Semi-Skimmed Moral Realism

[@KaneB]

The Moral Domain: kzbin.info/www/bejne/nKXMp3iGqq1msKc Moral Disagreement: kzbin.info/www/bejne/ZnjbpZ1sarusm9k kzbin.info/www/bejne/b3XCqK17ppejZ5o

[@dumbledorelives93]

Man, I know this is a parasocial relationship, but you're someone I really wish I could grab a beer with and chat/be friends. You'd be such a great conversation partner. Keep up the great work doc!

[@KaneB]

Well if you're ever in the UK, feel free to let me know. You might be disappointed though; I'm an extreme introvert and my conversational skills are quite poor.

[@dumbledorelives93]

@@KaneB I'll definitely take you up on that offer. And as a fellow introvert, don't sell yourself short! You seem to do just fine when having discussions on philosophy topics on here with other people. Play to your strengths. Also, a pint or two can definitely do wonders in social lubrication and overactive frontal lobe inhibition haha

[@Voivode.of.Hirsir]

Looking good !

[@KaneB]

Thanks dawg

[@blamtasticful]

First, what's up dogs is the most awesome Dad-phrase intro. Please keep 🙏. Second, I haven't even watched yet and am still liking the video just from the epic title and thumbnail alone. Props

[@KaneB]

Thanks, I appreciate it!

[@frasertierney7044]

Nice shirt Kane. I really need to get around to reading Parfit, the criticism by Baumann that you put forward is an interesting one. Thanks for the video.

[@swelteringswine]

Love hearing what u got to say. Keep killing it bud

[@truediltom]

Loving the shirt, hair and general aesthetic. Just need a bucket hat, some orange tinted aviators, a cigarette, and some amyl nitrite.

[@ericb9804]

The reason why we find questions like "do facts exist?" meaningful is because, in all our endeavors, from science to ethics, we can't tell the difference between 1. us all agreeing for no particular reason or 2. us all agreeing for some deep, profound reason. Which is how we know the reasons for our agreement don't particularly matter. But alas, we don't really like this situation; we'd rather have certainty, and so, Insisting that unidentifiable reasons DO matter and explaining why is the job of "metaphysics." And yet, we don't need "metaphysics" in order to keep doing what we are already doing. Its enough to just find our agreement where we can and move on, letting the "facts" be as they may. Pragmatism.

[@shafouingue]

Love your videos Kane !

[@KaneB]

thank you!

[@ericb9804]

13:35 to 13:55. No. the argument goes the other way. There is no coherent sense in which science "corresponds to" or "represents" or "discovers" the "real world." That's just metaphysical gibberish. So, yes epistemology is just like ethics in the sense that in both cases, we have our experiences and we have our justifications about what to do about them, but that's it. But questions like, "but WHY do we experience what we do?" are just silly examples of us confusing ourselves with our own language. There is no "why" beyond the justifications we offer to each other. And assertions of "objectivity" are just complaints by people who don't like this, despite it being wholly obvious. Pragmatism.

[@darthkant8783]

Interesting video. Along the lines of what you mentioned at the end, I think what you're describing is non-naturalist particularism, which is how I think of W.D. Ross' view (among others). A non-naturalist would say that there are categorical moral reasons that don't require further metaphysical explanation. For example, a non-naturalist could say that there are irreducibly normative favoring relations between facts and actions, and that facts in these relations are/ground categorical moral reasons. A particularist would say that moral principles are, at best, rough generalizations or rules of thumb regarding when agents have categorical moral reasons - e.g., the fact that torturing causes suffering typically disfavors the act of torturing. The particuarlist denies, as I think you do in the video, that moral principles explain why certain facts favor certain actions. The direction of explanation is instead in the other direction. Putting these two views together seems to me to result in the kind of moral realism that you're floating. I do think the view faces the question of why, given non-naturalism, particularism rather than generalism about moral principles is true. I would think answering that question would involve staking metaphysical claims about the nature of categorical moral reasons.

