Just 17 Seconds in the Air... | King Air 350 Texas Crash

Addison Airport, Texas. This King Air 350 was just about to depart for Florida. On board there were 8 passengers and 2 flight crew and very shortly this flight was going to be in chaos.
We break down the timeline of events, from engine start to the devastating crash, highlighting critical moments during the ill-fated flight. The pilots skipped essential checklists and emergency procedures, leading to a catastrophic incident shortly after takeoff.
Join us as we analyse the NTSB's findings and discuss the factors leading to this tragic aviation accident. Learn about the potential role of procedural lapses and the challenges investigators faced in determining the exact cause of the airplane crash.
This video serves as a somber reminder of the importance of adherence to safety protocols in aviation and the profound impact it can have on the lives of those on board.
Final Report: data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/ap...

[@CuriousPilot90]

** The aircraft registration has been blurred as it is a current live registration for an aircraft not related to this incident. Hopefully the blurring isn't too distracting! If you have any suggestions for other incidents you would like turned into a video please me me know!

[@rubixgeek2561]

If it is the base King Air from MSFS (which it seems like from the avionics), then you can change the registration (Tail Number) on the aircraft under "Customization" before loading into the airport. Hope this helps!

[@Mrbfgray]

New here--well done Sir. Subbed.

[@LtKrunchy]

Just wanted you to know (so you can correct it or watch out in the future), at approximately 0:28-0:29 the headphones & safety jacket disappeared off the ground crew member… It happened at the same time as the date appeared, like it was on the same video timeline layer… Love your videos, very informative & entertaining… hope this helps out…

[@CuriousPilot90]

@@rubixgeek2561it does, thanks! :)

[@CuriousPilot90]

@@LtKrunchyalways happy to receive constructive feedback. Thanks :)

[@johndonovan6840]

I’ve just retire from a 43 years flying career , 37 of them as an airline pilot, and was invited to fly a corporate job. As soon as i started my training I was literally bullied by the chief pilot in the firm cause I was making a point on checklists and standard procedures of the airplane’s manufacturer. I decided to stay retired..Checklists are a waste of time and fuel said the boss..checklists, SOPs and good CRM are vital to the safety of our flights.

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

Excellent decision making @johndonovan!. I’m recently retired as well from a FAR 91 Corporate Flight department. We operated G-550s and Falcon 900EX Easy aircraft worldwide. I’m sure it took you all of a few minutes to make that decision. What utter rubbish coming from a chief pilot!

[@lawrencerose5558]

Ditto. After a career with United and the FAA, I got a job starting in the right seat of a biz jet. I lasted for about 10 trips. As much as I wanted to fly again and positively influence their operation I ended up parting company with them. Many of these operators, do to the economics , cut corners and compromise safety. Buying or leasing a multi million dollar aircraft doesn’t make you an airline.

[@brentsutherland6385]

People are paying big money for corporate aviation, that isn't safe.

[@dave0351]

Part 91 can be the Wild West. I believe you made the right decision.

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

@@lawrencerose5558 Just curious here. Was this 135 flying or 91 ? The vast majority of Corporate FAR 91 Flight Departments have very high standards and safety records. Of course, there are some exceptions. I was very fortunate during my 35+ year career to be employed by such a company.

[@edadan]

When I was still a student pilot, I was asked one day if I wanted to ferry an airplane back to the school. I flew up to the airport with a flight instructor that I did not know. We arrived, I got out and jumped in the other airplane. Almost immediately after I got my radio turned on, the flight instructor in the other airplane was telling me to “hurry up”. I was so rushed that I almost missed turning my fuel shutoff to the on position. I’ve heard of accidents happening because of this…just enough fuel in the lines for takeoff, then the engine quits. Needless to say, I never flew with this guy again.

[@LloydCrumrine]

When I was a student pilot and worked as a line boy I was asked to fly an aircraft which had been left at an airport a hundred miles away because the pilot was not instrument rated and had left the aircraft there. I was flow down to pick it up , did the preflight and checked the log books . all was in order until as I was screaming down the runway I found I had an inop airspeed indicator. I had a lot of time in this aircraft so I continued the takeoff using my feel for the airplane. I continued to destination uneventfully but gave dispatch a piece of my mind.

[@gedstrom]

I had a scary situation while I was a student pilot in 1972. I was doing one of the solo 'cross-country' flights required for my private pilots license in a Cessna 150. My plans were completely checked out with my instructor before he approved them and signed my log book. It was a 3-legged flight and was planned out to return well before sunset. However, I ran into delays on the ground at my 2 intermediate stops and by the time I got back to my home base, it was DARK. My instructor had not had me out on any night landings before, and I was not authorized to be out at night, so this was something totally new to me and scary. This was while I was in the Navy and I was landing at Naval Air Station Alameda, California. I remember how dark it was out as I lined myself on the center-line lights and started a slow descent to the runway. Being a military field, I had plenty of runway space for the landing, but I had a burnt-out landing light and was unable to see the ground coming up on me and thus could not do my usual flare prior to touchdown. So, I just continued my slow descent until I hit the runway and landed safely. I was shaking afterwards and never told my instructor or anyone else about it. I gave up flying in 1982, so it has been over 40 years since I was last in the pilot's seat!

[@MovieMakingMan]

Did you report him? I know it would be intimidating since you were just beginning. I wonder how long he flew before crashing.

[@linuxranch]

The lesson you should have learned was, don't start a flight that will take you into conditions you aren't prepared for. The safest thing to do would have been to spend the night in a hotel at airport 2, and depart in the morning. I ended up being late returning from leave, one thanksgiving. Three days late. I spent the time in the hotel until the weather improved. An instrument rated pilot with three fellow college students was going to the same destination. He attempted the flight three times, before he finally made it to our shared destination. Each time returning to the departure airport. Gethomeitis cost them about 6 extra flight hours.. and the same number of hotel nights. I spent the time in the hotel and the pool. And arrived at our combined destination within 30 minutes before the other pilot and passengers.. And those flights trying to get in would have been nerve wracking for pilot and pax.

[@utah20gflyer76]

I don’t ever turn my fuel selector to off, the benefit is I might save some fuel if there is a mechanical issue, the downside is it could kill me if I forget it. Seems like an obvious choice.

[@McsMark1]

Not weighting luggage, a history of not doing a weight and balance calculations, a history of not going through the checklist & a Co-pilot not type rated IS A RECIPE FOR DISASTER.

[@user-zy3zd3sx2d]

It's a recipe in past tense as in no longer. This tragedy was totally PREVENTABLE. Complacency kills. RIP.

[@mtnairpilot]

I would say that the first of those three are indicators of a pilot who had done this for so long he had become complacent. He's typical of a lot of old school pilots you see around the airport who say things like "I can fly the box it came in." While not a good practice, a King Air 350 has no problem performing at 600 lbs over gross. And, a co-pilot (type rated or not) is not required on this airplane. So, IMHO, the "recipe for disaster" was the pilot's complacent attitude.

[@frankmutz7929]

A pilot should know when to do a weight and balance. Not necessary on every flight. But certainly there is a point when there are enough people and baggage that doing a weight and balance is a must.

[@belindakt]

​@@frankmutz792913:52

[@RobertEllsworth-di3hk]

Technically don’t even need two pilots for this airplane.

