The Eighth Army versus Rommel: The War in the Desert, Tactics, Training and Operations

The Eighth Army versus Rommel: The War in the Desert, Tactics, Training and Operations
With James Colvin
Part of a series of shows to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the battle of El Alamein on WW2TV
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Today, James Colvin will examine the undertrained and underfunded pre-war British Army, contrasting its leadership with its opposite numbers in Germany, and demonstrate how and why Eighth Army had difficulties in its first 18 months of fighting the Afrika Korps. He will go on to talk about the Eighth Army's victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
In doing so, he will discuss the perspective of the commanders, the decisions they made, and how cultural influences effected tactics and decisions of the Eighth Army high command. Ultimately, British commanders were as much the product of their military culture and education as Rommel and his commanders were of theirs, but British military culture and education was, for much of this period, markedly less fit for purpose than the German.
James Colvin has had a lifelong interest in the Desert War because several family members and friends were involved in it. Like most war veterans, they found it difficult to talk of their experiences to those who had not shared them, and he was often intrigued by the contradictions and omissions in their related accounts. James earned a history degree from Bristol University and, following a business career, embarked on a research degree in military history at the University of Buckingham. In addition to service with the Territorial Army's 44th Parachute Brigade, James has contributed to the History Network's World War II Podcast and published an article on Eighth Army operations in the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research.
James Colvin on Twitter / washbattle
Eighth Army Versus Rommel: Tactics, Training and Operations in North Africa 1940-1942 by James Colvin
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[@billballbuster7186]

Very interesting talk which raised many questions. The DAK though small was very well equipped and organized. Rommel had tanks, self-propelled artillery and armoured infantry that could all move at the same speed over the same terrain. The British had no transport that could keep pace with the tanks, both artillery and infantry used trucks which were only good on roads. Bishop and Priest SPGs arrived by El Alamein but the infantry was still in trucks. The British were dumbfounded by Rommel's intelligence coup, spies, poor radio discipline, bugged HQ were all blamed. In June 1942 it was revealed that Italian spies had taken US Black Code books from the American embassy in Rome and passed them to the Germans. Using these codes from November 1941 to June 1942 Rommel had access to all British battle plans via US radio traffic between Cairo and Washington. Interestingly after this source was discovered Rommel never won another battle in North Africa. The American blunder in using low-grade codes for military radio traffic was so serious the details were kept secret for 50 years, it had cost so many Allies lives not only with the 8th Army, but also at sea with shipping convoys.

[@philbosworth3789]

James's forthright views on the shambles that was the Eight Army before El Alamein and how this got turned around make for fascinating listing. No holds barred in this great episode.

[@MegaBloggs1]

yep -they still handt learned to coordinate

[@davidlavigne207]

Thank you Mr. Colvin and Paul Woodage for fascinating insight into the internal leadership problems of the 8th Army during the desert campaign. That the British and Commonwealth Army didn't simply fall apart is a testament to the brave soldiers who manned it. That they kept trying after some sobering defeats showed their resiliency as James pointed out. The Ole' Boy facet of the Army reminds me of what we in the American Army refer to as The West Point Protection Association (WPPA). I have seen it in action myself protecting marginal performers. It's not quite the same as the class and cultural differences, but similar in a way.

[@patm8622]

Brilliant presentation, certainly give us some great insights!

[@1089maul]

Woody/James, Thank you for such an interesting presentation! Really enjoyed it! Bob

[@prof_kaos9341]

Kia Ora, as a Kiwi i have many books on North Africa. I totally agree with the points made. What makes it worse is the senior officers had a great teacher of modern tactics in Rommel but they took yrs to absorb his bloody lessons in combined arms tactics. The Germans fought as one team. The British did not. As stated the tanks thought they should operate alone, hardly the attitude required for COMBINED arms warfare. Even though the British had motorised their infantry they had not motorised their infantry tactics. What they failed to realise was in modern warfare the tanks need infantry support & the infantry need tank support. Many times a lack of tank support (the questionable British AT doctrine for attacking units) led to the capture of large infantry formations. In this way NZ lost whole, 20th Battalion (~650 troops) during Op Crusader (Nov '41) & all of 4th Brigade (~2,000 troops, 1/3 of its infantry) at 1st Alamein (July '42). After 8 months of refitting/training replacements for the same doctrine to yield the same result... Once the German arty had knocked out the ATGs the infantry was helpless to even a handful of tanks. And conversely the tanks had taken terrible maulings from ATGs for want of the infantry support they had left behind. This led to the distrust between infantry/armour & low moral all round that Montgomery faced on arrival.

