: around 38:00/40:00 the sheer destruction and civilian casualties in the south are discussed, but largely in utilitarian terms: I would suggest using B-52s as battlefield support in 'heavily populated areas' very nearly constitutes a war crime in itself. In guerrilla war civilian deaths are absolutely inevitable... the guerrillas hide among the people but equally the peasant army is very much the 'society in arms' anyway. In 1914 the Germans massacred Belgian civilians for 'hiding the soldiers', a byproduct of Belgian reservist troops not being issued uniforms. The Germans doing the killing were definitely fearful but the massacres were unquestionably war crimes and the uniforms an excuse. But too often we allow ourselves to believe that therefore ANY amount of civilian death is okay or 'collateral damage' (very relevant to a war going on right now, where schools are being hit with 2000lb bombs because there is a 'military leader' in there among the children). I do not wish to stand in judgement from the safety of my home, distant in time and place, but the criminality of the methods used should not be washed away by the revival of the 'support the troops' idea in the 1990s (but nor do I stand in judgement of individual soldiers doing their best, their duty... guerrilla soldiers hide among civilians, criminal leaders hide among the common soldiery!). This leads to discussion of the communist forces in the south being very conditional on time and place. The composition in 1963/4 (when the communists very nearly won, with minimal direct PAVN support) was very different to 1967 which was again not like 1972. The pattern was always more northern troops and more sophisticated weapons, of course, but cutting Laos at each stage would have been a different operation with a different impact. My hypothesis is that in 1964 cutting Laos with a Marine division or two would not have saved the Saigon government, as the south was already largely overrun with indigenous troops whose material needs were not great. Post Tet '68 was probably the most promising time, but by then the tide was rapidly turning even as the Thieu regime gained stability, legitimacy and the ARVN became a solid force. After the '68 US election, it was politically impossible. Around 44:00 there are some points that I am not in a position to directly contradict, but of which I am deeply suspicious. When the Viet Minh left the south in 1954 many, if not most, were locally raised but going to the area controlled by their leadership... being redeployed if you like. Of course they took many young lads and wives with them. In 1954 there was no reason to suppose there would be another war: the 1956 election would unite the country and were agreed to at Geneva. You cite Rufus Phillips (I will have to read this, I am cautious in commenting without having done so) but the CIA in Saigon in 1954 was deeply corrupt, a fountain of lies and propaganda, and engaged in establishing the deeply unpopular Diem regime and discrediting Ho Chi Minh at all costs: Ho Chi Minh who had the legitimacy of all he had done up until then, and which I certainly do not need to tell you about. The CIA lied about widespread massacres and reprisals in the North, station chief Edward Lansdale regarded lies as simply part of strategy, and the press gang/forced marriage stuff sounds a lot like this. I maintain an open mind. I agree with the proposition that a blockade in Laos, with some US and Allied forces allocated to the South, (politically the Korean, Thai, Australian and New Zealand contingents were important to the US presence), could well have secured some sort of military victory. This might even have lasted after the US gave up and went home. But with hindsight, I do not think this would have been a better outcome for Vietnam: the country is united, free (in the sense of self-determination and the people and government identifying with each other), proposperous and rapidly developing. Communist victory did not bring mass slaughter nor any repetition of the genocidal tendencies of Stalin and Mao, and in fact the Vietnamese stopped one in Cambodia against the wishes of virtually the whole world. Vietnam is clean, happy, beautiful, and dignified. You can get very rich, but the poorest people have the necessities to live with dignity and comfort. How the US could have secured a military victory is a fascinating question and a very important one for soldiers and ex-soldiers to think about. But the idiocy, blind ideology and hubris that caused the US to be so intransigent in their determination to fight Ho Chi Minh and his government is the much more instructive lesson for citizens, political scientists and historians. The US reached for a military solution to a non-military problem. Thank you if you read this far and thank you for the clarity of your case, as put forward in the video.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@lllordllloyd I actually read every word you wrote, and will read again. I think you have provided many insights here that are worthy. You definitely have done your homework, few knew of the Vietminh marrying local girls prior to 1954 to cement bonds. I would say though given the large amounts of arms caches they left behind - we found many of them - they were prepared for war. On Rufus Phillips, google him and Cspan. He gave a great lecture which they recorded, you will enjoy. Ultimately my key point was - although as you say, I went further - that the U.S. failed to isolate the battlefield. This is a requirement for victory. To not even attempt it is malfeasance. Well, can’t thank you enough Lloyd, now going for my second read :-).

