Doubting Truth (The Law of the Excluded Middle)

[@jlhjlh]

At 3:01 it says about the statement "This statement is true" that it 'clearly seems to be true' (quote). But how so? As far as I can tell, I could declare that statement (let's call it P) to not be true and it would result in no contradictions. Assuming that P is not true, then necessarily its content states something that is not true. This means that the statement that it refers to must also not be true. But that referred statement is P itself, thus we conclude that P must not be true. But then we just concluded what we just assumed to begin with. Therefore it's a circular argument, in fact it is a circular argument whether we assume P to be true, or P to not be true, both resulting in no contradictions. How do we tell it is either of those if it can't be both?

[@mesplin3]

1. No proposition is both true and false. 2. No proposition is neither true nor false. "This sentence is false." This sentence cannot true because it would also be false. Nor can the sentence be false for similar reasons. Therefore the sentence can be neither true nor false. Therefore the sentence is not a proposition. "The following sentence is true. The previous sentence is false." These fail the prior axioms, so these aren't propositions, etc.

[@jaredgreen2363]

“Poorly formed” or rather i would say incoherent “statements” don’t break logic so much as they violate the grammar behind logic, a grammar that involves more rules than just the sentence structure people normally think of. That doesn’t just exclude them from being true, it excludes them from being meaningful. “True” and “false” are the values taken by meaningful statements, even if it may not be possible to tell which one is. However to acknowledge those who subscribe to constructivism, a distinction is to be made between propositions which are Boolean, versus theorems, which are proven. Truth can be considered Boolean while theoremhood can not abide the law of excluded middle(there would be theorems, provably false antitheorems, and undecidable nontheorems)

[@ConorCondor]

Correct me if i'm wrong, but this could be used to debunk Descartes [Cogito Ergo Sum], since it's premise is to consider false anything that could be false. It arrives to the conclusion that the doubting itself can not be false, but it then contradicts it's own premise by using logic as if it was absolute and saying "since it can't be false, then it's true". The method may be able to get to some "absolute" truth, but it uses logic so idk if there's even some part of it that could be extrapolated, and at least we can assert with certainty that the Cogito conclusion is wrong.

[@vectorshift401]

There is something very seriously wrong with this video. At 5:35 the statement is made: "How do we tell if our very definition of truth is in fact itself true?" Since when are definitions true or false at all? The presenter seems to be wildly saying things to promote scepticism. At this rate one should be sceptical of anything in here promoting scepticism.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Vector Shift Do you think that definitions are not the kinds of things that can be true or false? So you would claim that the statement "a Bachelor is by definition an unmarried adult male" would be neither true nor false? Similarly the statement "a triangle has by definition 100 angles" is not false, any more than it is true? Not only does this deny the LEM, which is the very proposition that I am challenging here, but it will include some serious bullet biting.

[@vectorshift401]

in your examples "a Bachelor is by definition an unmarried adult male" "a triangle has by definition 100 angles" Are these claims about what in in the definitions for these terms or are they stipulations that, for whatever reason , you are presenting to define the terms for some special use ? If they are claims about what is in some definition of each term then the claim can be evaluated by comparing to the definition to see it is true or false. But taking them as claims about definitions they are then not definitions themselves. Claims about definitions can be wrong but that doesn't relate to definitions themselves having truth values. If you are stipulating that you are going to use the words in this manner then fine you may do so. This is a redefinition of the terms.Of course the theorems about triangles with the old definition will have to be examined to see if any of them apply with the new definition (very unlikely). The old definition could be renamed "triangle classic" perhaps but you would certainly be free to maintain the change in your own work. The new definition may be useless , the set it defines may only be the null set. But useless isn't a truth value so the definition isn't wrong, just useless. This seems to cover all the bases with the examples. As claims about what is in the definitions for the terms they can be right or wrong but that doesn't make the definitions right or wrong. As definitions themselves they may be useful or not but those aren't truth values, so there is nothing in that to assign truth values to definitions.

[@robertwilsoniii2048]

Well, skepticism is the only infallible argument, but, ironically, it is also a useless argument that wastes time.

[@vectorshift401]

Skepticism is an infallible argument? The narrator makes a nonsense claim about definitions being false. That's a pretty serious flaw so infallible , no. Also skepticism- per se -is a position not an argument. Arguments are used to support it and they can be flawed as shown in this presentation.

