Why did Japan attack the United States

Why did the Japanese attack the United States in December 1941? After all, the Japanese military and leadership were not unaware of the power of the United States. The question is quite complicated, I broke it up in a set of factors, which I called: The Quest for Self-Sufficiency, Structural Problems, Psychological Factors and Timing.
Cover design by vonKickass.
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» SOURCES «
Frank, Richard B.: Tower of Skulls. A History of the Asia-Pacific War. July 1937-May 1942. W. W. Norton & Company: New York, USA, 2020.
Barnhart, Michael A.: Japan prepares for Total War. The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, US, 1987.
Drea, Edward J.: Japan’s Imperial Army. Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945. Kansas University Press, USA: 2009.
Millet, Allan R.; Murray, Williamson: Military Effectiveness. Volume 3: The Second World War. New Edition. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2010.
Paine, S. C. M.: The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2017.
Hotta, Eri: Japan 1941. Countdown to Infamy. Borzoi Books: New York, USA, 2013.
Peattie, Mark (Ed.); Drea, Edward (Ed.); van de Ven, Hans (Ed.): The Battle of China. Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford University Press: California, United States, 2011.
Cambridge History of the Second World War. Volume I: Fighting the War. Cambridge University Press: UK, 2015.
Cambridge History of the Second World War. Volume II. Politics and Ideology. Cambridge University Press: UK, 2015.
Cambridge History of the Second World War. Volume III. Total War: Economy, Society and Culture. Cambridge University Press: UK, 2015.
Tillmann, Barrett: Whirlwind - The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. Simon & Schuster: United States, 2010.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey 54: The War Against Japanese Transportation 1941-1945. Transportation Division. May 1947.
Messerschmidt, Manfred (Hrsg.); Guth, Ekkehart (Hrsg.): Die Zukunft des Reiches: Gegner, Verbündete und Neutrale (1943-1945). E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Herford, Germany, 1990.
Goda, Norman J. W.: The diplomacy of the Axis, 1940-1945. In: Cambridge History of the Second World War. Volume II. Politics and Ideology. Cambridge University Press: UK, 2015
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost
#WhyJapanWentToWar #WhyJapanAttackedPearlHarbor #WW2

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

T-Shirts and other Merchandise: teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized »» ERRORS / CORRECTIONS «« 08:33 - I said 1939 although it should be 1931. (Thanks to my Patreon Galtur) 15:57 - I said "new year plan" it should be "new war plan". »» TIMESTAMPS RELATED CONTENT «« 00:12 - Why Japan had no Chance - kzbin.info/www/bejne/omrEmGWuaKiGb68 03:25 - Why France fell in 6 Weeks kzbin.info/www/bejne/eXqVapueatZ1q8k 04:01 - Appeasement in 1938 - kzbin.info/www/bejne/n4uVXqymiZuYrbM 04:44 - Why German Victories Weakened the Japanese - kzbin.info/www/bejne/aKC4dnt-ndp4pcU 05:17 - Operation Weserübung - kzbin.info/www/bejne/nXmtoqd_aKatobM 09:35 - Why the Japanese Military wanted to fighter after the 2nd Nuke - kzbin.info/www/bejne/i2HOenxrmbqLgck 14:12 - Wikipedia not a source!? - kzbin.info/www/bejne/bIXdaGVmjbplg9k 14:40 - Attack on Pearl Harbor - kzbin.info/www/bejne/pYW9nopppt9mgNU 19:41 - What did the Japanese think of the Germans in WW2? - kzbin.info/www/bejne/kHTQf6OKpKl1fqM

[@WadcaWymiaru]

Did you know...in 1931 Japanese MISSED Liao-He huge oil field by only 100 meters? That field could produce 18 million tons of oil per year! 10 times of Japanese need! A shallow, low-sulfur one, close to the coast! If Japanese didn't missed it, they wouldn't attack or join the Axis!

[@bbbbbbbbbbbefw1606]

US and japan war was inevitable. US had plan to bomb Japanese cities before Pearl Harbor. watch these two video. FDR plans sneak attack before Pearl Harbor (1st half) FDR plans sneak attack before Pearl Harbor (2nd Half)

[@scipioafricanus6417]

"Total War Reserach Institute" - Do you mean the Creative Assembly?

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

yeah, I actually was tempted to put a CA joke in there.

[@TheArklyte]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized might not be a joke in the future considering how more and more devs use neural network to train AI to oppose and eventually beat players. In strategy, tactics, firefights, racing and so on. So far it'll all fun and games, but we'd be filtering millions of people in billions of engagements through those. Who said that we're not accidentally helping to create Skynet ourselves? Or that gamedevs and military research programms aren't aware of this possibility in the first place?:D

[@5678sothourn]

TheArklyte bruh chill

[@icecold1805]

@@TheArklyte Oh then there is nothing to worry about: If Skynet is gonna learn how to warmongering out of the noobs that are playing TW on Multiplayer, then we are safe. Also Skynet is gonna be rather puzzled when it figures out it doesn't have any raise skeletons ability on his robot army and it's processing capacity is consumed on it trying to find where to recruit Triarii.

[@TheArklyte]

@Computer Whisperer 1)if you mention Elon and his views on AI, then use full context. He did also warn about people misunderstanding what an AI is and mixing up real aIs and ones in sci-fi. Modern AI(aka Artificial Idiots) are just a data sheets and algorithms very far from any form of actual self learning and sentience despite what marketing departments of companies developing them might tell you:)) 2)and humanity is a static point in history, banned from evolving and reinventing itself?

[@williamspeck1198]

The more I learn about how the Japanese Government functioned during and before the war the more I’m amazed how far they made it against the allies

[@SouthParkCows88]

You mean how every government operated during the war......Japan just didn't have the luxury of it actually functioning well enough to do it for lengthy time, always competing over a resources within it's branches.

[@naamadossantossilva4736]

Attacking distracted opponents and digging in is a strong strategy.

[@jackprichard6780]

I think it is hard to overstate the difference in difficulty between conquest and retention.

[@whyus2000]

This has been my experience and seems to be the same for many others I have talked to who are knowledgeable about the subject. Though it is also one of the reasons I find studying them so interesting. Just as studying why the allied powers were so successful in the long run - not just in how they made war- is interesting, I find learning why the axis powers failed just as interesting if not more so.

[@dronfim]

@@jaredrevis4594 got any literature?

[@jacopomangini3036]

About the Netherlands' threat, I think it is more of a cultural and historical factor, rather than a tangible one, since the Dutch were the only westerners who could trade with Japan for two centuries, so for a long time they were the archetypical westerners in the minds of many japanese. Probably those in the Navy who wrote about the "dutch menace" were trying to strumentalize history and do a bit of cultural fear-mongering.

[@cavscout888]

Are you sure they didn't simply make the list by default since they had resource rich holdings in the area? I don't recall the Netherlands being mentioned by itself... or than that they could stop selling the oil from their holdings to Japan...

[@jacopomangini3036]

@@cavscout888 They are directly mentioned in the citation in the video, and they did stop selling oil to the Japanese, at first stalling the talks, and then joining the US in the embargo. The WW2 channel talked about this in last saturday video, I think. Of course the Dutch were a target because of the resources, but I think the "resource" reason goes hand in hand with the "cultural" reason, in a mutual reinforcing pattern, something along the lines of "they have resource we need, and they stopped selling them to us. For too long they meddled with our affairs, and now that we're finally stronger than them, and we could take their riches with force, if necessary, they hide behind the gowns of other, more powerful westerners (who also meddled heavily in our affairs in the past, especially the US)". Also, the "cultural" reason is very useful when justifying a war to your people.

[@cavscout888]

@@jacopomangini3036 'We should get these resources being denied to us so we can lop off heads and catch babies on bayonets, that way our master race will rule all of Asia.'

[@schnoodle3]

This would explain were the Japanese got the idea wearing wooden footwear was a good idea

I just find the phrase the "Dutch menace" hilarious.

[@NoMoreCrumbs]

I need resources to get more land to get the resources I needed to supply myself on the land I had before. Cyclical problems.