[@herehere3139]

Thanks for pointing me to this video ! I watched it in full last night, reflected around in my head with all I know of it and put a MUCH more full complete picture in my mind about the whole situation. In a previous Vietnam veteran story I listened too, He was a pilot, and he wondered why they wouldn't have them bomb the SAM sites BEFORE they were fully constructed. That's a good question too. So the US knew where the SAM construction sites where but did nothing about them, nor did they ever try to actually stop the main bloodvein of that major trail. So for our military, no matter which hill or city they took back, the supply of NVA was always intact to just take it right back. I believe anyways

[@CarterOnConflict]

Bingo - that's right - no matter what the US did, there was always a steady supply of reinforcements. For young folk (not me) I like it to playing a video game where the enemy always has automatic life regeneration. Thank you for watching AND your comment.

[@herehere3139]

@@CarterOnConflict Hahaha That's a great analogy. The enemy is constantly regenerating. That just makes the "game" a matter of how long can you survive and how many waves of enemies, before you lose. There was no "boss" fight to win. Very interesting stuff

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@herehere3139 Yes, sir, that's right!

[@jeffnorris3913]

Great analogy

[@twooclock9458]

Masterful

[@CarterOnConflict]

I’m glad you enjoyed. Thank you for watching and I hope you watch other of my videos.

[@jeffnorris3913]

I would love to see this is a war game scenario

[@CarterOnConflict]

Well, now that you mention it, that would be quite an exercise to see how it played out. Excellent point. Thank you for watching and commenting.

[@twooclock9458]

Damn this is good

[@CarterOnConflict]

Glad you liked, and posted a comment. Please share. Thank you very much.

[@JML385]

Great video, but at the end, US run away like a sick doooooooooog

[@CarterOnConflict]

We abandoned our allies, no doubt. Thanks for watching and commenting.

[@dontran391]

So I just saw this video & combine with your other video of the Laotian Secret War, I can see the US should have deployed troops to Laos & NOT South Vietnam. When North Vietnam invaded Laos to construct their Ho Chi Minh Trail, that is CLEARLY a violation because they are actually invading another country's land & that should technically allow the US to deploy troops to Laos to prevent that from happening. Laos was technically in turmoil & definitely needed the US help.The US does not have to go to North Vietnam to attack (of course by doing so would obviously provoke USSR & China) & instead they should typically isolate North Vietnam by ensuring Laos & South Vietnam can manage on their own. 1956-1960 was a critical year to strengthen the Royal Lao Army, Hmong Army, & the ARVN. By theory, Vietnamization Project should have been done between 1956-1960. If successful, Cambodia would remain untouched & unaffected by the war & there would be no such thing as Khmer Rouge or Cambodian Genocide. Unfortunately we see it was indeed the US Government's decision that causes nothing but escalation in conflict. Otherwise, if that wise decision happened, the Vietnam War would actually end way back in 1960 instead of 1975. Additionally, we see similar mistake made in Afghanistan. When hunting for Osama & most of the terrorist groups, majority of the terrorist groups migrated to Pakistan as sanctuaries & we allow that to happen. Let's hope currently with Ukraine & also potential with Taiwan, lessons would be learn & Ukraine & Taiwan would not encounter a same fate as South Vietnam or Afghanistan.

[@CarterOnConflict]

You are correct on your points, I believe. Thank you for watching, and comments for me and other viewers.

[@stephenpowstinger733]

I agree that we, U.S., should have done more actively in Laos, and around 1960. Perhaps dispatched a division. I don’t agree that this was an “instead of” decision as it was still necessary to protect northern South Vietnam. Even Eisenhower was remiss but it was Kennedy who really shook up the military for the worse. See McMaster’s book. Army Pleiku vicinity 1968.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@stephenpowstinger733 ah, did not know McMaster covered a portion, I am remiss in not reading his well-acclaimed thesis/book. Thanks for informing us.

[@johnmoreno9636]

@@stephenpowstinger733 Which McMaster book is that?

[@johnmoreno9636]

The difference was Laos and Cambodia had weak governments and armies. The US had an excellent chance to "convince" the Royal Laotian government to allow the US to make a DMZ, and they could not have stopped us even if they did not like it. Pakistan has a capable army, and I am not sure would have allowed a permanent US presence in large sections of its border. There is also a question that if the US forced the issue, whether the Pakistani Army might have even more actively helped the Taliban. They certainly would have cut the land road for supplies to Afghanistan. However, after the Taliban started challenging Pakistan for control of the border areas, that might have been an opportunity. But by then relations were sour.

