Chinese Amphibious Capability: How good is it?

Assessment of the PLA's Navy and Ground Force amphibious capability.
Intro
Type 075
Type 071
Type 072
Type 073
Type 074
Type 271
Type 728
Type 726
Type 724
New LCU
Z-8
Z-20
VTUAV
Z-10
Marine Brigades
Ground Force Amphibious Brigades
Disposition of amphibious vessels
Penghu Islands
Pratas Islands
South China Sea
Summary
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[@AmirShafeek]

Love the non bias information. Not too often you can find a fellow Westerner. Who's willing to give the chinese a fair shake down.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thanks. You can't be a good analyst if you let personal bias get in the way.

[@Vanyali]

what you call non bias I call ass kissing, Chinese as well as googles, cause if you say they are bad you get demonetized speaking of ass kissing, Google is the best at that... get paid a lot for that to !

[@adamtedder1012]

It's always a bad idea to laugh off the other side. It's how you get very nasty surprises. It's better to overestimate the enemies capabilities. The Pentagon luckily follows that model. When they wargame they purposely assume the Chinese military is not only as well equipped and capable as claimed but also have unstated capabilities. That is the proper way to counter the enemy. The same was done with the soviets. The threat was always assumed to be 150% of what it was.

[@pseudonymsam]

Excellent analysis of the PLAN sealift capability. This video also helped illuminate to me the tactical niche of the LPD-I had originally thought of them as just cheaper and less capable LHDs that skimped on aviation facilities, but the Type 071 LPD carries twice as many LCACs as the Type 075 LHD, granting it a special role in landing a larger volume of heavy equipment. Thanks for helping me learn something! For a future video, I would be interested to see the extent of China's "surge" sealift capabilities, with civilian ro-ro ferries and the like included.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thank you. Re future video, I almost added the civilian component in this briefing. I plan to cover that in the future.

[@nostradamus2642]

Excellent video about the PLA amphibious force. Very comprehensive with useful explanations about capability.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thank you. Much appreciated.

[@Vanyali]

supposed capability's, in reality, their fuel tanks are filled with water !

[@peterhsieh380]

​@@VanyaliAGREED. ALL FUELS USED ARE FILLED WITH WATER. SO NO BODY BE WORRIED OF CHINA'S CAPABILITIES. THE INDIAN ALWAYS REMINDED THE WORLD THAT "ONE INDIAN SOLDIER IS EQUAL TO FOUR PLA CHINESE SOLDIERS".

[@kenfowler1980]

Another excellent analysis mate!

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Cheers. Appreciated.

[@ALWH1314]

Very detailed and complete coverage, appreciate just factual and no geopolitical commentary.

[@greglee4016]

Thank you for the eye opening analysis on strength and capability for amphibious operations. Very concerning for Taiwan.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Much appreciated.

[@chrisspulis1599]

More videos please. Great work and well done.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thank you. Yes, more to come.

[@echen71]

Keep up the great work! Excellent, objective, non-biased content. Suggestion: conventional wisdom in the west is that China will invade TW sooner or later. Less often discussed is the more probable scenario of blockade. Please talk about PLAN capabilities for establishing one and whether US, Japanese, and Korean forces would be capable of breaking such a blockade.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thank you, much appreciated. Agree a quarantine/blockade is more likely, at least in the beginning. I will be covering this topic.

[@echen71]

@@Strategy_Analysis i look forward to it!

[@volticz1]

Love your work mate

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Much appreciated.

[@keli4068]

071 export price is 180M USD, San Antonio costs 2B USD. tax payer should really buy ship from PLAN

[@Vanyali]

lol, remember you are still dealing with a communist regime that is as corrupt as Russia, if not more so, you get what you pay for 2B is well worth it if you know your sailors will actually be able to fight and come back home, 180M is a price for crappy quality and underpaid workforce ultimately, not much is known except for wat China releases and they never release something bad, compared to the West where a lot of specs are published out of transparency, so they see us top speed 30 knots, I guarantee you they'll claim to have a ship better in every known way, while in reality they are just glad it floats for the camera...