[@cyrilchui2811]

"Between 1930 to 1935, there were twenty domestic terrorists incidents, four political assassinations, five planned assassinations, and four attempted coups...." So do you expect any civilian oversight?

[@conservativemike3768]

Excellent contextual observation.

[@MakeMeThinkAgain]

Another factor was the secret Japanese defeat in Mongolia by the Soviets -- it's my understanding that not only were the people not told about this, but the Army didn't even tell the Navy. The most obvious way for Japan to assist Germany in 1941 would have been by attacking the Soviet Union, but as the Army didn't think they could win that fight, they passed the buck to the Navy who couldn't say no.

[@MajinOthinus]

I mean Nanshin-ron was bad, but Hokushin-ron was just batshit insane. Supplying an army advancing in Siberia while you are already stuck in a war in China without enough capacity to supply even that is just walking into the knife.

[@MakeMeThinkAgain]

@@MajinOthinus True. But it would have required a lot less oil. And the Japanese didn't have to march to Moscow, they would only have needed to keep up a second front as the Soviets were fully involved with the Germans in the West.

[@brianlong2334]

As far as I'm awere the army wanted war with Russia but the navy got the bulk of resorces the island campaign the Japanese took on would have bean better spent in Siberia that's were they would have got more men and resources to spend in Siberia. The Soviet lost 2x what the Japanese did in pretty much everything or more for a win at Khalkin Gol so idk were people get this idear the Japanese got smashed.

[@brianlong2334]

@@MajinOthinus without the campaign in South Pacific they had the men and resorces to push into Siberia but they only had limited oil production only some 3 to 4 million barrels a year or with South Pacific 7 to 8million barrels. The Pacific tried down over 1million Japanese troops and America took the way of lest resistance the Japanese lost some 100,000+ casualties to America and the American's lost bout the same.

[@fulcrum2951]

Then you have the war in china which for some reason is always be seen as a footnote whenever discussing the japanese role in ww2

[@jslyrob4048]

Excellent video! I learnt a lot. Thank you for your hard work!

[@sealpiercing8476]

To get to the other side of the Pacific! I'll show myself out.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

lol

[@fulcrum2951]

lol

[@bezahltersystemtroll5055]

lol

[@MajinOthinus]

lol

[@cavscout888]

@Prussian Union Seriously? There's a whole video on Pearl Harbor's defenses... go watch it. A giant surprise attack on a country not at war... is probably going to a lot of damage. Although maybe not so much on this case, since most ships were refloated anyway...

[@eliasmiguelfreire8965]

One of your best videos, thank you very much for the content!

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

Glad you enjoyed it!

[@martincotterill823]

Great analysis

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

Bernhard: Mentions Japan Me: Justin is back? Justin: not being directly in the video Me: 😢

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

he is back in spirit ;)

[@bezahltersystemtroll5055]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized "marschiert im Geist in unseren Videos mit" 😝😂

This was Justin, he was just disguised as a handsome efficient Austrian.

[@taoliu3949]

What happened to Justin?

[@emperorjulian2159]

Wow, what an analysis. Great

[@TheIfifi]

How many eyebrows do you have? Raised a dozen eyebrows at the presumed threat of the Netherlands... Well, I get it. But five or six eyebrows seem more reasonable.

Totally agree. The Netherlands is no threat at all. Pay no attention. Now... about those spices you supposedly own....

[@Arbiter099]

@ My cubbard, it's empty! The dutch have taken my salt, my pepper, my melange!

[@scottyfox6376]

It's basic Kriegsmarine's Semaphore, not every signal needs enigma encryption..

[@bezahltersystemtroll5055]

be right back, gonna jump off the veranda and wish for a cute gril 🙂

[@ousou78]

I don't get it...

[@scottyfox6376]

You can buy a cute girl off Wish ? Ok I'll order one with my next frypan..

[@harukasaigusa8906]

We're all gonna make it. Self-improvement in small steps will shock you in time.

[@bezahltersystemtroll5055]

@@harukasaigusa8906 it was a joke.

[@harukasaigusa8906]

Still stands firmly. You are blessed. Carry yourself as such.

[@helmutthat8331]

My understanding was that the Japanese Army needed the resources from the Dutch and English colonial possessions to wrap up their war in China. The decision makers concluded that taking those territories by force would end all chances of a diplomatic solution with the USA. Not only that, but since the USA moved the Pacific Fleet from the US Pacific coast to Pearl Harbor already in response to the fighting already going on, an armed takeover of the Dutch and British possesions would cause the USA to respond by moving the Pacific fleet to Subic Bay in the Philippines, which would be untenable and lead to an inevitable outbreak of war. Now, we know that in 1941 the US leadership had NO internal plans to move the Pacific fleet to Subic Bay, BUT the Japanese did not know that!

[@fazole]

You have a good point about the possibility the USN would send ships to the Philippines, but the Japanese carrier force was 3 times larger than the US force and so they could have still successfully bombed Subic Bay and attacked with submarines if the US did that to threaten Japan.

[@michaeldunne338]

The Imperial Japanese Navy was the organization more focused on the need for oil from the Dutch East Indies and the "Southern Strategy" - and that "Southern Strategy" was getting kicked around since the mid-1930s (like when Britain was identified as a possible opponent in 1936). The US was trying to practice deterrence in 1941, with the move of the fleet to Pearl, and the build up of various assets in the Philippines. But with isolationism in the US, still would not have been a given if the Japanese Navy just went around and seized the Dutch East Indies. As for the Imperial Japanese Army, they were up to some odd things at the onset of the 1940s, like provoking fights with the Soviets, which they essentially lost. The IJA afterwards became more partial to the "Southern Strategy" but still had their focus on the continent and the Soviet Union (hence the massive Ichi Go offensive in 1944 against the Chinese Nationalists). If Japan had left Indochina alone, they probably would have been able to access most resources they needed for the war against China on the open market.

[@michaeldunne338]

@@fazole There were quite a few Japanese controlled islands between Pearl Harbor and Cavite/Subic Bay (think Truk, Saipan, Palau, etc.).

[@fazole]

@@michaeldunne338 Yes, there were many islands and they could not be defended. Even mighty Truk, Japan's version of Pearl Harbor, was just cut off and forced to be abandoned by the IJN.

[@michaeldunne338]

@@fazole But one reason for the plan Rainbow 5. Othewrise, to your point about reversing situations, understand that Truk provides very unusual scuba diving, due to that base becoming isolated, a Pearl Harbor/Cavite/Darwin in reverse ...

[@bificommander]

Yeah, the Japanese were on to the threat possed by the Dutch. We were THIS close to poldering in the entire Pacific, leaving Japan as a land-locked hill surrounded by the great planes of New Netherlands.

[@MajinOthinus]

*G E K O L O N I S E E R D*

[@ronaldderooij1774]

I am impressed. Honestly. Thanks.

[@TheGetout04]

If you think about it, This was similar to when the Nazi "suddenly" attacked the Soviet Union, both Japan and Germany at the time needed OIL to fuel (pun intended) their conquests

[@darthcalanil5333]

The nazi case is far more ideologically driven than just for resources

[@bingobongo1615]

No absolutely not. Germany got their fuel from the Soviets, US embargoed Japan.

[@deriznohappehquite]

Darth Calanil the ideology was all about securing resources to achieve self sufficiency though.

[@mikefay5698]

The US sold oil in those days and had a monopoly. Still do, but not their oil.

[@brianlong2334]

@@bingobongo1615 No they only suplied Germany with under 7million barrels or 900,000 tons. Germany domestic product was over 3million or just over 400,000 tons. Germany consumed 44million barrels before ww2 or 6million tons in 1938/39.

[@rexmundi3108]

They had no choice. They were already on a dead end road with no brakes.

[@JTA1961]

ZERO 🔴 options

[@SouthParkCows88]

Basically resources we need resources and then more resources and then oh yeah more resources.

[@useodyseeorbitchute9450]

Less than 60% of caloric intake of an average American? Well, nowadays it would be more than enough ;)

[@mikefay5698]

Depends on which American in the depression and 12M unemployed. Trumpy Pumpy and Pompeo would probably feed 20 Japanese soldiers in calorific intake.