[@JeaneGenie]

This old pilot may have had many flight hours under his belt, but was obviously complacent and reckless. Feel sorry for the passengers.

[@bogan-slayer7469]

He had 16,450 hours of flying time. Which, depending on the individual, could be described as only 1 hour of flying time, but taken 16,450 times.

[@johngreydanus2033]

Flying calls for care, not courage. It’s time to fly high, not high time to die. It’s better to be an old pilot than a bold pilot.

[@TacticalBuffoonary]

I was going to say arrogance and complacency by the pilot. It seems retarded the Co pilot did nothing regardless of the rules. These 2 neophytes killed those innocent people because they were lazy and careless. If the FFA requires Air traffic controllers to retire at age 55 the same should be for pilots’ it may not be fair but those innocent people would still be alive.

[@e6bav8r]

How can you say he was reckless?

[@johngreydanus2033]

@@e6bav8r Don't troll me U clown. O, wait, how can I say that?

[@georgecantley6320]

One of the passengers on this flight had been a Flight Attendant for a defunct airline I once worked in reservations for. Even though I didn't know her well, having only seen her during non-rev trips, this video made my hair stand up. One of our Captains lived within sight of that airport and knew her really well. NO CHECKLISTS?!? I am MAD at the arrogance of that pilot. The cabin graphics of this made me feel the same terror she must have felt along with everyone else; I feel physical shock after watching this. May God Bless Everyone.

[@hendrikdebruin4012]

God does not automatically bless everyone. Perhaps some in the plane did not even know Him?

[@JayBee-cr8jm]

@@hendrikdebruin4012 Your parents failed.

[@StephenFlynn-xl2fw]

I would let God speak for himself. @@hendrikdebruin4012

[@chrishartley4553]

@@hendrikdebruin4012 Was your comment really needed?

[@hendrikdebruin4012]

@@chrishartley4553 The term God bless everyone is used so flippantly it has no meaning. Do people know how to live a life blessed by God. I think THAT comment was not really necessary. It is meaningless without context. BTW who is "everyone"? Does that include murderers , rapists and child molesters. Yes bless them as well I suppose...

[@jaredlazaron8414]

You can fly your whole life... but it only takes once. There's no room for complacency in the cockpit.

[@Cazador60140]

Only when yo go to the lew

[@tripacer8259]

That is EXACTLY what happened! I have seen it many times, they take "stuff" for granted....

[@santii9305]

Usually these videos do not blame the individuals but gosh it's so difficult not to that in this story. Literally every factor that lead to the tragedy was caused by the Captain negligence

[@CuriousPilot90]

Like I say in the video, I would never blame the flight crew for their actions during an incident. It's very easy to make judgements when you are not present and with hindsight. But with this incident, there are many things that are not excusable that perhaps added to the crash. Not using checklists or even spending the time to carry out the relevant checks before departure is not good. Added to that the attitude towards weight and balance shows a wider issue of complacency which becomes a problem when it impacts safety.

[@FameyFamous]

A large share of the blame goes to the second pilot for failing to slow down and remind his colleague about the procedures.

[@buyaj7693]

The second pilot had belittled by the Pic and didn't have the experience to challenge him unfortunately.. the pic is 100% at fault

[@NoelKerns]

@@FameyFamous - Sure, but in reality, it's difficult for a young, relatively low-time pilot to start calling out out the senior member of the crew. Easy to cast blame in retrospect, but in the moment, pretty hard for the kid to actually make waves with a guy with 16K hours.

[@judd_s5643]

@@FameyFamousthat’s right! When ever I fly with another pilot I do the checklist even if the pilot in command is/has not. I look at it this way, my butts up there too. I do not fly in planes I don’t have access to the engine/flight controls either.

[@steveststst2968]

The first time I was told to keep a hand on the throttle was when renting another plane for my checkride. It literally saved me once when landing in a very gusty storm.

[@57Jimmy]

Jumping into the cockpit seat like a teenage driver rushing into his Amazon delivery van to get to the next stop was far from professional. So sad others died because of this pilots complacency.😢

[@ChabbaD90]

The crash is haunting. Must’ve been terrifying for everyone on board- and it’s awful it was avoidable. Another great video though, I love the way you explain things! Thanks 😊

[@CuriousPilot90]

Thank you very much. :)

[@kmg501]

It seems like it may be an idea for a system for pilots to send in letters of concern (and not anonymously either, IE usable for follow up questions) about fellow pilots when they see things that are obviously wrong or dangerous about the operational habits of their fellow pilots. The PIC here was simply a bad pilot who wasn't being called out on it. It would have been better for everyone including him if he was called out on it, so he could change his operational behavior.

[@adotintheshark4848]

going inverted after takeoff would scare the crap out of everyone on board.

[@johnpage735]

Complacency kills. I wonder who did this guys training?

[@folkblues4u]

Checklists can be tedious, but they save lives. Only have to forget one little thing one time for it to be the last mistake you ever make.

[@jeffrobertson5310]

One of my life long friends and his wife were on this flight. Still miss Steve and Gina.

[@jeffrobertson5310]

I do.@@user-zl2cj9ci4q

[@louisbrucetatarsky9817]

Oh my, so sorry to hear this! May you find comfort and peace in Christ. You are loved.

[@ValerieGriner]

So sorry for your loss.

[@zebop917]

In the course of my career I’ve flown many times as a science crew member on the flight deck. I can’t remember any time when the flight crew took off without going through the checklists and without the pilot monitoring covering the power levers to guard against accidental movement.

[@thecloneguyz]

If you knew for a fact that a pilot was cutting Corners would you automatically say I'm not getting on this f****** airplane? And absolutely stand your ground until they were done?

[@MrFadass]

Witnessed this live and subsequently drove past the aftermath for months. So crazy unlocking a memory on KZbin randomly.

[@aeomaster32]

Even on my Citabria, I had a written checklist, and used it every time. Even after stopping for a coffee, I would do a full walk around. Bugs in the pitot or Starlings in the engine bay were always a possibility.

[@wesrobinson7366]

I like this reply. When I was 12 flying with a family friend in a Citabria (1982), we lost our engine. Actually a piston when through the fabric. Every time I flew with him we went through a check list and emergency procedure in case he had a medical emergency. Without hesitation I did my job of looking for a place to land and he worked the radio and controls. We landed in a cornfield safely and I attribute the calm nature of it all the rigorous training I did at a young age. I only wish this pilot had the focus of my 12 year old self, those people would still be alive.

[@dannyj5688]

What a shame that a "bad" pilot has to take so many innocent people with him!!!

[@cheddar2648]

"Bad" pilots do not make it to thousands of hours of PIC time and 71 years of age. Other factors were in play here.

[@fbnick9987]

@@cheddar2648 well go on..name them. The guy had a HISTORY of arrogant slackness.

[@michaelbeattie8106]

He was complacent and check lists not needed. What a horrific death.

[@dannyj5688]

@@cheddar2648 HE was "LUCKY" and his luck ran out!!!

[@serisingh]

It makes me angry that aquaintences of the accident pilot knew he didn’t properly follow checklists and didn’t report that. Them reporting possibly could’ve saved at least 8 lives.

[@josh2961]

That’s a really good point! I guess it falls in the category of ‘nothing bad has happened before’ so they just let it slide…

[@larryroyovitz7829]

Good point, but no one wants to be a snitch.