[@sportcardcollector9599]

Great video thanks for sharing 👍

[@CarterOnConflict]

Big Mike - good to hear from you.

[@cmcc5825]

Amazing video. I thoroughly enjoyed your well researched arguments. In a way, it seems that the US leadership was its own greatest enemy. I wonder if those lessons could be applied to conflicts today.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Well thank you so much for watching and commenting. I do think that often US leadership can indeed be our own worst enemy, and, your thought that some lessons here possibly could be applied to today is good food for thought!

[@johnmoreno9636]

In Vietnam: The Necessary War by Michael Lind, he argues that indeed, ultimate fault lies with the Joint Chiefs. It is their job to advise the President on the military strategy needed to accomplish the political goals, and they allowed Westmorland to lead MACV for too long after it was seen his strategy was failing. Another KZbin argues that the difference between generalship in WW2 and Vietnam is that in WW2 failing commanding generals were more quickly replaced and taken out of the field than in Vietnam.

[@johnmoreno9636]

There is an interesting book on counterinsurgency in the Iraq War called Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice by John Nagl about how the 2003 US Army had forgotten all the lessons it had painfully learned about counterinsurgency in Vietnam, and the hard fight by counterinsurgency proponents to reintroduce basic counterinsurgency practices into the US Army by 2006's surge. Nagl makes it clear that fighting an insurgency is harder than defeating an established enemy force, that the US Army in 2003 did not have the theory in place to fight the insurgency that arose given Bremmer's and Remfeld's disasterous decisions, but once they did the Iraqi Insurgency did die down. But Vietnam and Iraq prove that while Government has very smart people in it, even smart people make obvious stupid mistakes, and that the key to victory is not smart people, but the ability to radically change direction and strategy should the present strategy prove to be failing.

[@georgemcmillan3360]

I am going to watch this again, I am doing a short discussion on your "Secret War in Laos" video on my GWM3 Grand Strategy channel in conjunction with the 1961 map of the old tail dragger airports and my recent motorcycle trip.

[@CarterOnConflict]

I'm honored sir. Always good to hear from you George. Keep me posted.

[@Jamespwickstromw]

I think, to keep it simple, it was a question of morality. The US simply tought they were too moral. Had the US fought the same way as they did in ww2 i don't think the North Vietnamese would have a chance.

[@joepvanderijt3725]

It seems to me after watching your excellent video Paul that cutting the HCM trial was the right thing to do. One can only wonder what ulterior motives really were behind the decision to not go for this previous proven strategy! Peace for all; xxx

[@CarterOnConflict]

Peace for all and I always look forward to your thoughtful comments Joep - God Bless you, and thanks for watching and your comment.

[@Dav1Gv]

Maybe the Somme 1916 and then Amiens 1918 which show the immense developments in machines like tanks, sound ranging for guns asnd infantry and air tactics during the war

[@CarterOnConflict]

I will check this out and appreciate the recommendation, thank you.

[@Robbi496]

Dr Carter: While I agree with your thesis, with the extreme feeling against the Vietnam War, could we have gotten support for this?

[@CarterOnConflict]

Robb, thank you for watching and commenting. Early in the war, I think we could have gotten American domestic support, if say, before 1966. Foreign support, probably not unless we pressed the point that the Viet Minh had invaded Laos. I think if we would have stressed the communist Vietnamese had violated the 1962 pact, rendering the treaty useless, then there would be very little foreign governments could have said. And had they objected, there was little they could have done against us anyhow. Of course, we wanted to keep Laos on the back burner, so we meagerly addressed Laos until it got out of hand and the Viet Minh were placing whole divisions down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By then, all courses of action were unfavorable. Thank you again for watching and your interest.

[@jamestakacs]

Once the NVA knew we wouldn't have destroyed Hanoi, invaded Laos and Cambodia all the NVA had to do was play a waiting game. The NVA also knew the American people would grow tired of this and want to leave. The NVA knew the South was corrupt. Just play the waiting game. Get into a few fire fights. Do a few offenses. Then in 1975 go for it. The NVA was right and they got what they wanted, a ONE Vietnam.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Good insights. Thank you for sharing, I would agree.

[@markgarrett3647]

Also to give credit where credit is due the south Vietnamese troops in the second military region or Corps with the assistance of reinforcing American troops and close air support managed with considerable amount of difficulty to thwart the attempts of the PAVN/VC troops to occupy at least half of the Corps through a systematic campaigns of ambushes and destruction of bridges that created economic asphyxia of the residents.

