Metabolism PT1: Te Mechanics vs Fe Teleology

[@RohanPosthumus]

Great work! Really enjoy these kind of videos👏🏻 Can't wait for the next two videos (Pe, Pi). What would be interesting to me is to find out what the psychological difference is between say a JePi ||-- and a PiJe ||-- as you make a distinction between type and development.

[@stormy3898]

I really liked this video.

[@littlemothasmr]

It is there a video of Te?

[@DenisaNastase]

All 8 functions being Cortical - Brilliant !

[@PeterIntrovert]

RE-POST (previous post disapear, seems like manipulation from Auburn) [ from the description] "Cognitive Typology ("CT") is a Jungian model, built from the ground up through physical observations," 1. Idea of functions was ispired by observations. It's nothing new or distinct. 2. Physical observation needs framework/interpretation therefore physical observations CT made aren't a start in modeling own jungian concepts. 3. What's new is a move to narrow observations to an area of unconscious or undeliberate behavioral micro expressions to subject them to statistical quantitative analysis and correlate them to qualitive (in this case quite shallow) investigation. Please notice that this move already disconnect us from things that are meaningful in JCF theory - their (functions) qualitive nature. [from the description] "and aims to provide scientific evidence for the reality of types. It is distinct from MBTI, Socionics or other models." 4. CT is distinct from MBTI becouse MBTI is based entirely on jungian theory following Jung's initial assumptions (at least in core elements, attitude and purposes). 5. CT as well as Socionics and some other systems contradicts fundamentally Jung's assumptions and go against it. These systems are essentially the same project tried to realize by different (yet similar) means, taking different shapes. Both make unjustified connection between meanings of jungian functions and cybernetics ( poorly made ) models 6. I would say all of these systems (from point 5.) use 'circular reasoning' to justify their presence and claim superiority. But they don't provide any substancial reasons to take their claims seriously. 7. For example they picked up on cybernetic ideas in very general terms, but this has nothing to do with the cybernetic models that currently dominate the cognitive sciences. On the contrary, they still use models that are inadequate to describe human cognition (they use first-order cybernetics modeling instead of second-order). From a layman's perspective they may seems advanced, but they will not be taken seriously by an expert who will see them as archaic and deficient as models that can describe human cognition in general and even less in specific dimentions. 8. The deep research is unnecessery to understand that Jung would see attempts to create systems like this as patological and driven by misconception about ontological status of the functions that he asigned to them. The made that explicit in his interviews: kzbin.info/www/bejne/gHOcqoWGqK2gn6M&feature=shares 9. To summarize these points I can say that: They tried to borrow authority of Jung's name and cybernetics (or cog-sci) forms - and use elements from work of both to create artificial reprocital relation between them - meanwhile contradicting Jung's intentions and don't meet scientific (cybernetic) standards. Even as hypothesis. But they tried to compensate that by circular reasoning (and other cosmetical/rhetoric means) between observations ("evidences") and sub-models.

[@koalakultofficial]

The video was simply reuploaded there was no manipulation

[@PeterIntrovert]

​@@koalakultofficial ok.

[@nicoleonlysometimes824]

literally everything you say makes sense and I’m your biggest fan

[@PeterIntrovert]

It make sense until you learn something about cognitive science. He manipulate concepts as he see fitting with no respect to the logic and frames in which those concepts arise. It's pseudoscience.

[@somethingelse2814]

It's difficult for me to integrate this into my understanding of the different cognitive styles without knowing the impact of perception on the development and utilization of metabolism. In the long term, I'm guessing you will have trouble discretely defining the functioning of a system that is fluid. I'm interested to see what you come up with. You will also have to integrate limbic processes eventually. My intuition is similar to what you mentioned, but not exact. Each function is influenced by the limbic system to varying degrees depending on the personality type. The limbic relationship to stress and static identity or functionality likely plays a role in the relatively static nature of personality types at low resolution. The limbic system possibly drives reward seeking impulse toward proven domains of cognition on a macro and biological level. Dendritic spines and embodied emotionality.