[@malcolmwhite6588]

@@larryroyovitz7829 yeah, quite right much better to say nothing ,a disaster happens and say :well , not my fault I didn’t fly

[@malcolmwhite6588]

@@josh2961 that is the hardest part. I have been a lot of my career in oil and gas production and very often things are wrong without anything happening and the challenges to raise those things because it’s too late once something has happened.

[@justinborysenko3885]

Who would you report him to? He owned the plane. Sure you could call the FAA maybe somebody from the FAA would call and “investigate”.

[@Codehead3]

It’s amazing that the PIC made it to 71 years old!!!

[@josh2961]

Things rarely go wrong, maybe because of this complacency set in. It was only when something did go wrong that it highlighted the lax behaviours of the accident Pilot.

[@mikes9759]

I've told a lot of people, that not doing all of the things you're supposed to do have killed a lot of people!! Even experienced ones!!

[@johngreydanus2033]

“Remember there are old pilots and there are bold pilots, but there are no old bold pilots. That’s a saying of Harry Copewell’s up at Boston, and he ought to know. He’s been flying since 1911 and still at it.”

[@tomreid5002]

@@johngreydanus2033 So hes been flying for 113 years? Or was that a typo?

[@johngreydanus2033]

@@tomreid5002 it’s a quote of a quote, but given all the dyslexic numbers here, I can see how you could be confused 🫤

[@josh2961]

Checklists, checklists, checklists! I know it must become tedious, especially after doing them for years. But like you said, 7 minutes from engine start to take off is madness, no time for run up checks etc… such a shame. I feel for the co-Pilot that was just another passenger here! Anyway, great presentation and thank you for being this story to us.

[@jaws666]

Plus a pilot who was 71 years old....how was he still allowed to fly commerical aircraft AND the bags were not weighed...2 major red flags right there

[@robertorambelli9618]

So, why was the age of the PIC an issue?, he had a First Class medical.. Was the flight IFR or VFR? Run up checks are normally required on the first flight of the day, was this one? Seven minutes from start to take off is not even a record breaker for a VFR departure. Is the use of a checklist required undef Pt.91?

[@northernlite3368]

@@robertorambelli9618 The use of a checklist may or may not be required by FAA rules (DNK, I am not american) but it is a viable tool to be used by all common sense rules in the world in a Piper cub or in a A 380 and anything in between (Learn from the mistakes of others, you will not live long enough to make them all yourself- Author UNK)

[@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549]

@@robertorambelli9618this pilot crashed a perfectly flyable aircraft killing everyone on board and endangering people on the ground, therefore the pilots age, experience and professionalism can all be questioned. I’m not sure that this flight was operated under part 91, it may have been under part 135 as a charter flight.

[@eduardozumbado415]

SOP's forever.

[@josephledkins3464]

Friction Lock not set for the throttles?? Two handed rotation?? Overweight, and regularly get in and no checklists……….the issues just added up to this moment. Speechless.

[@veritas6466]

When I went through flight school, the instructor taught us accidents are usually a combination of three issues.

[@robertorambelli9618]

Was the airplane overweight? How do you know that?

[@josephledkins3464]

According to the NTSB, they calculated the to plane to be 660 pounds overweight at take off

[@josephledkins3464]

That was a low number in this case

[@JBM425]

@@robertorambelli9618The 10:25 mark in the video says so.

[@ytuser0449]

While there is tons of stuff mentioned in this video, the fact is if he kept his hand on the throttles, which is one of the first things everyone is taught, the accident wouldn’t have happened.

[@rclarkcarpenter]

It’s actually not what is taught when you get into larger aircraft. The temptation to abort AFTER V1 would be too great if your hand is still on the throttles. In jets and large turboprops the procedure is to take your hand off the throttles when passing V1. There are of course many other considerations. When I fly the king air 350 single pilot I don’t take my hand off of the throttles due to the fact that no one is in the right seat backing me up. I think the risk in that situation is higher by taking my hand off. All things considered I find making an ill advised abort beyond V1 to be less risk than taking my hand off and risking throttle migration at rotation. I’ve experienced throttle migration at rotation and it seriously got my attention. Pilots MUST learn from these oversights (friction settings) as well as from accidents like this one.

[@stevenstyles7602]

Yes, yes, keep you’re hand on the throttle levers. Rotating with one hand is basic stuff. When flying a stick aircraft, there’s only room for one hand anyway.

[@ebikecnx7239]

Well it was 2 pilot so Pilot Not Flying should have power. Pilot Flying has both hands on yoke after pushing throttles up and saying "set takeoff power" to PNF. It's not a case of pilot flying should not have had both hands on yoke, as he should actually do under proper 2 crew flying...it's a case of 2 crew with no SOPs. In Canada it's a 2 crew airplane and flown professionally with PF and PNF calling out SOP operations with everything. This was just crappy sloppy crew with neither doing proper 2 crew roles. They certainly never went through FlightSafety type ratings if they flew like they did with no crew coordination.

[@ebikecnx7239]

@@rclarkcarpenter after saying "set power" the PNF takes the throttles in larger aircraft then both hands are on the yoke well before V1

[@camarocraig7060]

I am a 4000+- hour pilot, in every situation when the rpms start to roll back, my very first reaction is hand on the throttle, because it was engrained into me by my 20,000+ hr CFI, that in almost every case, the throttle is the culprit. Heck I even had throttle migration in a 172s one time.... It happens more than any of us can imagine.

[@user-wo6zt1hf9q]

I fly model airplanes, and even I use a checklist. I was at the field a few days ago, and someone crashed immediately after takeoff because he forgot to plug in the wing servos. He didn't even check if his control surfaces were moving before taking off. This is what happens when you skip the checklist, but in this case, they lost their lives, how much more important is using a simple checklist when lives are at stake? These pilots were NOT professionals.

[@pawelgrott1278]

With regards to the pilot colleagues who knew: Difference of being or not being a snitch is sometimes hard to balance, in a regular life. Yet in aviation, when it concerns human life, be an honest snitch. Tell the authorities about any misbehaviours, and tell the person concerned that you do, too

[@Steve211Ucdhihifvshi]

I think its important to also communicate with each other first, if someone is slipping up, get to the root cause, ask hey why did you do that or not? Explain why you do it, others etc dont target and attack, practice makes perfect in approaching dificult conversations, but i know from my own experiences its much better when someone comes to you directly than foing to your boss and bitching like a little puss. I mean if they arent responsive, and Ive been there too, go above. If this was a case of pilot complacency and it was well known by others, then by not speaking up your equally as guilty as the pIC for not doing the right thing.

[@jeffwelch7920]

I flew the KA350 for Wheels Up for 2 years. This Addison accident happened during that two year period. The procedures at UP was NFP calls V1, FP removes hand from throttles and places said hand on wheel. NFP does not guard throttles. Left engine throttle rollback is common in King Airs when the friction lock is set at ease for taxi and not tightened for takeoff. UP had already lost N800UP at KOSU from an excursion to the left off the runway at KOSU during takeoff. None of us were given any details about that accident. I suspect throttle rollback. The day of the accident I sent an urgent message to my Chief Pilot “Bill”. And explained this as a throttle rollback accident at Addison. I was told to bugger off that it was none of my business. I left the company when COVID hit. To the Brest of my knowledge the NFP’s still do not guard the throttles. The King Air 300 accident ast Tucson, and the King Air 200 at KICT (into the FSI building) were carbon copies of the Addison accident. Rollbacks. Totally preventable. Secondly Mr. King Air, Tom Clements, King Air Academy has a great article/video on this subject.