[@Jon.A.Scholt]

You're assuming that a one party State that operates very much the opposite of a "free and open society" is actually telling the truth about the cost of procurement when it has zero incentive and no accountability to do so.

[@keli4068]

yeah yeah yeah, your logic is 2B in the name of "free and open society" . Is cheaper than 180M price paied by Thailand Navy to Chinese shipyard. Chinese government subsidised another 1.8B If your logic is right American people is dumbX2 not taking advantage of this [e-mail]4362

[@Jon.A.Scholt]

@@keli4068 So you're willing to just take that $180 number wholesale, without any skepticism? Also, you don't think China has a huge incentive to give a sweetheart deal to Thailand? There is a certain, incredibly trafficked strait just south of Thailand that is absolutely vital to the national security of China. I think keeping on good terms with Thailand is worth eating the majority of the cost of a few ships. Also, there is another massive flaw in your assertion that Chinese ships are that cheap. If they are that cheap and effective why isn't every country on the planet rushing to buy them? Could it be, they actually aren't that cheap and Thailand got a sweetheart deal? I won't go on a tirade calling you an idiot or gullible or almost endearingly naive and simple, but I will say that you may want to look at things a little more critically instead of swallowing the party line wholesale.

[@SpruceWood-NEG]

Our military industry is just a state-owned enterprise that only needs to pay basic costs. How can military equipment make a profit? Then provide employees with sufficient salary and bonuses. Provide employees with free and high-quality housing, and build specialized hospitals, kindergartens, primary, secondary, and high schools for them. Give plenty of gifts every holiday. By the way, their salary is definitely lower than yours, but it is already quite high compared to other Chinese people. The average monthly salary for technical workers is 20000 RMB, about 3000 US dollars per month, which is very high according to the prices in China. You should know that with a monthly expenditure of 5000 RMB, you can live the same quality of life as the middle class in the United States. Moreover, their housing, medical care, and children's education are almost all free.@@Jon.A.Scholt

[@kyk1682]

Thanks for your work

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thank you. Greatly appreciated.

[@night8285]

Why not also include how many ship(of a certain type) they have in service, not just the displacement?

[@theredbar-cross8515]

In addition to the strictly military vessels, there's also the hundreds if not thousands of commercial small ships that can dock or beach to provide logistical support. Taiwan is just so close.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Yes, many indeed.

[@tonysu8860]

Not really. Tiny ships are less seaworthy and travel even more slowly than purpose built military craft. There is a program to convert ferries to something approximating LST, but is probably more experimental than practical. Commercial RO/RO cargo vessels still need to dock at a port, and can deliver amphibious forces to a beach. The point is that even if LHD and LST are the primary surface vessels used to transport an amphibious landing force, it would take at least 1 1/2 hours to traverse the Taiwan Strait, then around the island to a suitable beach. If Taiwan's defense lets an invading force travel that long towards the island, Taiwan would almost deserve its fate.

[@amunra5330]

Very good video! Besides expanding their amphibious capabilities the PLAN have really beefed up their Navel capabilities on a whole. It shows that the Chinese government are adept students of history. They realize the primary reason for the “century of humiliation” was that the Qing Dynasty navy was very weak which lead to foreign forces to occupy parts of China. The Chinese leadership is proactively building the country’s navel forces to prevent this humiliating circumstance from happening again.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

There was certainly a difference in approach from the Ming Chao to the Qing Chao.

[@WangGanChang]

More attention should be paid on the Type 271. While it belongs to the ground force rather than the navy, thus often ignore. But at 200+ vessels currently in service and numbers onces peaked at 500+, it was and in some ways still is the backbone of the PLA Amphibious transport force. While I do expect Type 74/74A to be quickly constructed before a real conflict (and I see large construction order of Type 74A as a sign of such. However, it can be constructed very quickly since there at more than 5000 shipyards in China capable of making them), Type 271 does keep PLAGF trained amphibious assults which would transfer quickly to the new platform. Also keep in that new IFVs and wheel vehicles (other than Type 04A, which has such capablity removed from vanilla Type 04s in favor of heavier armor) in China all have some amphibious in open seas, thus even more forces can make such an assult as part of second or third wave.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

As you suggest, the Ground Force (or Army) Type 271 is important. That is is why I mention it in the briefing.