[@bluestarfractal5434]

Definitions cannot be true or false because they are not assertions.They are specifications of the meaning of words.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Xephyra A couple of points. First, do you have to accept that particular claims are true to doubt them, surely not. Here's a video on indirect skepticism for more information (kzbin.info/www/bejne/rn3ZhJmifJ2neaM). For more on this paradox and the distinction between false and not true check out this series of videos on the Liar's paradox (kzbin.info/www/bejne/nZ2aYoKwq7Wnf7c) and for a more robust defense check out this video (kzbin.info/www/bejne/gnjWd56Jf76giNE)

[@patrickwithee7625]

To me, asking whether the Liar’s Paradox is true or false is like asking whether the present King of France is bald or not.

[@michaellangan4450]

What about the psychological state of 'ambivalence'?

[@MathProofsable]

Thank you for these insightful videos! As a mathematician, I think of these things maybe a bit differently. Self-referential statements may have more to do with a type/token (objective/subjective logic with bounds) distinctions and less to do with the law of the excluded middle. The law of excluded middle seems to lend itself more to a discussion of intuitionism and constructivism and thinking of proofs as a measure of truth rather than apriori irrefutable tautologies (Carnap's "vice"). We may not currently have a proof of p or not p.

[@xephyra7020]

I don't see how any of this is a problem for truth. Don't we have to accept Carneades claims as true before we could be skeptical of truth? I can't help but see a conflation between "not true" and "false". The confusion, I think, is derived from the fact that in ordinary language "not true" can often mean "false". But a question such as "are all utterances true or false?" is not itself true since it's a question not a statement. It is not true. But it is also not false since only statements/propositions can be. This is not contradictory. The law of non-contadiction does not state that all propositions are true or false. It states that nothing can assert a thing and its negation. There is a difference. Or am I missing something?

[@bluestarfractal5434]

No Xephyra, you are not missing anything!

[@lkjewcifer]

I agree. This is a false dichotomy (true or false). The true dichotomy here should it is either true or not true. An example is found in the court room. Guilty or not guilty; we may not be able to determine if the person is innocent or not.

[@Zenithguy]

Well there’s no negation at all (because there was nothing to negate before) however, while not dismissing “truth” as much as how Christian apologists, theists, and presups gloat over this we should take into account that there are relative truths but ultimately? There’s a dilemma over this especially since “absolute truth” would have to depend on “absolute false” hence this leads us to the liar’s paradox.

[@dewinthemorning]

A thought-provoking video. I have to go and read again about "fuzzy logic". Subbed.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Thanks!

[@seanmuniz4651]

What about instead of self-referential statements we exclude any group of statements with circular referencing? A self-referential statement is just a special case, a circular referencing group with only one member.

[@Kalernor]

3:11 These are just two other self-referential statements, but indirectly self-referential. It's like if you have a definition A that references another definition B, while definition B also references definition A. You can't say these aren't self-referential; they are, just indirectly so.

[@chrissavage6987]

Even if we can't solve this problem isn't it necessary to accept some things intuitively for pragmatic reasons? You did a video on the laws of logic containing a contradiction which I'm trying to find again and thoroughly analyze, but for truth itself don't we tentatively accept these laws of logic for pragmatic reasons at a minimum?

[@nathanswedan2676]

Yes, I think you can simultaneously accept that in order to figure out the closest things to truth, we have to adhere to these principles, whilst also accepting that you can never know for certain whether or not something can accurately represent the truth

[@jonkeuviuhc1641]

What if we say that we can't have statements that are about statements ?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

That would mean that statement itself can't be true or false, by its own standards since it is about statements.

[@no.neutrality.apologetics900]

The law of identity solves the paradox. What is a propositional statement? A propositional statement is one that puts forward a concept, in statement form, as a declaration of that which is true. Therefore, the proposition, "This statement is false," has inherently, by presupposition, "It is true that," before the rest of the proposition. In other words, (It is true that it is the case, that this statement is false.) Which means, before the meta value of T or F can be applied to the proposition, the proposition is already an absurd contradiction since it violates the LNC and LEM within the confines of the proposition. An equally absurd proposition would be, "It is true that the word true in all instances within this sentence is false." The LOI demands that even concepts must have a particular identity.

[@Kalernor]

Wow. Thanks

[@nathanswedan2676]

The law of identity is only affirmed by a priori reasoning of mathematics, which one can simply deny. Aristotle sort of contradicted himself when he mentioned the law of identity and the proceeded to roast the shit out of a priori reasoning

[@bradslowgrove1128]

Try '' This statement has no meaning''? How do you get around that both true and false are real?

