Battle for Nijmegen: Delays, Mistakes and 10th SS Panzer Division | With James Holland & Al Murray

[@digitalbegley]

A great episode guys some really good points well made, walking the ground is so important For actually understanding it. So loving the series overall. Keep it up!

[@ce17ec]

Again a terrific good walk over this historic ground. And of course so many "what if's". At some moments you miss some extra local knowledge that can correct you at some details or show you even the best locations to make things clearer and were you sometimes still can find the scars of war around you. My father was 16 at the time and he and his parents lived just east of the bridge. Their house together with the whole street was set on fire by the SS troops at the end of that second or beginning of the third day. They only managed to get out at the last moment without anything else then the cloths they wore. But my father, being 16, saw also the big historic event that happened just around them. He started collecting war items within a day or two. He found a nice SS-helmet at the Valkhof, only to discover that half the head of the owner was still inside. He dropped it and found other stuff I still have. That autumn and winter he was one of the many civil helpers in the city that now became an enormous R&R place for tens of thousands of allied troops. And at the same time the city staid frontline for 7 months (until April 1945). During those months the city was regular shelled and bombed by the Germans killing again hundreds of civilians in that period. Before the start of operation Vertible in February 1945 there were more then a million troops around Nijmegen. About all the newer buildings near the Valkhof: The city of Nijmegen was bombed by mistake by the American 8th air force at the 22 February 1944 so only 7 months earlier (over 800 citizens died). The whole centre of the city was destroyed by allied bombs, but the buildings near the Valkhof park survived and were mostly undamaged. Then some were destroyed during the fighting at Kelfkensbos and Valkhof , but most destruction of that part of the city with so many historic buildings from the 15th century and later was done in the sixties and seventies, just for housing renewal. That was a common thing in that period all over western Europe, so stupid!. The story of the tanks of Robinson and Carrington stopping at the other side of the bridge to make tea etc has proved to be totally untrue. There are perfect books and presentation (like at WW2tv) that tell the real story about that moment.

[@kevd3046]

Class..keeping these stories alive..✌️

[@Xyzabc998]

The argument, first sparked R.G, very well explained by Al and James, knocks over Ryan's wafeur thin argument using logic and insight. This series has been so useful.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Very good to hear! Thank you for supporting the channel.

[@jimmarnell3964]

Thank you gentlemen for another fascinating episode of Walking The Ground.

[@markfreestone4579]

Fascinating and thought provoking, and I know it’s because he’s so passionate about the subject, but Jim….let Al finish his thoughts and sentences!

[@martinbosley9910]

Another episode of Jim interrupting Al!

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

Browning and Gavin were inexplicably obsessed with securing a flank to the point they seem to have forgotten their primary objective. Had they done what they should have and secured the crossing earlier on the 17th, even with the planning and resourcing problems the Operation could still have succeeded.

[@davemac1197]

Browning wanted the bridge taken by a dawn glider coup de main along with the Arnhem and Grave bridges - this was removed by Brereton and Williams' decision to fly daylight flights in the middle of the day. He then suggested to Gavin he drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge, but aafter toying with the idea he discarded it because of his experience in sicily with a scattered srop disorganising the division for days. Gavin thought it would be alright to instruct Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the brdge after landing and even showed him on a map the exact route he wanted the battalion to ataake to t he bridge. Lindquist and Gavin let everyone down. Gavin's concern about the Reichswald stemmed from intelligence reports at 1st Airborne HQ Gavin saw after COMET was cancelled and he was given the Nijmegen assignment for MARKET. He only realised in 1966 when he passed some papers of Dutch researcher TA Boeree to Cornelius Ryan that the reports of armour in the rechswald was the Hohenstaufen Division in transit to Arnhem, since Boeree had studied the Hohenstaufen's withdrawal from Belgium into the Netherlands between 4 and 7 September.

[@MadMonk_]

I had the honor of visiting the bridge in 2017, it was certainly impressive seeing the bridge and experiencing the crossing, be it in peacetime. Great episode guys, following this and the Normandy series with great interest.

[@davids560]

Brilliant video, a great example of how to have a meaningful discussion, unscripted, while moving and being filmed. Bravo. Notice how they rarely interrupt each other too? That's how people should converse!

[@footstepsbrady8988]

You guys are the best. Loving James enthusiasm and Al is clearly fascinated by the fella and is as engaged and informative on such a detailed subject. I love the detail. They know each character who played the roles in detail. Spectacular. MORE!!!!! MORE!!!

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Much appreciated! More coming soon!

[@wienanddrenth7200]

Great show and explanation of the events on September 17, and how/when/where all went wrong. As to approaching the bridge from the east, through the Ooijpolder -- as that is all polder, hasn't that the risk of breaking momentum due to all the ditches, hedges etc? Having lived in Nijmegen, the Keizer Karelplein is a nightmare to navigate :-) It is part of anyone in the region taking driving lessons (been there, done that.)

[@A.J.K87]

I used to live in Nijmegen, so it's amazing to see all those places so familiar to me in this video. BTW, it's spelled ''Keizer Karelplein''. ;)

[@crusignatioutremer791]