[@prof_kaos9341]

@@alganhar1 So you think the Germans were just gifted amateurs who had a lot of good luck & had just stumbled onto combined arms by 1942? I dont agree, there is far more to this history than that. I agree on the 2pdr hamstringing the Brits but to be brief I chose not to discuss the effect of losing an armies worth of equipment at Dunkirk leading to the 2 pdr being used well past it's "use by date." But to be as blunt as you were, you need to do some more research on the topic. The Brits were the first to try combined arms tactics in exercises at Salisbury in 1928, just before the cutbacks of the Depression. These new tactics had been thought up by (then) Col. Fuller, Col. Hobart & Capt. Liddel Hart. These are the tacticians that inspired Guderian. Hobart went on to set up the 7th Armoured Div in Egypt (later to save it) and "Hobarts Funnies" of 79th Arm Div at D-Day while Liddel Hart proposed an armoured thrust thru the "impassable" Ardenne in 1935. The Germans read these theories & refined combined arms tactics in Spain(1935), Czechoslovakia(1938), Poland(1939), France(1940).... By 1940 they had had years of practice in real war situations. In Africa there was Rommel, a clever guy who tried things and repeated what worked. Rommel repeatedly lured the independently minded Brit tanks away from their support onto his ATGs then returned to knock out the supporting units' ATGs and once defenceless capturing them with his panzers. TIK's youtube channel did a good series on Operation Crusader, a classic example of this. The operations intent was for the Brit tanks to charge off (like Napoleonic cavalry) on their own. This helped Rommel destroy most of the 7th Armoured Div with ATGs at Sidi Rezegh, leaving the infantry at the mercy of the panzers afterwards. How else did ~7 poorly supplied Axis divs run rings round 15-20 well supplied Commonwealth divs for 2yrs? Particularly when no longer did armies just need ammo/food/water but also a good supply of POL, having become the life blood of a motorised army.

[@loreleikomm5802]

excellent show as always. WW2TV is the best channel in the world!

[@WW2TV]

You're the best!

[@jonathanparshall5019]

So glad to see James and his excellent book getting the attention they deserve.

[@curtiswebb8135]

Well done as usual....Thanks from America.

[@scottgrimwood8868]

An excellent presentation!

[@MegaBloggs1]

Excellent presentation by a man who knows his subject-just as the Americans learnt on the job after the torch landings its obvious the British were learning on the job with immense suffering by the troops on the ground-Messervy's service in Burma India(specifically the Imphal-Kohima battle) demonstrated his ability-eventually promoted to corps command in 1945-he was scapegoated. It was Messervy who ordered the grant tanks for India as director of armoured troops India army. The desert war sifted the incompetent generals out-the real shame is that the Australian general who commanded the garrison at the Tobruk siege was repeatedly refused promotion to corps command-he clearly understood combined arms warfare

[@preachyourstory3452]

That would be Leslie Morshead, nicknamed by his troops 'Ming the Merciless'. A recently-retired Australian Army officer I've bumped into attributes Morshead with instituting the aggressive patrolling tactics used by Australian forces for decades afterwards - including in Vietnam, which usually mystified the Americans.

[@zainmudassir2964]

Messervy was also C in C of newly formed Pakistan Army

[@guyh9992]

If the Australian government and military had had their way a revived ANZAC corps of four divisions supported by British armour under Thomas Blamey would have taken on Rommel in mid 1941 instead of the available British Empire forces diluted all over the place in Greece/Crete, Tobruk, Cyprus and Syria/Lebanon. The British however had no intention of putting Blamey, Morshead or any other Australian General in a command position in North Africa. The Australian army at the time resented British attitudes greatly.

[@marks_sparks1]

Enjoyed James presentation and thoughts on the 8th Army leadership in North Africa. The old boys school network was shown to be inefficient for modern war (which allowed Rommel to excel). Once a professional with drive arrived, Montgomery, fortunes changed. Not a moment too soon.