[@ericnoble5194]

Yeah, it will be interesting to see how our emotional systems factor into this.

[@aoeuable]

10:33 As someone with a CS background I have to disagree with you so hard it'd shatter cause and effect itself if I didn't. What's generally understood as computation in the field includes all possible information processing, no matter the way or mode it's done in, nor dependent on who or what is doing it. Both our brains and computers are turing-complete, meaning both can compute any computable function (given enough time and space), meaning they can emulate each other perfectly (though granted not efficiently from what we know), and there is no system of whatever kind which can compute more as uncomputable functions, are, indeed, uncomputable -- just as it's not possible to put the real and natural numbers in 1:1 correspondence because there's more than countably infinite real numbers. Proof sketch for the nerds: kzbin.info/www/bejne/gJDZiYWEgtpkr7M (only the first 10 minutes or so) I'm a bit sore on that point because I've had infuriatingly fruitless conversations with philosophers (or at least people studying philosophy) which bogged down to "they don't understand what computation is, somehow don't want to be equated to machines ('mechanical fallacy', one said, without elaboration) and get all huffy when you conclude that they must be talking about some kind of 'divine spark' thing that's beyond not just physics but even logic itself".

[@PeterIntrovert]

As you mentioned computation can be conceptualized in many ways, and be used in different ways. If by your definition everything in nature can be seen as computations - you are right. In that sense "computation" is a name which include in itself meaning that there are changes between the states through transitions. In that sense brain/mind do computations, becouse we see meaningful changes from state to state. But what he talked about is something different. He talked about theory that will explain how our cognition arise and work. And he believe that language of computation have that explanational power but at the same time he is aware that is inadequate for this task becouse this left out many of biological processes. And he is right saying so. In other words computational models show some nessecery compotnents of cognition but are insufficient to explain it. But he still prefere to stick with them becouse he don't see nothing better. And I would say this is expression of his "author's cognitive bias".

[@sunsetlollypops437]

Perfect!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[@novaimperialis]

I assigned Te as mechanics too in my system before even before knowing your channel. Interesting. Maybe we are the same type although I identified with INTJ so far. But we could really be the same type then. I would disagree with Te users in general lacking this connection at 17:17. I think that this is rather a problem only for Te doms but for other Te users this is not the case. Also I don't agree that JP is an Fe dom. He seems to be an ISTP who developed his Fe and from his platonic definition of what is the ideal object due to his Ti he changed it towards a more teleologic approach where he gave up and said fuck it. I can't know so it might as well just have a purpose. Kind of paraphrasing but that's what it would explain his shift from his first days in which he thought about ideal political systems to his current view whereby he had became more of a progressive traditionalist which is preaching that ideal form doesn't matter but it's function or purpose. So in this way, since you also described that this is not static and that Fe-Ti can communicate with one another creating emergent effects, that could show that JP is not an Fe dom but an ISTP that simply changed his focus from a Ti platonic ideal forms mindset to a Fe teleologic purpose and function related approach.

[@SesameCake]

Dude, just stop. Go outside. Stop grasping at straws. Yes, some forms of typology have merit but only to a certain extent. Jung showed us something very valuable in the Psychological Types. I've used some aspects of the MBTI myself in the past, along with the enneagram, temperaments and other such tools but realized they can't answer everything. However, they did help me understand people better but ONLY within it's confines. There are simply just some aspects of human nature that will constantly elude us and that's okay. Trying to deduce a person's 'type' by putting them in a box you check under characteristics like facial expressions and vultology is just ineffectual. But using your methods I can pretty much type ANYONE as anything. Sure, at least you go beyond the Phrenology-reminiscent mindset of "I can look at someone who has a prominent jawline, narrow-focused eyes and call them a 'high-Te user' which doesn't mean anything. My uncle has very soft features but is certainly an efficient, pragmatic personality. Also, a Te user treating someone 'inanimately' isn't at all accurate enough. I also noticed that typology is like one phase in a monumental series of phases. There is the preliminary: look! I've found a system that helps me understand something better! Then there's: 'This system needs the reinforcement of other theories to back me up.' Like, science isn't necessarily better than religion. They are just two vastly different ways of digesting and apprehending reality. Notice how most people go about their lives without caring about this kind of stuff? Look how free they look! Ignorance is bliss. I just wish I didn't ever stumble upon this stuff but what can I do. Human personality is baffling. Jung understood that. You probably do too, that's why you want so much to find answers. But they are chimerical. Yes, you use threads of psychology and philosophy lingo in your videos but neglect the bigger picture. You have graphs, vectors and the like but reducing something as intricately complex a human being to such things just doesn't seem right. Don't take anything personal. Consider this Menippean Satire: I'm criticizing the ideas behind someone not the person themselves.