You all are a real treat. Al, I still haven’t gotten over your comment on live TV during the Arnhem 80 event, that paratroopers time their exits out of both doors on the aircraft, to prevent each other from getting kicked in the head. Having made plenty of exits from a Hercules, I can tell you that won’t happen. Ever seen how wide they are? It’s to prevent canopies from being too close together and causing a leap frog effect, with the lower chute collapsing the upper chute. Something they didn’t have to worry about in 44. As for the dialogue on what the 82nd Abn and Gen Gavin, specifically the 508th PIR, I wonder if you’ve considered several points: The 508th didn’t put boots on the ground until after 1300hrs on the 17th. 1328 according to records. A unit just doesn’t drop fully assembled, it takes a moment to collect. According to the history, sunset was around 1845hrs. It was 6-8 miles from DZ to the bridge, so 1-2 hours with kit on the best of surfaces. You state that they should have come in from the East, have you ever tried to collect and haul your gear over apparently non paved terrain, in an intelligence lacking environment, where lessons you learned from possibly Sicily to Normandy might have affected your choice? Even a small element with 1-2 MG42s would have created havoc. Grazing fire is horrible! The road leading into Nijmegen, besides being a natural magnet for collection of forces, would also provide a faster approach. 13:28 + 1hr rally (best estimate) + 2hr movement (cautious; movement to contact) + delays if contact was made on either approach = It’s getting dark! Coordination, communication, and fratricide become serious concerns, which tends to slow things down. According to several sources, although you state there “nothing there” to protect the bridge, a small group of defensive soldiers with possible support weapons listed above, seems to be not worth mentioning, compared to the larger number of 508th elements moving in. If they had any crew served weapons, typical doctrine is a 3-1 superiority at the point of concern. There is mention that elements of the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion were at Nijmegen by that afternoon briefly. Sounds like they were there first, and would probably have maintained contact and brought more forward if contact was established, especially since their reaction time was increased by mechanization and condensed interior lines. These wouldn’t have been a negligible concern to the paratroopers (any veterans of Sicily and Normandy would have been a bit concerned), as they would have had vehicle mounted systems as well as dismounted heavy weapons to augment the existing “nothing there”. It seems to me, even if they took your command decision, they would have had to pass through SS armored elements. Don’t want to get caught in the open, and grunts know they have a survival advantage inside the city against any armor (readymade positions) and your flank is not exposed to anything from across the river. Just my thoughts. Former 1/505 PIR Paratrooper.

[@crusignatioutremer791]

And I will add, from General Frost's book titled: 'A Drop Too Many', we find him placing the blame for Market Garden with this statement- " ... the same voice (LTG Fredrick Browning) that had so firmly said to Roy Urquhart: "Arnhem Bridge. And hold it", said to James Gavin of the 82nd airborne division, "the Groesbeek Heights. Nijmegen bridge later". The failure to prioritize the capture of the bridge was what Frost felt doomed the operation. He did not blame Gavin and the 82nd, he actually commended them. This also doesn't take in the topics I mentioned previously.

[@ancsi7474]

I like that the episodes are getting longer.

[@AndyClayton-f5x]

I watched a video a couple of days ago about Carrington's troop stopping just beyond the bridge. The contemporary military action reports describe the anti tank guns and other heavy opposition they ran into. They didn't have enough force to blast on to Arnham alone. They would have if they could have.

[@Andy-co6pn]

kzbin.info/www/bejne/i2rEg4uZqcx2ipYsi=unjrElEMMozSykxv

[@seanbradley2134]

You earned your beers for this one gents, absolutely riveting stuff. Really interesting to hear about Peter Carrington. I’m no Conservative but I’ve heard he was a fine Foreign Secretary, obviously one with guts too. Didn’t Denis Healey have an ‘interesting war’ too? Anyhow, thanks once again chaps, really enjoyed it

[@tombonfield143]

Great series folks, love it. Keep up the great work

[@PatrickZ-k6b]

Aloha James & Al, Incredible series! I love both of your enthusiasm, humor, and extensive knowledge of WW2 history! Very inspirational! Your videos have a fun, relaxed feel and i am learning a LOT!!! Im looking forward to hopefully seeing many more episodes in the future!! Keep them coming!!! I appreciate you making these videos!!! Awesome videography/editing as well!

[@martinwhitaker5332]

Really enjoy what you both are making, great discussion's and making things so interesting.

[@wendyburgess8452]

My dad was a sergeant in the Ist Battalion Grenadier Guards and fought at Nijmegen losing friends in the process. My son and I retraced his steps through NW Europe last month. You are clearly very knowledgeable and I'm sure WW2 geeks get much out of your pieces but I really struggle. So much you speak about assumes an encyclopedic knowledge of events. If you have a target audience I'm not it and I do wish I was.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you for the comment Wendy. We’re sorry you are struggling but we’d love you to keep watching. We always like to hear from anyone with a link to this part of history and having them as part of our community. We’ve also had folks say that after the episodes they’ve been Googling terms and phrases then picking them up as they go. Walking The Ground is definitely about learning, James, Al and the team learn every time we set out making these videos.

[@kevinhendon]

Fantasctic as ever Gentlemen, thank you 🤜🤜

[@buonafortuna8928]

Great job guys, nicely explained. Loved the book Al, though I'm starting to wonder what went right with Op Market Garden.

[@garrybrough72]

Fantastic series guys!

[@rogerpoole8253]

Well done guys, one of your best yet

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Really?

[@jasonmussett2129]

Another great episode, reminds me of 'A Bridge Too Far.' Good stuff.

[@dankorolyk5917]

Another brilliant and entertaining episode guys

[@realwealthproperties5671]

I’ve watched this episode twice already today and shared it with a friend! Another great episode. I’ve learned from it. I read there were some German guns just up ahead when they got off the bridge and that’s part of the reason they didn’t advance. I’m not sure if that’s accurate or not.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you for sharing! 👍

[@allanburt5250]

Brilliant guys, fantastic job as always 👏

[@steves1112000]

i served in the 508th in the 80's Gavin was still a legend. Aso met 1st Leonard Funk. Look him up. man among men.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you for watching. Will definitely look him up.

[@PaulDouglasDouglas97]

Really enjoyed the video mate lest we forget

[@TheVigilant109]

Fascinating. Thank you

[@etissite]

Great series! 😀

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thanks! 😁

[@Alfie1970Waterhouse]

Thank you

[@fingers3239]

Although you wax lyrical about Gavin being cool, you overlook the fact that despite Lindqvist being given the orders of approaching the road bridge from the East, the overall command was Gavins and therefore it's his responsibility for the failure of Operation Market Garden. I understand that his head was turned having to concentrate on protecting Brownings HQ on the heights, but the overall, overriding aim of the airborne forces was to capture and hold the bridges. Although Boy Browning stole much needed resources from 1st Airborne Div, he also stole the impetus from Gavins Div too. They both have the approx. 8000 troops of 1st Airborne who failed to escape the Arnhem perimeters blood on their hands. This was covered up by the likes of Monty, Eisenhower, Brereton and Browning himself!