[@Scott-gt6od]

Haha okay they couldn't be trusted....68-70 phoniex program

[@markgarrett3647]

@@Scott-gt6od The commanders of the ARVN are a hit or miss in quality but what really held them back from being effective at fighting the VC and the PAVN was the unstable political situation in Saigon.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Thank you for your comment sir. I apologize for the late reply.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Thank you for watching!

[@CarterOnConflict]

Thank you for watching and commenting.

[@trevorflynn2905]

In 1968 they almost drop a nuke on the ho chi man trail but it got leaked and it never happened

[@CarterOnConflict]

Trevor, thanks for watching and sharing this. I seem to recall having heard of this before, but can’t recall where. Indeed, they were concerned about the trail. But never devised a real strategy against it.

[@anthonycheaford1962]

@@CarterOnConflict Outstanding videos, topics, knowledge and analysis. I've heard MACV-SOG's Billy Waugh was an advocate of tactical nuclear weapons on the Ho Chi Minh trail, something he repeated decades later when talking to a Vietnamese general in Vietnam. My opinion of the overall topic is there's no doubt America could have won a military victory if unhindered by politics and laws, but at risk of a wider war and international condemnation. I think the war was strategically lost in the 1950s by US involvement with men like General The, President Diem, etc - as per Graham Green's 1955 analysis in The Quiet American. Dien Bien Phu should have been the best indicator of the determination of the Vietnamese, which did defy everyone's expectations. Same in my War (one tour, 2012 Helmand) - that was strategically lost in Oct 2001 by CIA allying with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf - Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's boss! Helmand was tactically lost by MI6 in 2005 when it ignored everyone's advice and sacked governor Sher Mohammed Akhundzada. Best conflict analysis I've heard since serving is that War is a Racket. Thanks again for your videos, and hearing me out if you got this far👍

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@anthonycheaford1962 I read every word Anthony and I’m quite appreciative of your thoughtful analysis - appreciate you bringing Afghanistan and Helmand province into the debate. Didn’t know what Billy Waughs thoughts were but he was a true warrior. I think you are right, similarities between the conflicts and you articulated better than I. Thank you for watching Anthony and please share my videos - continue to comment as well, it is helpful for me and other viewers.

[@anthonycheaford1962]

@@CarterOnConflict FYI, my interest in Billy Waugh stems from my 1997 visit to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's front company in Yemen, 17-miles south of Al Qaidah town. Waugh admitted working with Al Qaeda operators in 1990s Yemen & I think one of his proteges from Vietnam (David Dean, who was my work colleague in 1997) helped setup KSM's front company by using me as a patsy. Dean took his own life in Lake Hartwell on Jan 8 2020, just after I made these allegations publicly. Sorry if this is too far off topic for you, but I do think they're related matters, i.e. what happened to Dean to turn him from one of America's most loyal sons on Hill 937 to one of American's most treacherous enemies, helping KSM plan 9/11

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@anthonycheaford1962 I’d like to read more about this Anthony - could you send me some info at [e-mail]. Fascinating stuff all new to me. Thank you.

[@Robbi496]

The Author of Inside the Green berets was LTC CHARLES Simpson, not Bill!

[@markgarrett3647]

Bill could have been a nickname.

[@stephenpowstinger733]

The whole thing makes me sick to this day. I was with the 4th Division 1968-69 fighting west of Pleiku near the Cambodia and Laos triangle. On one patrol we actually found a foot of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was clear that the main enemy was what we called NVA - regular soldiers, not VC. There it was, a bulldozed road deep in the mountainous jungle. I am also sick of the defeatism I hear - that we never could have won, and the fairy tale that we lost the chance to make Ho an ally in 1945. As for the “cut the trail” plan, the only problem would have been uncertainty as to how far the left flank needed to be held. The war might have spilled over to the west and Thailand.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Very good insights, really well made points. Thank you!

[@vanthai5738]

In my humble opinion, the US intentionally did not win the war so that it engaged Red China in secret cooperations which caused the collapse of the USSR and ended the cold war without direct US - USSR nuclear threat. In effect, the US lost a regional war in Vietnam, which is not within its strategic defense plan, to win a global war.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Thank you for watching, and I really appreciate you sharing your insights into the war.

