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From the earliest years of psychoanalysis onward, the issue of whether affects can be unconscious repeatedly has provoked divergences and disagreements amongst psychoanalytic theoreticians and clinicians. Freud's myriad reflections on the (non-)relation between the affective and the unconscious reveal him to be much more torn and indecisive about this issue than is usually acknowledged, including by Lacan and most Lacanians. Indeed, Lacan repeatedly alleges that Freud categorically excludes affective phenomena from the properly analytic unconscious (on the basis of a reading of Freud's 1915 metapsychological paper on "The Unconscious"). However, this allegation of Lacan's both fails to do exegetical justice to Freud as well as eclipses from view implications in Lacan's own thinking that point to an account of affects allowing them to evade straightforward conscious apprehension. In this presentation, Adrian Johnston seeks to develop a conception of unconscious affects compatible with Lacan's metapsychological framework.