Bostock v. Clayton County Case Brief Summary | Law Case Explained

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Bostock v. Clayton County | No. 17-1618 (June 15, 2020)
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 changed American discrimination law forever. It prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. But does it protect homosexual and transgender individuals? The United States Supreme Court considered that question in Bostock versus Clayton County.
Gerald Bostock worked for ten years as a child-welfare advocate for Clayton County, Georgia. Shortly after Bostock started playing in a gay softball league, the county fired him for conduct unbecoming a county employee. Bostock sued in federal court for sex discrimination under Title Seven of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed his claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that Title Seven didn’t prohibit discharge for homosexuality.
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[@dyrtiredd4906]

Definitely a video I gotta watch again to fully grasp. Interesting for sure!

[@pablohierro5060]

great decision from the court

[@deepanshchaudhary5094]

Thank you

[@qiuyushi2752]

Both very compelling arguments from the majority and dissents. Though Gorsuch should’ve distinguished gender from sex. Because that could change outcomes for transgender people

[@rainb5987]

Blame PWC v. Hopkins.

[@winter4953]

Here you go, I found it on youtube !!!! STRIKE ONE''

[@MikeRosoftJH]

It's a good verdict, but it isn't clear how the reasoning would apply to bisexuals, or to gender-fluid people (those who don't exclusively identify as either male or female).

[@shakky1512]

@An A How does it not? They are clearly being discriminated on their sex. A woman wouldn't be fired for liking men. So if a man likes men they are clearly being discriminated because they are men. The same applies to trans people as they are being fired for dressing and acting different then their birth sex. Also being trans is a condition you are born with so it has always existed: m.kzbin.info/www/bejne/g5rXop2JjtmqqLM

[@HistoryNerd808]

@An A You're misinterpreting was Gorsuch wrote. He derived the definition of "sex" from the 1964 meaning of the word. What he's saying is that that doesn't matter. If you fire a woman for being into girls but not a man who is into girls than the only difference is the sex of the employee. Therefore it's sex discrimination.

[@HistoryNerd808]

I don't think that it does. The decision is rooted in biological sex. The same logic applies. For bisexuals, you're still firing one sex for being into another sex, even if they like the one straight members of their sex are into as well. For the gender-fluid, it's still a question of firing someone for presenting as the sex they weren't born as, even if which sex they portray as varies.

[@HistoryNerd808]

@An A Even if that is true, it has nothing to do with the decision. The point of the decision is that you can't separate sex from sexual orientation.

[@HistoryNerd808]

@An A For instance, Gorsuch uses a hypothetical of a work party where employees bring their spouses and an employer has a policy of not allowing homosexuals to work. You have 2 employers who are model workers and they both bring their wives. The only difference there is their biological sex, that one is female and one is male. In other words, you're not firing the women because she likes women but because she's a woman who likes women.

[@edwardgrabczewski]

The example at [3:19] shows there was confusion between sex and gender identity. They are treated as the same whereas they are different concepts. If a person of male sex and male gender identity self-identifies as female (whilst remaining of male sex) then discrimination on the grounds of sex has not occurred but instead discrimination has occurred on the grounds of gender identity. Since gender identity and sex are not equivalent then any laws pertaining to sex have not been breached. The equating of sex and gender identity has caused confusion in many areas of life and the Bostock v. Clayton case is a prime example, since the logic only works if you assume that sex and gender identity are identical. This identity is a hard sell to most people, who know from their biology classes that you can't change your sex without changing every cell in your body; however we are told that you can change your gender identity by self-declaration. Since these two concepts are entirely different in nature then there should be no confusing them.