[@sinocare]

Very impressive factual based information and analysis. It would be interesting to see some reasonable forecast of PLAN's war production capabilities. Currently China produces roughly 50% of the annual ship tonnages, and it is likely to increase in the coming years.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thank you. Yes, China has impressive ship production capabilities, both military and civilian. It certainly could produce more warships per year. Of course, you need to train the crews which takes time.

[@user-fe5un8ku3j]

Hey there, great video. Do you think they’ll use the type 15 for the mostly urban environment of Taiwan instead of the heavy type99a ? How do you think the ground war is going to play out? I personally don’t see any third party able to put their ground asset onto Taiwan because of the Chinese area denial tactic, do you think Taiwan’s ground force can held their own against what China manage to put on Taiwan? Thanks!

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thank you. I'll cover the bulk of your question in a separate briefing, but in short yes I see the Type 15 (ZTQ-15) playing more of a role, at least initially, in that scenario than the ZTZ-96/99s.

[@user-fe5un8ku3j]

@@Strategy_Analysis thank you, cheers!

[@xsu-is7vq]

I don’t think PLA will deploy tanks into urban combat. If you paid attention to all of the unmanned equipments that PLA has been seen testing with, you will know it’s going to be mostly unmanned vehicles, robots, and drones taking the load during assault, with infantry following behind for mop up and holding territory. Heavy vehicles would be in fire support roles only. I believe PLA is still working out the doctrines for using those unmanned equipments in combat, and figuring out which is the best. Once they do, and build up the stockpiles, the war would start.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

@@xsu-is7vq Certainly the PLA will make extensive use of unmanned equipment on the land, air, and at sea both surface and sub-surface. They will also continue to use manned armoured vehicles.

[@user-fe5un8ku3j]

@@xsu-is7vq I don’t think they’re that reliable yet. Otherwise most units will simply switch to unmanned vehicles.

[@mdmotaled3318]

Thanks

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Appreciated.

[@warspite1807]

How is "amphhibious" defined? The lift ships are not 'amphibious'. The landing craft and helicopters are also not 'amphibious'. The definition only extends to combat vehicles that can fight in water and on land. Every other type of vehicles are defined in engineering as "functional interface" Dependence on funcional interfaces means the swimming vehicles' mounted force must disembark within a practical distance of entry beach. Since such vehicles have a water speed of 30km/h (ZBD-05 hull based) and the Over the Horizon distance is ~24km, the force would spend at least 45 minutes in water before lodgement. There are about 750 each of ZBD-05 AIFVs and ZTD-05 ALTs, and various combat support variants equipping six marine brigades, i.e. two division equivalents. This means each brigade has ~125 vehicles of all versions that are independent of a ship-to-shore connector (landing craft). Each of the planned T075 LHDs can lift 60 vehicles and 800 troops, a battalion. Assuming equal distribution, six brigades would be allocated two LHDs and one T071 each, with similar lift capacities, to enable lift of the helicopter battalions Once lodgement is secured, smaller landing craft may be used to deploy company-sized conventional units to reinforce the marines. The problem with these forces is vulnerabilities to shore-based missile/RPV targeting since the lift vessels must slow to 5kn when disembarking their vehicles, which at one vehicle per minute would require over an hour of being a virtually immobile target. Moreover, the vehicles in water would be targetable by light antiarmour missiles at ~6km range from shore which the vehicles are virtually incapable of evading. Fuel expenditure in the water would severely limit land operating range, requiring establishing of shore refuelling point, likely at lodgement point, a further vulnerability. This is a significant capability, but not one that cannot be defeated fairly easily by a prepared opponent such as Taiwan where all lodgement points are known, and approaches constantly under surveillance, eliminating the obligatory element of surprise required to achieve lodgements.

