Accident Review Global Express Dual Engine Out

[@Joe_Not_A_Fed]

I remember talking to my flight instructor about the British Midlands accident in the UK, in 1989, where they shut down the wrong engine and crashed short of the runway. He gave me a great bit of advice: "The first thing you should do in the event of an emergency...is nothing, because doing the wrong thing is worse than doing nothing". Thanks for doing these accident reports, Scott. You're saving lives.

[@Knight6831]

seriously have the lessons of British Midland flight 92 been ignored?

[@Joe_Not_A_Fed]

@@Knight6831 No kidding. Lots of people paid in blood so we could learn that lesson.

[@HernandoEUrrea]

The first thing is "FTFA"

[@Joe_Not_A_Fed]

@@HernandoEUrrea That should go without saying...but here we are. I'm definitely starting to lean more towards the Darwin Awards safety philosophy. Maybe draining some of the shallower gene pools ain't such a bad thing.

[@martinwarner1178]

Too true. I have never seen a "panic head" make a good decision.

[@glennshreiner]

The PIC was a personal family friend. I used to fly him around Florida when he was a young teenager, as well as attend as many airshow we could. Aviation was in his blood.

[@bernhardecklin7005]

Competence incarnate. Incredibly calm voice, alien to any showmanship. I'm not a pilot, but would follow Scott Perdue to the end of the world!

[@brettbetz8801]

Thanks Scott. I’m a current GLEX pilot. Not only the incredible vibration from engine, but also the noise from the RAT. I have done 6 intentional RAT drops for MX. All done at 180-200KTS. It deploys right beside FO’s Knee and makes an incredible racket of its own. IN the windmilling envelope it would be deafening

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks for sharing Brett!

[@CLdriver1960]

You’re right, it’s very loud. The Challenger 600 and 601’s ADG (Rat) had even longer blades and was significantly louder. This is one reason why I used to keep the simulator noise at 100% whenever I was teaching in the sim. (Challenger, CRJ, and Global)

[@robertbennett6697]

I have never heard the "first wind your watch" bit. That should not be glossed over. I was an engineer on high pressure steam propulsion plants when during my first "emergency" an experienced guy came to assist. I was rattled and hurriedly yelling across the engine room to him what was happening. He just held his hand up and said "stop". In the middle of all the crap, he motioned me to him, calmly explained, people can get hurt down here, so just tell me what was going on in a clear understandable manner so we can get things under control. Absolutely the best advice of my career. Many times after, people asked me how I could be so calm under some pretty hairy situations. I was happy to pass it along.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Great story Robert, thanks for sharing!

[@sl66ggehrubt]

For more emergency-prone pilots, it's helpful to write down the time of the emergency when something pops up on the EICAS, because you'll need it for the irregularity report you're going to spend the evening typing up. The most difficult field to fill in on irregularity reports is the time of the event, unless you begin every emergency by noting the time. Your out, off, on and in times are recorded so you can figure it out after, but no-one knows when you began pushing buttons but you.

[@L33tSkE3t]

I'm not a pilot but, I love videos like this. They've always interested me. Really well done!

[@danalexander1960]

Back in my controller days there was an F16 that had a flameout in a MOA at FL400 NE of their home base of an international airport. As the emergency unfolded and I was talking to the pilot he advised me he was going to the USAF base only 4 mile north of his home base. I queried him about that and his answer was classic. I am not passing up a suitable runway. "Don't bet on what you don't have." Thanks Scott for a great video as usual.

[@jr5218]

In 1974 I had an engine failure in a D55 Baron. The right crank case split as I began my decent into KJAX at night. I experienced severe vibration that precluding me from reading most instruments. Just prior to the failure I noticed an engine shutter and the right engine EGT went cold. When the severe vibration began I immediately shut down the right engine suspecting it as the culprit. My reaction was intuitive but in hind sight I think I was very lucky. Had I shut down the wrong engine without testing the available power on each the result could have been devastating. This accident reminds me somewhat of my experience.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks for sharing JR!