[@Ansatz66]

Under determination in science is quite different from under determination in ethics because the purpose of a scientific theory is different from the purpose of an moral theory. In science we have commonly agreed objective facts that we can all observe, and a scientific theory is an attempt to guess what underlies those facts so that we can predict the next facts we will observe. This is under determined because no matter what facts we observe, there will always be more than one way to explain the facts. In ethics we have no commonly agreed facts, so a moral theory is not an attempt to explain any facts, but rather a moral theory is an attempt to explain what ethics is trying to study. While the purpose of science is obvious, the purpose of ethics is muddled in loosely defined words and intuitions that people have difficulty putting into words. A moral theory attempts to cut through that confusion and figure out what people really mean by morality so we can understand what we're trying to study. If this task is under determined, then it is because the words we are trying to define are so ambiguous in people's minds that there are multiple distinct definitions that would all have an equal claim to being correct definitions. Scientific under determination is an issue for scientific realism because it undermines the connection between a scientific theory and the real explanation. In contrast, ethical under determination is simply to recognize that there exist multiple plausible moral theories. Obviously moral realists favor realist theories which is why they are realists, and so they dismiss those other theories as being inferior in some way. Moral realists have no need to explain the under determination of moral theories; they just need to pick what they take to be the best of the moral theories and find that this best moral theory happens to entail realism. 12:41 "There is a fact of the matter about the moral verdicts, but there is no fact of the matter about the reasons for those verdicts." This sounds like deontology. Things are right or wrong based on conforming to a set of rules, and there is no underlying reason for those rules.

[@KaneB]

There are very few normative theories that count as "realist theories" in my view. I think that conflates normative ethics with metaethics. For all of the standard moral theories, people can and do combine them with both realist and antirealist metaethics. >> This sounds like deontology. Things are right or wrong based on conforming to a set of rules, and there is no underlying reason for those rules. Take Kantian deontology vs consequentialism. Parfit argues that the best versions of these theories converge on the same verdicts; they classify the same actions as right or wrong. But they still disagree about what makes these actions right or wrong. The Kantian will claim that the right actions are right because the maxims on which those actions are based can be willed to be universal laws. The consequentialist will claim that the right actions are right because those actions bring about the best outcomes. Prima facie, Kantian deontology and consequentialism disagree, even when they deliver the same moral verdicts. Also, prima facie, Kantian deontology and consequentialism are at least partly explanatory theories. They provide explanations of what makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong.

[@Ansatz66]

@@KaneB "For all of the standard moral theories, people can and do combine them with both realist and antirealist metaethics." That has long puzzled me. As a realist, perhaps I am not as well-equipped to grasp the thinking of antirealists as I might like, but it would be fun to see a video about antirealist interpretations of theories like utilitarianism or virtue ethics. Would they claim that happiness and suffering are not real? That there are no really generous and courageous people, but we only imagine that brave and generous people exist as some sort of convenient fiction? It seems overly generous to Kant to say that Kant provides an explanation for what makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong. Kant provides a rule by which we are supposed to judge what is right and what is wrong, but that is not the same as an explanation. Kantian ethics has always seemed completely pointless to me because it does not give any reason why we should care about his imperative. It is just a rule that sometimes happens to neatly conform to what most people take to right and wrong, more like a clever exercise in logic rather than a rule that anyone would seriously use to actually judge right from wrong.

[@KaneB]

@@Ansatz66 >> Would they claim that happiness and suffering are not real? They could claim that, but that would not be the standard way of being an antirealist utilitarian. The more standard approach would be that happiness exists, but it is not a stance-independent fact that happiness is good or that happiness ought to be maximized. For example: A noncognitivist utilitarian will say that "maximizing happiness is good" does not express a proposition that can be true or false, but instead expresses an attitude of approval towards maximizing happiness. A constructivist utilitarian will say that "maximizing happiness is good" expresses a proposition, and this proposition may be true, but if it is true, it is true in virtue of our values and commitments (for instance, it may be true in virtue of the fact that we approve of happiness, that we seek out happiness for ourselves and promote it for others, etc.). An error-theoretic utilitarian will say that "maximizing happiness is good" expresses a proposition, that this proposition is false since there are no moral properties, but that there are practical reasons for acting as if this proposition is true. >> It seems overly generous to Kant to say that Kant provides an explanation for what makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong This seems to just turn on what we want to count as "explanation". We don't have to phrase things in those terms. The point is that Kant says that an action is right *because* the maxim on which it is based can be willed to be a universal law, or *because* it treats people as ends rather than as means. The consequentialist says that an action is right *because* it brings about the best outcomes. Prima facie, there is a disagreement here, and many philosophers have thought that this disagreement is important. Maybe it doesn't matter much to you -- and similarly for science, maybe it just doesn't matter much if theories disagree about the underlying structure and nature of reality, provided they make the right empirical predictions.