[@mo07r1]

Americans were thin then, since WW2, our waistlines have expanded as fast as the number of our overseas military bases...

[@hannibalkills1214]

I really love the thumbnail artwork! It reminded me of the Russo-Japanese War painting involving a big bear representing Russia about to maul a small Japanese samurai about half as tall.

[@jackprichard6780]

Great video. The hardest part for me to understand is the failure to recognise the shift from short wars to the type of war that world war one was. The idea that after world war one a country like Japan could expect to capture territory and then negotiate the retention of that territory seems like an idea from another time. All the more so given they knew US industrial power would grow giving the US a military advantage within a few years. I accept this but it is difficult to understand.

[@timonsolus]

Jack Prichard : That strategy worked for Japan in World War One - they ended up with quite a few former German colonies.

[@jackprichard6780]

@@timonsolus I agree. We, New Zealand, gained Western Samoa. I think the change I see which I don't think the Japanese saw is the change to a much larger scale of warfare across multiple dimensions with World War One. There is probably a term for this that I don't know. To over simplify the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian was that some provinces were exchanged by treaty and life went on. In World War One it was going to be a fight to the destruction of either France or Germany. From my point of view expecting a new war to follow the old model rather than the new one is hard to understand. Having said that if you were a Japanese leader and you saw Germany occupying Austria and Poland maybe you would think you could do something similar in the Pacific. Once Germany invaded France I think it became a big enough threat to Britian and by extension the United States that it was going to be a war to the destruction of either. Ok, now I have thought this through, here is what I am trying to say: Japan saw the US as their primary adversary. They knew the industrial strength of the US and the willingness to get involved in foreign wars, shown in World War One. They knew wars were now fought for longer on much greater scale. However, rather than pursuing a strategy which tried to keep the United States out of the war by doing things the US didn't care about they sought direct confrontation. They did this knowing they could not win a long war. I not being critical because they were there and I'm not but it takes some effort to get my head around this idea.

[@timonsolus]

Jack Prichard : Well, technically Germany wasn’t ‘destroyed’. The Armistice in 1918 wasn’t an unconditional surrender. The German Army didn’t surrender - it marched home. And it wasn’t the Entente who forced the Kaiser to abdicate - it was the Germans themselves. Back to Japan, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 ended in a treaty, and so did the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895 before that. In 1941, 1895 was still relatively recent history, less distant in time than the Vietnam War is for us. And WW1 wasn’t the shattering experience for Japan as it was for France or even Italy.

[@demonprinces17]

In the minds of their leadership they were Superman,only a few like Yamoto knew different and they were forced from government.

[@WarblesOnALot]

G'day, Have you niver heard o' George W Bush..., and the time he bogged Unkle Spam in BOTH Iraqagain & Absurdistandstill ? Short War = Endlessly Indefensible Quagmire upon Attempted Occupation. Ask Prissydunce Johnson & Nixon. Just(ifiably ?) sayin'. Take it easy. ;-p Ciao !

[@pablononpicasso1977]

I enjoyed this episode. I live in the region of the topic being Australia and have read many Japanese biographical accounts that touch on this period. It is very complex due to the many military factions within Japan at the time. It was as if they were striving to reintroduce the Samurai class with a Warlord structure after the late 18 hundreds Boshin wars that introduced a civil government.

[@ElDesperado7]

23:00 "thank you for sending me the service of the emperor." wait the empereor helped you make this video?^^

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

book title ;)

[@TBreezy17]

Your English is awesome man. Don’t doubt yourself.

[@thomas.02]

11:59 you know, I feel this weird familiar feeling when I read that quote and I look at China today

[@cavscout888]

Probably first time I've heard settling for NOT conquering everyone around you for their resources as 'concessions.' But it's accurate. Thanks! Love your WW2 Pacific Campaign stuff! Not just because I find it very interesting, but you look at it more critically than most, and don't just repeat stereotypes like most.

[@bbb462cid]

Thank you for examining the importance and nuance of the situation in China! It is sadly overlooked. The Japanese knew they were receiving increasing criticism the world over for their actions in China. The US took action in several ways to protest and to punish Japan economically, but it's not very well known that it was well before Pearl Harbor that President Roosevelt gave permission to create an air force for China, made up of US servicemen who had to resign from their US military branches of service. This permission created the First American Volunteer Group which became known as the 'Flying Tigers'. As a side note, the original Flying Tigers ceased to exist on 4 July 1942; the nickname passed on to the US 14th Air Force. There is legend associated with the Flying Tigers that is sometimes not understood. It is commonly held that the AVG was "just" a group of mercenaries that was in response to Pearl Harbor. While they did consider themselves mercenaries, their service to China was not only sanctioned by the Executive Branch of the US government, the entire enterprise was orchestrated in large part by agreements between the Chinese and US governments, and even payments from the US to China to pay the so-called "bounties" the AVG pilots earned for shooting down Japanese aircraft. US industry and the US war department procured combat aircraft from an RAF order, and US business provided the Front company, called CAMCO. The AVG were hardly just men who traveled to China with an idea of adventure and money. AVG personnel were later recognized as US war veterans. Furthermore, if the AVG had been in _response_ to Pearl Harbor, they never would have left the US or their branches of service; there was supposed to be a Second American Volunteer Group, but Pearl Harbor's attack dissolved the idea. The Japanese knew, months before Pearl Harbor, that these Americans were going to China to aid China in opposing the Japanese Empire. This undoubtedly contributed to Japan's resolve to attack the US and remove this thorn in their side before things got more out of control in an area they had invested in heavily.

[@porksterbob]

The first American ace of the war was Arthur Chin who was a Chinese American flying for the Chinese airforce from 1937 to 1939 flying a Gloster gladiator. There were several other Chinese Americans who flew for the Chinese before the AVG got involved.

[@bbb462cid]

@@porksterbob absolutely! And before the AVG there was a multi-national group. But the AVG was an American conscious effort from the President down, and this plays into the topic of Japan attacking the US.

[@fazole]

That's a good theory, but the AVG was not in combat until after Pearl Harbor. Plus they were really rag-tag with few aircraft and operating in poor conditions. I just don't think the Japanese saw them ad much of a threat prior to PH. The Soviets were providing aircraft and training to the Nationalist Chinese Air Force and the Germans were providing equipment and training for the Nationalist Army until the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

[@porksterbob]

@@fazole the avg was activated in 1941 before pearl harbor

[@fazole]

@@porksterbob Yes, but their first mission was after Pearl Harbor.

[@johnnyfortpants1415]

A video on the free Dutch role in the Pacific would be cool

[@fazole]

Welcome to Japanese and English tongue-twisters for German speakers with Bernhard! 😁

[@fazole]

@Tom Sanders "rear wheel" and "months".

[@taufiqutomo]

Also try to find Strategy Stuff's video on this very topic.

[@jackmoorehead2036]

Excelent analyses snd condensation of very well researched facts. Your hinge on China ties the whole slippery mess of Japanese politics to the key points.