[@davemac1197]

Gavin did not "have to protect Browning's HQ". Both 82nd and Browning's Corps HQs were located between the 505th and 508th PIRs. Browning had a Flight and Regiment HQ of the Glider Pilot Regiment for close protection and Gavin had Vandervoort's 2nd Battalion 505th and his Engineer Battalion in reserve near his HQ. Browning did not steal much needed resoures from 1st Airborne Division. His Corps HQ was moved from second to first airlift, switching places in the schedule with 1st Anti-Tank Battery's second line ammunition Jeeps and Trailers, the four anti-tank guns of Z-Troop for Division HQ defence, and 1st Parachute Brigades Jeeps - hardly essential in the first 24 hours. Browning's attempts to have the first two airlifts carried out on the first day, major bridges seized by dawn glider coup de main, drop zones between Valkenswaard and Son all frustrated by USAF officers Brereton and Williams, and a suggetion to Gavin to drop a battalion on the north end of t he Nijmegen bridge was also discarded. Gavin compounded this error by assigning Lindquist to the Nijmegen mission aafter he had not performed well in Normandy. Gavin stole his own impetus with his own bad judgement. This was all ignored by Cornelius Ryan and Richard Attenborough Stop inventing your nonsense.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Where did Browning end up after this? Buried in Southeast Asia.

[@Lilguy1066]

Magnificent! Thank you!!!

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Glad you enjoyed it!

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Magnificent? You are rather easily pleased.

[@pinchus34]

Hooray! Just listened to the live stream update and We Have Ways USA…I needed more war waffle.

[@realwealthproperties5671]

Yes! Another walking the ground video!

[@8020erwin]

there is an other reason why there are so many modern buildings in the center of nijmegen. It was bombed by the allies on 22 februari 1944. So when in september 44 marketgarden begon. the center of nijmegen was already in destroyed for a large part..

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Yes. It’s an important point also discussed by other commenters below. Thank you for sharing. And thank you for watching.

[@8020erwin]

@@WW2WalkingTheGround btw it was realy fun to watch an since i live in nijmegen, those spots have a new meaning for me now

[@ConsciousAtoms]

I think this is the crux of why Market Garden failed. None of the allied generals seem to have grasped that Nijmegen was the key to the whole operation, whereas Model and Bittrich, with their vast command experience, immediately understood the city's strategic importance. I don't know if it is historic - lots of details of the movie aren't - but if, as Bittrich proposed in the movie A Bridge too Far, the Germans had blown Nijmegen bridge on the 17th, Market Garden would have been over then and there. While XXX Corps had, in theory, enough bridging equipment for a Bailey Bridge across the Waal, it would not have been finished in time to evacuate 1st British airborne. Also, as to Guardsmen being unsackable: Boy Browning was Grenadier Guards. He should definitely have been sacked for his conduct during Market Garden. But who is going to sack a lieutenant general of the Guards? Short of the king himself I find myself hard-pressed as to who would have the clout to do so.

[@marcel-y8c]

Fyi the waal is far too wide to make a bailey bridge which can span around 60m. The crux of market garden’s failure is complex. One of them surely was the delay of capturing this bridge. But 1st airborne made critical failures as well getting just 1/3 of the planned troops at the bridge in Arnhem what let them only to be able to take the north side so no troops could go south to connect. If they would hebben been droppes altogether at day 1 they could have gone to the bridge with a major force instead of a battalion.

[@davemac1197]

Agree with your first two paragraphs, but a study of Browning's role in the operation reveals that he was not responsible for the bad decisions made in the planning. He was continually frustrated by USAAF commanders Brereton and Williams of 1st Allied Airborne Army and US IX Troops Carrier Command, who removed his proposed double airlift, dawn glider coup de main assaults on the three big bridges at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave, and drop zones for the 101st between Valkenswaard-Eindhoven-Son and 1st Airborne at Elst. Gavin also discarded a suggestion to drop a battalion on the northrn end of the Nijmegen bridge and Browning had no authority to object or he would lose his job. That political reality was established when he threatened to resign over Brereton's earlier LINNET II plan and he was only saved by the operation being cancelled. Montgomery's 21st Army Group was also notified of the changes only after Brereton's 14 September cut-off date for any further amendments, so the Americans completely dictated the air plan, and it was either do it their way or cancel 2nd Army's Rhine crossing. Not a very satisfactory situation.

[@marcel-y8c]

@@davemac1197it surely looks as if the Americans looked after themselves pretty well. Splitting drops from for instance the 101 would have been far more lo given if that choice had to be made. They were to be relieved much sooner anyway

[@davemac1197]

@@marcel-y8c - just seen your first reply which was made at the same time as mine. The Waal is not too wide for bridging - they built a Bailey across the Waal between the old ferry ramps located between the highwy and rail bridges. They used Rhine barges instead of pontoons, which I believe makes it a Class 70 bridge instead of Class 40 (tons). There's a picture of the "barge bridge" in Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps in Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2021). I think it was built as an insurance against the many attempts the Germans made to bomb or demolish the Waal bridges. Kriegsmarine frogmen succeeded in drop a span of the rail bridge and the highway bridge sustained hits from aerial bombs that required two sections of Bailey bridging to be placed across the hole. The planned troops sent to the bridges at Arnhem is more complex. Dobie's 1st Battalion was not to go to the bridge at all but to high ground to the north and secure Company strongpoints and roadblocks at Warnsborn on the Amsterdam highway and on the Apeldoorn road north of the Saksen-Weimar barracks. Frost's 2nd Battalion was to take the Oosterbeek rail bridge with 'C' Company and the Company would then pass across to attack the pontoon and highway bridges from the south, while 'B' Company secures the pontoon bridge and 'A' Company the highway bridge from the north side. In the event the rail bridge is demolished, and 'C' Company's secondary objective was the Ortskommandantur in Willemsplein near the rail station. Fitch's 3rd Battalion was to support Frost by going directly to the highway bridge and secure the eastern sector of the town, with only 'C' Company getting through. I don't know how 3rd Battalion was intended to be deployed had it arrived complete, but it was not the intention to have nine rifle companies sitting on the one bridge, there was a brigade perimeter planned, and only 'A' Company of 2nd battalion reached the bridge at first, and Frost then pulled 'B' Company in from the dismantled and damaged pontoon bridge to reinforce him at the highway bridge. Contact with 'C' Company at the Ortskommandantur was lost, so 'C' Company of 3rd Battalion was a welcome arrival. I've only just learned that it was proposed a third brigade be landed at Elst, presumably to secure the town and the road and rail bridges over the Linge-Wettering canal as part of Browning's "airborne carpet" concept, but this drop was removed by Brereton because of insufficient transport aircraft.