[@Ansatz66]

@@KaneB : The noncognitivist utilitarian seems to be incoherent, since one needs to believe "maximizing happiness is good" in order to be properly categorized as a utilitarian. If a person believes that this proposition cannot be true or false, then how can the person believe that it is true? It is like a wine connoisseur who hates the taste of wine and never drinks it. It just calls into question why we are even calling this person a wine connoisseur. We have a similar problem for the error-theoretic utilitarian. A utilitarian cannot believe that utilitarianism is false. Constructivist utilitarianism makes some sense, but it is not at all clear that constructivism is not a kind of realism, since people really do have values and commitments. Clearly there is an important difference between Kantian ethics and consequentialim, but the point is that Kant offers only his rule for what is right and what is wrong, and the only explanation for why these things are right or wrong is that they conform to his rule or violate his rule, which is a circular explanation that is equivalent to no explanation at all.

[@naomi8278]

@@Ansatz66 With respect to your first concern here, I'd recommend Matt Lutz's paper, 'The 'Now What' Problem for error theory' -- I think it goes some of the way in answering this! I think Kane's also done a video on it.

[@DIDHEJUST]

Can we apply the unrestricted principle of sufficient reason to moral facts? … moral theories wouldn’t be outstripping the facts so much as trying to pinpoint the (perhaps unifying) reasons behind why certain propositions are moral facts? The PSR would support our supposition that there is a theory, and our project would be identifying it. If PSR is limited or rejected, is there any reason to think (other than intuition) that moral facts might have a unifying theory? Or is the ‘door’ to brute moral facts totally open?

[@KaneB]

Yeah, I think if you buy the PSR, you would have an excellent argument for full-fat moral realism over semi-skimmed moral realism.

[@DIDHEJUST]

@@KaneB I gotta have my 2% fat

[@davidfoley8546]

Are you familiar with David Wong? He defends a version of moral relativism that says 1. there are moral facts, and 2. different "moralities" can be equally consistent with the moral facts. Very similar to what you've proposed here. Here's a quote from the introduction to Natural Moralities: "No adequate morality, for example, could allow torture of another person on one's whim. Nevertheless, I argued, such universally valid criteria do not begin to determine a morality with content sufficiently robust and determinate to guide action. As a consequence, some criteria for adequate moralities will be local to a given society."

[@ericb9804]

All claims of "objectivity," especially in the moral sphere, are ultimately veiled threats. It is a pretense by which one can claim, "I'm right, whether you agree with me or not. And if you don't I am justified in using violence in the name of truth." But there is no justification for violence, and yet that is not to say it shouldn't be used, and this is our "moral dillema."

[@ericb9804]

@Oners82 And yet violence is actually used, is it not? Is violence not always the implied last resort in all human interactions? My reminding you of this is not an "ad hominem," as much as simple statement of fact. So one can either claim that they have this thing called "objectivity" that "justifies" their claim to violence, and thus leaves their conscience clear. OR One can realize that claims to "objectivity" are as illusory as claims to know the will of god, and yet also realize that violence is still a possibility. This is not nearly as comfortable as the pretense of the "righteous" man, but it does seem to be our condition. The point is that we don't need some external, metaphysical yardstick called "objectivity." or even "reality," to self regulate our behavior. We can be fair and just and compassionate and, yes, even violent, with nothing more than appeals to our own "subjective," human experience.