[@yoseipilot]

I would to show from this List, that Japan has built so much Aircraft- and Seaplane Carriers. IJN can be stronger than Royal Navy and can reached 1/3 or 1/2 with Navy Air Power against US Navy. The finished Aircraft Carrier 1. Hōshō (Training) - survived war 2. Akagi (Fleet) 3. Kaga (Fleet) 4. Ryūjō (Light) 5. Sōryū (Fleet) 6. Hiryū (Fleet) 7. Shōkaku (Fleet) 8. Zuikaku (Fleet) 9. Zuihō (Light) 10. Shōhō (Light) 11. Jun'yō (Fleet) - survived war 12. Hiyō (Fleet) 13. Taiyō (Escort) 14. Un'yō (Escort) 15. Chūyō (Escort) 16. Kaiyō (Escort) - survived war 17. Shin'yō (Escort) 18. Akitsu Maru (Light) 19. Nigitsu Maru (Light) 20. Ryūhō (Light) - survived war 21. Taihō (Fleet) 22. Chitose (Light) 23. Chiyoda (Light) 24. Unryū (Fleet) 25. Amagi (Fleet) - survived war (beached) 26. Katsuragi (Fleet) - survived war 27. Shinano (Fleet) 28. Shimane Maru (Escort) - survived war (beached) 29. Yamashio Maru (Escort) 30. Kumano Maru (Escort) - survived war The not completed Aircraft Carrier 31. Ōtakisan Maru (Escort) (70% completed) - survived war 32. Chigusa Maru (Escort) (unknow% complete) - survived war 33. Kasagi (Fleet) (84% complete) - survived war 34. Aso (Fleet) (60% complete) - survived war (beached) 35. Ikoma (Fleet) (60% complete) - survived war 36. Ibuki (Light) (80% complete) - survived war Seaplane Tender 1. Notoro (Oiler) - survived war 2. Akitsushima 3. Kamoi (Oiler) - survived war 4. Mizuho 5. Nisshin 6. Kamikawa Maru 7. Kiyokawa Maru - survived war 8. Kimikawa Maru 9. Kunikawa Maru - survived war (beached) 10. Hirokawa Maru Half Seaplane Carrier 1. Ōyodo (Light Cruiser) - survived war (beached) 2. Mogami (Heavy Cruiser) 3. Tone (Heavy Cruiser) - survived war (beached) 4. Chikuma (Heavy Cruiser) 5. Ise (Battleship) - survived war (beached) 6. Hyūga (Battleship) - survived war (beached) I think this is such a stupid idea, when a Battleship becomes a Hybrid-Carrier/Battleship. Submarine Aircraft Carrier 1. I-400 - survived war 2. I-401 - survived war 3. I-402 - survived war 4. I-404 (95% complete) - survived war (beached) Best Naval Carrier Aircraft Mitsubishi A7M (Fighter) Aichi B7A (Torpedo-/Divebomber) Yokosuka D4Y (Divebomber) Nakajima C6N (Reconnaissance Aircraft) Kawanishi N1K1 (Fighter-Floatplane) Aichi M6A (Torpedo/Divebomber-Floatplane)

[@4T3hM4kr0n]

ahhhh no, numbers of planes built doesn't mean anything if they are inferior. Due to delays they didn't modernize their aircraft.

[@conservativemike3768]

They should have built cargo ships and an alliance with the USA. Better late than never…

[@redaethel4619]

"Total War Research Institute" That would be a great name for a thinktank.

[@Cheka__]

Great video. Who's Justin?

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

kzbin.info/www/bejne/nWXYY6N_ererjc0

[@88porpoise]

Before watching the video, I would assume because they expected to go to the war at some point in the near future so better to start the war on their own terms and doing as much damage as possible before the US can retaliate.

[@Mitaka.Kotsuka]

Actually, Japan the opposite

[@rickglorie]

I think the impression of the Dutch was formed by the same calculation we got a foot on the shore in Formosa.

[@gazhevski]

The fact that the army may have gotten the upperhand, and Japan initiating the northern strategy was the reason the Soviets kept over a million troops at the Manchurian border at all times, even at the hight of Barbarossa

[@momo9594]

Vrey nice thumb nail!

[@Jacob-df5hr]

"[Tojo] attempted to rebut the conclusion by arguing it omitted intangibles like unpredictability." Tojo my guy, that breaks both ways, and if getting lucky in a war you can't win could get you a favourable peace deal, then getting unlucky in a war you can't win could get you destroyed.

[@cannonfodder4376]

A most superlative explanation on the question. Surely the decision was incredibly stupid in hindsight and even to them, but they had their reasons and they leapt at the window of opportunity that existed. Only to met a Wall of Steel and Fire as you so aptly summed up.

[@bingobongo1615]

Cannonfodder43 Stupid yes but what was the alternative? The Japanese government couldn’t pull back from China and were running out of oil.

[@mechaboy0226]

Have u actually done a vid on Germany’s economic situation as well?

[@coolpants4590]

On the attack of pearl harbor we missed 2 stations if i’m right it was the naval repairs and the “submarine station(?)” also i’m pretty sure they attacked pearl harbor in an attempt of neutralizing the U.S’ battleships but since they didnt attack the naval repairs the U.S had their ships back up pretty quick Thats what i thought

[@JohnRodriguesPhotographer]

Oil. The IJN calculated they had enough oil for 1 year of War and I believe two to two-and-a-half years of normal peacetime operations before they ran out of oil. Use them or lose them was essentially their choice when it came to their Navy. their culture would not allow them to back down from their position that got them painted into the corner to begin with.

[@seanmalloy7249]

The conditions that Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the US were requiring for any settlement would result in a _massive_ loss of face for everyone involved in planning, ordering, and overseeing the China campaign. This created the cultural imperative that, as you describe, made it impossible for there to be any outcome that _didn't_ result in a full-blown war.

[@ericfunderburgh6080]

This thumbnail should be a poster

[@dwardodwardo643]

Should you redo this with four parts?

[@theflan045]

You should listen to the podcast - Hardcore History, and it's talk on Japan before the war and on the Japaneses decent into WWII the series is called "Supernova in the East", currently 3 parts have been completed and I presume more are to come. Or a more lighter take on it is the comic Showa by Shigeru Mizuki which again talks about Japan before, during and after the war.

[@dylanschnabel4859]

I recommend anyone interested in this topic find a copy of the Japanese film ‘Isoroku’. It does turn Yamamoto into basically Jesus, and perhaps portrays its characters and events with more interest towards narrative purpose than historical accuracy, but nevertheless it’s a very honest examination of how Japan went down the path to war and why they could never have won the war they sought to fight. It’s also an extremely philosophical movie that talks a lot about war in general. Additionally, the battle of Midway sequence is a must-see for every movie lover and is one of my favorite scenes in all of film. I do feel the need to mention that the film does not recognize the millions of Chinese civilians slaughtered during the 2nd sino-Japanese war, however considering Japan’s current political climate, the creator’s of this movie probably made the best anti-war film they could without being censored or attacked by the strong right wing historical revisionists controlling Japanese media.

[@ThePhantomSafetyPin]

What's interesting is that belief does definitely come right from Japanese myth and legend, considering the Shinto myth that the Emperor supposedly descended directly from Omikami Amaterasu, and because of that those he chose to aid him had divine providence. Incredibly fascinating how such a belief can be used as propaganda later.

[@VictorianChinese1860]

0:34 I thought he is going to say "Japan is an island by the sea filled with volcanoes and it's b e a u t i f u l."

[@bozo5632]

US embargo wasn't just a matter of scarcity, it was intended to cripple Japan. US was already directly supporting Chinese resistance groups long before Pearl Harbor. Who gets to own SE Asia's resources? Japan or Europe/USA? That was the question.

[@bingobongo1615]

Bo Zo Yep. Exactly. Japan did unspeakable things in China making them without a doubt the bad guys there but in the war with the US? What was the alternative?

[@bozo5632]

@steve gale Even the Nazis were appalled by Japanese war crimes in China. Or ask the uncontroversially non- communist South Koreans. Imperial Japan was terrible.

[@fulcrum2951]

@steve gale yeah, something like Nanking occured due to the communists when the Japanese took it

[@darthcalanil5333]

You're clearly downplaying the Dutch supremacy on the high seas!

[@bezahltersystemtroll5055]

in the mid 1600s they actually had supremacy, pretty fascinating stuff

[@bificommander]

We were THIS close to poldering in the pacific, and leaving Japan as a land-locked hill within the great New Netherlands plane.

[@silverdeathgamer2907]

@@bificommander Of course that would merely be a stepping stone to the Dutch's glorious reconquest of New Amsterdam.

[@bezahltersystemtroll5055]

@chris younts those were the days 🌷🙂

[@mikhailiagacesa3406]

Lol! All kidding aside, I (American) am VERY impressed with early Pacific war performance of the few Dutch subs.

[@chi-weishen6740]

I know I'm 3 month late but maybe someone (a native English speaker) knows an answer. At 10:54 I saw the sentence "Their vocabulary featured incantations that this path was manded for Japan's 'self-existence' and 'self-defense' against Japan's 'encirclement'..." and I cannot find the meaning of "manded". Also the original source uses this word but could it be that this should be "mandated"?