[@jasonspades5628]

The law of excluded middle does not say (Every proposition is true or false). It says (For every proposition, either that proposition is true, or it's negation is true)

[@legendary3952]

What’s the difference? Serious question.

[@michaelmartinek7408]

Yeah seriously what's the difference? Because I'm unfamiliar with the topic and saying "or it's negation is true" sounds like it is saying the first one is true until the second one is more true. Which confuses me. I'm probably mis interpreting it but I would love some clarification.

[@khermerker]

@@michaelmartinek7408 ok this is me without a philosphy degree trying to answer, the every proposition true or false is called complete, that means that there is no posibility of a statment were there is no posibility of know if its true or false. Example, in set theory the continuom hypotesis is not true or false, the set theory is consistent with that be true or false. Now the second is more that if you have a proof that a proposition is true then the negatiom can't be proved as true.

[@thomaslodger7675]

Going through these arguments, how can somebody not be a skeptic?

[@admiralmurat2777]

Because they listen to British vegan twinks that cry about Deism.

[@Cueteman]

Same question was asked 2000 years ago by Pilate, and today the same question is raised. Then Pilate said to him, “So you are a king?” Jesus answered, "You say that I am a king. for this purpose I was born and for this purpose i have come into the world-to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth listens to my voice.” 38 Pilate said to him, “What is truth?”

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+JAVV JAVVS For a wide variety of answers to that question check out my series on Truth: kzbin.info/aero/PLz0n_SjOttTdtycrFYOrO9zxszamWbSim

[@floepiejane]

Why do we look for this elusive thing called "truth" when we could be very happy with "the best answer we have at the moment"?

[@3DMint]

In response to the Liar Paradox, I'd concede it and just say point out that it doesn't affect most of our reasoning, all the liar shows is that LNC (or LEM) fail to hold for a few propositions. The kinds of propositions out of which these paradoxes arise aren't the ones that we reason with in life and rest of philosophy, they're called semantically paradoxes after all. To your circularity change against the definition of truth, I'd say truth is a primitive. A concept we're all acquinted with without needing to define it with other terms. We can know a thing to be true without being able to give a non-circular definition of true. Defining it is just done to make things more rigorous.

[@3DMint]

Semantical paradoxes* Woops, stupid autocorrect.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+3DMint The problem is that if the LEM or the LNC fails for any propositions, we can derive any proposition. From a contradiction anything follows. In fact such contradictions have been used to validly prove the existence of God (kzbin.info/www/bejne/iGW9qIqng9eUfrs). As for truth, I don't see how anyone can be acquainted with something that is impossible to define. There's more explicitly explained problems with primitivist definitions of truth in this series: (kzbin.info/www/bejne/laGcfoybqtutrac and kzbin.info/www/bejne/g5TFh5mpgK2ni9k)

[@johnnygodoy8329]

The way I see it, is that not every construction of language is a statement, even is it says it is, by defining statement as phrases that can be assigned a truth value that follows LEM and NC. Of course, this makes it hard to determine whether a given phrase is a statement, and maybe even impossible. This criteria might be kinda useless in practice, but I think it's a decent solution. You can't assign a truth value to "cat", the same way you can't assign a truth value to the liar's paradox, thus they aren't statements, even if it looks like one. One might think P(PF) is a statement because it concatenates logical symbols, but that only is true if P was a statement to begin with. In that same sense, "cat and not cat" isn't false, "cat or not cat" isn't true, because they aren't statements (due to cat not being a statement). Thinking the liar's paradox is a problem to logic just because it's written is logic is like thinking me writing the expression "x=x+1" is a problem to arithmetic, were the conclusion is that x just can't be a number, in the same way P cannot be a statement. The actual major problem would be, characterizing a statement (as you couldn't know if a very complicated phrase is one or not). Love your vids btw, I was looking for a proof that cantor-bernstein implied LEM and got sucked in

[@bluestarfractal5434]

The Law of the Excluded Middle is alive and well as far as I am concerned. In mathematics I see no paradoxes. The most ubiquitous device in all of our daily lives operates on this very principle. It's called a computer.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

It all depends on what you think the formal language (kzbin.info/www/bejne/pqXcnKZ5fKd1pJY) of logic (kzbin.info/www/bejne/kIHJqGdoZ7yWqdE) maps on to. If you think that it maps on to true statements about the world, and that we can actually use it to make arguments, we have a problem. If you think that it maps onto code that a computer uses to do things, (and that code does not need to be complete and consistent (kzbin.info/www/bejne/inPFfHeoqrmKiJY)), you may not have a problem. The concern is that we use logic to make arguments as well as to write computer programs. Whether we can make arguments or not is at stake here (kzbin.info/www/bejne/gnjWd56Jf76giNE).

