James Longstreet: The Civil War's Modern General

James Longstreet has long been one of the most controversial generals of the American Civil War. In this talk Retired Lt Col Harold M. Knudsen, author of James Longstreet and the American Civil War: The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War, suggests that he was also its most modern military thinker. He looks at some of Longstreet’s operations and uses his own training and experience in the US Army to compare them to 20th century military doctrine; and suggests that while not the sole agent of change away from Napoleonic methods, his contributions were significant and executed on a large scale.

[@terrywallace5181]

Very enjoyable presentation.

[@pereast]

Very good presentation! Thanks for posting.

[@Revolver1701]

At least two of my ancestors were in Longstreet’s Corps. He is buried in Gainesville Georgia where he was the US Marshall and Postmaster.

[@sirlarryofd]

Amazing overview. Particularly the Brotherton connection

[@gettysburgbrian]

Just found this channel and I am very happy I did!

[@DeltaStar777]

Absolutely brilliant. My favourite part is your comparisons with WW1 and WW2 strategy’s/tactics. Agree that Longstreet was ahead of his time but also the fire power was limited compared to WW1 thus allowing Longstreet and others maneuvering that will prove impossible during WW1 because of improved artillery and machine guns and only possible again with the arrival of armored units. Again thank you!!

[@haroldk3913]

Thank you Dan. Maybe down the road you all will have me back, and I will do a part 2 on Longstreet, and cover the Operational level in the context of the Chattanooga Campaign, starting where I left off after Chickamauga.

[@DeltaStar777]

@@haroldk3913 🙏

[@TorianTammas]

Even in 1860 in Europe that kind of American maneuvering wiuld havd ended in a catastrophe. The prussian breach loading artillery was 4 times faster, 3 times more accurate and had twice the rrach. A meaneuvef like Picket's charge in close order against the Prussian's would not have reached their lines. Not to mention the breech loading infantry gun. They shot 6 times per minute and were trained to fire faster when necessary. ( every Prussian had one and they were in use for more then 30 years, so they knew tactical how to use them best).

[@rayward3630]

Longstreet was ahead of his time. He knew the south couldn't sustain the number of casualties they were experiencing and win the war. He wanted to be on the tactical defensive, as much as possible and to use maneuver instead of just massing forces against entrenched positions. Both sides were still doing that too much and the casualties were terrible.

[@marknewton6984]

He was slow day 2 at Gettysburg.

[@manilajohn0182]

There was a strategic objective to the campaign- namely, to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. Reagan made clear in his work that the primary objective of the political leaders in Richmond was to bring relief to Vicksburg, and that the retention of forces in Lee's army- and his advance north- were predicated on this. Lee was fully well aware of this. He met with these leaders in the first half of 1863 to discuss the situation at Vicksburg, and he told Secretary of War Seddon on 9 April that: "Should Hooker's army assume the defensive, the readiest method of relieving the pressure upon General Johnston and General Beauregard would be for this army to cross into Maryland". Lee believed that the AoNV could influence events from almost 1,000 miles away.

[@herecomesaregular8418]

I don't believe this is correct. While Lee probably thought an invasion might redirect some Union forces from elsewhere , his main, and most prescient objectives were to relieve the Virginian countryside so that farms and their crops could recover, and to *hopefully* put enough fear and doubt into the hearts of the average northern citizen that they might pressure the US government to sue for peace. Although I can certainly appreciate a connection to Vicksburg more than the typical "He wanted to capture DC!" drivel.

[@haroldk3913]

Yes, that was one of the strategic theories that Lee and his allies in this idea were hoping for - that such a movement into PA would result in a suspension of Gran'ts campaign in MS. Another was that going to PA would pull the Army of the Potomac out of Virginia, which of course it did. But the theory that this invasion would end the pressure in MS was a chimera. The statement: "Should Hooker's army assume the defensive, the readist method of relieving the presure upon Johnston ... would be for this army to cross into Maryland," was not a valid statement. It proved of no concern to Grant, and Lincoln did not order him to do anything, knowing full well he was in the process of winning his campaign there. Lee was grossly mistaken. The main problem out west was Johnston should have been given complete authority over all forces in that region by Jefferson Davis, so he could act like a theater commander and marshall troops to go after Grant. Instead he acted like a peer to Pemberton, asking him to come out of vickburg and cooperate with him. Pemberton did what he wanted. This is not a proper unity of command and effort in the theater. One General needs to call the shots, and all the others need to follow orders. Another group of Confederate troops were in Arkansas and should have been ordered to reinforce Johnstons, Add a timely reinforcement from Virginia to this, and Johnston might have overwhelming numbers to attack Grant when he just gets over the river.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@haroldk3913 Very well said. Lee's grand strategic view of the war was badly flawed. The primary reason why the Confederates failed at Vicksburg was that Johnston told Pemberton one thing while Davis micromanaged and told Pemberton another- and all along, Pemberton lacked the will to act decisively. Instead of following the orders of his superior officer (Johnston), he called councils of war which debated the matter, wasted time, and then either disobey Johnston directly or attempted a half measure compromised. Pemberton should have simply ignored Davis and followed Johnston's orders. Although Kirby Smith's forces in Arkansas were, as a whole, definitely second- rate troops, not all of them were- and they would have been of far greater value east of the Mississippi. All in all, the Confederate government flopped during the war.

[@haroldk3913]

Having no proper command structure spells doom in any situation. This is not democracy and consensus of ideas. This is: the theater commander needs to get all the troops going in the right directions in accordance with the principles of war and the operational arts. Jefferson Davis should be doing nothing but asking the theater commander what he needs to accomplish the mission that commanders decide to undertake, but otherwise stay out and just do the politics and leave war to the military. One of the reasons the D-Day landing succeeded was Eisenhower had no civilian above him meddling in his business, and on the German side Hitler was acting as the Chief of Staff of the army. No one could make any decisions; he reserved that function to himself. The German army was paralyzed until someone could convince Hitler to defer judgement to the right general. By not having an iron clad chain of command in each theater, Jefferson Davis largely caused the inaction that led to the loss of Mississippi. @@manilajohn0182

[@manilajohn0182]

@@haroldk3913 Yep. Political leaders should set grand strategic objectives and should, generally, leave it to the leadership of the armed forces on how to go about accomplishing those objectives. Political leaders bypassing their senior military leaders to give detailed instructions to 'their' subordinates is a great example of Napoleon's "Order plus counterorder equals disorder". In the case of the Confederacy, much of the responsibility for their troubles resided with Davis himself- not least because he initiated the conflict in the first place.

[@MegaBloggs1]

totally different situation of a desert against broken countryside

[@bottlewishez7889]

That last on massing troops to punch through reminds me of Upton's attack on the mule shoe.

[@ThePrader]

James, "Pete", Longstreet was the best field Corps commander of the war, North or South. He was vilified for becoming a Republican after the war. His political views conflicted with those of lesser generals such as Jubal Early. He lost "the battle of the pen" after the war. But had the South had 3 more like him, they might have won the war.

[@brandonpliskin2310]

Hood would have ran into the 6th corp, furthermore he wouldnt have gotten there until 6pm and had no support, rommel had tanks

[@BuckleGeoffrey]

Davis Matthew Rodriguez Laura Jackson Brenda

[@vm.999]

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