[@fps079]

Sad, tough loss. I will remember the "wind your watch" statement for the rest of my life.

[@johnstreet819]

Gunny you do these reports with compassion and excellent advice. Thank you from a non-pilot who learns from you.

[@a1nelson]

As someone who trained to be a pilot but later became medically unable, I watch these videos with great interest, but not necessarily the intent to apply any of the information. Or, do I? In fact, although the examples used are obviously related to good airmanship - especially for general aviation - I’ve found much of the material taught here to be highly applicable to other industries, including my own. Heck, even automobile “pilots” can up their game by consciously thinking through the ways that they can improve, using these lessons as a guide. Thanks.

[@CLdriver1960]

Well explained Accident synopsis. I was an instructor on the Global (civilian), and your explanation of the Aircraft systems, indications and Human Factors was spot on. You’ve got my ‘Subscribe’.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks Driver!

[@golfwipe]

@@FlyWirescottperdue wind your watch.

[@rigilchrist]

I like your calm, steady and informative presentation. Others tend to get extremely agitated talking though incidents and blaming others (NTSB, usually). Subscribed!

[@steveperreira5850]

I like his calmness also, and how he reasons things out, and especially how he makes recommendations to other pilots on how to avoid making the same mistakes as usually are revealed in these accident investigations. I don’t think he doesn’t blame people, in fact in almost every accident report I’ve seen from him, if the accident investigation reveals pilot error, the pilot is held responsible in these videos. And I’m pleased to hear this because the pilots are responsible for accidents about 90% of the time, and this is unacceptable, there is something wrong with our professional pilot training. As a Lowly private pilot with very few hours, I have a simple recommendation that I just thought of after watching this video, having watched hundreds prior. I think that all commercial pilots should be required to be glider pilots with a current rating. Then they would be ready to fly the plane when the auto pilot is not engaged. What do you think of that idea Bob? I’m not joking here I’m really serious because so many people are being killed by incompetent pilots.

[@rigilchrist]

@@steveperreira5850 It's not a bad idea. Glider training (which I've never done) will convey a better appreciation of weather - for example of mountain waves (which I only leaned about through doing some powered mountain flying training). And presumably, a glider pilot has a much better idea about conserving energy. I believe Capt. Sulley was a glider pilot.

[@BigBlueJake]

@@rigilchrist "Sully" was a glider pilot and had been an F-4 Phantom pilot in the Air Force.

[@jameshazou]

Hi. Like you, I have read in detail the 42 page USAF Accident Report. I did so during my annual Global Express recurrent last month at CAE Dubai. I'm a Training Captain on the Global with 12 years experience on type. I'm also ex-military, former British Army helicopter and fixed-wing instructor. Your briefing puts the report into visual context extremely well. Thank you. However, I do think we need to clarify a few areas. You mentioned the process of matching the power levers following an engine failure. There has to be a caveat to that. It can only be done once the failed engine has been correctly identified. Matching the levers can actually compound the confusion. I also have a concern about this not being in line with the QRH drills to secure the engine. Any engine failure or fire drill should always follow the following initial sequence: CONTROL IDENTIFY CONFIRM That sequence also forces a slowing down of the processes and helps with the analysis. Whilst in the sim last month we looked at an engine failure on final approach. With both engines initially on a low power setting for the approach, an engine failure is still noticeable. What is tricky is identifying the correct engine. It has to be a very systematic approach to identifying the failed engine, following the above 3 processes. As far as we can tell, in this particular accident the left engine failed in a climb. The crew probably leveled off and then appear to have done a very quick engine response check. The left engine N1 was indicating 80 to 90+ %. This would have been very misleading. There was only the Amber left FADEC Fail message. There were extreme levels of vibration and following the incorrect shutdown of the right engine, the RAT deployment would also produce high noise levels and further vibration. Any attempted windmill airstart would appear to have been on the failed left engine. It's not going to happen; that engine was dead. CAE and Bombardier advocate the use of the Quick reference checklist for immediate actions. There are no longer any "Memory Items". Again, had the crew used the quick reference card, they have been forced to slow down a little, which arguably might have helped control their obvious and understandable "Startle Response". The standard double-engine failure on the Global Express is to maintain height as speed is reduced to a target indicated speed of 200 knots; then drift down. APU on below 37,000 ft. If, for whatever reason the APU cannot be started then the nose has to lowered and aircraft accelerated to 250+ for a windmill start. That will increase the loss of height. AVIATE NAVIGATE COMMUNICATE An accident like this is very sobering. It is easy to pass judgement, but maybe we should all take stock and ask ourselves how would we have dealt with something so unexpected and disorientating? Operators should also consider what we train for in the Sim. EFATO at or above V1 is standard. What about the non-standard? Final approach, or in the cruise? It wasn't that long ago a BA 777 had a dual engine flameout on short finals to Heathrow. That was due to ice contamination of the fuel. Glide approach to a touchdown short of the threshold, but they got away with it. How do we brief our departures, cruise, arrivals and contingencies? Nearest en route diversions etc? Fly safe.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Good points. Thanks for sharing.