[@MikeRosoftJH]

No, it doesn't. The court has ruled that discrimination by sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily constitutes discrimination by sex (understood to mean the biological gender, the identity of male or female as identified at birth). I'll give a more understandable example using sexual orientation: if the employer fires a man for being gay, i.e. for being attracted to men, but wouldn't fire a woman for being attracted to men, then this constitutes discrimination by sex; there's a particular trait - being attracted to men - which the employer accepts in women but not in men, and so the employee is being disadvantaged by his sex. For gender identity the court used the same argument: if the employee is being fired or otherwise discriminated against for their gender identity, then this constitutes discrimination by sex; there's a trait - e.g. identifying and presenting as male - which the employer accepts in people assigned male at birth, but not in people assigned female at birth (or vice versa).

[@rainb5987]

Nope. You should blame PWC v. Hopkins (1989) where it held that sex discrimination includes sex stereotyping. How come you stereotype people can only be heterosexual and cisgender?

[@dpg227]

Great explanation of the case and its arguments. I believe the court majority was mistaken when it said that "but for" the fact that Bostock was a man, his employer would not have discriminated against him. There is no evidence that if she were a woman, participating in a gay women's softball league, she would not also have been fired. In either case, Bostock would have been targeted on the basis of sexual orientation, not sex. An individual's sex and sexual orientation are not the same thing; but this decision stands logic on its head by merging them together. This is not how the legislators who passed the law in 1964 intended the word "sex" to be interpreted, and no courts since have interpreted it that way, until this decision. It is a very dangerous thing to have a high court reinterpreting old statutes to fit its vision of how society ought to be. What needed to happen here was for Congress to pass a law making sexual orientation a protected class under Title VII. But i guess Congress didn't have the votes to do that, so the court felt it had to take a short cut and substitute its will for that of the people's elected representatives.

[@MikeRosoftJH]

Well, he wasn't fired for playing in a softball league. He was fired because the employer found out that he was gay; in other words, because he was attracted to men. And this is the "but for" cause; if the employee were a woman, she wouldn't have been fired for being attracted to men.

[@Dr_JSH]

An employer who fires a man because he is dating a man -- but would never fire a woman because she is dating a man -- violates Title VII because of sex. The sole difference between the two employees is sex. It doesn't matter if people would say, "I was fired because of my sexual orientation," instead of "because of sex," just as it wouldn't matter if someone said, "I was fired for getting pregnant," instead of "because of sex." Both are due, at least in part, which is Title VII's standard, because of the person's sex (and, for the dating scenario, the sex of the person they associate with; see Bob Jones University v. United States). That an employer would also fire a female employee for playing on a lesbian softball team doesn't cancel out the discrimination against Bostock. It means the employer has twice discriminated. Your remarks about the intent of members of Congress in 1964 and the meaningfulness of Congress never including sexual orientation in Title VII are just conservatives' sour grapes they didn't get their way. Besides this case, when have conservatives ever resorted to cries of "congressional intent!" and "subsequent legislation!" to hang their hat on? Again, Bostock did NOT redefine "sex" to include sexual orientation. Sexual orientation has been "because of sex" all this time. You're also wrong about courts never before finding Title VII protects LGBT people against employment discrimination.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

​@@MikeRosoftJH Stop it with the "butt for" nonsense, you have no idea what you're talking about. The employers were treating men and women equally. If either does it with the same sex, they get fired. There is no different treatment.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

@@junying9068 Nonsense. Until very recently, NOBODY equated "sex" with "sexual orientation" or "gender identity". There is no foul according to SEX.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

​@@Dr_JSH Right! And if two employees are stealing from you, and one of them is FAT, you therefore have fired the FAT one because of FATNESS. The cannibal left utterly SUCK at logic.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

Take a look at Samuel Alito's dissent. Search for "model employee". Hilarious. The opinion of the court uses a "model employee" that would be fired. But in fact, what makes a model employee is its compatibility with, and worth to, the employer. Model employees are labeled as such by employers. That makes their example self-defeating. What a horrible decision...