[@tonysu8860]

It's my general understanding (maybe not true?) that the LHD are the only transport that can realistically deliver both troops and their equipment to attempt an amphibious landing. All other vessels including the next largest classification LST deliver mostly just troops, at least at the published max capacity. In this video, the LCAC is the only transport that is intended to deliver mostly equipment and not troops, but I suspect although Taiwan is theoretically within range of the Fujian shoreline, the distance to a seaport on the mainland coast is would stretch the capabilities of LCAC, especially crossing open ocean. I'd also heard (again not solidly verified) that Chinese do not make very good helicopters domestically and likely would have to rely on Russian helicopters for something as demanding as an assault on Taiwan. IMO bottom line is that even in this year 2024 that China doesn't have the transport capability to minimally transport 3000 fully equipped troops across 100 miles (minimum) or 150 miles(likely to a suitable landing beach on the eastern Taiwan shore) much less transport in such a way as to avoid major losses during transport. I doubt China has the ability to "prepare the battlefield" by eliminating Taiwan's defenses beforehand so my guess is that the PLA would likely try to surprise but that is enormously risky. If Taiwan takes its defense seriously, I don't see the PLA invading Taiwan successfully today, in 2027 or any time thereafter.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Actually the LPDs and LSTs are better for landing heavier equipment. The advantage of the LHDs is their ability to air deliver an assault force. These helicopters can be very vulnerable to enemy fire, more so than LCACs.

[@nikolatasev4948]

Great video! While the amphibious fleet USA has a lot more ships and greater capability, China seems to have better amphibious vehicles. The ZBD-05 swims faster and is better armed than the AAVs of the US Marines. On the other hand, the PLA has not been involved in any armed conflict while the Marines have been busy. After such long period of inactivity and with zero real-world experience the PLA would likely not do well against a peer or near-peer opponent. Somewhat related - in the latest public wargame of the Taiwan invasion the organizers concluded attacking the Penghu islands would be a losing move - it takes too much time and resources away from the main invasion. But you stated quite correctly, Penghu in Taiwanese hands would make the landing (almost?) impossible. On the other hand, if secured by the PLAN it can make reinforcing and resupplying any Taiwan landing much faster. If it comes to that, I think China would try and take the small island groups first, Kinmen, Matsu and maybe a bit later - Penghu. It would give them practical experience and overwhelming odds. And after a string of defeats, the morale drop in Taiwan would be significant. Then the CCP could try and deescalate for a while, to give them time to replace the losses, analyze the battles, adjust the tactics and maybe even tweak their hardware. But this would risk a repeat of the Ukraine scenario, while USA did not intervene directly after the Crimea annexation, they stepped up their support for Ukraine in training and hardware. If the Taiwanese use it as an opportunity to turn their main island into a fortress, I don't think China can take it with anything short of nuclear weapons. Can you expand a bit more on that? The options for each side, why they would want to choose or avoid them. There is very little information available for a non-specialist.

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Thanks for the very detailed response. You make an important point about the water speed of the ZBD vehicles. As for a briefing on a Taiwan scenario, it's on the list.

[@MrVice123456]

Do the Chinese ever design something on their own or do they just replicate everyone else’s?

[@craigkdillon]

Impressive. BUT ----- how can the PLAN or PLAAF prevent the sinking of those ships and assets by the 2000+ anti-ship missiles that Taiwan has??? Also, what weapons are most likely to be used to sink LCAC's and other units while they are coming to shore??

[@Strategy_Analysis]

Kinetic and non-kinetic preparation of the battlespace. However, no matter how effective the PLA might be with that, there will still be loses. How many depends on many factors. As for weapons to be used against LCACs etc, apart from drones, traditional anti-armour weapons including ATGMs and rocket launchers. Also the myriad of automatic grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, and vehicle-mounted auto-cannons.

[@craigkdillon]

@@Strategy_Analysis Those are the weapons I anticipated. They should be effective. I doubt enough will land to organize an assault. Amphibious assaults are very difficult. China's lack of experience, plus all the other things they do wrong mean their chance of success is very low.

[@user-ye4ij2fb3x]

@@craigkdillon两栖作战是最后阶段，想象下战争开始时解放军会怎么做？

[@craigkdillon]

@@user-ye4ij2fb3x I don't read chicken tracks.

[@williamtang479]

there is no type 75 in eastern theatre fleet, but there are two type 75 each in northern and southern theatre fleet