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How to answer a question on Impact of the Human Rights Act in context of statutory interpretation.
There are three key elements to the question that should be addressed:
1. What are the rules (approaches) of statutory interpretation?
2. How does the Human Rights Act 1998 affect these approaches to the interpretation
of statutes?
3. Does this constitute a fundamental change to the rules/approaches?
1. The fundamental purpose of interpretation is to give effect to Parliament’s
intention. There are no strict rules that judges must follow. Historically the
judiciary have adopted a variety of approaches. Briefly describe with examples.
Discuss development of the purposive approach with examples.
2. How does the Human Rights Act affect interpretation?
Describe the operation of s.3(1) and s.4 of the HRA 1998.
Describe the approach taken by the judiciary to s.3 and s.4 using examples.
A s.4 declaration of incompatibility is viewed as last resort.
Straining interpretation (e.g. R v A, Lord Steyn).
Reading down (e.g. Ghaidan v Mendoza).
Reluctance where it is a controversial area of law (e.g. Nicklinson).
Examples of declarations of incompatibility (e.g. A v Secretary of State for the Home
Department).
3. Is this a fundamental change?
Judges continue to adopt a literal and purposive approach to interpretation.
They also continue to use traditional aids in seeking to give effect to Parliament’s
intention. The HRA does not radically change that, but there are ways in which the
ECHR changes the approach and the balance between judiciary and legislature.
Straining to avoid a declaration of incompatibility means judges going further in
reading in and out words in statutory provisions. Does this occasionally mean that
they are, in fact, doing violence to the intention of Parliament?
While this doesn’t produce a fundamental change to the rules of statutory
interpretation, the emphasis on finding a way of reading provisions as compatible
with the ECHR has led to a difference in approach (e.g. Feldman, 2005) and a subtle
shift in the relations between judiciary, legislature and executive.