[@MikeRosoftJH]

Yeah, and consider two hypothetical "model" employees, except for that one of them is black. Would you say that the employee in question isn't a model employee, just because the employer wants to fire him for being black? That's something that the law expressly prohibits. (It's your argument that's circular.) The key part of the decision is a 'but for' test. If an employer fires a man who is attracted to men, but wouldn't fire a woman who is attracted to men, the employee is being discriminated by gender. (The two employees differ from each other precisely by gender.) What we have here is a trait - being attracted to men - that the employer would accept for women, but not for men. And it's no excuse that the employer would also discriminate against women by accepting if a man, but not a woman, is attracted to women - to the contrary, that would constitute another act of prohibited discrimination by gender. The Obergefell v. Hodges decision (legalizing same-sex marriage) has referred to the earlier verdict Loving v. Virginia, which legalized interracial marriage. So let's put a hypothetical example: suppose an employer would fire a black employee for marrying a white spouse, on the grounds that races ought to be separate. That would obviously constitute discrimination by race. (And it's no excuse if he would also fire a white employee for marrying a black.) So likewise, it's discrimination by gender if an employer would fire a man for being attracted to, or marrying, a man.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

@@MikeRosoftJH Considering the fact I have read both dissents several times each... The poster's first argument fails because that's an improper comparison. The proper comparison is "between a man attracted to men and a woman attracted to WOMEN". The poster's second argument is based on the fact, right or wrong, we consider racial prejudice so evil that it transcends ordinary logic. There is another reason, but it would go over the poster's head.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

@@MikeRosoftJH What country are you from? "Would you say that the employee in question isn't a model employee, just because the employer wants to fire him for being black?" That's weird! Employers do not fire model employees! Apparently the poster missed the obvious logic STATED in my post... An employee's compatibility with, and worth to, the employer is what makes it a model employee. The office party hypothetical is sloppy, just like the rest of the majority opinion.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

@@TC-zf1ji Oyez

[@rainb5987]

@@JonathanSterlingUSA The Supreme Court already held in PWC v. Hopkins that sex discrimination also includes sex stereotyping. Accordingly, these is no hard rule or stereotype that a person is attracted to opposite sex or identify consistently on sex assigned at birth.

[@daddymcsnacks_561]

Gorsuch is reaching and using new dictionaries to define sex in a manner different than male or female. Alto's dissent is worth reading and understanding what this is really about...

[@MikeRosoftJH]

No, he isn't; he is using the most conservative definition of sex (gender), as the biological gender as determined at birth, and concluded that under this definition discrimination by sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily constitutes discrimination by gender. (The verdict specifically said that for the sake of argument, it is using the conservative definition of gender; it didn't need to consider the question whether or not the definition needs to be updated.)

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

​@@MikeRosoftJH And if you fire somebody for stealing, and that person happens to be FAT, therefore you have fired them because they are FAT. The cannibal left utterly SUCK at logic. The question is whether you are treating men and women DIFFERENTLY. They weren't. Another problem here is that the cannibal left is misinterpreting "sex" as "anything to do with sex" as in "sexual activity". Their heads are screwed up.

[@MikeRosoftJH]

@@JonathanSterlingUSA That's complete nonsense. (That is, unless the employee could prove that non-fat people would be treated differently when caught stealing. And body weight is not a class protected by the Civil Rights Act - unlike nationality, race, religion, or gender - but that's beside the point.) And no, the verdict didn't interpret "sex" to mean "sexual activity". Obviously, "sex" in the law in question means "gender". The court took the most conservative definition of gender - the identity of male or female, as determined at birth - and decided that under that definition, discrimination by sexual orientation or gender identity constitutes discrimination by gender. And Neil Gorsuch doesn't seem to be much of a left-winger; he was nominated by Trump himself. Nonsensical slurs like "cannibal left" notwithstanding.