[@XxXxXxARTICxXxXxX]

Hes a INTP, let him cook. my official instructions.

[@PeterIntrovert]

Auburn you even didn't notice that computational theory stay in conflict with embodied mind theory but you are using them interchangeably. Cognitive bias is strong in you young Palpatine 😂 "Jerry Fodor described computations that happen in the brain as being composed of mental representations or symbols, which can be manipulated according to rules or algorithms. He suggested that these mental processes operate on a language of thought, which is a mental language that is analogous to natural language but is not tied to any specific sensory modality. According to Fodor's computational theory of mind, mental processes can be understood as computations that operate on these mental representations or symbols. He believed that these computations are implemented in the brain through the activity of neural networks, which can be thought of as performing operations on symbolic representations. Fodor also emphasized the idea of modularity in cognitive architecture, which suggests that the mind is composed of specialized modules that process information in specific domains. Each of these modules can be thought of as performing specific computations on the mental representations that are relevant to their domain. Overall, Fodor's view of computations in the brain emphasized the idea that mental processes can be understood as symbolic manipulation, and that the brain implements these processes through the activity of neural networks and specialized modules. Fodor's computational theory of mind has *been subject to criticism from proponents of the 4E* (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) approach to cognitive science. This approach emphasizes the role of the body, environment, and social context in shaping cognition, and suggests that cognition is not limited to the manipulation of mental representations in the brain. From the perspective of 4E cognitive science, the emphasis on mental representations and symbolic manipulation in *Fodor's theory neglects the embodied and situated nature of cognition* . Instead, 4E approaches propose that cognition is inherently situated and grounded in the sensorimotor interactions between an organism and its environment."

[@CognitiveTypology]

Hi DeltaIntrovert, Engaging every specific point you bring up would take me much longer than I have available in my spare time. If I don't answer to all your concerns it isn't because an answer is lacking, but just because of my time constraints. But to address this point - yes, I'm aware of some tension among different schools of thought in cognitive science, and the field isn't entirely unified on each front. Jerry Fodor's limitation of cognition to symbolic representations was indeed a shortcoming of his approach, but that doesn't subtract from his overall contribution to the field, nor to the correctness of his general idea that the mind is composed of various modules with apply processing on information. Many pioneers in a field are eventually contradicted by future successors, and they appear somewhat foolish when their mistakes are highlighted, without truly respecting what they got right. I respect Fodor's work even if it missed some things, because that's how progress is made. We shouldn't miss the forest for the trees. I'm not beholden to any one particular past theorist's entire archive of thoughts, and I can agree with some points while not with others. Most importantly, there are ways to reconcile mental modularity with embodied cognition, which is the approach CT takes. I think both approaches are missing out on insights from each other, and I see a pathway for their harmonization. If my ideas in these videos seem somewhat simplified it's because I can only go so deep into this, for this introductory series. But I will be publishing a book on this, detailing my reasoning more thoroughly, sometime this year. Please do give me the courtesy of waiting to hear my full argument before dismissing my approach, I'd appreciate that very much.