[@bluestarfractal5434]

Carneades, I believe that you are sincere about your concerns about the solidity of the foundations of mathematics, but really, before you can make a mountain out of a mole hill, you have a mole hill first; and I don't see that you have that even. Mathematics is not some sort of theological enterprise based on holy pronouncements and edicts handed down to us on smoldering tablets from on high. It may be that a very smart gal ( or dumb guy like me ) may discover a crack in the glass somewhere. It wouldn't be a first.We'll just have to patch it up or put in a new pane and then move on.Scientific progress is like that. There is a saying in medical circles:"before you bury the patient,make sure that he is dead!" I don't see a paradox crisis looming in mathematics due to the LEM or ZFC in general,but I am only an analyst, not a foundations specialist.You may be right.But I think that you had better think things through a little more carefully. Nobody has discovered a paradox in ZFC and it has been around for a couple of weeks now! If someone could poke a hole in it, it would mean instant fame. So you have to know that there are legions of smart asses out there, busy as beavers trying!

[@fabiodej]

So "this statement is false" can not be denied, otherwise we'd get a contraction. how does that invalidate the law of non contradiction or even the law of excluded middle? Certain propositions can not be denied, which means that absolute truth, at least logically, exists. here is my point. (1) the law of non contraction says no proposition can be both true and false. This principle does not says a proposition MUST be either true or false. it just says a proposition can't be both. So, we can see (a) propositions that can be either true or false (p="A is bigger than B"; ~p="A is not bigger than B"), (b) propositions that have only one possible value ("this statement is false" it's only false and can't be true, which is a logical absolute truth because there's no possible logical instance where a false proposition is true) and (c) proposition that is neither true nor false ("I only say lies " can't be true because you don't say the truth, and can't be false otherwise you'd say truths as well, both situations contradictory). (2) the law of excluded middle and fuzzy are not opposed, but complementary. In general, people mention the temperature case to say there's a third option, but that's at least silly. I think people knew that two thousand years ago, don't they? a premise such as "if the water is not hot, than is cold" is itself invalid, thus fuzzy logic only adds range to classical logic, but not replace it at all. So if you say "this statement is false", you can't just ask "if this statement if true...". c'mon!

[@bradslowgrove1128]

P.S. All of this work by Russell was carried out well before the '' Philosophical Investigations'' by Wittgenstein was published posthumously in 1953. Many of Russell's examples are simply bad usage and devoid of context and meaning. or '' poorly formed'' as you say. In short people just do not talk like that.'' This sentence is false'' is why we have paragraphs then it can become not self-referential very quickly. Sorry not a Russell fan. His greatest achievement was his patronage of Wittgenstein who eventually had to get away from him to write the PI. Russell was President of the Academy of the Over--Rated until his death when he was succeeded by Noam Chomsky.

[@GainingUnderstanding]

"No statements are true". Is that statement true? If yes then it is a contradiction and is therefore necessarily false. If no then this leads to double negation and therefore it is not the case that "no statements are true", thus some statements are true.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

I'm pretty sure that I never made such a statement. Being skeptical of the Law of the Excluded Middle means that there would be a third category of statement that is neither true nor false. The question is not "are there any true statements?" the question is "are the only things statements can be true and false?" If you answer no, all of logic breaks down. If you answer yes, you have to answer the objections in the video above.