[@jameshazou]

If I may, please let me expand on CONTROL, IDENTIFY, CONFIRM. CONTROL - fly the aircraft. Check the yaw and remember, the dead leg NOT correcting the yaw is on the same side as the dead engine. "Dead Leg - Dead Engine". IDENTIFY - cross-check to the engine indications and be very wary of "Compensation Bias". Positively identify the failed engine and corresponding thrust lever and run switch. Take your time and at this stage DO NOT immediately throw any switches! CONFIRM - use both crew to confirm the failed engine; double check. Then continue with the shutdown drill as per the QRH. Guard and protect the live functioning engine.

[@zidoocfi]

I agree completely that in principle, it seems so eerily similar to the B-17 "Nine-Oh-Nine" crash even though the exact details are vastly different. Engine failure, AN APPARENT RUSH, and then the situation is worse. "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" should almost be worded to "Aviate, Pause, Navigate, Communicate".

[@amunderdog]

I would say: Aviate, Navigate, Pause to asses the situation, then Communicate. As detailed in this presentation.

[@donstor1]

Somebody stressed to that crew to get the plane back to base no matter what due to the equipment on board and they were focused on that. Nobody thought that duel engine failure was possible. I always remember the advise to fly the airplane. Great presentation Scott.

[@lorifitzgerald2891]

I was flying from LAX to YYC in a DA200 at FL350 when a mid span dampener on the left fan let go. Just myself and the other pilot and engineer on board. The engineer was in the back lavatory when it happened. There was a great big bang and he came running up the aisle with eyes as big as an owl. In the cockpit, the only indication was a rise in temperature and N2. We waited to see if there were any other changes but not much changed and were ready if there was a fire. Knowing if we had to shut it down we would have little problem making YYC so we just carefully monitored it. After landing the engineers had a look in the left engine. When the first mid span dampener let go, due to gyroscopic precession, the corresponding ones on the blades at 90, 180 and 270 degrees also had let go. All those pieces went through that engine and made it look like a chewed corn cob. Those ATF-3s were some tough engine. Designed to take a 20lb bird strike.

[@av8rshane491]

That engine had the worst reliability of all time.

[@petesachs1276]

I had a dual flame out at FL390 Back in the eights Lear 24, N141PJ

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

So, tell the story!