[@philipdavis7521]

Terrific summary of a very complex topic. I'd add two other elements - one is that there is plenty of evidence that the Japanese public were getting increasingly war weary over China - Manchuria/China was increasingly becoming Japan's Vietnam - the army was struggling to control a narrative of victory when so many broken, disabled soldiers were returning home. The military seemed to have feared its public simply demanding an end to it. There are some very interesting 1950's Japanese films dealing with this (most famously, the trilogy 'The Human Condition'). Another issue was the widespread knowledge of US racist policy against Asian-Americans (such as bans on Asian American kids from public schools in California) - this convinced the Japanese public that the US would never accept Japan as an 'equal' in the region. The historian Kenneth Pyle in his book 'Japan Rising' says that the State Department was aware that these policies were having a very negative impact on the perceptions of the US in Japan, and were worrying that this was strengthening hard liners, but pleas to clamp down on racist State laws were ignored by Congress. The most important overall factor though is that the Japanese had convinced themselves (with some justification), that they were cornered geopolitically, and in their eyes a rapid strike was a rational defensive tactical measure, not the act of random aggression perceived by the US.

[@user-fc4px2ol1k]

I think there are a lot of different opinions. But the cause started when Commodore Perry came to Japan. Some Japanese think that Truman did something decisive. I am introducing Japanese culture and history, and I hope to address this issue someday.

[@mrniceguy7168]

Omg the thumbnail

[@ronaldderooij1774]

I had to laugh a bit about the "Total War Research Institute". I mean, what? Just knowing it exists would have been enough to know exactly what was coming.

[@JizzMasterTheZeroth]

The McCollum memo.

[@airborngrmp1]

The adjustment to economic and production factors as the primary lens through which we view the Second World War (as opposed to the 'great man' focus on generals and leaders' individual qualities, much more common in my youth and the more immediate post-war years) has really shown the Axis in a different light. Both major powers (Germany and Japan) knew they were incapable of defeating the combined economic and demographic strength of the status-quo powers, thus both sought to isolate their enemies into digestible chunks with a very distinct view of obtaining the economic resources needed to fuel their war machines from their enemies. Both powers also focused on their totality of commitment (politically, socially, militarily) to the fight from the very initiation by a cycle of ever-increasing centralization of all power. Both powers also should have realized that fighting a war to gain the resources needed to win the war you're going to fight is a fundamentally flawed strategy - in the event, neither power could secure the resources they sought (neither would be able to hold their economic targets long enough to exploit those resources in any meaningful way). In such a scenario, both would likely go down in defeat - one after another.

[@robertalaverdov8147]

I'm curious why the Japanese couldn't arrange a similar deal to that of the Molotov Ribbentrop pact in terms of resource acquisition from the Soviets? Yes they did not like communism but neither did Hittler. Perhaps the infrastructure in the far east was bad. But then again it's not spread out over a bunch of islands that require excess shipping capacity and under threat of Submarine attack. Considering how badly they mauled the Nationalist Army in 1944. I think it's possible that they could have completed their original objective of defeating China by 1942 if they focused solely on it.

[@variszuzans299]

Simple answer - bad infrastructure. There was a single rail line across Siberia to Vladivostok, the Soviet eastern port. Not a big port, and it freezes in winter.

[@robertalaverdov8147]

@@variszuzans299 Not that simple. The soviets built a dual line during Stalin's 5 year plans and there was several connections to the Manchurian rail network. So any material could be offloaded in ice free ports.

[@timonsolus]

Partly because the Soviet Army defeated the Japanese Army at Lake Khasan in 1938 and Khalkin Gol in 1939. The Soviets weren’t as scared of the Japanese Army as they were of the German Army. However, if the Japanese had approached Stalin and offered a Japanese-Soviet Pact as an alternative to Japan joining the Axis in the September 1940 Tripartite Pact, then Stalin probably would have agreed, as it would be in his interests to prevent a Nazi-Japanese alliance. But offering such a deal to an enemy which had recently humiliated the Japanese Army twice would be politically very difficult for the Japanese government - the Japanese Army would have been strongly opposed to it.

[@brianlong2334]

@Audio Sugar When ww2 started for Russia it had over 500,000 truck's it produced about 100,000 to 200,000 more in the war and America suply them with 250,000 to 300,000 more they also captured about 30,000 to 40,000 German trucks but Germany captured about 80,000 to 100,000 Soviet trucks most of that in barbarossa. Russia had a standing army of 5million at the start of oparation barbarossa and 11million reserves 20,000 to 25,000 tanks more then the rest of the world but 15,000 to 20,000 of them were light tanks or tankettes. There airforce was the same size as Germany or France.

[@uranus4511]

Japan has repeatedly proposed peace talks to withdraw from China once the restrictions on oil and other supplies are lifted.It held the Potsdam Conference, but conditional aviation was not allowed and only unconditional surrender was proposed.The United States knew that the Japanese government wanted peace negotiations and the Army was against it.The Army was killing two Priministars at the time, and the Army had more power than the government.However, when Roosevelt secretly struck Hull Note against Japan to his aides, Japan unanimously agreed to fight.Hull Note was the ultimatum for Japan, which had been engaged in peace negotiations until then, and was the haze of the blue sky.President Roosevelt also knew that if he sent Hull Note, Japan would definitely launch an attack.President Roosevelt said he was relieved to his aides when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Hull note kzbin.info/www/bejne/maSYf4WAjJKrgqc kzbin.info/www/bejne/fKSwf4Sor9pkpbc

[@ThePhantomSafetyPin]

IDK how I found your channel sir, but something about a German-accented man talking about WWII tickles me and I don't know why.

[@f12mnb]

Interesting video. One aspect that is often not considered is that while the US, UK and USSR did try to coordinate their strategies (broadly) and there was clear economic aid (Lend Lease to UK, shipments to Murmansk and to Vladivostok) there was little coordination between Germany and Japan. I know that you are familiar with the many wargames and simulations - and nearly all of these games from simple ones like Axis to Allies to more complex ones, suggest knocking out the USSR by combining the efforts of Germany and Japan is often the only pathway to victory for the axis. A question that perhaps you could follow up on is what if the Japanese only attacked the Dutch holdings and seized the East Indies and oil holdings but left the Philippines alone - would the US still have entered the war?

[@ianwhitchurch864]

The Japanese Navy player doesn't get any victory points from this, so he's got no incentive to agree with the Japanese Army player, and the Japanese Army player doesn't have enough transports or fuel points to make it work. US Entry can still occur as well.

[@Salmon_Rush_Die]

Hey, Tojo, you're shall surely be defeated in a war with the United States. Tojo: Well, obviously, we must attack.

[@wcovey9405]

Mine set, way of thinking.

[@strategicperson95]

Kinda funny I can oversimplify what started WW2 overall with one word: Autarky.

[@mark12strang58]

There are people who think a novel published in 1925 about a war between Japan and the USA might have given Yamamoto and the Japanese navy on how to fight the USA. The novel was called The Great Pacific War and Yamamoto could have red the book, when he was a Naval Attache in Washington. www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-09-24-mn-1046-story.html

[@pawelek83bdh]

Great video! Fun fact from my country which maybe is not so well known to you, Mr. History not Visualized - Poland declare war on Japan after Pearl Harbour. This is only case declaring a war by PL in XX century. But fun fact does not stop there! Japanese goverment replied they do not accept declaration of war, becauss JPN had not any interest to fight against PL.

[@fazole]

That's pretty funny, actually. Farcical.

[@JoeBLOWFHB]

The Japanese were very dependent on the Poles for intelligence on the Russians and later in the war on the Germans who they distrusted, neither they or the Italians supported the invasion of Poland. The Japanese rejected the declaration of war so their intelligence services could keep working together in secret. Japan had a history of helping Poland against Russia before the war the Japanese ran a rescue operation to help Polish children who had been deported to Siberia under the Bolsheviks. These children were taken to Japan and then later returned to Poland. It is important to note the Polish spies never divulged any information about the allies only Russia and Germany.