[@GainingUnderstanding]

Carneades.org Oh I wasn't trying to quote you when I stated "No statements are true". I suppose I could have made my comment a bit less ambiguous, sorry about that. I'm looking at this from the viewpoint of indirect proof. If I assume that the statement "no statements are true" is false then this leads to a sort of contradiction as I argued in the last comment. But what do you think this third category might be? If not true nor false what else is there?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

GainingUnderstanding Wait, I'm confused. Let me see if I can clarify. The indirect proof would look like this: P1. No statements are true (AIP) P2. P1 is true (P1) P3. P1 is a statement (Def. Statement) P4. Some statements are true (P3, EG) P5. It is not the case that some statements are true (P1, CQ) P6. {Line 4} & {Line 5} (P4,P5, Conj) P7. It is not the case that no statements are true (P1-6 IP) P8. Some statements are true (P7, CQ) The problem with this is that it relies on the law of the excluded middle in order to function. Rules like CQ and IP depend on the LEM to function. Without the LEM and the LNC, all of logic falls apart. So we will need circular logic to justify them. As to what would this third thing look like. It might be something like neither true nor false, or both true and false. In the same way that an apple with one bite out of it is somewhere between a full apple and an apple core, or two grains of sand are somewhere between a single grain of sand and a heap. It's fuzzy logic of sorts and there's no objective way to preference it over traditional logic.

[@GainingUnderstanding]

Carneades.org "So we will need circular logic to justify them." I think I see where you are getting at. It seems we will need circular logic whether we want to affirm or deny. Would you agree? So with this truth and false combination is it possible that there are necessary truths that are both true and false in all possible worlds?

[@mexamexo8]

Ok, so here is my essay defending the laws of logic First, truth is a label, such label can only be given to propositions alone, only using an epistemology. An epistemology is a set of axioms, and definitions, that given a proposition it tries to send a truth value associated (which can be more than two options). An epistemology is called complete if it never fails to return a truth value for any proposition. So if we set the axioms to be: Def 1 Everything is a proposition Ax 1 All propositions are true Then the epistemology is complete since it never fails, you can input this statement is false and it will return true, but is not useful (similarly with it's converse). Following from that your argument seems to imply that the epistemology defined with the standard rules of logic seems to be incomplete, but i don't see how that would make it any less useful (then again you didn't argue for that, but i want to play with you). The epistemology is as follows: Def. 1 Propositions deny or affirm a predicate associated with a subject. Ax. 1 Predicates and/or subjects are equivalent to themselves always. cor. All propositions are equivalent to themselves. Def. 2a Given a proposition that affirms a predicate, it's negation it's equivalent to the same proposition negating the predicate. Def. 2b Given a proposition that denies a predicate, it's negation it's equivalent to the same proposition affirming the predicate. Def. 3 Proposition have an associated truth value. Ax. 2 It is never the case that a proposition and it´s negation can both have the same truth value cor. Truth values are only equivalent to themselves. Ax. 3 The only two truth values are true or false. At this point it is not clear what is truth, hence we can define it as we please in further definitions and axioms, arbitrary or specific, random or deterministic. But the point being, even if we choose the most useful theory of truth, some propositions will fail to pass such as: this statement is false, so it is incomplete. Let's stretch the game by saying that all incomplete epistemologies are not useful, well then, we can easily expand our axioms to make it complete: Ax. 4 A truth value cannot be a predicate or a subject. cor. Therefore if a true value is a predicate or a subject, then it is not a proposition. Then: this statement is false, is not a problem. Others problems may emerge but overall if we are searching for completeness in our epistemology, nothing stops us to believe, that there is an epistemology that is both useful and complete, we may search instead for consistency (no two contradictory statements are true) and make the same argument, but we can´t have both consistency and completeness. That is not to mention three valued epistemology or fuzzy logic, wich are even more useful but more difficult to understand.

[@CosmicFaust]

Also Carneades.org what do you think of "AntiCitizenX" newest video called "What is Truth?"

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Ellis Farrow I have not seen it, but I will check it out when I get on a better internet connection.

[@CosmicFaust]

Carneades.org Yeah I think you will be interested with it. He comes to the conclusion of "rationalism empiricism pragmatism."

[@mikechiu8446]

Why does it sound like he's constipated... if there's "over-acting" with voice, this is a mastery of that. Can only listen to a minute as much as I wanted to learn from the video...

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Goodness, if you want to have a philosophical discussion about the issues, please feel free to comment, but if you have nothing but insults and derision pleas go somewhere else.