[@lbowsk]

Retired airline geek here. Fantastic vid, fantastic summation. I feel like I am back in the Sim! I think this is an excellent review for lower-time airmen who may not receive the type of training that airline guys generally receive. Lots of lessons to be learned, especially "wind your watch". At my first 135 job (American Eagle), we used to have a few of what we called "4-eye" switches. Namely, no one threw one of those switches without both guys taking a deep breath and deciding that was both; A) the correct switch and, B) the right plan of action at THAT TIME. It's not only a confirmation that you're throwing the correct switch (Left vs RIght fuel cut-off for example) but also to take the time to confirm the decision to throw it. Aside from a rapid decompression or Fire, almost nothing requires an instant decision. A V1 cut, yes. PUSH that rudder. But all the reconfigure stuff? Take the time to make a good decision. There are black craters all over the globe from guys who feathered the wrong engine. That concept served me well for the rest of my career. If I had to guess, I'd say the extreme vibration clouded their thinking. Thank you.

[@soaringdan]

Wow! Thanks for this surprising and detailed analysis of this tragic and needless accident. It's really a great reminder to slow down in a crisis and correctly assess the situation. I would like to think that I would have acted differently, but who knows. Scott, this accident and these details will stick in my mind and I am sure that if all the pilots who see this follow your advice, we will all be better prepared when trouble comes.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks Dan! Wind your watch!

[@BDOutdoorsCanada]

Great video! When things go bad, Aviate, Navigate, communicate... words to live by!

[@77thTrombone]

Need to get a spring-driven watch so I can wind it. Thanks, Scott!

[@lessharratt8719]

Back in the day, there was a flight engineer to help sort stuff out. Not a bad idea it seems.

[@richardseton7014]

Scott, thank you again for an exceptional presentation and your thorough measured and accurate explination of this sad incident! You provide us with significant information providing a sound platform for our learnings. I fly single engine, and there were four strong learning realisations from this post. Hopefully some of your fellow youtubers just might learn something about accuracy of information presented with an order of magnitude less blustering sensationalism.

[@jeffdeluca7536]

Had the crew taken a deep breath and taken Scott’s pace it probably would have ended much differently. Nothing needs to happen in one second.

[@loismiller2830]

In the medical field we say, in an emergency, take your own pulse first, then check the patient's pulse. That pause to clear your head is a difference maker.

[@SuperDave_BR549]

nice work Scott. loved seeing you and blancolirio on the same screen awhile back, hope you guys do it again real soon.

[@keepyourbilsteins]

Thanks for the 909 analogy. It was on my mind as soon as they caged the wrong engine.

[@PedroPatsf]

Scott, excellent analysis of a bad situation. Lesson learned...don't rush.

[@oldowl4290]

When taking my multi-engine checkride I was a little flustered at times and when we got back he said "Remember that there are only procedures for emergencies...not emergencies for procedures". It seems these guys went full emergency for their procedures and came up short. And I'm surprised to hear they didn't pitch for best glide and divert to somewhere closer. It appears they kept making the situation worse at every step. Huge lessons here.

[@thepacketnarc7634]

I was a passenger in a Challenger 350 that had this almost exact scenario. 20 mins after leaving an FBO in Northern VA, with 7 other people we felt a sharp vibration and heard the lav hatch rattling. We then felt it all smooth out and presumed it was turb. About 10 mins later we felt the plane make 2 left turns and heard it get very quiet and we could tell we were descending. The PIC told us that he had vibration alerts in the right engine and that as a precaution they attempted to restart the engine. It wouldn't restart. The other engine restarted and began to have issues as well. Then, we had an issue with the APU not wanting to start, or producing low power. So, we were under emergency conditions. They requested emergency clearance at Dulles which was at this point about 70 nm away. Thankfully we made it back, landed safely and the only challenge was getting a hotel room and a commercial flight. Oh, I forgot to mention, this all happened at 11pm Eastern time.

[@guggyp]

Scott I saw you flew the F 4 E. I was an inertial tech on F4Es then G model before going to college getting my engineering degree then working for the Navy at China Lake

[@ARAMP1]

E-11/BACN instructor pilot here with several hundred hours in the mishap aircraft. This was a tough report to read. Great assessment overall. A thing to note, due to the nature of the classified information onboard, many of these FOBs and outlying fields were not secure and we were always spring loaded to come back to Kandahar/home base. Obviously, that was one of the things that came back to bite the mishap crew.