[@davemac1197]

@@marcel-y8c - the drop zones between Valkenswaard-Eindhoven-Son were to effect quicker seizure of the bridges at Aalst, Eindhoven and Son on D-Day. Since the Aalst bridge was only 4 km beyond Valkenswaard, where the Guards actually stopped with an hour of daylight remaining on D-Day, you can see the advantage of an early linkup with the 101st Airborne would have created. If the Son bridge was still demolished, then bridging equipment could have reached the site on the first night instead of the second, and the tanks would be in Nijmegen 24 hours earlier on 18 September and potentially in Arnhem in 24 hours if the Nijmegen bridge were in American hands. General Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command objected to these drop zones because of the Flak around Eindhoven, and it was four 8.8cm Flak guns and two StuG III assault guns covering the bridge at Aalst that held up the Guards for most of D+1 (18 September) while they tried to find an alternative route. The Germans abandoned the position in the late afternoon when they heard that American paratroopers were in Eindhoven, which is a common German reaction when they know their supply lines are cut. This reaction might well have been prompted immediately if they had seen paratroopers dropped close to their rear on D-Day. The conflict in the planning was that Browning was prepared to accept 33% casualties going in, if it meant that the troops would be landed close to their objectives, and COMET had been planned on that basis and the proposed upgrade operation SIXTEEN carried over the same features as COMET, but adding the two US divisions at Nijmegen and to secure the corridor. Brereton and Williams on the other hand had been appointed to their positions in 1st Allied Airborne Army by Eisenhower and charged with addressing the problems with navigation and drop accuracy that had plagued the operations in Sicily and Normandy. Brereton and Williams' solution was to conduct all flights in broad daylight with no night flying, and to drop the troops as far from Flak as possible to minimise aircraft losses, but it was at the expense of the requirements of the airborne troops to seize their objectives quickly, and of the ground forces to make rapid progress.

[@dolgorwel]

Absolutely the reason for the failure of MG was Gavins obsession with the Reichswald and Brownings appalling leadership. Robert Neilland in Battle for the Rhine explains it well. Not sure that Carrington agreed with the post-war biographies that said the 82me troopers threatened him, more likely his account was more accurate that the 82nd soldiers were glad to see the tanks and glad to be alive.

[@davemac1197]

"Browning's appalling leadership"??? Explain, and give examples. If you have any.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

How about this…the MG plan was terribly flawed. Instead of blaming Gavin or anyone else why not blame Montgomery and the plan itself. I see a lot of hate on Gavin but very little on Urquart who abandoned his division HQ for almost two days.

[@davemac1197]

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d - "Instead of blaming Gavin or anyone else why not blame Montgomery" - which is blaming someone else, "and the plan itself" - which did not invent itself but was drawn up by people - namely Brereton and Williams, because Browning and Dempsey's outline approved by Montgomery and Eisenhower was changed by Brereton and Williams. Gavin is also reponsible for his own divisional plan, which rejected a British suggestion for a drop on the Nijmegen bridge (I presume from Browning) and assigned his worst commander to the critical Nijmegen mission, so Gavin has to own that. Which part do you not understand?

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Ok then with your logic we can then blame Urquhart for his division’s failure at Arnhem. Brits love to attacks Americans. The reality is this comes from pure envy. The US makes history where as the UK IS history. The British military of 2024 is irrelevant and surpassed-yes officially- by Italy! So enjoy the past while east Asia and 🇺🇸 eat your lunch.

[@adrianbay1496]

Great stuff . Love it . :)

[@kriskarpjee9657]

Nothing to do with market garden but part of the centre of Nijmegen was bombed mistake on the 22th of February by British bombers who thought it was a German town. After they couldn’t find their primary target. Around 800 civilians died. And it left a big hole in the city centre. So a lot of the city is relatively recent.

[@davemac1197]

Not British bombers. It was target of opportunity for USAAF bombers as the primary and secondary targets of Gotha and Eschwege in Germany as part of "Big Week" (Operation ARGUMENT) could not be found due to heavy cloud, so the Dutch cities of Nijmegen, Arnhem, and Enschede, were selected and attacked on the return flight. The squadron flying to Nijmegen consisted of twelve Liberators of the 446th Bombardment Group, which were joined by two detached Liberators of the 453rd Bombardment Group. The target was the railway station and sidings, as the rail hub was used for weapons transport, but most of the bombs fell short on the city centre with a great many civilian casualties. Officials long denied it was a deliberate target and claimed it was a mistake, but research has found that the Dutch cities were selected as alternative targets.

[@kriskarpjee9657]

@@davemac1197 you are right. My bad.

[@davemac1197]

@@kriskarpjee9657 - no problem. It was thought to be a mistake for a long time. I don't think British bombers were involved in any of these missions as it was a daylight operation.

[@seanbradley2134]

Also, I’ve no idea how he won it, but Carrington was an MC winner apparently

[@davemac1197]

His tank held the far end of the bridge on his own until more tanks (actually M10 tank destroyers of 21st Anti-Tank Regiment) arrived to consolidate the bridgehead. Robinson, who with Pacey, had gone half a mile up the road to the rail overpass at the far end of Lent before making contact with American paratroopers, received the higher award of a DCM.