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

Our company SOP was very similar. The exception being that the NFP would back up the setting of takeoff power and after the V1 call. Friction locks are on the checklist for a reason. Power levers can most certainly creep back if the locks aren’t tensioned correctly. Another accident that occurred was a BE-B200 in KRFD a few years ago. Friction locks are suspected in that one too.

[@demagescod9657]

YEa, I dont understand why KA operators are trying to pretend to be a jet and remove hand from power lever at v1... especially when this is a known thing... Guard that damned PCL and keep a hand behind it at least... If something happens and you need two hands to fly then you can move it, but FFS Power lever migration is KNOWN to happen

[@77Avadon77]

I've never heard of a PIC without a hand on both throttles during rotation and climb-out. Seems suicidal, and apparently it is.

[@demagescod9657]

@@77Avadon77 it is done on every takeoff in a jet... and many do it in the King airs as well.

[@77Avadon77]

@@demagescod9657 So I'm starting to learn. Maybe they need to re-think that after this accident. Some methods are tride and true.

[@packard1650v]

Part of pilot training is one hand on the power lever at take off.

[@brianbarry9177]

Thank you for your analysis! I’m a brand new pilot and like reminders of how to keep myself and my passengers safe! Always use checklists!

[@CuriousPilot90]

It's always important to keep learning. That's why I think it is important for people to know of these incidents so lessons can be learnt. I remember making a video on a similar incident with a King Air in Melbourne, Australia. For some reason, it has always stuck with me, as in that case it was believed that the rudder trim was set all the way to the left for take off. Even though your trim is always checked and set for take off, I always give a double/triple check because of that incident.

[@brianbarry9177]

@@CuriousPilot90 keep making videos and I will keep learning! I’m flying a 182 and it’s been getting it’s annual for the past 2 months….it’s ready now and I’m wondering how much my skills have degraded since I got my certificate 3 days before the plane went to the A&P.

[@MovieMakingMan]

And ALWAYS speak out if a captain doesn’t know what he’s doing or is reckless.

[@chrisw4562]

Thanks for sharing. Things are always more clear in hindsight, but the one or the things my PP instructor drummed into our heads was to hold the throttle during takeoff until we reached cruising altitude, and that was in a single engine Cessna.

[@77Avadon77]

I know right, that part baffles me beyond belief. That is standard no matter what you're flying.

[@oboealto]

I’ve seen a lot of crash investigations where there was a vast difference in age and experience between the two pilots. The younger pilots naturally feel overshadowed and afraid to speak up their mind, which too often leads to a very weak CRM. Whereas the captain’s Russian roulette attitude was probably the first hole in the Swiss cheese here, had the co-pilot insisted on doing things right, this crash would never have happened. It’s time to look into a new legal requirement that prohibits rostering pilots of two vastly different levels together. In addition to that, those tedious checklist have been written in blood. No checklist? No co-pilot. Gets up and leaves. This must be the life-saving rule of every co-pilot in the world, for the safety of everyone onboard (and on the ground). Thanks for another excellent video, I hope the lessons it teaches help save lives. RIP to everyone on board.

[@TheRayDog]

There's always unintended consequences in micromanaging to such a degree. Younger pilots can and do learn well with far more experienced pilots. Prohibiting that dynamic would mean, what, younger with young? Older with old? That'd lead to overall lack of experience being passed on. The answer is for this self-governing population to damn well speak up. Un-damn-thinkable for the co to say nothing about these procedures, and your "get up and leave" is the only solution.

[@CuriousPilot90]

Interesting point! As much as the 'cockpit gradient' is attempted to be reduced, it still comes through sometimes. Also, like you say, as a co-pilot, you need to be willing to point out, even to the point of refusing to continue, if major safety aspects are being missed.

[@TheRayDog]

@@CuriousPilot90 And we may see more of this dynamic as the pilot shortage and lack of piloting interest continues. Standards dropping, weak kneed students, etc. I shudder.

[@danpatterson8009]

The presence of a careless pilot in a senior position would suggest that the company allowed it, so a junior pilot would have to wonder what would happen if he rocked the boat.

[@TheRayDog]

@@danpatterson8009 I don't disagree. And I don't mean to heap blame on the co, considering the pilot is 100% to blame here. But we need courageous young pilots to stand up, too. The co was one slice of the Swiss cheese. That's all. This is one of the most sickening accidents stories I've seen. I cry for the passengers lost. Can't lose sight of that.

[@paulcox4273]

I recall this crash at ADS it’s crazy to think all of those flight hours and it only take one mishap, he’s probably gotten away with it many times but eventually complacency will catch up ….

[@chrisedwards7856]

Just a student pilot, but I was astonished that there was not right rudder input at the inception of this tragic incident. Thanks for sharing.

[@prussiaaero1802]

This is so similar to the king air crash at Essendon in Melbourne Australia.

[@illletmyselfout.8516]

I remember it well very sad

[@GregSr]

I'm not a pilot but I spent almost 4 years as an observer in a KC-135 flight simulator. Back in the late 70's, I was a maintenance tech responsible for the proper operation of the simulator. I cannot count how many times a pilot stepped on the wrong rudder pedal following a simulated engine failure during takeoff. Just like in the real plane, the simulator would crash. Then the instructor pilot would angrily chastise the pilot for causing an avoidable crash. Referring to the rudder pedals, the IP would yell repeatedly, "always step on the good engine(s)" when responding to lost power. Fortunately, the simulator is serving its purpose by allowing pilots to make stupid mistakes and still survive.

[@craigmackay1004]

It is interesting how in so many accidents the pilots were “ very experienced “, CRM is key to avoiding tragedy.

[@ItsAllAboutGuitar]

They get complacent and get away with such things for many years.

[@scdawn8658]

Thanks for the vid. It's one I haven't heard before. Well done.

[@johnwhitmore5408]

I flew a Navajo with a captain like that. Let me tell you, it is very stressful to the point that I refused to fly with him anymore. Several weeks later, he was ferrying a small single engine plane back to his home airport. He was alone and I am not certain what he did and did not do. He was killed when he crashed into a parking lot shortly after takeoff.

[@chasg8183]

Thank God no one was with him

[@josh2961]

I love these weekends! My two favourite channels, MentorPilot and CuriousPilot uploading videos… yes!

[@DennisGentry]

I'm not flying a lot anymore, but it would just feel wrong to not run at least a short checklist, even a physical "flow" checklist, or one printed on the panel; quickly brief the plan for an engine failure, keep at least my hands on the forward throttles (if not also the copilot's), and to call out V speeds. Even when I'm flying by myself, I say this stuff out loud half the time as I do it. It really adds just seconds and the routine has me ready for whatever might happen.

[@sophiasocal68]

When I was a student Pilot in 1991 I took my hamd off the throttle once during takeoff. Instructor asked " Do you like having an engine?" while simultaneously placing my hand back on the throttle. Never forgot that.

[@sigbauer9782]

I couldn't get a 172 from cold to take-off this fast.