[@BigBlueJake]

This information would have clarified other videos analyzing the accident, namely why they were so determined to get back to Kandahar.

[@danholstein411]

I learn from you every time Scott! Please continue doing your great work!

[@dougarroyo794]

lessons we can all take in our daily live whether we're flying a plane or not, thanks!

[@wadesaxton6079]

There is a fan blade failure profile to fly. Descend near MMO to keep the Fan loaded by ram air. Level at 10-15k ft and quickly slow down through the harmonic range. Then analyze and shut down.

[@brentdykgraaf184]

Mr.Purdue sir..so cool you have your dad's Stearman.

[@jimheckert5383]

Thanks Scott. Great video. 🇺🇸🍀🇺🇸

[@dave1ahc]

This is the first time I have seen your channel and I love air crash investigations and follow them a lot. I also appreciate the unbiased information without putting down the servicemen who lost their lives. Everything you have said can help general aviators, like me as well as men and women that fly the commercial and military men and women. Keep it up!

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks David!

[@benc1103]

Like what has been said below: 1) Never be in a hurry to shut down an engine. When you do, everyone in the cockpit make sure it’s the correct one. 2) Doing nothing is better than doing the wrong thing. 3) Sit on your hands till you breath and calm down and figure it out, then pull out the correct checklist. 40 years of flying. Air Force and airlines. 25,000 hrs in 15 jets (many dozens of prop planes). Includes Flight Engineer on 2 jet types.

[@frederickwhite6416]

Great info as always. Boy that brought back memories, "the 1st thing you do is wind your watch." Sad and unfortunate mistakes. Sounds like you were in their heads. Tragic mistakes, RIP.

[@christophergoggin5524]

reminds of the swissair crash years ago cabin fire and they spent forever trying to figure it out

[@P-CROZIER]

Very Good review- Thank You - I spent a Year in Afghanistan - Tremendous flying, but always kept in mind the Terrain and Weather...Thank You Sir !

[@jeanbailliez6199]

You are the best aviation commentator/analyzer around,lów tone,no gimmick,facts rightfully used

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks Jean!

[@davidgilpin5200]

Great analysis. Sad story. These pilots were doing their mission, and *unfortunately* made choices that assisted in their own demise. This reminds me a bit of the Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701 CRJ-200 incident in 2004. in the Global Express situation the initial "domino" was the loss of a fan blade... The Pinnacle pilots instigated the beginnings of their own demise by hot-dogging the CRJ-200 (high G climbs at full throttle to hit FL410) which caused their "dual engine failure". The similarities: BOTH tried air-starts (losing precious energy.) BOTH either did not attempt to restart the APU or did it too late to make a difference. BOTH had plenty of altitude and energy at the beginning of the incident to have sufficient glide slope to reach MULTIPLE suitable runways. Fancy pretty digital screens are great - until they aren't. I'd imagine many pilots would "freak out" at that laundry list of errors displayed on that screen. Even after practicing failures in a Sim, I imagine it's quite different when presented with the "real world situation." I have some old pilot friends who reiterate this mantra often: "Aviate, navigate, communicate."

[@paulcontreras3264]

Fascinating stuff. I am not a pilot but like aviation especially business jet aviation. Thanks for explaining things in a way that even us non-pilots can kind of understand. Love your channel.

[@mba7454]

Great documentary and illustration. Looking forward to your next video upload Sir.

[@lusilk7954]

top marks brother

[@PeteLehmann]

I hope that I can develop the level of comprehensive structured analytic processes and skills you exhibit as go to you carefully and methodically pick through and unwrap these incredibly complex scenarios. You do so with an uncanny level of tact and compassion, outlining what the pilot's mistakes were likely caused by, and what they in turn caused to exacerbate the issues they face. I was an active flight instructor for about 3 years, then an aircraft sales manager for the 3 that followed (same job, just can't criticize the deficiencies in basic stick and rudder skill and lack of awareness of stored energy in the airframe. I was never as effective a teacher then as you are in your videos, but I was also 24-26 years old, so maybe I'd do better nowadays. Anyway, thanks for sharing your knowledge and maybe you'll see this question and be able to answer it's: During your various military tours and air carrier employment stints, were you ever trained as a squadron/ wing safety officer, or anything equivalent on the 121 side which provided you with the opportunity to take any of the USG/ DoD Service Branch Safety Officer & Aircraft Accident Investigation Courses? If not, and your analysis is all based on your the body of your life's work and experience, that would be incredible.

