Nature, Grace, and the Deeper Protestant Conception, w/Josh Smith

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@MilitantThomist Жыл бұрын

Looking forward to watching when I get a moment! Would love to have y'all and my friend Ethan Dolan on for a roundtable discussion on this topic

@scholasticismreformed166 Жыл бұрын

Thanks for tuning in 🙏🏽 that sounds fun!

@Acek-ok9dp Ай бұрын

Did the roundtable happen?

@chrismathew2295 10 ай бұрын

Thanks for this. My head's muddled on this issue, and I'm glad that your side of the debate is able to make your case.

@scholasticismreformed166 10 ай бұрын

Much more can/will be said, but I hope that this helps in some way 🙏🏽

@samuelhaupt3217 Жыл бұрын

Fantastic. Been following Josh for a while

@DordtyHylemorph Жыл бұрын

At about 28:24, to my shame, I failed to credit Dr. Michael Lynch for the translation of this part of Le Blanc’s *Theological Theses*!

@AnglicanSE Жыл бұрын

Wonderful video

@Greg-n 3 ай бұрын

I'm catholic and think this (distinction between nature and grace) is the most important question for protestants to answer... I also listened to this all the way through and with reference to Dort, Burgess et al, was gradually struck with one question: 'with what logic or consistency can the reformed draw up articles of faith with the expectation or demand for internal assent and outward confession of members of the Church?' It appears that most accessible reformed sources along with the canons of Dort, Westminster, Heidelberg et al are replete with subtle incongruencies with one another, alot of which is due to misconstruals of thomistic metaphysics. When you and Josh toss up the "majority view" among reformed regarding the imagi dei (around the 2:13:00 mark) in order to cast Brigham's position as dubious, are you considering a "majority view" as a standard by which to judge his assertions? There is no executive branch to clarify... I felt as if the elephant in the room grew larger as Josh put forward his case. And how does Burgess' concept of infusion meld with Luther's extra nos righteousness? To explain the nuance of this distinction would involve at best a base level understanding of scholastic metaphysics; a quality the average Christian is not expected to have... yet the profound implications of this difference are significant. Appeal to the "confessions" or "divines" (as this video makes clear) is non accordant, and the expectation to retrieve the philosophies and theologies that undergird said confessions is not going to aid the average believer.

@EthanMiller-ul9sp 2 ай бұрын

As if the average RC layman is going to understand the differences between Suarez, Molina, and Banez.

@Greg-n 2 ай бұрын

@@EthanMiller-ul9sp Of course not. That's why the RC has the authority of the Church, just as Paul directs Timothy: 1 Tim 3:15.

@GTMancz 7 ай бұрын

Thank you for this discussion. It's hearterning for this Roman Catholic Thomist to listen to this Reformed perspective. To explore this further, just what would you say is problematic about the hypothetic economy of "natura pura"? I recall reading incredibly negative comments about it in e.g. Turretin, whom I assume to be representative of the Reformed. Further, in this connection, I'm very interested in finding a defence of the proposition that concupiscence (including prima-primi motus) being, properly, sin made without denying the "nemo ad impossibilia tenetur" (something, again, not found in e.g. Turretin).