[@robertorambelli9618]

It clearly shows that you are a good pilot.

[@vjfeefeecat586]

I really do like your video content 🎉 thank you. This one was tragically preventable. RIP all.

[@CuriousPilot90]

So true, and thank you 😊

[@drstevenrey]

Can I just add, that my hand is on the throttle from brake release to power reduction for climb, with the single one second when the gear is selected up. I learned, thank you Geoff, to never ever trust a multi engine aircraft unless at altitude. I did have an examiner in Europe that once asked me to rotate with both hands, upon which I immediately closed both throttles and never rotated. Actually I kicked him out of my aircraft at the end of the runway.

[@davidlegeros1914]

This is a very good example of VMC rollover and the need for pilots to plan their departure: 1. Conduct a takeoff briefing 2. Calculate weight and balance and performance 3. Use checklist discipline 4. The need to speak up on the part of the copilot. The graphics are excellent and can be used for any multiengine pilot and instructor. Thank you for your very thorough analysis of this accident.

[@hugostiglitz6914]

I personally know of two incidents where the Kingair 200 crashed due to asymmetric power caused by the throttle friction locks. Its amazing how quick you can lose control when you're low and slow in these aircraft!

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

If that happens and the auto feather is now disabled, the airplane is virtually impossible to control. The 350 requires that the auto feather and rudder boost be operational to be able to dispatch the aircraft. There is way too much power and way too much drag to keep it under control.

[@hugostiglitz6914]

@@douglaswhitcomb9729 I've not worked on Kingairs for more than 10 years. Not sure any autofeather would be involved if it's just a reduction in power. You may know, I'm not sure!

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

@@hugostiglitz6914 I do have a 350 type rating. It has been many years since I flew them, however. The 350, unlike, the 200s requires that the auto feather and rudder boost are operable to be able to dispatch the aircraft. There is no MEL relief for the 350. In King Airs with Auto Feather (most of them have it with the exception of early A-90s) there is a switch to “Arm” the system. This is done prior to takeoff and as I remember is on the before takeoff checklist. When advancing the power levers above a certain PLA the system now becomes active. I don’t remember the actual torque value or N1 that this happens. This is also confirmed by annunciation. This should be one of the takeoff callouts by the PNF. If you have a power lever(s) either pulled back or creep back below that activation PLA, the Auto Feather is now de-activated. Even with the switch in the “Armed” position. The 350 has so much power and an unfeathered propeller has so much drag it renders the aircraft uncontrollable. That’s why there is no MEL relief for the 350. At Flight Safety and of course in the simulators, we would attempt to fly with an engine failure at V1 without auto feather and rudder boost. It was impossible to control and unless you pulled the operable engine immediately to flight idle, you would loose control and crash. In this tragic accident it is believed that the friction locks were not set and the left power lever crept back with a loss of power and no feathering of the prop.

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

This particular accident is very difficult to look at and study on so many levels. It has been many years since I flew the 350, so there may be some things that have changed. The 350 and 1900 series King Airs are certified under FAR 23 Commuter Category. If I recall, it is SFAR 23. The King Air 200s and 90s are FAR 23 aircraft. The 350 is very similar to FAR 25 Transport Category aircraft in terms of certified V speeds and runway performance. BFL vs accelerate stop or go. Second segment climb as well. Unlike the 200 and 90 series, the Auto feather and Rudder Boost must be operable to dispatch. No MEL relief there. It is common practice for 350 operators to remove their hand from the power levers at the V1 call. Our company SOP required that the PNF would “back up” the setting of takeoff power and after V1. Flying jets (depends on the specific aircraft) is the same SOP with the exception of “backup” of power levers. Additionally, per SOP, we would conduct full governor and auto feather checks first flight of the day. This was obviously not completed in this case. Although the destruction of the aircraft inhibited the investigators, I think it was due to the fact that the friction locks were not set. This is a checklist item. If the left power lever crept back, it disables the auto feather. In the FSI simulators, we would attempt to fly the aircraft with an engine failure at V1 without the rudder boost and auto feather. It was impossible to control. This was just to prove the point that they must be operable. The lack of briefings, CRM, checklists, no W&B calculation, rushing to get airborne, all ended in disaster. Another extremely important factor here was recurrent training. If I remember correctly, the PIC was receiving recurrent training in the aircraft. In my opinion, this is wholly insufficient. You cannot receive the appropriate level of training without motion based simulation. Who wants to risk a multimillion dollar airplane training actual V1 cuts? This also calls into question the training that the company provided for their PNF. It sounds like little to none was received. Add this to the list of contributing factors. If the company was operating this aircraft with a “crew concept” then training for the PNF needed to be in place. It doesn’t matter if it’s a C-172 or a Gulfstream G-550, flying airplanes demands professionalism. Checklists, CRM (including single pilots) SOP, briefings, setting clear and defined expectations are a must.

[@mattwoodford1820]

If the PIC was in the process of receiving re-currency training, It seems like it's not a great idea for the second "pilot" to not be type rated as you effectively already have 1 pilot who is not quite up to scratch. I do wonder if it would be better to have a type rated co-pilot without any additional training requirements until the PIC's re-currency training has been satisfactorily completed. Where the co-pilot is not type rated and they are in this situation, they should be with a pilot who has no outstanding currency training. Maybe even a pilot examiner. I am not a pilot tho so these are just opinions without any form of experience to back them up

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

@@mattwoodford1820 The PIC was Type Rated in the 350. He had several Jet Type Ratings as well. FAR requires(FAR 61.58) that a Pilot in Command of a Jet receives training and a check every 12 months. Although this requirement is not the same for King Air type of aircraft, most crews will conduct, at a minimum, annual training at a facility that has motion base simulation. Flight Safety for example. It wasn’t a matter that the PIC wasn’t receiving recurrent training, but that it was being conducted in the actual aircraft vs a motion based simulator. In my opinion, you cannot receive the necessary level of training in the actual aircraft as you can a simulator because the risks are too high. These Simulators are very advanced and are exactly the same as the actual aircraft. Although it is a computer, the flight characteristics etc. closely resemble the aircraft. They need to be certified by the FAA to be used for initial and recurrent training. I have 8 Jet Type ratings, including the 350, and all initial training, recurrent training and flight checks were done in a simulator. As far as the Co-Pilot having a type-rating, it would depend on the operator requirements for their flight crews. I don’t feel that a type-rating is essential for Co-Pilots of the King Air 350. However, normal and emergency procedures training in the aircraft, company SOP, etc. is. Our flight department would use contract pilots at times and we required them to attend training at Flight Safety before conducting any actual flights. They would join us for a recurrent training session and train in the Sims. Of course there is a bit of additional cost, but we felt it was well worth it.

[@mattwoodford1820]

@@douglaswhitcomb9729 I guess the co-pilot would not always be required in the 350 depending on the type of flying if it is similar to the 99 which I've been fortunate to fly in many times almost always single pilot. Though we were classified as freight rather than passengers plus the flights were all sub 20 minute.

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

@@mattwoodford1820 That is correct. My type-rating in the 350 is for single pilot, however, we never operated that way. Our company required two pilots. Full time employees were all type-rated and we trained annually at Flight Safety.