[@nickinportland]

I could never fly a plane but love to hear about it. Sounds fun and complicated. Got a Flywire shirt the other day!

[@StudioRV8]

Scott, thanks for putting these together and sharing. Always good learning on how we can fly more safe!

[@DavidMcbrady]

Scott, you make the best videos. You explain it in such a way that even a non pilot such as myself can understand and enjoy, Thanks sir.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Wow, thanks!

[@goleafsgo8496]

Agree 100% virtually no aviation knowledge guy here but the breakdown is excellent. Cheers .....

[@julesviolin]

I wish all bloggers would wear a lapel microphone. Your sound is superb

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks!

[@donc9751]

Thank you Scott! Excellent video and summation of what likely occurred during the course of the pilots emergency situation! Anything that can be learned from the experiences of others to keep pilots thinking process and awareness is saving lives and I enjoy your channel!!! Keep up the great work Scott!!!

[@shack1975]

Exceptional accident breakdown, Scott. It’s been 11 years for me, but as a Strike Eagle WSO I remember routinely briefing that I would guard the “good” throttle during an engine fire / failure until we both agreed to move it. That, as you know, was to offer a backup (second set of eyes and brain cells) to prevent just such a mistake. I wonder if 2-pilot airplanes have a similar practice, civil or military?

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Guarding the throttles is done in some airlines that I know of. Not sure about Bizjets. Where did you fly Strike Eagles and when did you go through FTU?

[@shack1975]

@@FlyWirescottperdue I went through the B-Course in ‘96 (after an initial ops tour in F-111s at Cannon) then a TX in ‘06. F-15E ops tours were Mt Home twice and Elmendorf in-between. That sound of the JFS in your intro is music! Just back in GA for about a year now, with a son a few weeks from a PPL check ride. We really enjoy the channel - let me know if there’s anything I/we can do to help.

[@DutchThackers]

I really enjoy your crystal clear commentary and thorough analysis. Thanks very much for your content.

[@dermick]

Great video and analysis, Scott. Add this to the list of many accidents - mainly non-aviation - that could have been avoided if the crew had literally done nothing.

[@av8rshane491]

I was in recurrent training for the Global 6000 and this crash came up in class, someone in the class had relevant info on how these aircraft were operated and maintained and neither were normal.

[@tomdchi12]

Things I'm learning from Scott: Don't futz with stuff in the air. Land first. When there's a significant problem, get safely on the ground ASAP, and mess with stuff there, not in the air. "Turn towards the nearest suitable landing spot and trim for the best glide speed." Conserve altitude and speed, then communicate and run checklists. One additional thought - they had a few minutes - is there a way prepare/practice something like "Stop, wait, this isn't working. How can we start over? How can we re-check what we've been assuming?" Checklists can get around that lock-in by doing/trying things that someone thought of calmly on the ground, but is there any way to take an opportunity to zero out and re-start from scratch?

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thomas, great comments. The only way is to think about stuff before it happens and figure out what your approach will be. Keep calm and carry on.

[@ivorevans1795]

Mentour Pilot mentions the use of the acronym PIOSEE P roblem identify I nformation available O ptions S elect option E execute E valuate The evaluate is to me the one that makes sure you don't continue "down a rabbit hole" I would add that with the level of automation today - getting the Information bit would require a LOT of training. In fact the Hudson incident referred to the FO's very recent type certification as a positive into the final outcome. As has been said - very easy from the arm chair. Very much like Scott's idea of go with what you have and not what you think you may have

[@WolfPilot]

Great video Scott. The audio was greatly improved! I always hate to see situations like these. I can't imagine what the crew was feeling as every warning message on earth seemed to be popping up at the same time..