[@Splodge542]

Jimmy was ace. I loved the verse from the poem. In the rear view mirror, it sounds prophetic.

[@richardschaffer5588]

In evaluating Monty as a commander his greatest achievement, getting the 8th Army squared away, gets ignored. The Allies had the men, the weapons and supply, Monty ended the squabbling and sacked the bunglers clearing the way for the the British, Aussie ,Kiwi and French soldiers fight and win.

[@chazmolony4162]

Definitely worth the time, if that counts as ticket price 😂. @ww2tv given Mr Colvin's point about the old school tie network, it would be fascinating if you could do an education week. I seem to remember some really well researched and touching points were raised about the secret education in the ghettos, but I think it would be really intriguing to look at schooling across the powers. Thanks again for all the great content.

[@anselmdanker9519]

Alexander and Ritchie and Leese are part of the old boy network. Brooke promoted Ritchie to command 12th Corps in North West Europe. Leese blundered at the Mareth line but wasn't sacked. He rose to the highest command in in Burma and was degummed by Slim and the Indian Army in 1945. All very interesting-absolutely love the Alamein narrative thanks both of you!

[@andrewblake2254]

I have been unable to hear the last few interviews due to the terrible sound quality from the interviewees. A $10 microphone stuck on a desk does not cut it however knowledgeable the gentleman. I have good quality Bose headphones my end. I don't like to complain but if I do not let you know you never will know about this problem which may diminish your following. I appreciate your excellent work and wish you the best with your valuable channel.

[@WW2TV]

Yet, not one other person watching said anything. If there's an audio issue, its always pointed out to me very quickly. It's very strange that with 1000 views already, you are the only person to say it was terrible. How do you explain that?

[@andrewblake2254]

@@WW2TV Well its up to you if you want to take any notice of the comment or not. Thing is its hard work listening to sub par audio and I wonder how many people just give it up part way through, even if they do like the channel like I do. I do listen to many many YT podcasts, several a day and I have no trouble with 90% of them. I suspect these are mostly guys who have taken the trouble to put in a working sound set up as you seem to have yourself. I don't have problems hearing you. Its the interviewees who have boomy echoing audio environment. Obviously unlike YTers they have no financial interest in spending money on audio when it suffices for business calls and the like. Anyway best wishes for your channel.

[@davidg1811]

@@WW2TV consider this a second comment on audio quality. Possibly it’s just the tone of the guests voice? His voice is not very sharp. Your voice comes over clearly. His voice is somewhat muted. I’m viewing this on my TV using a Bose surround sound system, so the equipment quality on my end is reasonably good. I’ve boosted the tone as much as I can with my audio equipment.

[@WW2TV]

@@davidg1811 I think that must be it, it's maybe the tone of James voice. Living in France, with most people I can listen to their French and understand 95% of what they say, but perhaps 5% of people I meet, I just don't understand a word

[@WW2TV]

@@andrewblake2254 Thanks Andrew and I do appreciate it, but as I say, whenever there is an audio issue my regular viewers leap in and tell me immediately, so I don't think there was a problem for the majority of viewers.

[@pwking100]

Messivey (spelling?) was significant during the drive on Rangoon - arriving 36 hours after the Monsoon broke. I feel you are overly critical. I wasn't there. Good podcast, again.

[@grahamwheeler6967]

Paul this Alamein series is a one of a kind. You've divided up the series superbly, just I'd love one more solely about kidney ridge haha and a live show on the ground there would be grand ;) Please for the love of fellow kidney enthusiasts ask someone for a photo! Keep up the good work!

[@WW2TV]

I did try and partner up with a tour company that takes groups to the desert to get some video, but they were not interested, unfortunately.

[@grahamwheeler6967]

@@WW2TV thanks for trying! Was that western desert tours?

[@WW2TV]

@@grahamwheeler6967 no names no pack drill as we say

[@grahamwheeler6967]

@@WW2TV ah haa quite right too! 👍

[@albion1962]

Fascinating talk, have bought the book.