[@MrLewy94]

Looks like the Tyne Bridge!

[@jandenijmegen5842]

Indeed: the Tyne bridge has a length of 389 meters, the Waalbrug has 604 meters. (wiki). The Waalbridge at the time of opening was the longest bridge of this type in Europe (1936).

[@johnstimitz2629]

I’ve always found the Market Garden operation fascinating. James’ and Al’s look at this battle has been very well done. Looking at this part of the battle has got me thinking about some points. At what point did Gavin know about the whereabouts( how close) the 9 and 10th SS were to Nijmegen? If he wasn’t aware of how close they were, 6-8 miles north at Arnhem, did that affect his decision. Had he known earlier, would Gavin had pushed harder with a larger force for the capture of the road bridge ? Would he have done so while having to hold the drop/ landing zones because the Intelligence guys told Gavin about German “forces/ armor” in the Reichswald, which might have been in the back of Gavin’s mind?

[@davemac1197]

I can help with that. Gavin did not know anything about the 9 and 10.SS-Panzer-Divisions because nobody below Montgomery and Dempsey were cleared for the 'Ultra' intelligence that the II.SS-Panzerkorps were ordered to the eastern Netherlands to refit. Lower formations were given 'sanitised' information stripped of unit identifications, so for example Major Arnold of the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery supporting 1st Parachute Brigade at Arnhem was told to expect heavy armoured counter-attacks from the first day, including Panthers and Tigers - this is a steer to expect a Type-1944 panzer division and even a heavy panzer battalion, which was a Panzerkorps asset. In his correspondence with A Bridge Too Far author Cornelius Ryan, Gavin says in a covering letter enclosing some papers by Dutch researcher TA Boeree, that he had only just realised (in 1966) that the reports of armour in the Reichswald was the Hohenstaufen in transit to Arnhem, as Boeree had researched the division's withdrawal from Belgium into the Netherlands, crossing the Maas at Maastricht on 4 September to assemble near Sittard, then they were ordered north to Arnhem on 7 September, apparently making a stop in the Reichswald before passing through Nijmegen and Arnhem on their way to billets around the Veluwe region between Arnhem-Apeldoorn-Zutphen. Gavin said that after the British/Polish operation COMET was cancelled and he was given a warning order by Brereton on 10 September that he was now assigned to Nijmegen, he went immediately to the 1st Airborne Division HQ to study their plans and intelligence for their own drop on the Nijmegen area for COMET and saw the reports that he could expect "a regiment of SS" in Nijmegen (the reduced condition of each SS division) and that they may be drawing new tanks from a tank storage area in the Reichswald belonging to a depot thought to be near Kleve. By 13/14 September there were now Dutch reports of SS troops movng into the Veluwe and Achterhoek regions on both banks of the River Ijssel, but only vehicle insignia for the 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen' had been positively identified by the Dutch. It was speculated the heavy armour in the Reichwald and SS troops in Nijmegen were the 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', which had not been positively located. The intelligence certainly affected the British planning for COMET, who were planning to land the Airlanding Brigade and Division HQ units (with the most anti-tanks guns) south of Nijmegen, and Gavin would have taken that on board when devising his own divisional plan for the 82nd, although it's surprising he took much fewer AT guns on his first lift - only eight - divided equally between the three regiments and a Division HQ reserve. He prioritised the Grave bridge with his best regiment (504th PIR), and the Groesbeek area facing the Reichswald with his other more aggressive and experienced unit (505th). This left the 508th and Colonel Lindquist (who had not performed well in Normandy on his first combat operation) with the critical Nijmegen mission and initially ordered defensive positions to be established on the Groesbeek ridge, and then 48 hours before the jump felt confident enough to order Colonel Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the highway bridge via the open flatlands to the east immediately on landing, hoping to snatch the bridge quickly. All the Dutch reports were accurate, but it wasn't appreciated the units were only in transit in the Nijmegen area (they mostly moved at night or in bad weather and laagered under cover during the day to avoid aerial reconnaissance). Sources (online at the Cornelius Ryan Collection of WWII Papers, Ohio State University): box 101 folder 09 page 48 - Gavin letter 18 November 1966 re Boeree papers box 101 folder 10 - Gavin meeting 20 January 1967 re Lindquist and objectives

[@sulevisydanmaa9981]

​@@davemac1197 CONGRATS, once again. You owe a book to this ...peel of a world. Go 4 it.

[@davemac1197]

@@sulevisydanmaa9981 - I have too much data for one book, there's no way I could edit it down to something a publisher would find acceptable. The aim has always been to get to the bottom of the rabbithole - been trying since 1977, but I'm not sure there is one!

[@sulevisydanmaa9981]

@@davemac1197 ALTERNATIVELY ...build up a databank-website + link it to the official municipality of Nijmegen ws, upon their co-operation. Funds & fame from there as much as from the posterity. Not a bad idea if multi-volume printed books 2 far out these last of the remaining dayzzzz. WW3 =(?) : "Next Stop Greenwich Village ..". U know 2 much to throw it all away upon leaving ...(PS. where is the belgian PALLUD, btw. He did an incr phone book 4 AFTER THE BATTLE on The Bulge, as u know. Still alive ? @ least his,book,is ....

[@LordLaDiDa]

The city center of Nijmegen was largely in ruins due to the air raid of February 22, 1944.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Good point. Thank you for watching

[@rayflegg8565]

Love it!

[@InterestedAmerican]

Famous last works from modern warfare, "The war will be over by Christmas."