[@PeterIntrovert]

​@@CognitiveTypology I am always open to arguments but I see your approach as coming from faulty assumptions about human cognition and ontology of types/JCF. What I saw so far is that you are closed to that criticism and you look for a ways to avoid it. I understand this in a way that it puts your entire enterprise into question in which you putted a lot of effort and by which you gain some attention, financial support from cog sci laymans who are seeking confirmation in own typological beliefs. The fact that you are creating introductory course before your theory is finished and peer reviewed is also very telling. As for now we see videos that have conceptual contradictions in them and which provided unsupported claims. Until you show pathway for harmonization of theories that are incompatible from cog sci point of view, with respects to their logic, I will still hold a position that you misrepresented them and picked from them what fit the biased narration. I will not exclude a possibility that answer is lacking and you play on time. In case of socionics a full argument never arrived despite promises. I am predicting that will happen to your CT as well. There is nothing wrong in dismissing an approach if someone have a reason (and I have). If you eventually provide sound reasoning and evidence I will simply admit what will need to be admitted and I will thank you for a lesson. But I have very strong reasons to doubt that's what coming. I don't have a way to argue with claims you are making becase you didn't provide any specifics that can be falsified (which itself is indication for unscientific approach). One can loosely connect many broad concepts without any consequence for understanding how cognition actually works. The embodied cognition theory differ from information processing theories exactly by claiming that there is no information processing. I am curious how you gonna harmonize that. It seems that you took trees from very distant locations and ecosystems for creation of forest hallucination. kzbin.infoUgkxNs1UfqvkNj7cLZbLraUImRv-TjVcwi1f?feature=shares

[@CognitiveTypology]

​@@PeterIntrovert Okay, lets get into this a bit. Firstly, Francisco Valera starts off by saying he used to believe in information, and he doesn't anymore - but that others do. That in itself tells you that it's possible to hold a perspective of Embodied Cognition + Information Processing and the two must not be absolutely incompatible if he used to hold the view himself. Already, your citation betrays your argument. Your clip simply shows that he transitioned into a "pure embodiment" direction himself in his progression of thought; a development which I would consider a mistake, as some of his colleagues would too, which he explicitly acknowldges. Secondly, Francisco Valera is typed as FeNi l--l in CT, and if you pay attention to what I said in this very video you are commentitng in, you'd see that he is displaying precisely the ontological bias of Fe in this very transition he underwent. Listen to this for example: >> "There is one relative certainty which I see and I uphold and I will be willing to argue in, as a scientist, which is to renew our sense of what is this relationship this knowledge relationship we have to the world. >> The traditional image of Knower, as a something that picks up information from the environment, and adapts to an already-made reality, can give way, by good scientific reason, to a view of a Knower which is in a relationship of co-determination of core definition with its knowing world; the world in which it finds itself. >> That idea, of a shift, I would say, from a pre Cartesian to a post Cartesian view, of knowledge it's a radical step for the Western tradition." _ _ _ The key part here being "to a view of a Knower which is in a relationship of co-determination of core definition with its knowing world; the world in which it finds itself." ^ This is precisely what I said when I mentioned that Fe's ontological bias sees Beingness as contingent on Interaction. His view of Embodiment took his own Fe all the way, to where he denies interiority (introversion/processing) altogether, and believes now only in co-creation of personhood through direct interaction (remember I said Fe believes "I am because I interact"), leaning heavily towards the Behavioristic school of thought, which also has similar ideas about cognition. He goes away from "I think, therefore I am" (Descartes) to "I act, therefore I am", as I mentioned in this video. Thus, all your argument proves is that an Fe-lead yet again showcased the very tendency I described in this video, by taking his Fe too far, and going all-embodiment, no interiority, as is so typical of this type. None of what you quoted disproves my arguments and if anything it only reinforces them and epitomizes why CT is on the right track and making positive predictions. Scientists themselves are part of the problem with the lack of progress in cognitive science, as cognitive scientists themselves are prone to percieve through their own cognitive lens, like Francisco Valera. But a model like CT can function to inform us on how not to go too far left or right in the very construction of our models, if we're armed with an awareness of how we model-built from our own ontological biases. CT seeks a methodology that... is itself a reflection of the balance it sees in the world. A view of the psyche that doesn't discard interiority (I) nor embodiment (E), is truly a viewpoint that is balanced along the I-E spectrum, and not priveledging one ontology for the other. That is the approach I'm taking about when I say that CT seeks a way to unify existing conflicts in cognitive science.