[@MoldredTMalcontent]

Q= MAYBE

[@arvinpillai681]

This is a problem of language not logic. Logic remains uncontradictory, it is the language used to express it which is problematic.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

But Logic is a language. My series on Tarski explains this in greater depth, particularly the video on formal languages kzbin.info/www/bejne/pqXcnKZ5fKd1pJY

[@MCP2012]

Well-done... ;-)

[@MoleDownunder]

Solution? *A statement must refer/be about either directly or indirectly to the facts of reality/sense perception.* 'This statement is true', or 'The above statement is true' do not, so they are not statements. 'All true statements are true' is still a statement because it is referring to statements which themselves refer to the facts of reality. Psycho-epistemologically, the process looks like this, from the instance to the universal. We observe all chairs are chairs. All statements referring to chairs are referring to chairs. All referential statements are referential. All true statements are true. We can see how logic itself is strictly anchored to reality. We get paradoxes when we stop referring to reality because consistency doesn't exist outside of reality, that is truly an indiscernible path. 'A priori' logic does not exist. 'A statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the world' is true because we work from the instances to the universals and not the other way around. We don't first try to affirm that 'a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the world' and then start discovering the truths. We first discover truths and conclude that 'a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the world'. We first observe a chair, then another chair. Then we categorise them and formulate 'these are chairs'. If we observe yet another chair, it is true that 'this is also a chair', and we start to understand that a statement such as 'this is also a chair' is true if the subject corresponds to the categories we created. And we know this itself is true because 'statements' correspond to the category of 'sentences where the subject corresponds to categories'. There seems to be no circular reasoning here. We know 'A statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the world' is true because it corresponds to the world. We know 'this is also a chair' is true because it corresponds to the world. So we know this statement is true, and other statements are true if and only if they correspond to the world. And we don't know any other possibility of know truth. Not through divinity, pragmatism, or anything else. If it was possible to learn truth in such a way, 'a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the world' would itself no longer correspond to the world. I think the confusion and fallacy is in thinking that the concept of 'truth' is equal to its definition. This is not true. We don't first define truth and then discover truths. That would be circular reasoning because you can't know if that statement is true without referring to it. With all concepts and instances, we first observe their similarities and differences to others and this is what determines our definitions. So we don't refer to a definition to know that 'a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the world'. We refer to the world itself to know this is true, so it's not referring to itself and there is no circular reasoning. So again, this fallacy occurs because we are not referring to the instances but rather to an arbitrary definition that is detached from reality. I truly believe that the last two centuries with a priori knowledge and analysis has corrupted the way people think about truth. We are slowly regressing back to the Greeks, living inside our heads and having disregard for what is under our noses.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

The central problem with your argument was pointed out by Quine in arguably the most influential philosophy paper of the 20th century. The claim "A statement must refer/be about either directly or indirectly to the facts of reality/sense perception." Does not itself refer to or be about either directly or indirectly the facts of reality/sense perception. Therefore your maxim itself is nonsense, by your own rule. For more on this read Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism. You claim, "We know 'A statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the world' is true because it corresponds to the world. " but you fail to provide justification for this. Tell me the place in the world that I can go to see this is true. Even if you think that you can show that statements which correspond to the world are true, showing that statements are true if the correspond to the world is not sufficient to show that this is the only way that they can be true. The problem is the only if part. You have not shown that the statements "2+2=4" or "No Gryffindors are Slytherin" are not true despite not corresponding to something in reality. You fail to show that this is the only way to do this. you dogmatically assume your definition of truth ignoring serious objections. There's quite a few other problems for the correspondence theory of truth which I outline in this video: kzbin.info/www/bejne/q5-TfJV9m9iXi68 And it seems ignorant to claim that returning to the Greeks who came up with academia, democracy, and much more would be a regression.

[@adam2aces]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene On what basis do you claim that 2+2=4 does not correspond to anything in reality? Numbers are symbols invented by humans for the specific purpose of defining things in reality, ergo numbers correspond to reality. If I have 2+2 apples you know exactly how many apples I have because of the fact that numbers correspond to reality, unless you don't think apples are a part of reality. You ask where in the world you can go to see this? Go to the grocery store there are apples there. Furthermore, you require Mole Downunder to show that 2+2=4 is not correct which seems to be a strawman fallacy since he never made that argument, you invented it so that burden of proof is yours to show. While I do agree with you that the Greeks had many good ideas ex., democracy, academia. pythagorean theorem, not everything they did or said was correct. For example, according to Epicurus a commonly held belief at the time was that falling stars and lightning was the result of two stars rubbing together and sparks of their elements fell down to earth. Their alternative explanations that rely on gods were even worse. So I do agree with the Mole Downunder that spending time hypothesizing about things, "fantasies like gods in their heads" that have no demonstrable causal connection and have never been verified indepented of predispositions is a grand waste of time not worth revisiting, which is what I believe he was alluding to. However, inventing symbols like 2+2=4 does not fit into that category since the purpose is to correspond it to reality. Without a corresponding reality the numbers become meaningless. It is irrelevant that the numbers are intangible symbols in and of themselves. The only thing that makes 2+2=4 true is its correspondence to reality. You seem to be falsely equivocating definitions with truths.