[@michaelwimmer1063]

Hoch interessant

[@wojtekimbier]

I just watched Midway and this is perfect

[@tHeWasTeDYouTh]

The Dutch threat.........happy to see the Japanese understood the threat of windmills and wooden shoes.

[@lrw3984]

read OPERATION SNOW - John Koster

[@Mitaka.Kotsuka]

Begin not aggressibly enough might also lead to begin murdered.... That is the point to summarize it all, the Japaneese imperial Gov knew that

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

Very, very well done. I was in fact unaware of the appeasement of the Japanese by the British in shutting down the Burma Road. The one thing I'll add, is further back ground on Japanese thinking. After initially allowing some contact with early western explorers - missionaries in Japan created Christian Political Factions that caused a political disruption. These factions were destroyed - and Japan cut it's contacts with the West - not allowing any westerners in. This went on for about 200 years. Before the American Civil War - Commodore Perry - went to Japan and demanded that it open up. After the Civil War he went back with a fleet to force the issue. Japan, looking about saw that almost all of Asia had been colonized. China - to big for any colonial power to be allowed to have it all by the others - was divided into Spheres of Influence over which it had no control and had been defeated in the Opium Wars by Britain and not allowed to restrict the use of Opium by it's own citizens. At this point Japan's main aim was - to avoid becoming a colony. The Meiji Reformation in 1870, among other things, sought to reform Japans military along western lines. Japans basic idea toward Colonialism was "if you can't beat them - join them". Ironically - it was Japans very lack of anything that any of the Colonial Powers wanted - that had saved it from Colonization so far but - in order to protect itself with something other than just not being wanted - Japan had to expand to increase it's resources. The first areas taken were Korea and Manchuria (which the Chinese could do nothing about as when that happened the nation was still divided up into the fiefdom's of War Lords). The thing here about Japan's becoming a colonial power itself - was that it believed that if it ever backed down to a colonial power - it was on a Slippery Slope to becoming a colony itself. Thus - when it's continuing policies in China led to a confrontation with the United States it felt that it could not back down to a colonial power. It felt it's choices were limited to - Become a Colony - or - Be Destroyed. In Japanese Culture - when forced into an untenable position - one honorable way out - was to commit suicide. When faced with a war with the United States which they KNEW they could not win - they essentially chose to commit suicide by going to war with it. When reading John Toland's "The Rising Sun" I came to the impression that a series of Japanese governments wrestled with being between a rock and a hard place - all while being pressured by more radical people - until they each threw their hands up and effectively said to the radicals "OK! YOU do it!" The radicals got into power and found themselves in the same position, each giving in to those radicals still pressuring THEM now by saying in effect "OK! YOU do it!" This went on until they reached Tojo - and he did it. Then ... there is this transition in Japanese thinking ... Before - they had simply known that they would be destroyed if they went to war with the US. After they had made that decision though - they began to bull shit themselves that maybe they wouldn't be destroyed ... that maybe they could win ... Of course - bull shitting themselves WAS what they were doing - and they were destroyed. Some might also argue - that they did in fact become a US Colony ... but this would be more complicated than that. .

[@tobydawes6007]

the second sino Japanese war started in 1931 with the invasion of manchuria but was not declared as a war untill 1937

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

> the second sino Japanese war started in 1931 with the invasion of manchuria but > was not declared as a war untill 1937 the first statement is still debated by current scholars, the second is just wrong since Japan never declared war on China and China only declared war on Japan in 1945.

[@tobydawes6007]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized thanks for, correcting me on the second statement I did a university essay on the this topic and came down on the side of the school of thought that believed it started in 1931

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

@@tobydawes6007 yeah, it makes a lot of sense. I remember I wanted to include it in a previous video, yet, it would open up a complete new can of worms and just over-complicate matters. So for now, I settled on the "orthodox" interpretation.

[@tobydawes6007]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized the nationalist tried to slow down the Japanese through political and diplomatic means from 1931 up to 1937 whilst engaging in actions close to war but wasn't war

[@Lowlandlord]

IT is worth considering that shipping is needed in Japan just for domestic commerce. One of the problems with the plans to invade Japan was the assumption that there would be trade interdiction against Japanese shipping, which would lead to mass starvation as the various islands rely on eachother (as well as foreign imports) for food. Also, the Hagakure thing can be taken out of context, and kinda is. This "book of the samurai" (which is not at all what it is known by in Japan, just a western tag) was written by a samurai who lived at a time of peace, never served in a battle himself, as the wars in Japan were over by that time. They largely deal with maxims from his clan leadership. Moreover, they often deal with how their clan specifically did things different from other clans. Other clans practice they arts, poetry, flower arranging, calligraphy, etc. The samurai of our clan practice only war. I paraphrase because I'm too lazy to look it up. So hardly the norm of samurai society. Also, Japanese society and Japanese samurai society were never the same things, samurai made up like 1% of the population of Japan. The rest of the culture was made up of various levels of peasants, farmers, merchants, and priests, most of whom suffered at the hands of the samurai throughout most of Japanese history, and occasionally raised rebellions against them in one form or another. All that said, the political propganda machine of the time very much did feed this to Japanese citizens, descendants of peasants or samurai regardless, so it does have some weight, but not as much as to paint the entire culture with the same brush. Presumably more weight with the people in position to make decisions, although many were descendants of the other castes (merchants specifically did well in the 19th century), not samurai. That has just been a traditional oversight of western academia.

[@ElysiumNZ]

Easy. US had imposed oil embargo against Imperial Japan and they attacked Pearl Harbour to try to knock the US navy out of the war. Japan was resource poor and didn’t have enough oil to sustain it’s large war machine for too long.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

Basically yes.

[@yoseipilot]

ElysiumNZ What *IF* Japan invade East Asia, without attacking Pearl Harbor? Will US join the War or not?

[@alexipestov7002]

No, isolationist sentiment is still running high at this point. Only an actual attack would galvanize the American public to war. FDR's hands were tied until war is declared on him or an attack happens first

[@aussiejed1]

@@yoseipilot The US had been increasing military strength in the area since Japan invaded China, and Japan's goals were in direct conflict with US interests such as the Phillipines. Conflict with the US was inevitable.

[@cavscout888]

But Japan did it merely so the Japanese master race could emulate European empires and conquer oriental Asia and the Pacific. I would hope ANY country, then or today, would stop selling the resources to accomplish that... Especially since the Japanese enjoyed slaughtering while they did it.

[@daemonofdecay]

That great cause in history... OOOIIILLLLLLLL

[@johnnyfortpants1415]

Another idea for a video; why Japan’s military did not collapse in 1945

[@neiloflongbeck5705]

Apologies to the late, great Spike Milligan, but the period of 1930-1936 sounds like simple moments of political fun.

[@youtubede963]

ハル・ノート

[@timonsolus]

Japan should never have signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in September 1940. It benefited only Germany and Italy while giving no benefits to Japan beyond a newspaper headline - indeed, the response of the United States was to become much more hostile to Japan. Japan’s Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941 was far more beneficial to Japan than the Tripartite Pact. Japan’s political system gave far too much power and influence to the Army. This could only be changed if the Army was completely discredited - and that could only happen if the Army was catastrophically defeated. The only thing Japan could have done differently, politically, was to attack the Soviet Union in late 1941 instead of the Western Powers. But the Western Powers were very worried about the prospect of a Soviet defeat, which would make an Allied invasion of Western Europe exponentially more dangerous, and so they might have declared war on Japan by mid 1942 even if Japan hadn’t attacked them first. Militarily, an all-out Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union in late 1941 probably would have ended in disaster, as the Soviets were far better equipped than the Japanese Army, particularly in artillery and tanks. Although it would have saved the exhausted German Army from the Soviet winter counteroffensive of 1941/42, as the Soviets used forces transferred from Siberia for that.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

An all out japanese assault into eastern siberia in early 1942 would have resulted in the fall of the soviet union within the year, and axis victory through negotiated peace within another.

[@fulcrum2951]

@@ineednochannelyoutube5384 and it would at the same time compromise the chinese front, further complicate the supply and manpower situation

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

@@fulcrum2951 Indeed. And it is doubtful it would prevent US intervention. Though the handover of the peacful east indies and its oil to Japan would be a likely part of the peace deal.