[@ericb9804]

@Oners82 No on is saying "realism leads to violence." And yet, violence is real, right? Both "realists" and "subjectivists" live under the specter of violence, right? Violence is always an option in human affairs, philosophy be damned, right? Everyone has to "deal" with violence, whether they like it or not, right? Do we agree on this much? Claims to "objective truth" are a tool used by the "moral realist" to justify their own use of violence, at least to themselves. An example of this is the way that religious people (a kind of moral realist) often feel their actions, no matter how violent, are justified for their fealty to their god (i.e. their "objective truth"). Atheist claims to "objective moral truth" are used the same way. Claims to "objectivity" are a way for a person to absolve themselves of violence, by claiming their violence is "justified" by way of its fealty to their "objective moral truth." This "absolution" is precisely the psychological appeal of "objectivity." On other hand, a person who realizes that there is no "objective truth," still has to deal with violence, including their own, right? But these people realize that violence is not "justified" by way of some third-party objectivity, but only by way of other people, including the people upon whom violence is used. This is just a fancy way of saying that human affairs are messy and we have no "guarantee" that we will get them "right." For example, we don't punish child abusers because child abuse is "objectively wrong." We punish child abusers because we want to, and that is enough. Our claim to violence is justified only by appeals to other people. So while neither the "realist" nor "subjectivist" likes punishing child abusers, only the "subjectivist" takes responsibility for it. The "realist" pretends they have no choice, to help them sleep at night. In summary, violence is our birthright, it is just part of who we are and it seems always will be. The "realist" pretends that they can marshal violence in the name of their "truth" and does so to avoid their own complex feelings of remorse. While the "subjectivist" knows that violence, like everything else, is justified only by other people, and lives with the emotional burden that sometimes entails.

[@ericb9804]

@Oners82 You seem sincere. But I think we are talking past each other a bit. Given that violence is always a potential in human interactions, it seems we, humans, have to ask ourselves, "when are we justified in using violence, if at all?" You seem to agree with this much. So, there are basically two ways to answer our question: "realsim" - A person makes claims to "objectivity." They say that the extent to which violence is justified can be determined by comparing the specific human situation in question to some independent, third-party set of rules that is "independent" of humanity. Such a "realist" claims that "truth" exists and that they know what it is. And it is by way of this knowledge that they justify all their actions, including violent actions, if any. Or "non-realism" - A person does NOT make claims to "objectivity." They say that they don't know of any third-party set of rules. As such, their actions, including violent actions, if any, in any given situation are justified only by the people in the situation or by other bystanders. In Summary: A "realist" justifies their actions, including violence, by appealing to something non-human they call "objectivity." A "non-realist" justifies their actions, including violence, by appealing only to other people. This much is just a description of what actually happens. This is what people actually do. I don't see how there is anything to argue with so far. Agreed? My only claim is that the avoidance of other people is the whole point of what you call "realism." Whether a person appeals to an "objective" god or nature or reality or "morality" or whatever, their whole motivation in doing so is to pretend that they don't need other people to justify their claims. And the reason they want to make to make this pretense is because then they can use it as a mechanism for social control. An example of this is easily seen in traditional organized religion.

[@darcyone6291]

Thanks for bringing up the topic 👍 so, why isn't this view widely defended?

[@Lojak-exe]

Yo yo yo, Dr. B! if you had to pick what's your favorite philosophy book?

[@KaneB]

I'd pick two: David Hume - Treatise, Book 1 Paul Feyerabend - Against Method

[@helveticaneptune537]

@@KaneB what do you think of Schopenhauer?

[@Lojak-exe]

@@KaneB Thanks mate!!

[@KaneB]

@@helveticaneptune537 I haven't actually read him yet, but I've been told that my pessimistic orientation has a lot in common with his. (I explain my stance in this video: kzbin.info/www/bejne/d3XMgIOrqs-WmrM ) I've been intending on looking more closely at his work for a while, but other things keep coming up. At some point though I hope to do a video on him.