[@goldreserve]

The Atlantic Charter, signed by the Allies in 1941, promised the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they live. The Viet Minh, working with OSS, believed the Allies would support Vietnamese independence at the end of World War II. At the end of World War II, the British used Japanese troops to suppress Vietnamese uprisings and returned Vietnam to colonial French rule. Japanese occupation and French colonial rule exacerbated the Great Famine of 1945 (Nạn đói lớn năm 1945), causing 1-2 million deaths. The US reneged on the the Atlantic Charter in 1950 by providing direct military aid to colonial France to subjugate the Vietnamese. After the defeat of the French, the Geneva Accords of 1954 stipulated elections would be held in July 1956 to unify North and South Vietnam. President Ngô Đình Diệm, with support from the US, cancelled the elections to prevent communists from taking power through a democratic election. A completely pointless war that should never have been fought.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Good points on all and I agree with your overall conclusion. On one point though, remember, neither the US nor the south Vietnamese signed the 1954 agreement so legally we’re not bound to hold elections. That said, senseless war. Thank you for watching and commenting, I greatly appreciate it. Here is my list of videos and I hope you find others you like: youtube.com/@carteronconflict?si=8blRpCBZ1hbHVy4f

[@stephenalexander6721]

Creighton Abrams said the correct strategy would have been to isolate South Vietnam from North Vietnam the let the govt and viet cong fight it out.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@stephenalexander6721 thank you for watching this video, and contributing to the dialogue. Not a lot of people watch it. Thanks Stephen for sharing Abrams thoughts, I was unaware. Much appreciated.

[@KimChung1970Saigon]

For normal citizen (not VC & betrayer) who live in capital Saigon. We all never were forgetting our bad days. Scary time, bad experiment to VC did. We also understood how a distorter communist government behaves when that animal took control of South Vietnamese people just for 2 days. KC from Saigon "Boat People" - After 4/30/1975 Saigon lose what communist done to the South citizen & the Republic of Vietnam Military Forces: Tù Khúc Du Ca - Nhạc: Xuân Điềm(Chiến Sĩ VNCH Người Tù Cải Tạo) - Ca sĩ: Khánh Ly : kzbin.info/www/bejne/m6WmmKehlLRnn8k

[@CarterOnConflict]

Thank you for for comment, and God Bless.

[@disposablehero4911]

I think the military needed funding they could divert to Secret/Black Book anti-communist operations around the world. So this linear approach, being as effective as so many thought it would have been, would have stopped that cash flow and the Pentagon/MIC couldn't have that.

[@CarterOnConflict]

That is quite possible. Thank you for watching and this insightful comment.

[@Dav1Gv]

The UK broke the Japanese invasion of India at the Battles of Imphal and Kohima both of which were defensive battles and caused the Japanese to overextend their suppilies (cf the Lines of Torres Vedras in the Napoleonic War) so a blocking line could well have worked. My only concern would have been that it could have been held, does Dien Ben Phu argue against this? Also as the North would certainly have tried to outflank any US line it might have been harder to maintain that the video suggests and, as to the effectiveness of DMZs it could be argued that the Korean DMZ has worked only because the North has never attacked. All that said it does seem as if it would have been a better bet than what happened and it was certainly an excellent video which made one think a lot. Thank you very much..

[@CarterOnConflict]

Thank you so much for your comments. As you note, it’s speculation that it could have held. I addressed the ‘outflank’ issue in the video, and addressed there the transition to the defense and effectiveness of establishing the defense in Korea which held against multiple Chinese wave-type attacks. I would argue Dien Bien Phu was different in that it was a series of small forts in a valley with mountains on the sides, whereas a defense in Laos would have been tied to mountainous terrain. In any sense, your primary point is well taken - we really don’t know, but seems a better option than what we chose. Thank you again for watching the videos, I’m glad you enjoy and comment.

[@Dav1Gv]

I am inclinded to agree about Dien Bien Phu although perhaps the real problem was over reliance on air supply but against that air supply worked pretty well in the Burma campaign 1944-5. Military history (mainly WW1 and the ACW) has been a hobby of mine most of my life so you may hear from me again. Going back to the bombing of Japan I knew someone who as a naval pilot and he said he was very relieved that the Japanese surrendered before the British Fleet was really involved. I also knew someone from the British who was on USS Missouri for the surrender.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@Dav1Gv good thoughts….do you have a good book recommendation for the Burma campaign 1944-45? I’m sure there are several books on it but I figure you know the best books. That campaign fascinates me - nasty fighting that doesn’t get talked about a lot.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@Dav1Gv oh, meant to say, yes, required over reliance on air supply does indeed seem to have been an Achilles heel for the French at DBP.

