Be glad to show you.

Abraham Lincoln in the 4th Lincoln/Douglas debate While I was at the hotel to-day an elderly gentleman called upon me to know whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality between the negroes and white people. [Great laughter.] While I had not proposed to myself on this occasion to say much on that subject, yet as the question was asked me I thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes in saying something in regard to it. I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races, [applause]---that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will for ever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and description PAGE 146 political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race.

He was slow day 2 at Gettysburg.

I don't believe this is correct. While Lee probably thought an invasion might redirect some Union forces from elsewhere , his main, and most prescient objectives were to relieve the Virginian countryside so that farms and their crops could recover, and to *hopefully* put enough fear and doubt into the hearts of the average northern citizen that they might pressure the US government to sue for peace. Although I can certainly appreciate a connection to Vicksburg more than the typical "He wanted to capture DC!" drivel.

Yes, that was one of the strategic theories that Lee and his allies in this idea were hoping for - that such a movement into PA would result in a suspension of Gran'ts campaign in MS. Another was that going to PA would pull the Army of the Potomac out of Virginia, which of course it did. But the theory that this invasion would end the pressure in MS was a chimera. The statement: "Should Hooker's army assume the defensive, the readist method of relieving the presure upon Johnston ... would be for this army to cross into Maryland," was not a valid statement. It proved of no concern to Grant, and Lincoln did not order him to do anything, knowing full well he was in the process of winning his campaign there. Lee was grossly mistaken. The main problem out west was Johnston should have been given complete authority over all forces in that region by Jefferson Davis, so he could act like a theater commander and marshall troops to go after Grant. Instead he acted like a peer to Pemberton, asking him to come out of vickburg and cooperate with him. Pemberton did what he wanted. This is not a proper unity of command and effort in the theater. One General needs to call the shots, and all the others need to follow orders. Another group of Confederate troops were in Arkansas and should have been ordered to reinforce Johnstons, Add a timely reinforcement from Virginia to this, and Johnston might have overwhelming numbers to attack Grant when he just gets over the river.

@@haroldk3913 Very well said. Lee's grand strategic view of the war was badly flawed. The primary reason why the Confederates failed at Vicksburg was that Johnston told Pemberton one thing while Davis micromanaged and told Pemberton another- and all along, Pemberton lacked the will to act decisively. Instead of following the orders of his superior officer (Johnston), he called councils of war which debated the matter, wasted time, and then either disobey Johnston directly or attempted a half measure compromised. Pemberton should have simply ignored Davis and followed Johnston's orders. Although Kirby Smith's forces in Arkansas were, as a whole, definitely second- rate troops, not all of them were- and they would have been of far greater value east of the Mississippi. All in all, the Confederate government flopped during the war.

Having no proper command structure spells doom in any situation. This is not democracy and consensus of ideas. This is: the theater commander needs to get all the troops going in the right directions in accordance with the principles of war and the operational arts. Jefferson Davis should be doing nothing but asking the theater commander what he needs to accomplish the mission that commanders decide to undertake, but otherwise stay out and just do the politics and leave war to the military. One of the reasons the D-Day landing succeeded was Eisenhower had no civilian above him meddling in his business, and on the German side Hitler was acting as the Chief of Staff of the army. No one could make any decisions; he reserved that function to himself. The German army was paralyzed until someone could convince Hitler to defer judgement to the right general. By not having an iron clad chain of command in each theater, Jefferson Davis largely caused the inaction that led to the loss of Mississippi. @@manilajohn0182

@@haroldk3913 Yep. Political leaders should set grand strategic objectives and should, generally, leave it to the leadership of the armed forces on how to go about accomplishing those objectives. Political leaders bypassing their senior military leaders to give detailed instructions to 'their' subordinates is a great example of Napoleon's "Order plus counterorder equals disorder". In the case of the Confederacy, much of the responsibility for their troubles resided with Davis himself- not least because he initiated the conflict in the first place.

Thank you Dan. Maybe down the road you all will have me back, and I will do a part 2 on Longstreet, and cover the Operational level in the context of the Chattanooga Campaign, starting where I left off after Chickamauga.

@@haroldk3913 🙏

Even in 1860 in Europe that kind of American maneuvering wiuld havd ended in a catastrophe. The prussian breach loading artillery was 4 times faster, 3 times more accurate and had twice the rrach. A meaneuvef like Picket's charge in close order against the Prussian's would not have reached their lines. Not to mention the breech loading infantry gun. They shot 6 times per minute and were trained to fire faster when necessary. ( every Prussian had one and they were in use for more then 30 years, so they knew tactical how to use them best).

If Forrest was dismissed Hoods cavalry would of gone AWOL.

@@potcrak1 Very probably!