[@TheCheshireWanderer]

Brill as always 🍻

[@RupertBear412]

hindsight is a wonderful thing but in this case, it truly is unbelievable the Americans so spectacularly failed - one wonders if they thought the ground on the east was mined, flooded or covered by german guns? the very same open ground so good to approach from would be equally god for a defender to see and take out attackers

[@nickdanger3802]

LZ Z 4 miles/6km from Arnhem rail bridge, bridge destroyed 4 hours after 1st AB landed

[@davemac1197]

The failure was a command failure. Gavin for selecting the 508th for the critical Nijmegen mission instead of the more aggressive and experienced 505th, and Colonel Lindquist was not a good field commander, having not performed well in Normandy on the 508th's first combat operation. Lindquist had drawn up his Field Order No.1 on 13 September to establish defensive positions along the Groesbeek ridge and was prepared to move on the bridge in Nijmegen "on division order". Gavin then instructed him during the final divisional briefing on 15 September to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing, and even showed him on a map the exact route he wanted the battalion to take to the bridge. Lindquist didn't seem to appreciate he was now receiving the "division order" his own instructions stated he was to receive, before sending in the battalion, and that was why he only sent the pre-planned patrol under Lt Robert Weaver of 'C' Company to check on the condition of the bridge, despite being met on the initial objective by a Dutch resistance leader, Geert van Hees, who told him the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men to guard the highway bridge. Lindquist just wasn't a good field officer. Gavin was quite open about this in his interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far (1974), but Ryan just didn't include this in his book or do any further digging into the story. The film omits the entire episode altogether, not surprising since it was made for the American market. Sources: September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)

[@davemac1197]

@@nickdanger3802 - and if you had wheels you would be a wagon, but that's not relevant to this video either.

[@sulevisydanmaa9981]

​@@davemac1197 LindEqvist !

[@davemac1197]

@@sulevisydanmaa9981 - he spelt it "Lindquist". He was American, and it's just how they do.

[@paramarky]

JH looks cross when AM deign's to speak?!

[@lauriepocock3066]

So, was a Bridge to Far an opportunity for all the 'technical consultants' in charge in the real operation to cover up all their mistakes? But seriously, would it have been better to have delayed a couple of days to do the staff work properly and make sure that everyone from the major rank and above knew what each of their objectives was? however, I have a theory that the operation was rushed because Roseavelt and Marshell and maybe Churchill feared that the Germans having launched the first V" rocket a week before were going to unleash if not a nuclear warhead then at least a dirty bomb. But you can understand the confusion, in an earlier episode you completely debunk the American argument that Carrington stopped to brew up but here you appear to take the American side.

[@davemac1197]

It was thought everybody did know their jobs, except Colonel Lindquist of the 508th PIR did not seem to understand his. Phil Nordyke's regimental history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) - is illuminating not just for Nijmegen but also for Lindquist's poor performance in Normandy on the 508th's first combat operation.

[@sean640307]

@@davemac1197 I have September Hope, but still don't have Put us Down in Hell, yet..... It's needed for me to finish off that part of my "myths debunked" piece that I am writing. Like you, I've been studying it for a long time and for the most part, we've been in total agreement! However, given what Gavin said to Captain Westover and the way the narrative changed later to pointing the finger at Browning, I'm wondering whether there wasn't an element of some arse covering. Even with regards to Lindquist, I sense that he's not totally at fault. Gavin said he gave verbal orders to take not more than two battalions to the bridge immediately on landing, Lindquist said it didn't happen. Westover's conclusion was that it didn't happen, but there IS some middle ground, here. Gavin's verbal orders were witnessed, to a point, and this is what Nordyke's history has said (going on what you've said to me in the past). Given that we know there was a very small recce party that did go to the bridge immediately, it's clear that Lindquist dispatched this. That they effectively "took the bridge" (according to Bergstrom) and had to give it back when they were not relieved, it's plausible that Lindquist's instructions were to send a small force to check things out, while he was to then securing their other objectives. His written orders suggested that it was Heights first, then bridge later. Being the type of officer who would be totally by the book, it's not impossible to think that by doing what he did, he was actually doing precisely what Gavin ordered, as he DID send a small force to the bridge.

[@davemac1197]