[@chipan9191]

I think there are features which do distinguish the normative theories such that we can determine the correct one. For example, the defining feature of deontology is universalization and thus under this normative system any wrong action is universally wrong. But this runs contrary to our moral sense which tells us extenuating circumstances could cause variance. Under consequentialism, since the very circumstances can have differing consequences, actions are not necessarily universally wrong under this normal system. This tells us consequentialism explains this better than deontology. But then we move to intentions... If you have a circumstance where one man kills another man who is about to kill a child, say we have two scenarios. In the first scenario the man kills the other man because he could not find another way to save the life of the child. It seems obvious that he didn't do wrong here, and in fact he may have done right here. Say in the second scenario he didn't even notice the child and just decided to kill this man out of spite. It seems obvious in this scenario that he did wrong here. But on a consequentialist evaluation, both scenarios have the same consequence... A man kills another man and saves the life of a child. So it seems that under consequentialism both scenarios have the same moral evaluation... Which should tell us that consequentialism does not explain this aspect of morality very well at all. The reason is that it seems obvious that intentions matter in moral evaluation, yet intentions don't necessarily affect the consequences. This is why I would say virtue ethics makes much more sense if these. Under virtue ethics moral evaluations can be situational rather than universal and intentions do matter. Therefore virtue ethics explains more than both consequentialism and deontology.

[@uninspired3583]

I made two attempts at replying with something approaching insightful, and both turned out to be word salad. I do think though, there could be cases where moral virtues are acted upon and cause great harm. In such a case, it seems like consequentialism is capturing something that virtue ethics misses. If morality exists in some kind of flexible space where perspective matters greatly, (much like what einstien gave us in relativity), maybe its the case that deontology, virtue ethics, and consequentialism all have their place. If that's the case then context and perspective have a lot to say about how we read a situation. I hope that wasn't a mess, the first two attempts certainly were...

[@chipan9191]

@@uninspired3583 I don't think I could see a situation where acting out of virtue causes harm. Compassion is a virtue which causes us to avoid harming others. I could only see a scenario where someone acts out of ignorance, but then I wouldn't say that's necessarily acting out virtue. Perhaps it would be helpful to give a scenario to illustrate how virtue would result in wrong action. But of course I agree consequences do matter. In order of importance for moral evaluations I would say intentions are more important than consequences, but that's not to say consequences aren't important. They certainty are. I would just say consequentialism is false in the respect that morality isn't defined by consequences.

[@uninspired3583]

@@chipan9191 out of compassion a mother protects her child. But in succeeding at this task, she fails to equip her child with the resilience to flourish in an unfriendly world. He suffers, and isn't able to provide for himself. Now he has failed out of university despite immense potential, and doesn't hold down even the most menial jobs. She fears he will end his life if she pushes too hard, so she continues to support him, and protect him from having to live in the world. In this case too unbalanced compassion has resulted in a moral failing. I agree with you that both consequences and intentions should be part of the equation, but i would tilt them the other way, usually consequences are more important than intentions. I think of when my wife gets mad at me for something I've said, ive chosen poor phrasing and good intent is received very differently. In my case, my intent never seems to count for much.

[@chipan9191]

@@uninspired3583 I wouldn't necessarily call that a moral failing... That's more like a lack of wisdom on the part of the mother. And generally I would say that a compassionate mother should always consider what is best for her child, and not just act on her unbridled emotions. So in the example you give the mother could only be consistently motivated by her virtue of compassion if she were a fool. So even if we consider this a moral failing, we could say that she wasn't properly exercising virtue. It's sort of like saying someone is properly exercising wellness if they isolate their child from all diseases... Except we know but this would cause the child to have a terribly weak immune system. So in reality that's not a good practice in wellness. Perhaps when you misspeak it is still held against you, but I would say that intending to insult someone should be considered worse than unintentionally insulting someone. And of course what the person intends isn't the only factor. Another factor to consider is whether they ought to have known better. So if someone has good intentions with a bad result but they ought to have known better, then their intentions are still wrong. Ignorance and foolishness can't always be the excuse. Moral agents still have a responsibility to grow in knowledge and wisdom, and their failure to do so when they're able can still be used to hold them accountable.