@DordtyHylemorph 7 ай бұрын

////Thank you for this discussion. It's hearterning for this Roman Catholic Thomist to listen to this Reformed perspective.//// Thank you so much for watching! I hope it was enjoyable :) ------- ////To explore this further, just what would you say is problematic about the hypothetic economy of "natura pura"? I recall reading incredibly negative comments about it in e.g. Turretin, whom I assume to be representative of the Reformed. //// It depends upon how we are characterizing the state of pure nature. E.g., Turretin's comments (and I have only read him in the English, which is not a good translation overall) have in view a specific perspective, viz., a condition in which man is created with only constituent parts and consequent properties of human nature, without any positive moral qualities/habits in the soul (whether of the natural or supernatural orders), and one in which concupiscence of the flesh and the soul's lower powers against its higher powers is a natural condition (i.e., one that accords with man as he belongs to the natural order) that needs to be restrained by an added perfection of the supernatural order. He wants to argue that the parts of man per se are naturally harmonious (the lower appetites naturally submitting to the higher) and this harmony is only disturbed by sin. Accordingly, man couldn't be created without at least this rectitude that pertains to the natural order. We weren't able to get into the Reformed views that would oppose what we presented; these schools of Reformed thought argue (contra Turretin et al.) for a state of pure nature as an actual state in which man is only created for/with only a natural end, and thus he only requires whatever is due to his nature as rational animal, viz., natural gifts. Nevertheless, these Reformed would also agree with the others that man cannot be created without at least natural rectitude. I don't think there's anything wrong per se with the notion of pure nature defined in this way, man being created in that state, etc. The issue seems to be what precisely is natural to man/what is his natural due? Does this include natural rectitude? The Reformed take issue with a notion of discord/conflict between the lower and higher appetites being natural to man (which Thomas, e.g., seems to teach in *De Malo* q5, a1; but cf. *Sentences* II.D24.Q3.A2.Obj5, Rep5); they argue that this would be contrary to certain divine attributes (albeit not contrary to His absolute power; in this regard, the Reformed are similar to the Augustinians and certain Thomists that Pohle and Preuss mention in their *Dogmatic Theology* as well as Sagues in *Sacrae Theologiae Summa* IIB). ----- ////Further, in this connection, I'm very interested in finding a defence of the proposition that concupiscence (including prima-primi motus) being, properly, sin made without denying the "nemo ad impossibilia tenetur" (something, again, not found in e.g. Turretin).//// When you say, "properly sin," I take it you mean mortal sin specifically, correct? Accordingly, you wouldn't have an issue with saying second first motions are venial sin (e.g., with Thomas in, inter alia, *Sentences* II.D24.Q3.A2)? I ask because, from what I understand from RCs, there were/are debates concerning what falls into the category of being, as Session 5, Canon 5 of Trent says, "truly and properly sin" (some saying this applies only to mortal sin and others saying venial also belongs here). And it's important to note that, when Turretin discusses first first motions, he's not talking about what Thomas describes as "natural" in *Sentences* II.D24.Q3.A2, but only those instances in which the lower appetites have "an unjust and unlawful object"; likewise, he states that concupiscence is "middle and natural" when it has such an object (viz., one that is middle and natural) and "it is neither praised nor blamed" in this case. (*IET* 11.21.1). Also, IIRC, I do think Turretin addresses that principle at least implicitly when he discusses what is voluntary, how, and those things in/outside of our power. He also affirms that principle explicitly in multiple other places.

@GTMancz 7 ай бұрын

@DordtyHylemorph ///Thank you so much for watching! I hope it was enjoyable :) /// You’re most welcome, as, indeed, it was. Many thanks for your prompt reply! I should say at the outset that I’m presently presuming, broadly speaking, agreement between us on the issues of natural philosophy and metaphysics, or sufficient affinity, at minimum. Having gone through the videos on the channel, I believe myself justified. This is also what I propose to focus on. I believe there’s a reason for this departure from the rule of proceeding from positive revelation, namely, the philosophical underdetermination of Scripture. I concede arguendo that at least some of the Scriptural loci adduced by e.g. Turretin can be read, even, perhaps, plausibly, on their own, in the way he suggests, and ditto for some of the loci in St. Augustine et al., but I’d contend such readings reduce said authorities to absurdity, which is reason enough to avoid them. Permit me to address the second part of your reply first. (I should also say that I'm not a native speaker of English, so I apologise for the idiosyncrasies that are likely to follow) 1/x