[@dutchflats]

Excellent presentation! Shutting down the wrong engine in a situation like this has happened in a number of other past accidents. My instructors always advised me to count to 10 before taking action, furthermore both pilots should agree on which engine to shut down with the pilot flying guarding the good engine start lever.

[@jameshuggins7320]

Another great video, Scott. Well done.

[@donmoore7785]

Great review of this sad event. Multiple important lessons here. When a Sully happens, pilots look like geniuses. When something like this happens, pilots look human.

[@callisto8232]

Excellent, easy to follow analysis as always

[@johnbond7044]

Thanks for the video, It was originally thought that it was bad fuel - good video.

[@nancychace8619]

Excellent analysis. Appreciate your sharing. Sorry for this loss. You make your choices in this life, and then you have to live with them.

[@leeadams5941]

Had a friend lose a propeller blade on the left engine of an E2...the aircraft was shaking so bad he could not see the instrument panel ...he took a WAG and fortunately was correct when he T Handled...this was late 90s as I remember a composite prop...

[@kingjeff1758]

THANK YOU AGAIN ! 😀

[@LeviNoguess]

Great video. I am very familiar with a Liberty type King Air 350ER accident where the wrong engine was shut down after the computer filled up with smoke. Never once did they attempt a restart even though the PF commented on "what's the chance of having two bad engines at the same time"?. Fortunately they survived an off airport gear up landing 6 miles from the airport. Lots of lessons learned, but could have turned out so much better if they'd wound their watches. I've used this accident in training other pilots and discuss it often. Thanks for your perspective.

[@av8ir68]

The assessment on what happened seems dead on accurate!! I have to admit, I have so many questions because the military seems to have cornered the market on training and redundancy and it seems like this accident leaves the door wide open to the question why?? You have done a great job of trying to explain this to us, but we have hours to sit here and study the facts, where they had mere minutes to study what was happening without fully understanding what was actually happening.. I can’t hardly imagine what it would be like trying to read a screen full of messages while having numerous things going wrong and having to fly in a hostile arena in the world and find a place to land.. Thank you for your dedication to posting these videos.. Hopefully we can all learn something valuable from your insight..

[@davelester5839]

There is also the two guys ferrying a regional jet and tried to see how high it could go--similar result.

[@warped-sliderule]

Your analysis gives hope that they didn't die in vain. Lots of confidence even with ZERO ENGINES RUNNING! Regardless of engine out procedural details for the type, basic strategy for any type doesn't change -- "fly the plane - best glide" head toward a field (Kabul), then work the problem. You can orbit the field until problem resolved or land. In this case, the basic strategy would have saved the situation and overcome the opportunities that were missed. Shame to loose two good men in a flyable plane...

[@timken4648]

Excellent master. Tks for the teaching!!!

[@TIO540S1]

Such an excellent presentation and analysis, thanks!

[@shanehecker4925]

Excellent analysis and great time to remember the basics during an emergency!

[@MOAB-UT]

In 2022 there is zero excuse to not have full audio and video of every single flight. I propose a REDUNDANT set of camera w/mic and a completely separate audio recorders IN THE COCKPIT. You can buy 4k action cams for $200. Of course, they would need to be fortified but to only have one set that often fails or gets lost is simply not acceptable anymore. Having video in the cockpit would provide so much valuable data.

[@IvanCruz-ys6by]

Great job with the accident recap. Definitely a good vignette to use and learn from.

[@milesreed3772]

Excellent video and the breakout of events in addition to the fail-down sequences you explained were above and beyond. You’ve got a new subscriber! Thanks again. Great video.

[@MrTommybadger]

These are lessons that are just as useful in everyday life as they are in the air.