[@bambiknow]

For the sake of argument, I can imagine that light, and gradations of light, may objectively exist and can be tracked by sensory organs, but at what point does darkness track onto the world? It seems to me that darkness is a concept that stands in for the absence of light, and it's hard for me to imagine this as a mind-independent property. No matter how dark, it will always correspond to the presence of light or the possible presence of light-for complete darkness. I was wondering if you have an opinion on a treatment of the problem of evil I have seen attributed to Saint Augustine (my understanding of it), not with regard to defense of the existence of god, but as a possible psychological theory: God doesn't create any evil, badness arises from the way we frame something in terms of lack or non-being in some way. I don’t care about the religious aspect of it, but rather as a psychological theory for where the concept of bad comes from. While gradations of light may track to the world, perhaps concepts such as darkness may track certain cognitive processes, which may also be implicated in the processing of moral, and other normative judgements.

[@josebolivar4364]

Great video! Congrats!

[@KaneB]

thanks! glad to hear you enjoyed it

[@helveticaneptune537]

Beard looking good

[@KaneB]

I think it's looking more like I'm a lazy slob who can't be bothered to shave, lol.

[@KommentarSpaltenKrieger]

like, this is pretty much the standard phenomenology or qualia of morals, no?

[@HudBug]

Fuck… Kane, your forcing my hand to read Parfit again to see if these objections hold. The dust has literally settled on these books on my shelf. Since it’s been so long, I suppose i should start flipping again.

[@KaneB]

The article I mentioned that raises the underdetermination challenge is "Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination" by Marius Baumann

[@InventiveHarvest]

Ok. Took me a bit to think of what to say to this one. While harming others is objectively immoral, what individuals consider harm is subjective. Thus, while morality is objective, specific moral mandates are subjective.

[@ericb9804]

Ok, but what's the point in framing it that way? Why insist on "objectivity" at all if only to undermine it with the realization that it doesn't matter in practical situations, which are, after all, the only situations we have? i.e. What does your "objectivity" get you that you don't already have with "subjectivity" alone? I submit to you, it only gets you something psychological - it gets you a sense of certainty and safety; It just "feels good" to think we have something called "objectivity," even though we also know that this thing won't help us make any actual decisions. I also submit to you that indulging in this feeling is just cowardice - its just a way to alleviate the anxiety caused by realizing that our behavior is justified only in reference to each other, and there is nothing "objective" about it.

[@InventiveHarvest]

@@ericb9804 correct. It doesn't get much. I guess what it gets that actions that do not harm people are not in any way immoral.

[@InventiveHarvest]

@Jacob B because it meets necessary and sufficient conditions. Harming others is necessary condition for immorality because it is intrinsic to what immorality means - if an action doesn't harm anyone how could it be considered immoral? It is a sufficient condition to be immoral because people do not want to be harmed. Now, there are some work around to this as people can be compensated for harm done to them.

[@Bolaniullen]

Mr Kane please refer to us as Cowboys from now on, yes i speak for the whole audience

[@HudBug]

You look like my dad as he was in the 90’s

[@KaneB]

did I mention that work on my time machine is progressing well? planning to try it out within the next couple of months.

[@GottfriedLeibnizYT]

To me, moral facts have the same ontology like money. In strict sense, both don't exist, but that doesn't matter. To be efficient in the world, we have to relax our ontology to think that money exists and we do that for morality for the same reason.

[@Opposite271]

Why does money not exist strictly speaking?

[@GottfriedLeibnizYT]

@@Opposite271 Because, in essence, money is just a piece of paper or a metal or electrical states in a server. It's us who give it value. It has no value to the universe.

[@Opposite271]

@@GottfriedLeibnizYT Couldn’t it be that the value that makes something into money is a relational property that depends on its relationship with the human environment? Wouldn’t that make money exist strictly speaking? Or does it only exist strictly speaking if it has an intrinsic property in itself that makes it into money?