[@WW2TV]

Good for you

[@Caratacus1]

Inspired by WW2TVs Alamein week I dug out Barrie Pitt's Alamein volume last night which has been a standard for 40 years now. He gives the figure of approximately 110,000 Axis troops and 500 tanks at the start of the battle. Rommel manages to extract 5,000 mostly German survivors and 20 tanks at the end of the battle. With 95 percent+ casualties Alamein really was a total disaster for the Axis. However there seems to be a modern (dare I say wehraboo) narrative growing that it was more of a draw.

[@demo9192]

You should add a zero to the number of axis survivors. I'm sorry and I truly mean no offense, but the idea that the AK took 95% casualties at Alamein is ridiculous.

[@Caratacus1]

@@demo9192 The idea that I should take the word of a random youtuber over a renowned historian who has stood the test of time is ridiculous 😁 Rommel did pick up some garrisons on the way back to Libya that increased his force to around 20,000. But the army he fought with in Tunisia was effectively almost entirely new and sent in at huge effort only to surrender 6 months later.

[@demo9192]

@@Caratacus1 You might want to try reading something a little more up to date, mate.

[@Caratacus1]

@@demo9192 I have read much more up to date but I'll certainly take some suggestions for more reading. Also be interested to know a qualified historian who has argued against Pitt's findings because I've never seen anyone. Who would you recommend who addresses this issue?

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@demo9192 They did take 95% Just to review: 2nd El Alamein began 23rd October 1942, the 8th Army finally punched through Rommel's army on November 5th, at which point Rommel retreated with whatever German mechanized forces he could, and abandoning the non-motorized Italians to their fate. (They gallantly defended Rommel's retreat) Three months after El Alamein, by 13th February, and following several rearguard battles, the last Axis soldiers retreated out of Libya. The 8th Army had pursued them 1,400 miles, without any railway to move material, and with every supply port en route wrecked and unusable. How many of Rommel's vaunted Afrika Korps are left? According to Matthew Cooper's 1978 book *The German Army 1933-1945, Its Political and Military Failure.* just 5,000 made it out of Libya. Quote *"When the Panzerarmee arrived, the Afrika Korps had only 5,000 men, 35 tanks, 16 armoured cars, 12 anti-tank guns, 12 field howitzers"* That's 111,000 out of 116,000 men of the Africa Korps (& Italian allies) either killed, captured or evacuated as wounded from Libya. An entire fresh Axis army of some 350,000 - 400,000 reinforcements was then diverted from Europe (or Russia) and sent to Tunisia

[@Desertrats43]

My grandad was a gunner in the 8th army he would tell stories how hot it was and the biting incects

[@Desertrats43]

My grandad was to a gunner in the 8th army to and to use tell about the biting centerpides

[@stephengriffin8509]

Get Neill Barr on please. He does little in the media but Pendulum is the standard in my opinion

[@WW2TV]

I tried - no reply to my e-mails

[@madcat3525]

I like someone to do a through book on the Gazala line battles.

[@lollypop333100]

very intresting as always but i guess we are still victims of the great Rommel Myth...certainly many things were wrong in the Eight Army like the rivalry of regiments and the social class system of the British but it's strange that there's still not research about the misconceptions in the Afrika Korps...maybe Rommel was lucky that the Waffen-SS didn't participate in the North African campaign because that would have been a rivalry and power struggle...but i learn much today about the Eight Army...splendid!

[@WW2TV]

You're right, and I wish I had found someone to "take apart" the Afrika Korps in the same way

[@kingscarbine]

What are the best North Africa Campaign books available? I´m mostly interested in the early period up until El Alamein +/-.

[@WW2TV]

Well obviously James Colvin's and Niall Barr's is good too

[@lllordllloyd]

I mainly study the Great War, and I find this campaign greatly reflects events on the Western Front. The 'learning curve' historians (Haig and Brit generals were good peofessional men, big losses inevitable, they were always learning/improving) seem to sweep aside the corrosive effects of c lass, cronyism, regimental and arm of service chauvinism. By 1940, the hard-won lesson of 1918 were entirely lost and had to be learned anew. It's a cliché Auchinlek was a "bad picker of men", but who to pick? Why so few even vaguely competent subordinates? And Gott, argued here to have been unable to think or fight properly, would have led 8th Army instead of Montgomery, but for a plane crash. Now, THERE'S a historical "what if" for you...

