What Does Deleuze Mean By 'A Life'?

[@francescosticchi3817]

This was great!! A personal way (I don't know how effective) to summarise Deleuze's notion of immanence is to think about it in terms of the primacy of relation and movement over stable models and configurations, whether we are talking about consciousness, individuality, subjectivity, or forms of rationality and logic. It is relation (as impersonal tension) the force that allows them to form, operate, and transform. The power to live corresponds with the possibility of creating relations. Essentially, in many ways, all forms of narcissism operate as reactive forces that destroy relations. Thank you!!

[@AcidHorizon]

Great comment and I think you are correct wrt narcissism. Thank you!

[@michaelcarrig627]

Deleuze gives an important example in Difference and Repetition that acts as an alternative thought figure to Heidegger's soldier, who is thrown into being. He speaks of the mortally wounded soldier who is between life and death, becoming a life, much in the same way as Dicken's scoundrel. The soldier becomes a death of war, they become a flood of memories, they do not act with intention or imagine a future. From a transcendental perspective the moment of death is a cut between living and being a life, a point of immediate actuality becoming pure virtuality, and a transition from sensing to sense in general as determined by those extrinsic determinations that make a life. But without the will to counteractualize, an event becomes is unalienated insofar as it no longer struggles against the problematic grounds of life and returns to that ground. It is also worth noting the frequent reference to biunivocality in ATP, particularly when describing stratification (various poles of actuality and virtuality or sense and nonsense) that describe the living; the indifference of death escapes these polarities. Now the problem is if Deleuze's later descriptions are consistent with univocity or polyvocity.

[@AcidHorizon]

Is this the same Michael I shared a classroom with once??

[@tonacion]

Great example. Can I get the chapter this is said? Ty!

[@SPACEDOUT19]

I dont know, cause i dont have one

[@heartache5742]

~58:00 the virtual opposes the possible

[@serogers3523]

Hey, can someone point me to the specific track that plays at the end of this episode? (Fantastic episode btw)

[@AcidHorizon]

This is a track I collaborated on with another producer in my dance music days. It was never released.

[@serogers3523]

@@AcidHorizon Well damn! It's a great track!

[@trogsothoth4919]

"imagine your childhood" *jackass theme starts*

[@AcidHorizon]

lmao

[@MateoPizarro]

Please: whats the title of the song at the beginning🙌?

[@thegrangephilosophydepartm3799]

Great episode, folks. Really useful. Quick question: an essay is mentioned towards the start of the episode by a Bernard 'X'. I couldn't make out the last name. Would anyone be able to point me in the right direction? Thanks

[@Epsomgwtfbbq]

Funky outro there what a bop

[@o.s.h.4613]

When you made a comment that you might get a Heideggerian on your case, you'd be right! :-) While it’s true that I'm not a Heideggerian, I am still going to add a little tension to what was said regarding the unapplicability of Heidegger's being-in-the-world to account for the margin of the primacy of "violent" material impressions (although here I’m ragging on the ontological side of it) which constitute the pre-representational, “fluxing” movement-relation of the plane of immanence, in all its “stratigraphic filtering” as it’s described in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (And you don’t need to look for short essays from 1925 for it!) As a confrontation between pure intensity and virtuality, as the self-sufficient cause of its own organization, a Heideggerian being-in-the-world acts on the level of a hypergradient (and by that I mean a _double_ opposition to a binary yes-no, correct-incorrect, you-me relation that takes up so much Cartesian thinking, insofar as there’s not just a gradient in “identity” but the gradient itself shifts to the movement of what’s on it; this second abstraction comes to mean the shifting practices between various cultural canons) of the faculties prior to the formation of a sense of self, a “primordial Dasein” in his early writings, although it would be better to call it a paleo-Dasein. This hypergradient describes in equal parts the diversity of the extant, its sheer multiplicity, and the immanent experimentation and valuation it demands. However, it’s Heidegger’s later writing which confronts and challenges the supposed “primacy” of the representational objectivity characteristic of (transcendentalizing) individuation, of the empirical sensibility-he does a similar move to the pre-predicative, sub-representational nature of a Deleuzian “A Life” with Dwelling as an “inauguration” of the Fourfold. The stability of an individuated individual in a single, immanent plane is given by these four “logics” of unfurling into the world which also organizes, endemically to itself with no reference to a “Higher,” the very world it buoys up and into, and this uneasy balancing between “horizons” (to appropriate a Gadamerian term) makes room for this very de-centred ground or “earth” to begin with; the very notion of a transitory middle-ground in identity lights the way, for Heidegger, to a revealing of the “clockwork” behind our social arrangements, it’s a confrontation with an “abyss” [Abgrund] in a sense, not too dissimilar to the earthly character of the world analogously to a Deleuzian Life. The dominance of the relational, non-identitarian movement in pure immanence shares many direct similarities with Heidegger’s Fourfold. The idea of a gap or chasm that needs to be mediated across, as this middle-ground between a total “unbecoming” and a total “is,” is an almost anachronistic doppelgänger to Deleuze’s understanding of A Life-it becomes manifested in Heidegger as a “leap,” [Springen]. There might be, to some degree, an overestimation of how disparate Heidegger and Deleuze truly are, especially when the former enters his post-Kehre era. In the future, it might be interesting to consider an explicit Deleuzian apprehension of Heidegger and, likewise, a Heidegger-ish apprehension of Deleuze, if you want to sign me on for an episode ;) This was very enjoyable to listen to on the bike ride today, cheers- Edit: at approximately 51:30

[@rabidgoon]

one or several lives

[@migueldeitos]

Gostei, fizeram bons apontamentos.

[@BoyGeorge76]

Deleuze is the best philosopher 4 ever.

[@travis1759]

Great video. I’m sure this has been said many times before but Deleuze’s conception of the transcendental field sounds like a kind of pantheism, and pre-individuated experience sounds a bit like Buddhist ideas of de-centred subjectivity.

[@florianfelix8295]

Ohh I love deleuzes bergsonianism

[@inco9943]

Interesting