[@finecutpost]

Excellent analysis thank you

[@nelsonmorales6831]

I really get alot of your technical analysis!

[@danieldillon9225]

Thanks for sharing your views and expertise.

[@peterthepilot4413]

Great video!

[@stihlnz]

Thanks Scott, appreciate your time knowledge and work on this. There's lessons for all pilots here, if you're a rotor pilot you may have to act a bit quicker ...but thats another story with its own poor outcomes at times.

[@RALPHD57]

Thanks Scott!

[@ronpekkala3281]

Good explanation.

[@joepayne7494]

I was taught to stop flying into the problem declare a Mayday as soon as possible and get the plane to the closest airport no matter how little the problem.

[@nightshift5201]

Scott, well done analysis. I'm sure you meant "engine pressure ratio" @ 10:50

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Most folks use that ‘definition’. It measures inlet and exhaust pressure as a ratio. I learned it as exhaust pressure ratio... I thought I mentioned that in the video.

[@pwilson90]

Scott, nice analysis. One piece of info you got wrong was Sharana (OASA) does in fact have a runway, albeit not a very long one for such a plane.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Thanks for pointing that out.

[@jamesnull5415]

Well done, Scott!🇺🇸

[@the_duke_of_bork8702]

This has shades of British Midland 92 at Kegworth in 1989.

[@Knight6831]

yeah that was my reaction upon seeing the conclusion oh ffs its like Kegworth all over again

[@marioalbertocasanovaguio4271]

Kind of similar to the TransAsia Airways Flight 235 ATR72, that crashed into the Keelung River shortly after takeoff from Taipei on feb 2015, pilots misjudged the troubled engine and ended up shutting off the good one, and the rest is history,

[@klk1900]

My dad flew fighters then went on to nasa during the shuttle era. When he taught me to fly he beat into my head. Know as hoots law around nasa “There is no problem so bad, that you can NOT make it worse” meaning don’t start throwing switches because it may be a death switch.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Smart man!

[@ds2112]

That slogan needs to be put on a t-shirt!

[@billcallahan9303]

With cameras the size of an old Ben Franklin 50 cent piece, I don't know why they aren't more used on all jet aircraft. Put one on each side of the rudder aimed down at the engines & usually you'll be able to see any damage that appears in either cowling. Usually!

[@plane-fuzz]

Wind your watch, OUTSTANDING JOB!

[@jg6438]

I agree, slow down, wind your watch. Another example that "Speed Kills." JG

[@goleafsgo8496]

Wow it seems like it was a preventable outcome and this makes the loss of life so much more tragic. RIP to the crew

[@drdoolittle5724]

I have had engine out but also have had gliding experience so, there was no need to panic because you were trained in the 1st place to get it down safely. I never had another engine to rely on so just like The Miracle on the Hudson, I firmly believe so many hours controlled engine-less would benefit a lot of pilots!

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

I do as well!

[@alantoon5708]

You explained this in layman's terms. When my father was learning to fly he was taught to always be looking for a suitable place to land, because....

[@shmaknapublar]

For a VFR flight plan, yes. These folks didn't break out of the clouds until they descended below 1000ft and the rate of descent left them almost no time to make any decisions regarding landing options.

[@fhuber7507]

Airframe is standard... Just loaded with military radio systems. Actually a good choice for getting the job done without excess costs.

[@arturoeugster7228]

2:03 The image here is a differnt, smaller airplane. Could you identify its mission with attached under body structures and the dome above the fuselage. It looks more like a modified CRJ-200.

[@dougdrvr]

If I understood correctly, a FADEC FAIL always results in an automatic shutdown? Seems like it would be a good idea to show the FADEC FAIL annunciation right on the EPR or N1 gauge instead of or in addition to the annunciation box? After all, it’s only software.

[@FlyWirescottperdue]

Apparently, the automatic shutdown is one of three options in the checklist. Your idea is a good one, but convention has it in the Crew Alerting Box and the exceedance in yellow or red for the engine instrument box.