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@lllordllloyd For able subordinates you had Horrocks and Pip Roberts, yet Auchinleck chose Lumsden and Neil Ritchie and what did they end up doing? Oh yeah charging tanks unsupported into German flak guns....🤦‍♂

[@lllordllloyd]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Horrocks was okay but IIRC arrived mid '42. Roberts the exception, a young talent of the kind held back in peacetime in favour of cavalry meatheads. Again, Auk had to choose from limited options and he probably chose the best based on their resumes. But he faced a system that had promoted mediocrity for decades. Interesting Roberts relegated to minor roles in France, despite being far better and more experienced than other armoured div commanders. If they'd used 11th instead of Guards in Operation Market-Garden... ah, but the mediocre aristocrats of the Guards had to be the stars.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@lllordllloyd The Guards did make a quick run but were unfortunately halted when they could've moved on the Albert canal, Horrocks wanted to go on but I heard that Monty stopped him, possibly due to fuel issues.

[@lllordllloyd]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- M-G was probably not decided by the speed of XXX Corps, that is true. But Bluecoat showed the 11th to be far superior to the Guards, especially at command level. My basic point is the British Army oftens puts 'connections' ahead of effectiveness. They were far more a meritocracy 39-45 than 14-18, however.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@lllordllloyd Yes Bluecoat was a solid performance by Roberts, although as much stick as Monty gets, his plan was fairly imaginative, landing paratroopers to take the Rhur and outflanking the West wall.

[@MegaBloggs1]

My question to James is-if Malta had fallen in 1941 would the British stopped the Germans taking Alex and Suez-I think not

[@MegaBloggs1]

if the DAK had another panzer corps and sufficient logistics, the axis forces would have taken egypt

[@WW2TV]

Okay, but that's like saying "with another battalion of Paras at the bridge, the British would have held Arnhem". They didn't so....

[@MegaBloggs1]

@@WW2TV perhaps smiling albert should have stopped rommel at trobruk and forced him to accept more troops

[@MegaBloggs1]

@@WW2TV i know its a rabbit hole but the commander of the 82nd should have rushed the bridge at nimijgen on the 1st day(strange he didnt) he spent time and effort immediately post war defending why he didnt and 30corps was frightened by 1 sturmegeschutz half way to arnhem on the island -please ... the bottom line is where was the cab rank support???

[@johncraig9011]

I reckon the SA troops have been given a undeserved bad reputation by British military historians writing firstly as a mouthpiece of the humiliated British high command officers to shift attention away from their very poor handling of the 8th army and to put the blame on the Saffers. Even the British Armour, their performance was not good at times, although I got much respect for the British tank crews, the high command must take the blame. Now days military historians are repeating the same. Take the fall of Tobruk in 1942, between Churchill and the British high command, they threw the 2nd SA div. under the bus, and then they blamed the Saffers! Unbelievable! The British high command ordered the port to be evacuated, only to change and order the port to be held! at the 11th hour.!

[@OldWolflad]

I don't see much criticism of the South Africans, 1st infantry Division were excellent, and yes the decision to suddenly retain Tobruk having already stated clearly that it would not be redefended was criminal. There were no anti-tank minefields, and defences were substandard. The British and South African divisions present were not experienced divisions admittedly, but the Australians and New Zealanders thereafter blamed the British and South Africans for letting it fall, having themselves fought so hard not to let it fall. But the circumstances and defences were entirely different.

[@johncraig9011]

@@OldWolflad No, not officially (blaming the SA troops), the Poms are too diplomatic for that, old chap, but very much implied throughout the volume of writings of British military historians on the said subject through the decades. I mean did you listen to what Mr. Colvin said about the SA troops, with all respect said to you.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Nicholas Moss, And the Axis taking Tobruk in 1942 hardly mattered in the grand scheme of things. It was too late by then. It may have made a huge difference in 1941 but by 1942 it didn't.

[@OldWolflad]

@@johncraig9011 I heard what this chap said about the South African troops “good”, just the Commander. I’ve rarely read books where historians blame the South Africans for the surrender of Tobruk. As this guest and book publicist pointed out - nearly all the problems originated from senior British command.