[@daddymcsnacks_561]

@@MikeRosoftJH He literally quotes a newer dictionary definition in the oral arguments. The fault in your argument remains. Whether it be a man to man or woman to woman they both can't under the law. Nothing discriminatory about it. Both sex's couldn't marry the same sex. I'd further argue that marriage isn't a "right" or privilege. Nothing special about me going out and spending $28 dollars for a piece of paper from the State...

[@MikeRosoftJH]

@@daddymcsnacks_561 Marriage certainly is a constitutionally protected right. Many court decisions have said so; including Loving v. Virginia. (If you object to the Obergefell court ruling that same-sex couples have the right to marry, would you also object to the Loving court ruling the same for interracial couples? After all, both blacks and whites had the same right to marry a person of the same race.) Going back to the Bostock court, Neil Gorsuch may have quoted anything during an oral argument, but in the verdict he said that he is using the conservative definition of gender, and the question whether or not the definition should be updated isn't relevant for the decision. Already under the conservative definition, discrimination by sexual orientation or gender identity constitutes discrimination by gender, which is against the law. (For the third time: have you read the verdict?)

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

The majority is playing semantics. Title VII says "deprive...discriminate against...because of such individual’s sex". The majority is saying anything that takes sex into account is illegal. It's pretending that "discriminate" means differentiate, but in fact the statute obviously means to treat one worse than the other. That's always been the idea, it still is. They can't change language like that, at least not for long. And of course Congress is doing nothing about it. The Supreme Court and Congress's inability or unwillingness to do something about it is the worst problem we have. Hopefully it will swing far enough in the other direction so that they can amend the statute to tell the Supreme Dictators what Title VII OBVIOUSLY means.

[@MikeRosoftJH]

The court has specifically answered the question what it means to "discriminate", or, more concretely, "discriminate against". "... the question becomes: What did “discriminate” mean in 1964? As it turns out, it meant then roughly what it means today:“To make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as compared with others).” Webster’s New International Dictionary 745 (2d ed. 1954). To “discriminate against” a person, then, would seem to mean treating that individual worse than others who are similarly situated." (It then went to demonstrate that what is meant in the law is the treatment of the individual, not of groups as a whole.) You are breaking into an open door.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

@@MikeRosoftJH WHAT COUNTRY ARE YOU FROM? Determining disparate treatment requires more than one person, silly. It's treating people DIFFERENTLY. The first two synonyms of "disparate" are "different, dissimilar". Nobody's talking about groups, were talking about treating men and women differently as in ONE WORSE THAN THE OTHER. That's what the law prohibits. The law doesn't prohibit knowing the sex of your employee.

[@MikeRosoftJH]

@@JonathanSterlingUSA Technically, it doesn't. Suppose that the employer starts a company, the first applicant comes, and the employer rejects him for being a Jew. Then the would-be employee is being discriminated against by religion and/or nationality. What the law prohibits is to unfairly disadvantage an employee by their race, nationality, religion, or gender (especially by firing or refusing to hire them on those grounds). As I have repeatedly said, and as the court has said, the law is concerned with the treatment of the individual employee (as opposed to a real or hypothetical case of an employee whose gender etc. would be different), not with that the groups as a whole are treated the same.

[@JonathanSterlingUSA]

@@MikeRosoftJH WHAT COUNTRY ARE YOU FROM??? "not with that the groups as a whole are treated the same" Loaded up on hard drugs, I see!

[@MikeRosoftJH]

@@JonathanSterlingUSA That's your argument? That I have used awkward phrasing (not being a native English speaker)? So once again (and read the verdict if you want to see the detailed reasoning): The law is not concerned about races (or other groups) being treated overall the same. It requires that the *individual employee* is not being unfairly disadvantaged by his race, or nationality, or religion, or gender. (The verdict gives one of a few examples: an employer who would - on the grounds of gender stereotypes - only hire a woman as a secretary, and only hire a man as a mechanic, is guilty of discrimination by gender.) Got it?

[@danielnewman9772]

shows why Godly kings remove the sodomites from the land