@GTMancz 7 ай бұрын

@@DordtyHylemorph //// When you say, "properly sin," I take it you mean mortal sin specifically, correct? //// No, I happen to mean sin generically. As St. Thomas says in the locus you cite (Sent II, d. 24, Q3, art. 2), _[n]ullus autem motus ponitur in genere moris nisi habita comparatione ad voluntatem, quae principium est moralium, ut ex 6. Metaph. patet: et ideo incipit genus moris ubi primo dominium voluntatis invenitur._ This is why I mention first first motions: I’ve seen various Reformed authors, such as Turretin or e.g. Davenant (and not a single dissenting opinion), explicitly call them sinful (contrary, I confess, to my expectations, as discovering Protestant Scholastics making the distinction between first and second first motions in defending the confessional formulas had been the initial (if uninformed) hope of my attempts to understand Reformed doctrine in Thomistic terms), which judgement is incompatible with the above cited understanding of morality, which I believe to be, apart from anything else, demonstrably (and fairly obviously) true (most certainly on the truth of Aristotelianism and/or Thomism). 2/x

@GTMancz 7 ай бұрын

//// I ask because, from what I understand from RCs, there were/are debates concerning what falls into the category of being, as Session 5, Canon 5 of Trent says, "truly and properly sin" (some saying this applies only to mortal sin and others saying venial also belongs here) etc. //// In this connection, even if the condemnation of Trent could be thus restricted with some plausibility at some point (which strikes me as doubtful, personally), the condemnation of de Bay (Baius) within 21 years of that session of Trent, particularly of propositions 48 ( _Prava desideria, quibus ratio non consentit, et quae homo invitus patitur, sunt prohibita praecepto : 'Non concupisces'”_ ), 49 ( _Concupiscentia sive lex membrorum, et prava eius desideria, quae inviti sentiunt homines, sunt vera legis inoboedientia_ ), especially in connection with 46 ( _Ad rationem et definitionem peccati non pertinet voluntarium, nec definitionis quaestio est, sed causae et originis, utrum omne peccatum debeat esse voluntarium_ ), I’d say, clearly excludes the reasonableness of such a reading. (Perhaps needless to say, but I don’t think such an understanding of concupiscence is plausible against the background of (the totality) of Scripture, in light of e.g. description of the “mechanism” in James 1.,14, 15, _prout jacet_ ). 3/x

@GTMancz 7 ай бұрын

@@DordtyHylemorph //// Also, IIRC, I do think Turretin addresses that principle at least implicitly when he discusses what is voluntary, how, and those things in/outside of our power. He also affirms that principle explicitly in multiple other places. //// Would you please be so kind as to cite examples of this? The reason I ask is the fact of Turretin’s affirmations that impossibility does not excuse from sin. First, in ITE loc. 9, q. I, V he states that the formal ratio of sin consists in _ἀνομία_ and privation, which denote the lack of a due goodness in a rational creature prescribed by Law, whether [the lack] inheres in nature, or qualities, *_or their actions_** [Mancz: emphasis mine],* cf.: _Hinc sequitur rationem formalem peccati in ἀνομία et privatione consistere, quae notat carentiam rectitudinis seu bonitatis secundum praescriptum Legis debitae inesse Creaturae rationali, sive ea naturae sit, sue qualitatum, _*_sive actionum ipsarum_* Rather obviously, our nature and qualities can be only modified by us if they fall within the scope of our powers qua subject to our will, *_through second-act actions_*. Turretin, though, seems to treat nature, qualities and actions as equally suitable subjects for the privation in question. That he thinks this can be seen, e.g., in his comments re: *_motus primo primi_*, ITE loc. 9, q. II, V: _ Quamvis vero *motus illi non sint in nostra potestate [Mancz: emphasis mine]*, quia tamen fuerunt in principio ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, et debent esse ex hominis officio, non desinunt esse peccata._ True, he does note both the duty and the power, however, the “nos” and “ἡμεῖς”, are of course, not co-extensive: *_it is not_* possible *_for us_* to avoid such movements, it *_was_* initially possible *_for the first parents_***, such movements, are, nevertheless,said to be sinful for ***_both_* them *_and_* us. 4/x