David Chalmers on Extending the Mind Beyond the Brain

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Күн бұрын

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@marcobiagini1878 Ай бұрын

I am a physicist and I explain why current physics leaves not room for the possibility that brain processes can be a sufficient condition for the existence of consciousness. The hypothesis that consciousness emerges from, or can be identified with physical, chemical or biological processes is incompatible with current physics. It is a scientifically established fact that a mental experience is associated with numerous distinct microscopic physical processes that occur at different points; there is no physical entity that connects all these distinct microscopic processes, therefore the existence of mental experience requires an element of connection that is not described by current physics. This missing element of connection can be identified with what we traditionally refer to as the soul (in my youtube channel you can find a video with more detailed explanations). Emergent properties are often thought of as arising from complex systems (like the brain). However, I argue that these properties are subjective cognitive constructs that depend on the level of abstraction we choose to analyze and describe the system. Since these descriptions are mind-dependent, consciousness, being implied by these cognitive contructs, cannot itself be an emergent property. Preliminary considerations: the concept of set refers to something that has an intrinsically conceptual and subjective nature and implies the arbitrary choice of determining which elements are to be included in the set; what can exist objectively are only the individual elements. Defining a set is like drawing an imaginary line to separate some elements from others. This line doesn't exist physically; it’s a mental construct. The same applies to sequences of processes-they are abstract concepts created by our minds. Mental experiences are necessary for the existence of subjectivity/arbitrariness and cognitive constructs; Therefore, mental experience itself cannot be just a cognitive construct. Obviously we can conceive the concept of consciousness, but the concept of consciousness is not actual consciousness; We can talk about consciousness or about pain, but merely talking about it isn’t the same as experiencing it. (With the word consciousness I do not refer to self-awareness, but to the property of being conscious= having a mental experiences such as sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories and even dreams) From the above considerations it follows that only indivisible elements may exist objectively and independently of consciousness, and consequently the only logically coherent and significant statement is that consciousness exists as a property of an indivisible element. Furthermore, this indivisible entity must interact globally with brain processes because there is a well-known correlation between brain processes and consciousness. However, this indivisible entity cannot be physical, since according to the laws of physics, there is no physical entity with such properties. The soul is the missing element that interprets globally the distinct elementary physical processes occurring at separate points in the brain as a unified mental experience. Clarifications The brain itself doesn't exist objectively as a mind-independent entity. The concept of the brain is based on separating a group of quantum particles from everything else, which is a subjective process, not dictated purely by the laws of physics. Actually there is a continuous exchange of molecules with the blood and when and how such molecules start and stop being part of the brain is decided arbitrarily. An example may clarify this point: the concept of nation. Nation is not a physical entity and does not refer to a mind-independent entity because it is just a set of arbitrarily chosen people. The same goes for the brain. Brain processes consist of many parallel sequences of ordinary elementary physical processes occurring at separate points. There is no direct connection between the separate points in the brain and such connections are just a subjective abstractions used to approximately describe sequences of many distinct physical processes. Indeed, considering consciousness as a property of an entire sequence of elementary processes implies the arbitrary definition of the entire sequence; the entire sequence as a whole (and therefore every function/property/capacity attributed to the brain) is a subjective abstraction that does not refer to any mind-independendent reality. Physicalism/naturalism is based on the belief that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. However, an emergent property is defined as a property that is possessed by a set of elements that its individual components do not possess; my arguments prove that this definition implies that emergent properties are only subjective cognitive constructs and therefore, consciousness cannot be an emergent property. Actually, emergent properties are just simplified and approximate descriptions or subjective classifications of underlying physical processes or properties, which are described directly by the fundamental laws of physics alone, without involving any emergent properties (arbitrariness/subjectivity is involved when more than one option/description is possible). An approximate description is only an abstract idea, and no actual entity exists per se corresponding to that approximate description, simply because an actual entity is exactly what it is and not an approximation of itself. What physically exists are the underlying physical processes. Emergence is nothing more than a cognitive construct that is applied to physical phenomena, and cognition itself can only come from a mind; thus emergence can never explain mental experience as, by itself, it implies mental experience. Conclusions My approach is based on scientific knowledge of the brain's physical processes. My arguments show that physicalism is incompatible with the very foundations of scientific knowledge because current scientific understanding of molecular processes excludes the possibility that brain processes alone can account for the existence of consciousness. An indivisible non-physical element must exist as a necessary condition for the existence of consciousness because mental experiences are linked to many distinct physical processes occurring at different points; it is therefore necessary for all these distinct processes to be interpreted collectively by a mind-independent element, and a mind-independent element can only be intrinsically indivisible because it cannot depend on subjectivity. This indivisible element cannot be physical because the laws of physics do not describe any physical entity with the required properties. Marco Biagini

@extavwudda 2 ай бұрын

I find it curious how the smart and open-minded Chalmers, the formulator of the hard problem of consciousness no less, is conflating memory with 'mind' and 'consciousness' (which is philosophically imprecise) and still suggesting AI may one day be conscious. I wonder if this is what he actually believes, or whether perhaps he just feels it's his duty as a 'philosopher of mind' to keep entertaining ideas he may not actually agree with.

@mindfulmoments4956 3 ай бұрын

The AI systems can only solve what humans program it to do. The 'AI' system does not have feelings, and also they do not have any first-person understandings (unlike humans) regarding whether or not they have feelings, frustrations, wants, etc. We like to *believe* that AI is conscious. Also what we do is to simply project human experiences into AI systems. Our consciousness is simply getting *deceived* by AI!

@AnthonyWoodd-x7h Ай бұрын

It is my psychology as consciousness conditioned limited but consciousness is a common attribute of life and I am conscious of, but is that not what I am, not something whish is mine?

@simonhibbs887 3 ай бұрын

Not all of our mental faculties are accessible to consciousness. I understand and agree with the idea that divisions between say memories in our brain and memories in an external medium are somewhat arbitrary but we re only conscious of memories in our brain after we access them.We just use a different mechanism to access memories stored external. However once we are con scions of them, they're not just stored externally, there's a copy of them in the regions of our brain responsible for conscious activity. So extended mind, sure, extended consciousness no.

@dinningproduction 29 күн бұрын

The more I listen to David Chalmers the more I think he's drifting towards materialism. Strange for a man who once said, one starts out as a materialist, then goes to dualism, then on to panpsychism and ends up with idealism.

@hn6187 3 ай бұрын

If the mind extends from brain why would an in silico system have a mind that resembles anything we'd describe as conscious. I think Chalmers is contradicting himself, brain consciousness is not an in silico computation

@bradmodd7856 3 ай бұрын

part of the brain is memory, if memory is accessed via a chip or the cloud....these are mental processes, how many neurons are conscious? they aren't, nor are chips.

@prashanthirai929 3 ай бұрын

the parity principle is important in this case that you have pointed out so have a look at that.

@mattsigl1426 2 ай бұрын

Well, for the sake of argument, if the silicon system use functional or causal processes that mirror the functional or causal processes in the brain, it would make sense to assume that the mental states of the silicon system could resemble those of biological systems.