[@mattwoodford1820]

@@douglaswhitcomb9729 It's the human factor that's the hardest to manage. I guess the trouble with SOP's can be the variance between different companies. Sounds like this would likely be caught in simulator at your company. Thanks for all the extra info :)

[@Travisesty]

Great video and it’s laid out great!! Details details details but NOT boring. Awesome !!

[@CuriousPilot90]

Glad you liked it!

[@LanceRomanceF4E]

I had to convince my 74 yr old father (retired fighter pilot) to stop flying. He flew a company owned TBM 850 turbo with about 2,500 hours flight time. He had recently passed his flight physical. I had not flown with him in 3-4 years, but was shocked how bad he was after a recent flight. He was very slow and deliberate and relied completely on auto pilot. ATC had to literally repeat every radio call. I flew two visual over head patterns from the right seat and watched him struggle during his visual patterns. I told the company chief pilot not to allow my dad to fly this aircraft again. Fortunately, dad agreed to stop flying before the company fired him. Too many elderly men are flying general aviation aircraft. It’s dangerous out there.

[@MartinMcAvoy]

That must have been a difficult conversation to hold with your pa but entirely necessary. Well done, sir.

[@Flumphinator]

I’m watching this in the park across the street from the new building that they built at the crash site. Crazy stuff.

[@j.t.5826]

I am not a pilot but had 25 yrs in another dangerous career. What I hated the most was a veteran thinking they know everything. That is the most dangerous people to be around with. It happens in other professions as well.

[@petrosstefanis6234]

Great video, well done.

[@mikemashburn155]

Very informative. great production, thanks.

[@CuriousPilot90]

Thanks!

[@LongEZpilot]

So much to unpack here... I fly the King Air B200 professionally, and when I became aware of this accident and its apparent cause, I was struck by just how unnecessary it was. To begin with, there is no need to omit checklists for the sake of "saving time." If you and your FO are efficient it's quite possible to do all pre-takeoff flows and checklists within 7-8 minutes and be ready to roll. It's all in how you manage your time and the division of duties in the cockpit. The rudder boost in our planes is checked during the runup, and it is normally left "on" but of course its position is checked. Even without it, keeping the aircraft under control in an engine failure at or above V1 is simply a question of centering the ball and flying the command bars, after which the engine failure drill is run which consists of cleaning up the aircraft, flying the appropriate airspeed, and confirming the engine failure and autofeather. If the autofeather fails to function, then the propeller is feathered using the appropriate lever and nothing further happens until 400' Above Ground Level (AGL). A properly trained crew can keep the aircraft under control and buy themselves enough time to get the aircraft cleaned up and climbing. But there was no engine failure at all, and I agree that the most likely cause of this was the lack of friction set on the power levers. So, if this item is forgotten or missed, what is the backup? At my company the SOPs state that either the Pilot Flying or the Pilot Monitoring must have their hand on the power levers at all times until 1000' AGL. At the "Rotate" call, the PF removes their hand from the power levers to rotate with both hands on the yoke, but the PM must keep their hand there and keep scanning both the engine instruments and the flight instruments. When through 1000' AGL, climb power is set and the status of the friction locks is double-checked before the PM removes their hand. With proper training and CRM, this inadvertent rollback of a perfectly good engine should never happen. When the loss of power was noticed, the Captain should have called "Engine failure, set max power" or words to that effect. The actions triggered by this call are for the PM to verify that the propeller levers are all the way forward and then push the power levers forward. These actions, taking roughly one second, would have immediately resolved the issue and control would not have been lost. The FO/PM apparently recognized the loss of power on the left engine (maybe he even looked at the gauges) but failed to glance just below them to see where the power levers were. The split should have been glaringly obvious. Compounding the problem is that the autofeather system would have been disarmed by the power lever sliding back, and a properly functioning engine would not have had the torque drop low enough (even at idle) to trigger the system in any case. Thus the loss of power would not have resulted in an autofeather activation. So between that and the landing gear being down, this was just a very bad situation requiring superior airmanship and good training to resolve. And sadly, this crew had neither. I find myself quite angry at this, actually, because those eight passengers had a right to expect that their pilots would behave professionally and do their best to get them safely to their destination. Their trust was badly betrayed. And yet...in spite of everything, the solution that could have saved their lives was tantalizingly close. If one of those two pilot had just thought to push the power levers forward...

[@scottwright8354]

There are many elements of this accident that are very similar to a B200 accident in Wichita, KS in October of 2014. I just looked up the NTSB final report for that accident because of the similarities. The pilot was doing a repositioning flight from what then was Midcontinent airport, now Eisenhower, to another local airport. He was alone on the airplane when after takeoff he declared an emergency, stating he'd lost the left engine. He failed to maintain directional control, didn't feather the engine or raise the landing gear, and was nearly inverted when he struck the simulator bay of Flight Safety International, killing a good friend of mine, along with three others in the sim bay. The NTSB investigation could find no reason for the power loss and was hindered by the post-crash fire and extensive damage. They speculated possible problems with the FCU, and a couple other possible reasons for the reported power loss but determined at least some power was still being produced on the left engine at impact. I lost my medical in 1994 and had been flying for a Fortune 100 company with two Falcon 10s as well as two 20s and a BE-58 Barron at the time. I was a captain on the 10. Our chief pilot was extremely knowledgeable and focused on safety. Following checklists for all phases of flight was the only way we were allowed to operate, which is the way it should be. He even brought in Archie Trammell, the renowned expert and primary developer of aviation radar two different times for an all-day seminar. Although there was some inter-department political nonsense that I had to deal with I felt fortunate to have worked under such a professional chief pilot.

[@raoulcruz4404]

My personal parameters for engine out is that if the bank angle goes beyond 45 degrees both throttles are brought to idle. Then treat the situation as a single engine aircraft loss of thrust.

[@donaldmalone2095]

I am not trying to shame you here and hope you dont take it for any other thing other than some guidance but you should rethink your personal policy if confronted with a engine failure after V1. Allowing the aircraft to bank 45 degrees should never happen. Proper training and recurrent training should teach that. while your thinking of going to idle with both engines is correct in order to get the wings level, the obvious down side to that is you will need to trade off altitude for airspeed to prevent going below stall speed. Unfortunately if the engine failure happens right after V1, and you haven't reached V2 the only thing you have accomplished by having both engines at flight idle is less engines noise during impact, because you will very likely run out of airspeed and drop down to the ground. The King Air just like all other twin engine aircraft during certification demonstrate that while operated within its flight manual limitations will be able take off and climb in the event of one engine fails. Most if not every airline pilot will tell you that once V1 has been reached you are safer to continue than to abort. the point I am making is that if you are flying a twin and have an engine failure, still treat and fly it as it is certified for and you have trained for. During an emergency the one thing you have going for you is that you trained for it and know what steps are required such as your immediate actions to your use of checklist are in order to keep the aircraft and all abort safe. And again I am not trying to talk down to anyone and simply hope to offer you a different view. Keep safe.