​@@sean640307 - Hi Sean, really appreciate the debate on the available historical record - this is what the comments section should be about! I think when you get hold of Nordyke's regimental history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) you'll get a better idea of what kind of personality Roy Lindquist was, and I would urge you to do the hard yards by starting the book from the beginning and not skip ahead to the MARKET GARDEN chapters (9 and 10 for the planning and first day), as we all do when getting a new book. Lindquist was an early officer volunteer for the Airborne, so he had some seniority by 1944 that gave Ridgway and Gavin some problems when it came to promotions, and I refer here to Gavin's comments to Cornelius Ryan in his 1967 interview for A Bridge Too Far (box 101, folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection online). Roy Lindquist was a gifted administrator, but not a good field commander - in the same way perhaps as Herbert Sobel was a gifted training officer and not a good field officer in command of Easy/506th, the 'Band of Brothers' that would be familiar to so many people from the TV mini-series. While Easy/506th had a Sergeant's revolt before D-Day, refusing to serve under Sobel in combat, and Colonel Sink's solution was to move Sobel out of the Company and assign him to command a parachute school as well as taking various disciplinary actions against the Sergeants, there was no such revolt against Lindquist in the 508th. Maybe Lindquist was holding too high a position to expose his lack of field command skills in exercises, the 508th had good company commanders and perhaps good battalion commanders as well (certainly Mendez of 3rd Battalion stands out as superb) that saw them through and there was no sign of the problems ahead. I'll leave you to discover the command problems in the Regiment that were exposed in Normandy, starting immediately after the drop with the Regiment Executive Officer, Ridgway's solution to shake things up in the 508th, and the unfortunate loss of his replacement. Chet Graham is a key witness to these events and was directly involved in the disastrous attack on Hill 95 (Saint Catherine) near La Haye on 4 July 1944 ordered by Lindquist. If I may skip to after the war, I believe (can't recall the source, it may be Poulussen or someone else...) Gavin wrote to the US Army to recommend that senior officers who made mistakes in the field should not be immediately dismissed as was the usual policy, but left in place so that they could learn from their mistakes. Many might think he was talking about himself, but I believe he was preaching what he practiced within 82nd Airborne, where Lindquist remained in place throughout the war and Gavin had no real problems with him during the battle of the bulge, which is in the later chapters of Nordyke (2012). This is all very fine, but it's too late for the men lost on Hill 95 and those lives lost by the extension of the European war due (arguably) to the failure at Nijmegen bridge. On the orders for Nijmegen, we have to distinguish the first cut undertaken on 13 September with Gavin's and Lindquist's respective Field Orders No.1, for the division and the 508th, from Gavin's verbal instruction in the final divisional briefing on 15 September, where he felt confident enough the plan was shaping up well and thought he could risk not more than one battalion (not two) to grab the bridge immediately after landing. The 13 September plan envisioned the 508th taking up defensive positions on the Groesbeek ridge with all three battalions (less D Company clearing the drop zone), and this is described in Lindquist's Field Order No.1, also stating to be prepared "on division order" to move on the bridge. Gavin then decided to give this division order on 15 September in the final briefing before the jump, not after landing and seeing the situation. This contrasts with Lindquist's normal behaviour, in the words of Lieutenant Colonel Mark Alexander, who was the replacement Regiment XO in Normandy and then badly wounded just before the attack on Hill 95: _"Lindquist stayed back in his CP and never did even come up before giving those orders, I found out afterwards. I know he didn't do reconnaissance. It's foolish, in fact. But he was more of a guy that commanded from back a-ways. He always laid back and relied on information from others, and you generally can't do it that way and be successful. Can't do it._ _"That operation always bothered me, because I know if I'd been there, a lot of these guys wouldn't have lost their lives."_ For Nijmegen, Lindquist had pre-planned the reconnaissance patrol based on Lt Bob Weaver's 3rd Platoon of C Company, selected because he had performed well in Normandy, and Lindquist and Lt Col Shields Warren (1st Battalion) went ahead and launched this patrol despite Gavin's instruction to send in the battalion immediately and Lindquist having just received a personal report from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men guarding the highway bridge. I think McManus hit the nail on the head in his (I think) excellent analysis in September Hope (2012) Chapter 3, where he says: _Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation ... and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion."_ Well, a reconnaissance patrol based on a reinforced platoon does not exceed a battalion, but based on his responses to Captain Westover's questionnaire, Lindquist seems to be saying he thought he had not yet received his 'division order' to send the battalion to the bridge and only got it after they were in position, when Gavin found out the battalion was not moving and he visited the 508th CP with Chet Graham (_"I never saw Gavin so mad"_) to _"let's get him moving."_ The source for PFC Joe Atkins' (1st Battalion S-2 Section Scout) testimony was Zig Borough's The 508th Connection (2013) of stories and letters from fellow 508th veterans (Boroughs was a member of the 508th's Demolition Platoon at Nijmegen), but Bergström quotes it in full.

[@marcel-y8c]

I think you are totally right about that but if he had a straight back he should have had to refuse. Airborne is all about surprise. Landing some 8 miles from the objective in a period of three days is a joke. It also meant athat the whole route had to be protected as well. Yess he should outright had to refuse with this ridiculous demands from Brereton.

[@johnlucas8479]

The landing zone at Arnhem was the same as the cancelled Operation Comet, which was decided by RAF, with no input by Brereton.

[@marcel-y8c]

@ that does not make it any better

[@johnlucas8479]

@@marcel-y8c You right but it's does make it any better, but explain you actually make the decision.

[@rumoursofwar4624]

For more on the British decision to stop ... kzbin.info/www/bejne/i2rEg4uZqcx2ipYsi=LZctI33p34mAxhlj

[@maikelvane5185]

I wonder what is the difference between Arnhem and Nijmegen... Both have buildings, both have roads. The Brits got to the bridge... but the yanks might have Germans hiding and ambushing from every building? What if Frost and his men hesitated to there objective?

[@jandenijmegen5842]

The brits got the north half of the Rhine bridge. Never had control of the north and southern part. Getting the northern part and holding it was a big achievement.

[@davemac1197]

The difference was the difference in experience and quality between Frost at Arnhem and Lindquist at Nijmegen. The geography is virtually identical, but reversed in mirror image. Both divisions had similar problems in having bridge objectives, with a major urban area and high ground between the bridge and the drop zone. The British solution was to assign one battalion to secure roadblocks on the high ground and two battalions to go by different routes to the bridge - only one battalion got through to their objective at the bridge. The American solution was to initially assign all three battalions to defensive positions on the high ground, then a late order two days before the jump to send one of the battalions directly to the bridge, and the instruction wasn't followed until the division commander found out too late.

[@Harmon1ca]

I think that was one of the issues with the landing plan. Half the force had to stay and try to hold the landing grounds for the second drop. Frost’s party managed to find a way through on the first day and were then cut off for the remainder of the battle. Al and James talked about in We Have Ways the podcast how they’re essentially planning to fail based upon past experiences in Sicily and Normandy. They should have gathered everyone possible and made for the bridge and damn the torpedoes.

[@marcel-y8c]

Frost certainly did not hesitate. However another battalion did spending the night at oosterbeek just a few miles west. They could have reached the bridge easily making the force twice in size. They could also have made a decisive difference.

[@Harmon1ca]

@@marcel-y8c yes, I think Frost took the southernmost of the 3 routes into town. If he’d communicated better they may have been able to get the next group through and avoid the German blocking lines. As always, it’s another “what if?” question

[@johnleney9541]

I think tanks laager at night

[@JaccovanSchaik]

2:28 "Kaizer Karolplein"? Oof. You could have taken a picture of a street sign you know. Or go on Google Maps maybe. It's not that hard to get right.

[@jandenijmegen5842]

Keizer Karelplein. The ground plan is still the same, but only 1 mayor building is still there : Concertgebouw De Vereeniging.

[@JohnDouglasist]

It’s not that hard to be nicer to people when pointing out an inaccuracy either

[@Peter70539]

I've got to ask, why are the Guards not technically part of the British Army?