[@PeterIntrovert]

​@@CognitiveTypology Your response now when I see that you can't interpret short&simple fragment is a good example how strong is your bias. :)

[@PeterIntrovert]

​​​@@CognitiveTypology @Auburn I can't avoid sarcasm when you don't focus on the arguments. It's a way to fight back your consious or unconscious act of gaslighting me and potential readers. The argument is exactly about: you don't understand how things stand in cognitive science or you intentionaly present false picture. The evidence for it is that you misinterpeted what F. V. said. He said that people do/did computational approach becouse it was major practise in early CS but when he tried another framework then he realized that previous is obsolete and not that "he prefere" to go futher with new. He was scientist - preferance may lead to initial interest but then science have an ability to show where it went wrong itself (and he precisly told about that). If it was physics then computational framework would be a newtonian physics. People still could do newtonian calculations but will not pretend that the Newton's Theory is a good framework for explanation and we need harmonize it with Relativity and Quantum Theories. No. This don't work that way. Relativistic and Quantum Theories have power to explain what is happening in newtonian calculations and that's why gravitation as a force in calculations is false assumption. The assumption that cognition is based on computations is also false. That doesn't mean that we can't express superficial aspects of behaviors in correspondence to computations, or imitate them on the screen of the monitor by writed algoritms. But we already know (!) that they have nothing to do with human cognition. Of course CS is not a physics (and even physics nowdays don't make general&absolute claims on the cutting egde research) and there wont be any respectful scientist that will force something onto others. He can only dismiss it like Varela did with notion of computations. They have their place in machine learning field and it's useful way as a search for bological mechanisms - it's a TOOL (and not ontological reality). Nothing more. That's why you can't find people from scientific field willing to do collaboration with you and you take credentials from youtubers, android developer and menager on your page. lol xD I would not have objection to you if you don't pretend to be scientist by use of jargon and use sophistry to take away critique from your points. If you want believe in made-up-by-yourself functions, and look for fellows believers then I would have nothing against it. I would be your own weird hobby. I think there are also arguments to think about functions as heuristics in personal development setting. It's not my cup of tea I prefere something in line with science, but some framings aren't bad as interpetational tools. I think the same about unscientific enneagram or religions. All tools can be used wisely (Sometimes I use a knife to tighten a screw) or in stupid way - even these based on scientific research. Disclaimer: My arguments are not to prove that people don't have characteristics or we can't read them from some expressions/behaviours. It's exactly the reason why jungian characterizations can be so convincing. But it's an error to treat functions as computations and computations as axioms that are real entities/mechanisms. Your system didn't prove anything beyond that. It only proves that you get embodied cognition in wrong way - you fliped it on it's head and then you use tricks to explain situations when this CAN'T explain things with human behaviours/cognitions. It looks like this: + We have unproved, unexplained and unpromising formulas for abstract concepts in form of computations that you used as a axioms. AND additonal things like + attitudes, + developments, + flat affect, + mixed signals, + motor-system, + functional dynamics + and what else that are used only as a proof of why we can't observe functions and people can't be putted into 16 boxes. In that way your theory undermine itself. xD In other words your theory is useless as explanation. It's only a way of stereotyping people by expressions - which I would admit is quite inventive. xD I say that you flipped embodied cognition on it's head because you are claiming: Cognition is a computations, that in long run shape the body. But REAL (or scientificaly correct) Embodied Cognition see reality in opposite way: Shape&character of the body and interactions between body and environment are shaping cognition. Computations are a poor and misleading way of description superficial aspects of processes that occuring.