Refuting David Hume: Is Bible Against Science?

[@WH6FQE]

I am also a descendant of Clan Hume of Scotland. David Hume was my 11th great grandfather.

[@intelligentdesign2295]

Many of Hume's objections can be answered. Objection (1) :"A great number of men join in building a house or a ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth: why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world?" Responses: "If the physical universe is the product of intelligent design, rather than being a pure accident, it is more likely to be the handiwork of only one rather than more than one intelligence. This is so for two broad reasons. The first reason is the need for theoretical parsimony. In the absence of any evidence for supposing the universe to be the handiwork of more than one intelligence rather than only one, then, faced with a choice between supposing it the handiwork of one or of more than one intelligent designer, we should choose to suppose it to be the creation of only one. For it is not necessary to postulate more than one to account for the phenomena in question. The second reason for preferring the hypothesis of there being only one designer of the universe to supposing more than one is that the general harmony and uniformity of everything in the universe suggest that, should it be the product of design, it is more likely to be the handiwork of a single designer, rather than a plurality of designers who might have been expected to have left in their joint product some trace of their plural individualities. " (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom") "And, to jump ahead a bit, there are two further problems with polytheism as an explanation of the existence of not merely a universe but a universe governed throughout space and time by the same natural laws . If this order in the world is to be explained by many gods, then some explanation is required for how and why they cooperate in producing the same patterns of order throughout the universe. This becomes a new datum requiring explanation for the same reason as the fact of order itself. The need for further explanation ends when we postulate one being who is the cause of the existence of all others, and the simplest conceivable such-I urge-is God. And, further, the power of polytheism to explain this order in the world is perhaps not as great as that of theism. If there were more than one deity responsible for the order of the universe, we would expect to see characteristic marks of the handiwork of different deities in different parts of the universe, just as we see different kinds of workmanship in the different houses of a city. We would expect to find an inverse square of law of gravitation obeyed in one part of the universe, and in another part a law that was just short of being an inverse square law-without the difference being explicable in terms of a more general law." (Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God") Objection (2) :"[I]f we survey the universe ..., it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it ...: a continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part or member ... operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole [I]t must be confessed, that... the universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art and contrivance [Y]et is the analogy also defective in many circumstances ...: no organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal." Response: "Hume's argument seems weak. Hume's claim is that the physical universe - more specifically, our solar system - bears a closer resemblance to some animal or a vegetable than it does some machine or other artefact. The claim is unconvincing. In its manifest workings, the physical universe in general, and our own solar system in particular, exhibits a degree of regularity and predictability that far exceeds that which is exhibited by any animal or vegetable. After all, it is by the sun that we set our clocks and not by the comings and goings of sun-flowers or salamanders! That this is so suggests that the physical universe more closely resembles some regular and predictable machine or artefact, for example a clock, than it does any far less regular and predictable animal or vegetable. " (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom") Objection (3) :"But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain." Responses: "From time to time various writers have told us that we cannot reach any conclusions about the origin or development of the universe, since it is the only one of which we have knowledge, and rational inquiry can reach conclusions only about objects that belong to kinds, for example, it can reach a conclusion about what will happen to this bit of iron only because there are other bits of iron, the behaviour of which can be studied. This objection has the surprising, and to most of these writers unwelcome, consequence, that physical cosmology could not reach justified conclusions about such matters as the size, age, rate of expansion, and density of the universe as a whole (because it is the only one of which we have knowledge); and also that physical anthropology could not reach conclusions about the origin and development of the human race (because, as far as our knowledge goes, it is the only one of its kind). The implausibility of these consequences leads us to doubt the original objection, which is indeed totally misguided." (Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God") "By tracing the origin of the physical universe to a supposed 'Big Bang', modern cosmology places Hume in the following dilemma. Either, he must deny that the physical universe as a whole is singular and unique, on the grounds that it resembles other things besides it that explode, such as grenades. Or, alternatively, should he insist on the uniqueness of the physical universe, he must concede that there are some unique things which are capable of standing as terms of causal relations. " (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom") "Hume's objection seems to involve two distinct principles. First, he assumes that we can infer from an observed A to an observed B only when we frequently see As and Bs together, and we can infer to a B only when we have actually seen other Bs. Such an assumption is simply false. Scientists often infer theoretical entities (electrons or quarks) which have never been seen and which may not be possible to see (e.g., a magnetic field). When observed As have a relation R to Bs, it is often reasonable to postulate that observed A *s similar to As have the same relation to observed and unobserved B*s similar to Bs." For example, the pressure of colorless gases varies with the temperature of those gases, and on this basis, one could infer that a change in pressure of a colored gaseous substance would likewise vary with the temperature regardless of the fact that he had never seen a substance of this sort. Second, Hume seems to assume that the universe is unique and conclusions cannot be reached about unique objects by analogy. But this is false as well. Astronomers reach conclusions all the time about the origin of the universe and this is unique. Furthermore, all events are unique in some sense, but no one would want to say that arguments by analogy do not apply to any objects whatever. The fact that the universe or some other object is unique does not rule out the possibility that it has properties in common with some other object, including some of its parts. For example, there may be only one object which satisfies the description "the tallest man in Maryland," but one could still compare this object with other objects and make judgments about the origination of the object. If one accepted Hume's principle it would seem to rule out the possibility of discovering a new culture and inferring that an utterly new and unique object in that culture was designed. But such an inference seems to be quite possible. " (J.P Moreland "Scaling The Secular City") Objection (4) :" Who Designed The Designer? " "The next argument which we meet in the Dialogues is that the postulated existence of a rational agent who produces the order of the world would itself need explaining. Picturing such an agent as a mind, and a mind as an arrangement of ideas, Hume phrases the objection as follows: "a mental world or Universe of ideas requires a cause as much as does a material world or Universe of objects." Hume himself provides the obvious answer to this-that it is no objection to explaining X by Y that we cannot explain Y. But then he suggests that the Y, in this case the mind, is just as mysterious as the ordered Universe. Men never "thought it satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself." On the contrary, scientists have always thought it reasonable to postulate entities merely to explain effects, so long as the postulated entities accounted simply and coherently for the characteristics of the effects. The existence of molecules with their characteristic behavior was "no more to be accounted for" than observable phenomena, but the postulation of their existence gave a neat and simple explanation of a whole host of chemical and physical phenomena, and that was the justification for postulating their existence. " (Richard Swinburne "The Design Argument")