[@Dav1Gv]

While I'm interested in Burma because my dad was there and Pete Rees who commanded 19 Ind Inf Div was in charge of Cwmbran New Town near where I live the only real book on the campaign I've read is Bill Slim's Defeat into Victory. John Masters as Pete Rees's GSO1 and the second book of his autobiography is interesting - The Road to Mandalay I think - and he covers the Chindit Campaign - he was in command of the Blackpool(?) position. I seem to recaall a book by a relation of MR James, the famous writer of ghost stories, wrote a memoir of the Chindits which mentioned Masters who was the GSO2 of one of the brigades at ther time but I can't remember its name. Sorry, that's the best I can do, I think I said my main interests were WW1 and the ACW - I could probably be more help on those as my house is full of books about both wars. @@CarterOnConflict

[@jamestakacs]

When the former German and Japanese military leaders who were in jail or what ever were probably saying to themselves why in the world didn't Americans act like this 20 years earlier. If the Germans were being over run in France and said lets go to Belgium. We went into Belgium to go get them. If the NVA was being beaten to death and said lets go to Laos or Cambodia , we just let them and didn't go after them. There is your difference.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Bingo - great point. Thanks for weighing in.

[@markgarrett3647]

Hmm... In my view going into Laos with boots on the ground even just the southern part has several highly prohibitive factors such as the need to reinforce the wavering southern Vietnamese Armed forces so distressed by repeated coups and the mostly rough terrain of Laos and the huge gap in knowledge and experience between the American Armed forces ground forces and the Communist Vietnamese PAVN in operating in Laos and therefore too much of a risk. Instead we should have milked to the maximum the Gulf of Tonkin incident and conducted mass blockades of Communist Vietnamese ports through direct air strikes and sea mining and the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville through similar means and conduct a massive strategic bombing campaign on inland targets in northern Vietnam targets like railroads and power stations and the Ho Chi Minh trail facilities in Laos and the Sihanouk trail facilities in Cambodia of course after they refused demands that are tantamount to them giving up the war in our advantage.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Don’t disagree at all Mark with your other recommendations. In fact, the measures you outline are ones we would have taken in other wars - say, World War II. I appreciate you adding to the dialogue here with well articulated points. You are exactly the reasoned, knowledgeable type of viewer I hoped would watch my videos.

[@markgarrett3647]

​@@CarterOnConflictThanks again and apologies if I had to make a reply in another of your commenters comments section in another of your video that's really just a shorter version of this comment though.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@markgarrett3647 Mark, I always enjoy reading your comments, so thank you for the engagement, reply.

[@brucebartup6161]

HI Paul, still love your videos I'll put yhe same point as last time, who knows? some one with knowledge ofvthercm ojher side might be able to absolutely put a blue pencil through it. I stll see some advantages to an alternative plan. There was some talk at the time that the South vietnamese did not jhave airtbojurnde troops, could not understand the consewqurncee of hosting a large resource hungry culurally incompatible, relgiously divergent, by cpmpaarison pluitofcraticsly rich body of fighting men. And could not give consent inany meaningful way. MIght it have been possible, instead, to build roads countering the equivalent oprrrations on the HCMT I beliieve we had some evidence at the time that South vetnamese could understand all aspects of such grounfd war, couldc potenntialy have raised trained indocrinateed. equipped, structured, logistic asured etc the whole nimne yatds - got; all the troops required. A spouthh vitnmaerse efort to seize their own destny. Soory for the tyopios.I do try. thanks

[@CarterOnConflict]

Always appreciate hearing from you Bruce. Glad you are still around!!

[@brucebartup6161]

@@CarterOnConflict i'm also glad to be around. A little surprised also. Not quire as surprised as the man who ordered a pineapple, ham and pyjama pizza and got it; but still quite surprised. (my apologies I have no shame). Glad you are still going strong.

[@brucebartup6161]

@@CarterOnConflict I'll jut one more thought. Was the "do nothing" option fully evaluated? Vieytnam had be n a Frenvch Colony. Laos also. The only largish uncolonisdd terrrktory in the whole region was Thailand as I recall.. In Burma WW2 as II recall the British had beeen so awfuul that the popultioon didn't belllieve that tghe Japaanese could possssibly be worse, so at first did not resist as much. If Vietnam weere similar in reaction, the political will to fully accept a large ground force deployment. So just let it ggo. Sue the PRC for a lease on Saiglol, They did it fior Hong Kong. once thd population has known despoic Communist rule and somee meassure of ffreedom they tend tlo oopt for freeedom. Freedom that will o' the wisp, tahat idea. that fixtiomn that so scaredthe British n 1776 and dduring th frevplutionart=y war as previously discusssrd. Soorrr, comn siderations way above my head. Just lke divvixsikon srencthh airnborne cdep;lyments

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@brucebartup6161 Bruce, one of the objections to the plan was from our Laos ambassador who said it would ruin our political standing in Laos, so, your point is well taken.