[@davemac1197]

Not something I've heard of before, but it may be some obscure minor arcane historical technical anomalous hereditary quirk in the Army's "simple job name description allocation system basis" (Al Murray - Why The British Are Undefeated World War Champions, KZbin).

[@TheKogafan]

I read somewhere that the Guards had a separate recruitment process, effectively selecting the best recruits, min hight etc. There’s no doubt they encouraged loyalty to the regiment above all else. It might be a stretch to say the SS modelled themselves on the Guards, but the similarities in recruitment is obvious.

[@Andy-co6pn]

​@@user-mc4sq3fk5dchildish and ignorant

[@sean640307]

@@Andy-co6pn like most things that particular person has stated in his comments thus far!!

[@timcoffey5927]

The cyclists !

[@tamsinp7711]

What if the 82nd had captured the bridge on D-Day? It's quite likely that the Germans would have recaptured it on D+1 or D+2 and Guards Armoured would still have had to take it back again on D+3; if the Germans retook it on D+2, the fight might have been a little bit easier as there would be less Germans on the south side of the Waal, but if they retook it on D+1 the fight would almost certainly be just as hard.

[@davemac1197]

"It's quite likely that the Germans would have recaptured it on D+1 or D+2" - how? And with what? The force ratio between the attacker and defender usually has to be in excess of 3:1 to succeed, particularly if the defender is in a good defensive position. The Germans would have to reverse the ratio they had at Nijmegen to retake the bridge(s). On 5 October they tried with II.SS-Panzerkorps (10.SS-Panzer, 9.Panzer and 116.Panzer-Divisions under command) from the northeast, and XII.SS-Armeekorps with 363.Volksgrenadier-Division from the west at Opheusden-Dodewaard, and diversionary attacks across the Rijn at Opheusden, Renkum and Doorwerth by Division von Tettau... and got nowhere. In the first two days of MARKET the best they hope to do would be to build a blocking line at Elst and hope to stop the XXX Corps advance along the Linge-Wettering canal. It's interesting that in the proposed plan before it became MARKET the intention was to land a brigade of 1st Airborne at Elst as part of Browning's "airborne carpet" concept, but the shortage of transport aircraft reduced the division's first lift to two brigades, both of which were needed at Arnhem.

[@mogster71]

When you look at the WW2 history of targets being captured by airborne forces one thing stands out. If the airborne force gets to the target and has a short time to prepare defences then it’s very difficult to shift them. They might eventually be pushed off as with Primasole and Arnhem but it takes a concerted effort. With this in mind if the 82nd had captured the Nijmegen end of the road bridge on D0 it’s hard to see how they’d have been dislodged. If they’d reinforced and managed to occupy the far end quickly then it could have relieved pressure at Arnhem by giving the Germans a further headache. Everything could have been different.

[@afvasmr8035]

I truly think Holland loves the sound of his own voice he doesn’t shut up poor Al can’t get a word in edgeways

[@sulevisydanmaa9981]

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d READ AGAIN mine. Wasn t talkin bout/to these fellowzz. But to codename DAVEMAC. Eton ideals can still be located @ Sandhurst, but in theory only, not in practice, excl the SSS (=the satanic super soldiers ....).

[@NigelPerkins-m8w]

Tad harsh folks.

[@iandewey6505]

Dutch words said the Dutch way, waffen ss said the British way, the W Is a V!!!!

[@ianprice9563]

It’s worse when they have guests on the podcast. I really wait for one of them to wait for JH to draw breath and then start with “well, anyway….”. I don’t know if he just needs to prove that he knows something….

[@paramarky]

Wimpy Yanks FIUBAR'd it basically.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Childish and ignorant.

[@paramarky]

@@user-mc4sq3fk5d 3 thumbs up though knobhead

[@RealOlawo]

It is easy to sit on a quite road 80 years after with all information and be very clever! Would like to see your decisions when you are there under fire with limited information....

[@TheKogafan]

It’s generally accepted that the failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on day 1, was the primary cause behind the failure of the whole operation. Even the German analysis of the battle confirms this. If 2 companies had followed the assigned route round the outskirts to the bridge, they could have secured it. However the big question is whether they would be able to hold it, if attacked by determined enemy forces .

[@RealOlawo]

@@TheKogafan afterwards everybody is more clever. Be the one in charge in the situation and than show better performance.

[@FilipDePreter]

The both of you should write a guide " Walking Operation Market Garden".

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

It really is not that good. There a much better guide books out there.

[@jbjones1957]

All the Germans SS troops came from Arnhem

[@davemac1197]

Not exactly, as few of them were stationed in Arnhem (only SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 and the medical unit at Velp), and they did not get sent to Nijmegen: SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 - unloaded from flat cars at Beekbergen station, near Apeldoorn, sent south to Nijmegen via Arnhem bridge. II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 (Kampfgruppe Reinhold) HQ staff - from Klooster Kranenburg, near Vorden, via Arnhem bridge. II./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 19 (Kampfgruppe Euling) - from Rheden, east of Arnhem, tried to cross Arnhem bridge after taken by Frost and then diverted via Huissen ferry. 1./SS-Panzer-Pionier-Abteilung 10 (Kompanie Baumgärtel) - from Wilp, near Deventer, diverted via the Pannerden ferry after the Huissen ferry was scuttled by the Dutch ferryman.

[@claudiaxander]

Amidst all this eye-wateringly impossible valour; i want to briefly tell the story of one of my ancestors, who, on the eve of battle during the civil war, fighting on the side of the cavaliers, gathered up the men from his estate and set out bravely to battle. He thought his soldiers were in need of a little dutch courage so they stopped at the next village for a quick pint... Two days later, after drinking the pub dry and missing said hostilities entirely, they all returned home, very much alive and very very drunk! Another ancestor , a colonel, got so drunk that on his return to camp completely forgot the password and was swiftly run through by the guards! So the moral of the story is a 2 day bender is better than one, well that's how i see things anyway. Cheers chaps!