[@timonsolus]

I need no channel youtube! : Consider the outcome of the fighting between the Soviet Army and the Japanese Army at the battles of Lake Khasan in 1938 and Khalkin Gol in 1939. The outcome was not favourable to the Japanese. In 1941, the Japanese Army had no anti tank gun that could penetrate the front of a T-34 tank. They would have to resort to Molotov cocktails (petrol bombs) and suicide bombers.

[@ineednochannelyoutube5384]

@@timonsolus On the other hand, the Soviets could ill afford significant armoured forces in the far east, and the Japanese wouldnt have to win, mearly tie down the forces that were shifted west irl for operation Uranus. If the Don and Stalingrad hold, the road to the Baku fields is open for the Nazis, and the forces that were used fruitlessly at Kursk could well provide the final push that breaks the soviet defense, and cuts off Moscow, Pwtrograd and Stalingrad. The Japanese would only have to 0ose a credible threat for about half a year. Still, it is nota gamble that they could realistically take, I will agree on that.

[@fazole]

I read an article that stated even today in Japan there is a huge reluctance to stop the actions of an obvious bad decision from continuing. This might be due to "sunk cost" bias.

[@timonsolus]

fazole : More likely, ‘Loss of face’ by whatever powerful men made the decision in the first place.

[@fazole]

@@timonsolus Yes, that is a powerful element too and no one talks about how this trait unquestionably affects China's and N. Korea's policies. However, during WW2 I read that Japan was going through a kind of military "cultural revolution" in that if a superior's decisions were seen as too timid by his junior officers, they could strongly challenge him and it may account for some of the rash decisions made by Japanese military leadership. Also, during the war as pilot losses were occuring, the Japanese Navy aviation training acceptance became even stricter! It was already the hardest course in the world with a 90% fail rate! If we look at the Guadalcanal campaign, that was a disastrous sunk cost effort. Why didn't they build airbases closer to Guadalcanal, but out of US fighter range? The generals conducting the campaign were not aviators. Carrier Bomber commanders were not aviators. Carrier captains were not aviators. Yamamoto was an aviator, but had no combat experience in the air. Are these conditions due to face, tradition, sunk costs? All of the above I think.

[@timonsolus]

fazole : Regarding your comments about Guadalcanal, the newly constructed airfield there was well within FERRY range of Rabaul (a one-way trip for a single-engined aircraft). And the Japanese thought that would be all they needed, for 2 reasons: 1) they weren’t expecting the US to be capable of taking the offensive so soon after the Battle of Midway (the Japanese believed they had sunk 3 US carriers in that battle, not just one). 2) they didn’t believe that the US would be capable of carrying out a successful amphibious landing on Guadalcanal (once it had been properly fortified and fully garrisoned, see point 1). They expected to drive any US force back into the sea. In Japanese planning, the airfield on Guadalcanal was never expected to fall into US hands. So the issue of building proper airfields between Rabaul and Guadalcanal (other than crude airstrips for emergency landings by damaged aircraft) never came up, until it was too late to do anything about it.

[@fazole]

@@timonsolus The Guadalcanal campaign lasted 6 months AND the Japanese sank several ships at Savo Island, and the carrier Wasp later. They were still a formidable threat to the USN early on in the campaign. They had the airfields at Rabaul and a small one at Buka, which was far from Guadalcanal. The Zeroes were forced to keep their drop tanks on while dogfighting due to a shortage of them and this reduced their performance substantially. Direct r/t from Rabaul to Guadalcanal was about 1200 nm which was in patrol range of the Zero, but a dangerous distance when you add the unknown high fuel consumption required in combat. The Japanese had at least 3 months to build airbases closer to Guadalcanal with which they could also threaten USN shipping, use as a staging area and as an emergency field but they didn't. To me, this is an unfathomably bad decision.

[@quitecapable]

Great background at the complexity of the considerations. It is easy to forget that "losing" would not have seemed that bad to japan at the time - if england could not be invaded, they were not contemplating occupation either. They also naturally had the mindset of the technology and attitudes of the time - by that time germany with its army support airforce dropped 1% as many bombs as the allied total war year zero annihilation air force were prepared to drop on germany.

[@numbermuncher1308]

Japan simply self destructed. Japan projected an oil shortage and tried to secure oil ressources but they could acquire only limited ressources. Problem #1 in order to defend/secure these ressources they had to exact control over a large area thus creating new ressouce requirements and overcompesating the initial gain. Problem #2 by attacking the US they antagonized the by biggest oil producer in the world again overcompensating the initial gain. There was no way for Japan winning this war.

[@newpivot1]

They wanted to catch these hands. I couldn’t work a good nuke pun into this comment.

[@demonprinces17]

Wonder if Japan's original plan would have worked?

[@jollyswashbuckler]

Its Simon Whistlers foreign twin hahahaha

[@shermanfirefly5410]

Can you please talk about the February 26 incident :P? Therefore people might get a better idea of The conflicts within the Japanese government. Also, this event have heavily influenced the Japanese Startgies and policy upon the war against China and USA.

[@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized]

I generally try to stick to military history, domestic politics, diplomatic history, etc. all are needed to a certain degree. Yet, the more I learn, the more I see how little we know about WW2. The other issue is, I don't speak Japanese. So my main focus is on German Military History, for the simple reason that I speak and read the language, unlike some others that constantly dabble around in that area, yet probably can't read a simple sentence in German.

[@shermanfirefly5410]

@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized It's OK:D, I can't Read Japanese either

[@shermanfirefly5410]

@steve gale but latter on the KMT still joins the war anyways.....

[@guilhermemoraesdasilva226]

Why not?

[@niconestra]

Sehr gut!! Greetings from 64283

[@anderskorsback4104]

In hindsight, I guess it would have been possible for Japan to just invade SE Asia for oil and ignore the US. No attack on the US, but no compliance with US demands either. Without Pearl Harbour, the Roosevelt administration would have had it far harder to get the necessary public and political support to go to war with Japan. Did this at all figure into Japanese calculations, or did they assume out of sheer paranoia that the US would come for them at a time of its choosing unless they struck first?

[@Wolfeson28]

Objectively, I think you're right that FDR would have had a much harder time getting the support for war with Japan if Japan only attacked the British and Dutch. However, from the perspective of the Japanese military, I can see why it was inconceivable for them to attack the East Indies while leaving such a strong U.S. military presence (which could be reinforced at will) directly astride their supply lines to those new conquests. In that scenario, the U.S. could have potentially cut off Japan's deployed forces and the resources they desperately needed any time they wished. While it would have been far harder for FDR to get the necessary support, it wouldn't have been impossible, and I certainly have a hard time seeing 1941 Japan trusting merely to the political situation in the U.S. to keep their vital supply routes safe.

[@anderskorsback4104]

@@Wolfeson28 true that, I hadn't thought about the Philippines and its strategic implications.

[@ianwhitchurch864]

No, it wouldnt have been possible. Every Japanese task force would have an American tail, reporting home as to the position of the Japanese fleet. In the clear. On frequencies the British were monitoring.

