Collective Action Game Theory | Multi-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

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Күн бұрын

I explain collective action games and multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemmas. I relate these to public goods, the tragedy of the commons, and drop-in-the-bucket problems. There is also a discussion of stable and unstable equilibrium in multi-player games.
0:00 - Overview
0:36 - Real-World Situations
1:16 - Starting with 2x2 Prisoner's Dilemma
4:05 - Goal: Changing the Payoffs
6:07 - Public Good / Tragedy of the Commons
6:52 - Building Objective Function
7:49 - Drop-in-the-Bucket
8:57 - Functional Form
10:27 - Adding Uncertainty
11:18 - Multi-player Nash Equilibrium
17:09 - Stability of Equilibrium
18:00 - Take-Aways from Exercise
19:07 - Multi-Player Prisoner's Dilemma
19:44 - How do you Address Collective Action Problems?
Solving for Nash Equilibrium: • Nash Equilibrium Examples
The numbers in the multi-player Nash Equilibrium Example come from the following video, which is posted on an excellent game theory channel... • Game Theory - Collecti...

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@Lazabaza7752 2 жыл бұрын

Awesome vid Dr. H 👏. This helped me see how economists may expand simpler games to better model different situations

@chongzhenemperor7551 Жыл бұрын

You're definitely right about the under-production of educational videos! I would like to share my deepest thanks for producing these informative videos

@SaiGanesh314 Жыл бұрын

What a really educative and informative presentation, professor! I thank you from the bottom of my heart for putting together this really amazing content. As for the solution(s) to incentivizing more donations, I propose doing a similar thing to what you did with the Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix (subtracting whenever a convict defects, which forces the state of the game to converge to a Nash Equilibrium of both keeping shut, aka incentivizing cooperative equilibrium, and more importantly making this new cooperative equilibrium more stable than it was before). On the same vein, we can perhaps introduce a "penalty" of sorts to the payoffs, like you already alluded to in the video, to make more people regret that they haven't dontated and make less and less people regret that they did, thus moving the stable equilibrium status from nobody donating to everybody donating. But again, like you also pointed to this, the random term ε can also be manipulative of this penalization in some gratuitous ways that we did not take into account beforehand maybe because we did not want the game to head toward those ways. I would love to see how game theory lets these kinds of situations play out in practicality! (perhaps like also taking into account the reciprocity among the donators? Need your ideas on this...)