[@brucebartup6161]

@@CarterOnConflict Thanks Paul. Most kind of you. Might I just say that the British having gone to world war twice in one century over the issue of territorial integrity neutral powers might also have found some diplomatic friction. You have been most kind as always but did the situation contain a US option to manage the conflict in Indo China as the French did in the Revolutionary war 1765 to 1783. The "quiet" war specifically?

[@sugarpuddin]

Why did the USA war with North Vietnam? American corporations love doing business there. In fact, the Intel CPU chips are made there.

[@CarterOnConflict]

Because they invaded South Vietnam. This was a long, long time ago.

[@sugarpuddin]

@@CarterOnConflict After the Japanese left, Vietnam became a Democratic Republic - Why did the USA war with Vietnam? US corporations love doing business with Vietnam today! In fact, Intel CPU computer chips are manufactured in China! I believe it was for control of the drug trade, hegemony in Asia and to profit the war machine. After the people of Vietnam were free of the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh used the American Declaration of Independence and US Constitution to form the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The people of the country then democratically elected Ho as their president. Listen & watch Archimedes Patti (OSS) who worked closely with Ho say it himself @23:50 of the documentary! In Hanoi, President Ho Chi Minh began his speech, “All men are created equal; they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights..” See documentary @24:43 Upon the conclusion of the speech, they sang the National Anthem. This was followed by President Ho reading the Declaration of Independence. President Ho then ask the people, “Can you hear me?” This simple question went into the hearts of everyone there. After a moment of silence, they all shouted, “Yes, we hear you!” They did not just shout with their mouths. But with all their hearts - the hearts of over 400,000 people standing there. When President Ho finished reading the Declaration of Independence, an American plane flew overhead with the American flag. The crowd cheered with great enthusiasm. @25:00 The OSS provided the Vietnamese nationalist with reconnaissance information to facilitate their overthrow of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The OSS and American government loved and GREATLY supported Ho. Unfortunately, Truman - a weak puppet - took over US government shortly thereafter; and, was thus largely controlled by the Dulles family (the formation of the Deep State [National Security State - an independent branch of US Government formed in 1889] & multiple assassinations including Diệm & three weeks later JFK; and, eventually RFK and many other luminaries for peace). The Deep State then installed Ngô Đình Diệm in South Vietnam. The people of Vietnam had previously run this criminal mafioso (Diệm) out - Yet Edward Geary Lansdale (CIA) and the Dulles family loved him! The CIA/OSS has a long history of loving, supporting and propping up Mafioso and drug dealers (Contra Cocaine to Afghanistan heroin): Birds of a feather flock together. So, he was put in as the puppet government. Ngô Đình Diệm had long been involved in illegal smuggling of rice to North Vietnam on the black market and opium throughout Asia via Laos, as well as monopolizing the cinnamon trade, and amassing a fortune stored in foreign banks. He supplemented his criminal fortune by running numbers and lottery rackets, manipulating currency and extorting money from Saigon businesses. He controlled gambling houses, houses of prostitution and the Indochina drug trade (and dens). This Indochina drug trade was precious to the Deep State. In 1947 the US shot down four British aircraft fighting over the drug trade in Indochina. A drug trade treaty was brokered with the UK shortly thereafter. The problem as the Dulles Family and Deep State saw it: Ho Chi Minh refused to support their drug trade. On the other hand, Ngô Đình Diệm was an expert at the propagation of the Indochina drug trade. So, they installed Ngô Đình Diệm as the head of the puppet Vietnamese government. Meanwhile, even Eisenhower admits Diệm - like Zelensky in the Ukraine - is a dictator that won’t allow for any democratic vote. (see documentary @1:16:00) Yet the American government praised Diệm (see @1:17:30); and poured in the money and military aid; whilst the CIA fortified there Indochina drug trade machinery. Naturally, as soon as he got into power, Diệm - being the consummate Mafioso - sent out his secret police to torture & assassinate all of his adversaries and critics. The entire country hated Diệm; monks protested by setting themselves on fire; and, even his own generals tried to bomb him out of the palace. See @1:28:40 Diệm’s wife responded by saying she would gladly light up a Buddhist monk herself. When Diệm felt the US would not continue to back him, Diệm also turned to Russia for support. See @1:45:00 Which leaves the question: How did the US people get duped into warring against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam? The American people supported the invasion & destruction of Vietnam simply because a wealthy man by the name of Colonel Edward House (not a real Colonel) invented the domino fiction: If the USA doesn’t invade and take-over Vietnam communism would take over the world. This fiction fails the most fundamental ‘laugh test’ and discounts the facts that Vietnam fought against the Chinese; and among other things, freed the Cambodians of Pol Pot. Notable is that Col. House helped form the League of Nations - the forbearer to the ‘New World Order’. Ironically, the US Deep State had no desire to “win” the Vietnam war. If they did, they would do what every warring country has done for Millennia: roll into the capital and sack the leadership. Just as today: there is no attempt to win the wars of Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, etc. The purpose is “war profiteering” and the drug trade. Nothing changes. Today the American people support endless phony wars started on a pack of lies, the Afghanistan drug trade and now the wearing masks, socially distancing and the destruction of small biz simply because they are being told-too by an unelected cabal of non-scientists. “Ask yourself, ‘if this little nation goes what is going to happen to all the other little nations’?” - LBJ [NOTE: LBJ had a major shareholder interest in Bell Helicopters and profited greatly every time one was shot down!] I ask LBJ, “Goes where?” Why can’t Vietnam elect its own president and determine for itself how they are governed? After all, they developed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by using the Declaration of Independence, the US Bill of Rights and democratically elected Ho Chi Minh as their President! What gives us the right to install a Mafioso and drug dealer into power and bomb that nation? The USA also supported the rise of Pol Pot in Cambodia - Even after he began filling up the killing fields with civilians. Meanwhile, the CIA pumped heroin into the USA; and, later created the crack epidemic (Contra Cocaine train) in the USA. Today they bring in Afghanistan heroin (Google ‘Fast & the Furious’). “If the United States now were to throw in the towel, and come home, and the communist took over South Vietnam, then all over South East Asia, all over the Pacific, in the mid-East, in Europe, in the world, the United States would suffer a blow. And Peace, because we are the great peace keeping nation in the world today because of our power, would suffer a blow from which it might not recover.” - Nixon (@3:13 documentary) The USA has been at war for 222 of the last 237 years - Throwing away national treasure, throwing away it’s youngest & brightest, and infecting society with the neurosis of returning GI’s. For what? So, the 1% can get richer; and, so the Deep State can promote drug sales & arms deals? Why do the American people say nothing as their government continually installs despotic Mafioso into power in country after country; and, manages the drug trade? Clearly, the people of the USA are not ready for freedom. [Refer to KZbin video entitled: "vietnam war documentary [full documentary] by Great Documentaries. YT bans me from posting URL. Let me know if you have trouble locating for reference.]