[@filipeamaral216]

I gave the 69th like. Now I am going to watch the video. Okay, I finished the video. The explanation is superb and I wish to put in evidence some things: - Ideology: the Japanese saw themselves as super-soldiers (hum... were did I see that before?) and the decadent, laxed and spoiled Americans lacked the discipline and courage of the Japanese sons of the gods. - Book-soldiers: The Japanese high-command was completely formed by officers without actual combat experience. Their mentality was mostly theoric and a lot of it was complete self-praising baloney. The Japanese went into war with the Chinese in 1932, and the results were dismall. Only for the utter incompetence of the Chinese opposition the Japanese managed to push the Nationalist 19th Route Army off Shanghai. Their naval and army units were very quick to land from their ships and form up in battle order (peacetime practice) but had no idea what to do next (no initiative from line commanders). Their artillery was critically under supplied with shells because their theoretical doctrine stated that every shot was to hit a target (talk about wishful thinking). And speaking of wishful thinking, the Japanese fancied themselves as masters of night infiltration and attacked without proper reconnaissance both in 1932 and 1937, and both times getting beaten back by Chinese soldiers in prepared barricades. The Japanese would repeat this particular mistake against the Allies from 1941-45, including a direct parachute jump in the Philippines in 1944 with the same mindset and the same results. The Japanese formed starting lines too far away from their intended target at Guadalcanal against the Marines, for example. Great in a mock-up battle in front of high ranking officers, bad idea against living-breathing targets. During 1937's Quhar operations, General Tojo dispersed the assets of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade (Col. Sakai) widely in the infantry support role against a now mobile Soviet response; thus robbing the Japanese of an armored reserve. Tojo was a "book-soldier", with no combat experience, and did not hear Colonel Sakai's protests, treating them as mere insubordination. Sakai called him "an idiot", something hard to dispute. Sakai's complaints were treated just as petulance and he was dismissed, and the brigade was disbanded (a combined arms force). The Japanese would be beaten in Nomohan sometime later even though they were doing somewhat well earlier. - Political soldiers: Japanese high-ranking officers were expert political in-fighters, and all of their most important commanders, like Tojo and Yamamoto, were just political officers. Their command performance was dismall. Yamamoto's response to criticism was the threatening to resign unless he got his way - just like a spoiled child making a tantrum. He failed to listen to alternative views or to incorporate any degree of flexibility into his planning, being overly-rigid, inflexible and willing to allow preconceived ideas rather than battlefield realities to guide his decisions. He was advised by lower ranking officers not to attack Pearl Harbour, as the idea of the US just getting crippled by it was utter nonsense. His response was the typical "shut up and be braver" rethoric. Since pen-pushers in Tokyo were old and strong-headed, tactical adaptation was really, really hard - sometimes nonexistent. "You don't need submachine guns, I didn't back in my day - just be braver, you wuss. What do kids know anyway?" As you said in 6:49, what could possibly go wrong?

[@filipeamaral216]

I forgot to mention. Japan saw itself as the champion of Asia against the champion of the West: the United States. So their idea of inevitable clash is akin to Nazi Germany's clash with the Bolshevist Soviet Union. I recommend Dr. Edward Drea's lectures on KZbin: - Military Transformation: The Japanese Army during the 1920s and 1930s. - Japanese National Strategy and Alliance Politics 1920-1941.

[@timonsolus]

From a naval point of view, Japan might actually have been better off not attacking Pearl Harbor in December 1941, instead concentrating on invading Guam, Wake Island and Midway Island instead. This would have encouraged Admiral Kimmel to ‘come out swinging’ with the US Pacific Fleet, as he was a very aggressive commander. Officially, the US Rainbow strategy was to allow Japan to advance in the Pacific while concentrating against Germany, but that position would be very hard to maintain politically against US press and public pressure to “Save Our Boys in the Philippines!”. The loss of 5 battleships in Pearl Harbor gave Roosevelt and the US Navy ‘a very good excuse’ to not help General MacArthur in the Philippines. But without that ‘excuse’, it would have been politically far more difficult to maintain the purely defensive US stance in the Pacific. If Roosevelt caved in to public and naval pressure and allowed Kimmel to sail out and take on the Japanese Navy in an attempt to break through to the Philippines, then the Japanese would get their only opportunity for a Tsushima style decisive naval victory over the US Pacific Fleet. Sinking those 5 US battleships at sea (plus at least 2 aircraft carriers), drowning or capturing most of their crews, would have a far greater negative impact on US civilian morale than sinking them in harbour ever could. In the end, maybe Admiral Nagumo was right to oppose the Pearl Harbor attack he was ordered by his superior Yamamoto to carry out.

[@filipeamaral216]

@@todds6823 Thank you, I didn't know this book. One more for the wishlist!

[@nukclear2741]

Slight problem, Yamamoto was VERY experienced, having lost 2 fingers against the Russian 2nd Pacific squadron in the Final battle of the Russo Japanese war, I forgot how to spell it, and knew full well that what japan planned against the US would fail.

[@filipeamaral216]

@@nukclear2741 Except he wasn't "very experienced", that's the very definition of an overstatement; he did take part in Tsushima but after that it was all about staff college e theoretical work. The Russo-Japanese War, "The Short Victorious War", was the last actual war the Japanese had until 1937, and their promotion system was based on academic and theoretical and Yamato believed he would cripple the Americans for long enough. By 1942, the Japanese were completely drunk with the certainty of victory.

[@RonJohn63]

5:54 60% of American caloric intake at a time when a *lot* of Americans were underweight. (This is why post-war Japanese are so much taller than their ancestors: a lot more calories, including protein.)

[@nostradamusofgames5508]

One word- (inhales) *OIL!!!!!!!* (us military bust through wall) "WHO SAID OIL?!"

[@simonnachreiner8380]

TLDR:Oil

[@buxbear7009]

Great episode, love your channels. Danke schon 👍🍺. Maybe im missing something here, but to me Japan's options in 1941 are easy. Dont attack the USA at all, bypass the Philippines, and go straight for all French, British, and Dutch holdings in the Pacific. Dont bother with India or Australia, not much strategic resources there anyway.

[@MrArtbv]

There was a 5th and more immediate operational aspect to Japanese planning. While the actual battle for Crete occurred in May/June of 41; IJN appreciation of just how severe British naval losses had been were not discovered until LATE summer/early fall. These were confirmed by hard intelligence gathered by Japanese agents in Singapore in late September/early October. RN losses between the evacuation of first Greece and then Crete were catastrophic; lost or severely damaged were 2 BBs, a carrier, 10..TEN CRUISERS (6 sunk outright), and 15 destroyers Suddenly the IJN realized there would be NO significant RN fleet to deal with and only American and minimal Dutch opposition would present itself through the spring of 42. Thus the strike at Pearl Harbor would prevent an advance across the Pacific by the USN under "Rainbow 5" or one of it's variants that would coincide with the reappearance of a significant RN component. Sudddenly the IJN had roughly a 6-8 month window where their Indian Ocean flank would be secure. Still it was China that dominated Japanese political and military planning from 1932 onward. I highly recommend "Forgotten Ally; China's WW II, 1937-1945" by Rana Mitter (Kindle). It is a LONG and somewhat difficult read because of it's meticulous detail.. Yet extremely worthwhile. Mitter goes on at length giving the background on BOTH sides that led to the outbreak of full scale war and the various objectives and shifting myriad factions that made it such a "Hot Mess" the Japanese found made it impossible to extract themselves from.....

[@porksterbob]

The British Far East fleet in the Indian Ocean was intact after Crete. Japan had to go and wreck it themselves after Pearl Harbor. Japan could have been secure in knowing that RN reinforcements from Europe were unlikely, but the Brits had 3 carriers, 5 battleships, 7 cruisers, 15 destroyers, 7 submarines and several smaller ships in theater in December of 1941. The Japanese launched the Indian Ocean Raid and attacked Shri Lanka and damaged port facilities, sank one carrier and two cruisers, destroyed a third of enemy ground-based fighters and nearly all of the enemy ground-based strike aircraft as well 23 merchant ships.

[@MrArtbv]

@@porksterbob The British "Indian Ocean: fleet WAS NOT the RN fleet promised Australia to take station at Singapore. The RN's IO "Fleet" consisted of a couple of non-refitted WW1 BBs a couple of old cruisers and a Lt CV. After the POW and Repulse got cold stomped it was reinforced.. BUT IT wasn't sent to Singapore because the RN KNEW it was hopelessly outclassed. It was as comprised intended to escort convoys and protect them from German surface raiders NOT to take on the IJN.

[@paulgee8253]

After attacking the most populous country (China) and largest country (Russia)the genius Japanese strategy added the largest empire (Britain) and largest economy ( USA ) to their list of adversaries along with Holland, France, Australia and New Zealand. Japan had the economy of Ohio.

[@kissmy_butt1302]

What if Japan caved on China but still joined the Axis and focused on the expansion they had in Malaysia but focused on India and the Middle East? I doubt they would ever tangle with the Soviets but tying down Soviet forces may have made the Germans life easier.