[@raoulcruz4404]

@@donaldmalone2095 I was speaking in generalities and in regards to the accident video. In the specific instance of take off V1, V2 engine failure primary is heading. If I recall my check ride standards,5 degrees change max. Proper engine out response should not allow any appreciable bank angle in any instance. However, in the event somehow I got behind the curve despite regular recurrent training, my policy would come into play. As a prudent pilot I must keep in mind that I can screw up or get into unexpected situations. If the accident pilot had the same policy, he might have had a better outcome instead of trying to salvage an out of control situation. My training had been to keep control and not get into a Vmc roll. I guess the same reason they no longer teach spin training. Train to avoid stalls and not get into a spin in the first place. I took spin training on my own initiative, just in case. I do appreciate constructive criticism. As a pilot community we need to critique and encourage each other.

[@MartinMcAvoy]

Calm and fair commentary from you, CP. I am sure that lives are saved, by studying your videos. Thanks.

[@CuriousPilot90]

That would be amazing if it were to happen. Thanks Martin, I know I am definitely a better pilot after studying these incidents. Thank you for the kind comment.

[@MartinMcAvoy]

@@CuriousPilot90 I forgot to sub, fixed now! 👍😀

[@chris55529]

Only 30 seconds in, and already I'm impressed. Just subscribed.

[@landychen9968]

Great video!

[@billsmith5166]

Well done. Subscribed.

[@RPPerry1984]

Great video! Subscribed

[@PatrickWilsonDestin30A]

enjoyed the video very much nice work!

[@ohger1]

What I don't get (as a real amateur flyer) is why the copilot didn't first check the throttles when the engines dropped rpm.

[@Axagoras]

He wasn't type rated on the aircraft so he might not have been aware of the throttle friction system and the risks associated with failing to utilize it. Pilot flying should have hands on throttle well up into climb-out. Really until autopilot is on or cruise/cruise-climb is established. But also, one of them should have also noticed the throttles falling back. Even innocuous items on the checklists can and do regularly prevent unnecessary deaths.

[@mmayes9466]

Because he was likely a token required by by the insurance company.

[@GorgeDawes]

This accident gives me a depressing sense of familiarity, since it features virtually the same sequence of events in the same type of aircraft as an accident I witnessed at Blackbushe airport in the UK back in 2000. Throttle migration due to insufficient application of the throttle friction nut leading to asymmetric thrust and a loss of control was also strongly suspected as being the cause of that accident. The only significant difference was that the weather that day was extremely foggy, meaning that pilot disorientation likely set in as soon as things started going awry. Loss of life in an accident is always tragic but it is especially so when it could have been prevented had the right lessons been learned from previous incidents.

[@XRP747E]

Your video was well done. Thank you.

[@dmfitzsim]

Good analysis and reporting.

[@CuriousPilot90]

Thank you. I'm glad you found it interesting.

[@JoeCollins-dyinat63]

My father flew for over 30 years. He said you only get one “Oh shit.”

[@scottw5315]

I fly a twin beech. If a throttle starts creeping back its' a pretty simple affair to push it back up. When flying any twin the immediate actions for an engine failure are mixture, props, throttles full forward. I know the King Air doesn't have a mixture control but still. I don't get this at all.

[@bradcrosier1332]

For the love of God, quit trying to put light aircraft procedures into transport category aircraft! On a transport aircraft, at V1 the everyone’s hands are moved AWAY from the power levers, so that no one attempts to abort the takeoff after V1 - period. They stay away until third segment climb is reached (400’ above field elevation minimum per regulation), and the aircraft has been configured for final segment climb (a.k.a. 4th segment). Light aircraft pilots need to quit pretending they understand transport aircraft operations, as there are significant differences in the procedures BECAUSE their certification and performance is significantly different. With proper technique (and auto-feather armed, as required by the regulation (the aircraft flight manual procedures), the airplane was completely capable of continuing the climb out and returning to land safely.

[@jimgw]

Pushing the power levers forward is a memory item for EFATO on the King Air Use rudder and aileron to control, Power up, Props up (prop rpm), Gear Up, Flap up. (Loose the flap straight away if used for T/O) Identify, check feather (auto feather), affected power lever closed, affected prop lever feather. Climb at V2, QRH at safe altitude. Many King Air operators have the 2nd pilot put their hand behind the power levers after V1 to stop them drifting back. There have been at least 2 other fatal crashes caused by this. Contributory here is the fact he was 8 knots slow on rotate, with the power lever closed the auto feather is disarmed (obviously), the pilot initially used the wrong rudder input despite the rudder boost system that would have put the correct rudder in. The situation was mishandled and no memory items actioned. King Airs are a handful with an engine failure, they require rapid correct rudder input even with the rudder boost and a good armful of aileron into the live engine. With the left prop in fine pitch, gear still down and the pilot countering the rudder boost there was only going to be one outcome.

[@bradcrosier1332]

@@jimgw - I stand corrected then, thank you! It’s been MANY years since I flew a King Air, and it was the 90 series, so obviously some differences there. That said, I thought I remembered part of the run up including pulling each power lever back to test the auto-feather on each engine - am I mis-remembering that too?

[@bradcrosier1332]

@@adventures7356 - Thanks, good to know I haven’t completely forgotten everything about it! So again, I’ll grant different aircraft, possibly different systems - how does that square with the above statement that regarding a power lever disarms the auto-feather?

[@scottw5315]

Yawn, the Twin Beech was the King air of its day. They're all dead. I can hardly believe that two pilots in the cockpit let a plane crash because of a friction lock not set. . But, you guys have al the answers don't you. As the great EK Gann said, rule books are made paper, they aren't much help in fiery crashes. One last thing. This is an opinion board here. Not a forensic analysis. You can stop clutching your pearls now.@@bradcrosier1332

[@AnotherPilot1]

Great video…perfect explanation.

[@jamesgraham6122]

I am qualified to fly the 300 series KingAir and have instructed on it for a major training organisation. This pilot had recently undergone training at a very professional training organisation, unfortunately, once out of the door, a pilot can revert to old, and in some cases, fatal mindsets. There's every likelihood that the friction locks were not set and in reality, there was no power 'failure' in the sense that both engines were capable of producing maximum power. In addition, the KingAir 350's PT6 Engines are able to produce circa 1000hp.. as such, in the event of a failure of one engine it may be necessary to reduce power on the opposite engine in order to get control of asymmetric thrust. I would be very surprised if during training the pilot was not advised to delay rotation for just a few knots above rotation speed when possible as this provides for better control in the event of an engine problem at or just beyond rotation. Be careful who you fly with and if you become conscious of any departure from good piloting practice, take a bus.

[@Atomsk102]

I live under the departure path from rwy. 15 at Addison. The turn from runway heading to 050 brings traffic right over my house. I've seen a lot of these guys go over in the last 5 1/2 years. I wonder how many of these pilots are as careless as this guy.

[@culdeus9559]

Just had another crash last week there.

[@garyb2392]

Amazing analysis! Amazing incompetence…some people can’t be trusted with people’s lives

[@davidhodson5086]

Excellent clear report

[@MrAlwaysBlue]

Spot on. I fly light aircraft. Any pilot is only one flight away from an accident. You may have flown that flight before, but you have never flown THIS flight before.

[@xYuki91x]

Damn... Accidents like these are as unnecessary as they are heartbreaking. 10 Lives lost for nothing... May they rest in peace.

[@sethtenrec]

Flying for nothing in the first place

[@JohnnyHandle279]

valuable analysis. tragedies are so often a result of strings of often under appreciated discrepancies in series. stay safe folks. use checklists. do the calcs.

[@the_phaistos_disk_solution]

Nicely done!