[@souravmohapatra2501]

Challenge for skeptics A statement is true if and only if it corresponds to facts Prove that this statement cannot be a fact In my opinion it is a fact because a fact by definition is a true and proven statement and by definition it is a true statement

[@real_pattern]

not all skeptics may assert that this statement cannot be a fact. pyrrhonian/indirect skeptics may suspend judgement and claim that it's unknown/unknowable. does it matter / why does it matter / why do you assume it can be proven / unproven?

[@souravmohapatra2501]

@@real_pattern yes i know, the only statement which can be proven with absolute certainty is “I exist”

[@JimmyCurry]

Nice videos, however, Logic and Philosophy did not start in Greece. Persia, Egypt, Nubia, China, India had logic, philosophy way before this. We must be careful not to white-wash logic and philosophy. It's a logical fallacy to say that all logic and philosophy started in Greece. Thanks for your time.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Jimmy Curry The logic and philosophy that I am discussion, namely analytic philosophy and classical logic can trace their origins back to ancient Greece (though the addition of those titles is a recent occurrence). I agree that there are many things throughout the world that can be labeled as philosophy, but those traditions are importantly distinct from analytic philosophy and classical logic in their methods and approaches. So yes, I agree that all philosophy and logic did not start in Greece, but the classical logic and analytic philosophy which encompasses the majority of English speaking philosophy did.

[@adamlove592]

It's not a logical fallacy. It's an inaccurate statement. It's not invalid, it's untrue.

[@bluestarfractal5434]

One may accept the LEM in mathematical reasoning without chasing every screaming know it all bone head down every philosophical looking glass rabbit hole on the planet. The square root of two is true or it is false! Produce a paradox out of that Einstein!

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

The problem is that as soon as even mathematical logic can do basic arithmetic, Godel's incompleteness theorem takes over and starts causing problems. If you are not concerned about completeness and consistency, then you may be okay, but most people are (kzbin.info/www/bejne/inPFfHeoqrmKiJY).

[@bluestarfractal5434]

I think that if the beautiful work of Herr Godel were causing contemporary mathematicians to spill their beer, you would have heard about it by now. I mean if a fox farts in a forest in France it's bound to make KZbin before your coffee is cold! Yes,I know that their is this raving maniac on the Tube with a "demonstration" involving the root of two raised to the root of two power that purports to show that the LEM is flawed. Check it out. Maybe you will find it persuasive, but I think it misses the mark by a couple of light years. Theorem: there exist irrational numbers a and b s.t. a raised b is rational. Proof: let a = b = root 2 and n = a raised b. Case(1): n is rational. Done. Case(2): n is irrational.Raise it to root 2 power and we get 2.Done. Q.E.D. Okay, he is satisfied that he has shown that the LEM is flawed. Work it out for yourself. Perhaps you will agree but I don't see it.

[@Kalernor]

"If a fox farts in a forest in France" lmao love the alliteration

[@michaelmcnaught262]

how could anybody listen to this guys voice

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Michael McNaught If you have an objection to my position, please offer it. If you have nothing but personal attacks please take them somewhere else.

[@MatT3431433]

+Carneades.org well ... i'm subscribing BUT couldn't you speak like an english stage actor; slower, more 'rounded', less 'shouty' & 'full of brash American enthusiasm' etc - or otherwise maybe sexy; like Angelina Jolie. :-)

[@ghiribizzi]

this statement is false...only formally without correlate and not empirically

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

What do you mean by that?

[@ghiribizzi]

Carneades.org like trying to make a syntactic-semantic truth distinction. Syntax is the grammar. It describes the way to construct a correct sentence. For example, this water is triangular is syntactically correct. Semantics relates to the meaning. this water is triangular does not mean anything, though the grammar is ok. one is relate to the axioms and/or or theorems; grammar rules for instance. The other is verifiable either it's existence or is not. veriafiability or non existence

[@revelationsriedel928]

It is true that God exists.

[@admiralmurat2777]

Gay

[@johnken3307]

can't you speak like human! ps. "this statement is false." "this" in that sentence doesn't refer to that sentence. Statements don't refer at all. People do.