[@jacklessa9729]

Any moral argument wouldn't make a psychopath(someone who enjoy cause suffer) refrained him self to kill someone if no ones would ever know. Any moral argument wouldn't make a person who feel compassion let a baby dies alone in a garbage if no one would ever know. If you feel compassion and you can save a child, do it. If you feel compassion and you can help the poor, do it. It's not a obligation, is a satisfaction. If you don't feel, you may only do it if someone is watching and you got something to lose. Other way, you won't do it Most of us feel compassion, the problem is we only feel compassion for who we believe are innocent. I believe we are all innocent, even the psychopaths, because the world is determined

[@exalted_kitharode]

No. Person may be motivated to be rational, not compassionate. So if it could be possible to convince him that reason requires to act as if he felt compassionate towards fellow creatures, then we would propel him towards moral actions. Isn't it obvious? Of course it would be convenient, if our feelings always will push us towards right actions, but that is not the option for simple reason. Our emotions might conflict with activity that we choosed to pursue. Envy to ingenuity of our opponents' thought might lead us to discard their proofs, unreasonably so.

[@jacklessa9729]

@@exalted_kitharode Compassion is a involuntary feeling, is like sexual orientation. You can't make a gay horny for a woman, you can't make someone that don't feel it, feel it. The only think you can do is show that a innocent baby, that most of us would feel compassion if was starving is as much innocent like Hitler, or Stalin, because they were determined to that way There's is no "gay cure", there's is no " Compassion cure"

[@jacklessa9729]

@@exalted_kitharode Of course you can make a Agreement to someone that don't feel compassion, but you have to give him something he wants

[@exalted_kitharode]

@@jacklessa9729 well this something for someone might be an argument concerning what's true, regardless of his interests. And this only thing might move him to this direction. So I think that's strategically flawed course of action, basically giving it all up to flimsy emotional lives of other people. The fact that it wouldn't persuade everyone doesn't mean that it won't do for anyone.

[@jacklessa9729]

@@exalted_kitharode The only reason I answered you is because I think your believe will make you suffer and waste you time, compassion. Maybe your view can work?! Maybe, but I have no time for hope, I need to help other people and this is already a lot of problems to solve Good luck

[@ASH-cn7qs]

semi-skimmed moral realism may actually be connected to moral anti-realism. Why the hard work of theorizing about "why" killing children for fun is wrong to start with? If there are moral facts as such, as facts, the search for reasons would not be necessary. Then we would have accepted them as facts.

[@macattack1958]

This makes me think of political liberals for some reason. It is quite popular in the US since John Rawls is a rockstar here because he is from America. It isn’t really popular outside it. Deconstructionists like Stanley fish just let loose on this theory. It is ridiculed. Even analytic philosophers like Raz think it is incoherent and make pretty strong claims about it. Check out epistemic abstinence by Raz for a strong critique. David Enoch have also made very strong arguments against it. Check out sep on public reason.

[@KaneB]

I wonder whether semi-skimmed moral realism might be more attractive to liberals who promote tolerance of different ways of life. Sometimes the "naive relativism" that you find among laypeople is motivated by tolerance, but the relativist justification of tolerance runs into the challenge that, for the relativist, aggression and imperialism can be good relative to the values of some societies. Semi-skimmed moral realism might allow for tolerance while avoiding this problem, since certain basic moral rules of thumb (e.g. that one should respect the self-determination of other societies) are viewed as objectively correct.

[@macattack1958]

@@KaneB I think it is popular for just that reason. But it occupies a very unstable middle ground imo. So it usually collapses into either relativism (Carl Schmitt) or robust moral realism (some interpretations of Schmitt or Enoch or Raz). It is very popular with Kantian constructivists; it appears to be sophistry to me. Political liberalism depends on a successful distinction between comprehensive theories of justice and political theories of justice. The difference between them is political theories don’t make claims to truth but only reasonableness and do not seek to inform all aspects and of life while comprehensive theories seek both of those things.

[@HazYyy]

To me, the cows milk thumbnail is in bad taste and displays a limitation of moral consideration towards humans only. If anything, expanding our moral circle to other animals gives us a better perspective and understanding of morals through a biocentric and broader suffering bases.

[@KaneB]

If you have a problem with bad taste, this is not the channel for you