[@sugarpuddin]

@@CarterOnConflict “Ask yourself, ‘if this little nation goes what is going to happen to all the other little nations’?” - LBJ [NOTE: LBJ had a major shareholder interest in Bell Helicopters and profited greatly every time one was shot down!] I ask LBJ, “Goes where?” Why can’t Vietnam elect its own president and determine for itself how they are governed? After all, they developed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by using the Declaration of Independence, the US Bill of Rights and democratically elected Ho Chi Minh as their President! What gives us the right to install a Mafioso and drug dealer into power and bomb that nation? How many Mafioso has the US National Security State put into power around the world? Meanwhile, the CIA pumped heroin into the USA; and, later created the crack epidemic (Contra Cocaine train) in the USA. Later, they brought in Afghanistan heroin (Google ‘Fast & the Furious’). Today they continue to manage the Mexican drug trade.

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@sugarpuddin they do indeed ;-)

[@shanetharle9211]

If you find the question of why the US lost Vietnam you will find the answer why they lost korea and they lost Afghanistan

[@CarterOnConflict]

Shane, what are your thoughts? I think each conflict was different.

[@shanetharle9211]

@@CarterOnConflict you cannot fight a war calling it a police action ,what they did in Korea,for a, Guerilla warfare you got to fight with every weapon at hand, in Korea and Vietnam they tried to fighter war with conventional army that's why the French loss Indochina, you gotta fight Fire with Fire,just like Korea and Vietnam ,the US did not strangled the supply route of North Vietnam, to wither on the vine, that's where it was won and lost

[@CarterOnConflict]

@@shanetharle9211 well thank you for that. I cannot disagree with you.