[@intelligentdesign2295]

"Hume claims that antecedent probability lends strength to his use of analogy: “We ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations.” Thus, if the greatest number of observations in the past is that when a person dies, he or she stays dead, a greater probability already exists that reports of a person returning to life from the dead are false. As with the principle of analogy, several major problems beset an antecedent-probability argument against the consideration of miracle-claims by historians. First, unique and improbable events known to have occurred would have to be ruled out as the best (or most probable) explanation by historians. For example, we could never conclude that a specific lottery winner actually won, since the probability of anyone, much less a specific person, winning the lottery on a specific day is vastly outweighed by the probability that no one will win. As a result, by placing too much value on antecedent probability in historical judgments, the historian is many times forced to make conclusions that are incorrect. Second, when applied to the resurrection of Jesus, antecedent probability proves much less than Hume would hope. The failure of billions who have not returned from the dead only warrants the conclusion that the dead are not raised by natural causes. The Christian claim is not “Jesus is risen by natural causes.” The claim is “Jesus, the Son of God, is risen” or “God raised Jesus from the dead.” Can historians a priori conclude that if Jesus is divine he cannot raise himself or that if God wanted to raise Jesus from the dead there is a high degree of probability that he cannot have done so? It would not appear so. A third problem with Hume’s antecedent-probability argument is that, even if legitimate, it is only applicable when blind processes are involved. The principle does not work when enabled intentionality is present. Consider my example in the first chapter of my son lifting weights. The chances that an average twelve-year-old boy can lift two hundred pounds over his head are zero. However, if an external agent, such as a bodybuilder, were to enter the equation, the chances increase significantly to almost one hundred percent. Similarly, if a context exists where there is reason to believe God may have entered the equation, the chances that we have a genuine miracle on our hands may be greater than they are for naturalistic theories, such as myth, dream or hallucination, especially if other data point away from these natural hypotheses. Flew comments, “Certainly given some beliefs about God, the occurrence of the resurrection does become enormously more likely.” Hume’s fourth point is that miracle-claims from religions conflicting with Christianity cancel out claims to Christian miracles. Serious problems beset this point as well. As Hume noted, most miracle-claims are poorly attested. Miracle stories involving founders of several major world religions appear centuries after the purported events and are not usually corroborated by multiple sources or neutral-to-hostile witnesses. So, the existence of counterfeit currency does not negate the existence of the genuine. In the same manner, poorly attested miracle-claims are scarcely able to rule out well-evidenced ones. For example, if the resurrection of Jesus has good evidence for it, why should a single report of postmortem appearances of Apollonius of Tyana made more than a century later be placed on equal ground? Our only extant biography comes from Philostratus writing around a.d. 225, one hundred and thirty years after the death of Apollonius. Philostratus informs us that his primary source for the life of Apollonius is Damis, whom most scholars maintain was a fictional figure invented by Philostratus who also claims that Damis’s information ended prior to the death of Apollonius. So he continues his biography by supplementing Damis’s information with reports from unnamed sources. Belonging to this latter category are a number of reports of postmortem appearances of Apollonius as a spirit being. Only one is described in detail, and it is not a resurrection. Instead, an unnamed person at an unidentified time sees Apollonius in a dream. Apollonius believed in the immortality of the soul. For him, postmortem existence did not include a revivification of the corpse. Prior to his death, Apollonius invites Damis and Demetrius to take hold of his hand so that they may know he is alive, literally not a ghost that cannot be held, since he has not yet “cast aside” his body. Contrast this with Jesus’ invitation for his disciples to take hold of him after his resurrection so that they may know that he is not a spirit being without flesh and bones. Thus, the postmortem appearance reports of Philostratus are late, reported by only a single source and never make the claim of a resurrection. Accordingly Ehrman is mistaken when he writes, To agree with an ancient person that Jesus healed the sick, walked on water, cast out a demon, or raised the dead is to agree, first, that there were divine persons (or magicians) walking the earth who could do such things and, second, that Jesus was one of them. . . . The evidence that is admitted in any one of these cases must be admitted in the others as well. Second, whereas several plausible explanations exist for most miracleclaims, this may not be the case when we come to Jesus’ resurrection." (Michael Licona "Resurrection Of Jesus")