[@josephcovino9697]

Spot on, and great detail. CFIAM JOE COVINO. Lake Havasu, Arizona.

[@John-ev3rm]

You would think it would be instinctive to apply right rudder when rolling to the left or at least check the throttles after loss of rpms if friction settings were at fault.

[@TheAirborneDaddy17]

There are pilots and drivers of airplanes. Looks like we had a driver in the left seat on this one unfortunately.

[@billlawrence1899]

My God!! 36 years with United and I never once performed a take-off, lamding, of anythng in between without complete compliance with the checklist, no matter how well memorized it was. Read and respond. "Flaps 5." Flaps 5 verify on the guages and touch the handle to make sure it's in the detent. And so with every item on the list! That Air Florida crash makes me want to scream. "Anti-Ice" is on the checklist, and there is NO WAY IN HELL it should have been off!

[@marcusdurrett5655]

Fantastic video and analysis of the crash, unfortunately this accident should've never happen. I started my flying career flying with the PIC of this flight and have many stories to tell. My heart goes out to all the families involved in this accident as they should all be here today. One persons complacency and ego has affected so many people.

[@mkepler5861]

excellent analysis!!! yeah the pilot screwed ROYALLY, sorry for the pun. thumbs up and a sub from me mike

[@angelinasouren]

Oh, wow. My office once was right next to the destination airport. Just a bit of water in between, really. But before that was mentioned just before 0:47, I'd already gasped because what happened to that king air looked pretty dramatic and I want to know what happened so I'll keep watching. I hadn't heard about this yet. Sigh. This can't end well.

[@sdmckinlay]

Excellent analysis. Especially use of wrong rudder.

[@johnkilgore1055]

It’s also a known fact that if the power on the operating engine of a KA350 isn’t properly controlled (reduced) within mere seconds, that the 350 will uncontrollably roll into the dead engine. This is a characteristic of all twin engine aircraft with asymmetric thrust (wing mounted engines). Also, when I was flying corporate, (usually single pilot in a Cessna 421), I would read out the check list to myself, including the lost engine after takeoff procedures. I was also required to complete annual proficiency checks in the insured aircraft. Makes me wonder about the pilots training records.

[@adep6189]

Was just about to go out .. then this arrived .. oh well take my coat off and get into it .😂

[@CuriousPilot90]

Hopefully I don’t make you late!

[@Sean_Coyne]

I had the curious experience of flying with a group of "pilots", none of whom ever used checklists. As a result the accident rate was hilarious and expensive. Less amusing were the severed fingers, cut hands and one near disembowelment. I am of course talking about an r/c model airplane club. Wings fell off shortly after takeoff because they hadn't been screwed on. Models went out of control because the wrong one was selected in the transmitter...you name it. Batteries were connected with the pilot leaning over the prop and the throttle getting nudged with no safety cut off...that near hara-kiri was only stopped by his jacket zipper. Even the chief instructor, who had countless flying hours in military jets, government VIP flights and commercial airlines, lost models due to not using check lists. For the same thing to happen in a commercial flight operation, such as this video relates, is nothing less than criminal negligence of the highest order. What a pair of utter muppets.

[@dave0351]

I'm an MEI and I have a little time in the 350. This both breaks my heart and infuriates me at the same time. Please be diligent with safety ladies and gents. The time savings is not worth it.

[@thepurpleufo]

Great job in your presentation.

[@CuriousPilot90]

Thanks 😊

[@davidgardinera3620]

Good vid nicely explained. Think you nailed it on the friction lock.I thought it was compulsory for pic to leave hand on throttle during t/o and lnd.

[@CuriousPilot90]

Thanks David, I'm not sure if it is compulsory (perhaps solo pilot) but standard when multicrew, for the pilot monitoring to guard the power levers during takeoff.

[@dalemullins4562]

Pilot's; "we don't have time for check list" Jesus; "I'll give you time to think about that one"

[@RACECAR]

Its still crazy that I live just down the street from the airport where this incident happened (in my first full year of living here too) yet I wasn't fully aware at that moment in time despite my sister telling me that she saw smoke during her walk (Think she was far on the other side as she was walking when it happened). The real security videos I saw of that crash were the first time I was truly aware of it.

[@rogerferris5361]

13:33 Complacency is an inevitable killer in aviation or any profession involving man and machine. And old joke perhaps, but the sudden stop that occurs is all the evidence necessary for proof. Relentless training and RETRAINING are absolutely essential. As a 30,000 hour pilot with time in J-3 Piper Cubs up to and including the L1011 Tri-Star, I know how easily one can permit their experience to lead to complacency.

[@craigpennington1251]

Great video about a very sad story.

[@_KRose]

Another reminder of how much more worrying it is to fly on one of these small planes or "with a pilot friend". Such little regard for protocol and regulations would never fly with an actual reputable company. These things exist for a reason and anyone who goes out of their way to avoid them shouldn't be allowed to be a pilot.

[@davidmotter5140]

The king air is NOT a snall airplane dumbass thing ti say

[@Airpaycheck]

I would assume that the auto feather system would not function when the thrust lever is retarded (to prevent unintended feathering when aborting a takeoff). In aircraft I have flown with that system, if power loss is noted by the system with the thrust levers in the takeoff position, an engine failure is assumed and the prop feathers. So the theory that the levers moved on their own is plausible. Proper CRM, checklists and procedures would have prevented this accident. Using the correct rudder after observing the aircraft’s flight path would’ve helped as well.

[@CuriousPilot90]

Really good point, I believe the engine torque needs to be above 17% with the N1 above 88% for the autofeather to be armed.

[@douglaswhitcomb9729]

This is correct. The Auto Feather is “Armed” by a switch. It is “activated” when you advance the power levers to a certain degree of PLA. I don’t recall the torque or N1 values. If you pull or the power lever creeps back on its own the auto feather is now deactivated. That’s a really bad situation. Especially in a 350 series airplane.

[@joeianniello]

Nice analysis of this flight. Thanks

[@CuriousPilot90]

Thank you

[@FuturesInPastTense]

I was actually at Atlantic Aviation at KADS the morning of this event. I will never forget the sound of that aircraft crashing just a few hangars over.

[@blackhawkorg]

It wasn't the checklist that brought it down in an unsurvivable landing. It was the fact he didn't bring the angle of attack down low enough and improper rudder input. He stalled it. Had he kept it level and descending they may have survived. The landing gear and did he check the throttles? Error after error in flight sealed their fate. Rest in Peace

[@JBM425]

The checklist was a part of a pattern of neglect. Had they followed a checklist or at least done certain checks from memory, perhaps the crew might have discovered something amiss, or ensured the friction lock was properly applied for takeoff.

[@northernlite3368]

'' Learn from the mistakes of others, you will not live long enough to do them all yourself !'' _(well known aviation sentence by UNK author))

[@amyjohnston1017]

You are exactly providing alot of personal commentary on this.

[@fredvaladez3542]

I will never pilot a plane, but it is fascinating to learn about all the items a pilot has to check and be aware of.

[@robertquinlan9297]

How about having a scale that you can roll up on and enter the plane model number, that could calculate your weight and where center of gravity is? Weigh the front and weigh the back landing gear, sounds simple, I can drive my semi truck over a set of scales without even stopping, Caterpillar scales,